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THE
METHODIST
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

1847.

EDITED BY GEORGE PECK, D. D.

VOLUME XXIX.

THIRD SERIES, VOLUME VII.

29
3 Series
7
1847

New-York:

PUBLISHED BY LANE & TIPPETT,

FOR THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, 200 MULBERRY-STREET.

JOSEPH LONGKING, PRINTER.

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
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CONTENTS.

CONTENTS OF JANUARY NUMBER.

ART.	Page
I. Stuart on the Apocalypse	5
II. Bacon's Philosophy	22
III. Popular Prejudices	53
IV. Evangelical Homiletics	63
V. Reply to Rev. T. M. Hopkins on Jasher	82
VI. Franklin's Discoveries in Electricity	101
VII. Biblical Exegesis	120
VIII. Christian Alliance	151
IX. Critical Notices	161
1. Pickering's Greek Lexicon; 2. Worcester's Universal and Critical Dictionary of the English Language; 3. Gesenius's Hebrew Grammar; 4. Etchings of a Whaling Cruise; 5. Curry's Life of John Wicliff; 6. Chase's Recollections of the Past; 7. Hoyt's Observations on Congregationalism and Methodism; 8. Hackley's Treatise on Algebra.	

CONTENTS OF APRIL NUMBER.

I. Phrenology and Revelation	165
II. Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation	194
III. Von Raumer's America and the Americans	211
IV. Greek Lexicography	240
V. Hackley's Algebra	257
VI. Missions and Methodism	269
VII. Life and Correspondence of John Foster	308
VIII. Critical Notices	318
1. Walton on the Witness of the Spirit; 2. Kingsley on the Resurrection; 3. Barth's General History; 4. Aydelott on Denominational Divisions; 5. Chambers' Cyclopædia of English Literature; 6. Baldwin's Pronouncing Gazetteer; 7. Hooper's Physician's Vade-Mecum; 8. Use of the Body in Relation to the Mind; 9. Galt on Insanity; 10. Thompson's Philosophy of Magic; 11. Farmer's Library—Monthly Journal of Agriculture; 12. Sermons of Christmas Evans; 13. Pictorial History of England; 14. Thirty Years' War; 15. Eclectic Moral Philosophy; 16. Statesmen of the Commonwealth of England; 17. Christian's Daily Treasury; 18. Scripture School Reader; 19. Mahan's True Believer; 20. Salkeld's Classical Antiquities; 21. Mattison on the Trinity; 22. Pre-Adamite Earth; 23. Noyse's Hebrew Reader	

CONTENTS OF JULY NUMBER.

ART.	Page
I. Dwight's Theology	325
II. The Christian Professor	338
III. Lord's Poems	357
IV. Dr. Beman on the Atonement	379
V. Le Verrier's Planet	393
VI. Atonement	414
VII. Chalmers' Natural Theology	434
VIII. Coles' Concordance	451
IX. Matters and Things in Europe	459
X. Critical Notices	480
1. Report of the Evangelical Alliance; 2. Schmitz's History of Rome; 3. Stevens' Essay on Church Polity; 4. Life and Writings of Wash- ington; 5. Constitutional History of England; 6. Russell's Juvenile Speaker; 7. Mattison's Astronomical Maps; 8. Filmore's Ecclesiastical Polity; 9. Discovery and Settlement of the Valley of the Mississippi; 10. Homes and Haunts of the British Poets; 11. Porter's True Evan- gelist; 12. Myrtis, with other Etchings and Sketchings; 13. Christian Love, by Rev. D. Wise.	

CONTENTS OF OCTOBER NUMBER.

I. Pictorial History of England	485
II. The British Poets	504
III. Nott's Lectures on Temperance	534
IV. Phrenology and Fact	557
V. Works of Rev. Robert M'Cheyne	589
VI. Matters and Things in Europe	607
VII. Critical Notices	630
1. Methodist Episcopal Pulpit; 2. Clark's Mental Discipline; 3. Com- fort's Exposition of the Articles of Religion; 4. Hill's Lectures in Di- vinity; 5. Tyler on the Sufferings of Christ; 6. Randall on the Science of Geology; 7. Selections from Chaucer; 8. Turnbull's Genius of Scot- land; 9. Schmitz's History of Rome; 10. Half-hours with the Best Au- thors; 11. Hackley's Geometry; 12. Harpers' New-York Class Book; 13. Louis the XIVth, by Miss Pardoe; 14. Life of Madame De Guyon; 15. The Protector, by Merle D'Aubigne; 16. Macdonald's Coming of the Lord; 17. Buchanan on the Office and Work of the Holy Spirit; 18. Mickle's Solitude Sweetened; 19. Riches of Grace; 20. Scripture Text Book and Treasury; 21. Schmitz's and Zeumpt's Classical Series; 22. Hackett's Hebrew Exercises; 23. The Karen Apostle; 24. Dwight's American Magazine.	

THE
METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1847.

EDITED BY GEORGE PECK, D.D.

ART. I.—*A Commentary on the Apocalypse.* By MOSES STUART, Prof. of Sacred Literature in the Theological Seminary at Andover, Mass. 2 vols. 8vo. Andover: Allen, Morrell & Wardwell. New-York: M. H. Newman. 1845.

We at length have a Commentary by an American scholar and divine on the Revelation of St. John; and a work of which we may be proud: a work which, while it does not despise the labors and opinions of its predecessors, is eminently original and sound. Moses Stuart, the author, has long since come to be considered a Coryphæus among Biblical scholars and interpreters, both in this country and in Europe. His commentaries on some of the most difficult portions of the Scriptures, as the Epistles of Paul to the Romans and to the Hebrews, have won for him an elevated rank as a commentator, on both sides of the Atlantic. The immense learning, fervent piety, and clear, sound sense of the author, peculiarly qualify him for the work of interpretation. The occasion and manner in which the work was composed are thus stated in the Preface:—

“When I began my official duties in my present station, I had no other knowledge of the book, than what the reading of Bishop Newton on the Prophecies, and of others who were of the like cast, had imparted to me. The classes of pupils under my instruction soon began to importune me to give them some information respecting the Apocalypse. I commenced the study of it with a design to comply with their request. I soon found myself, however, in pursuing the way of regular interpretation, as applied to other books of Scripture, completely hedged in; and I felt, at the same time, that to pursue my former method of interpreting the book, would cast me inevitably upon the boundless ocean of mere *conjectural* exposition. I frankly told my pupils, therefore, that I knew nothing respecting the book which could profit them,

VOL. VII.—1

and that I could not attempt to lecture upon it. After still further examination, I came to a resolution not to attempt the exegesis of the Apocalypse until a period of ten years had elapsed, which should be devoted, so far as my other duties would permit, to the study of the Hebrew prophets. I kept my resolution. After this period had passed, I began, with much caution, to say a few things in the lecture-room respecting the book in question. Every three years, these lectures, such as they were, I repeated, with some additions and alterations. In process of time I began to go through the whole book. This I have done several times; and the present work is the result of these often-repeated and long-continued labors."—P. 5.

Prof. Stuart sets out with the proposition that this book has one great object in view,—and that is to declare the final victory of the church over all her foes, the triumph of Christ, and the glorious establishment of his kingdom here in the earth. It is maintained that this is discernible by even common and ordinary readers, and still further, that we cannot suppose the revelator wrote a series of unintelligible symbols, but that the book really was *intelligible* to all well-informed readers of the seven churches of Asia, to whom it was immediately addressed. That the book is substantially the same in form and manner with other prophecies, as those of Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, and Zechariah. The import of their prophecies was understood by the well-informed Hebrew converts scattered through the churches of Asia Minor, and that these could have explained it to others. The *Paradise Lost* of Milton is intelligible and read with interest by common readers, but there are some things, as its frequent classical allusions, which only well-informed readers would comprehend. So with the Revelation; by the common spiritual Christian it may be read with interest and profit, though the prophetic images and symbols, and striking orientalisms, may be understood only by the reader well-instructed in the Old Testament Scriptures. In illustration and confirmation of this position, follows an elaborate section on the similarity of the Apocalypse with other Scriptural prophecies. There is only a general, not a minute, resemblance as to *form* and *method* between the Apocalypse and the Old Testament prophecies. The same general theme is observable, viz.: "The final and universal triumph of truth and holiness over error and sin." In many a passage of the Old Testament and of the New, we find the *kernel* or *nucleus* of the Revelation. The chief difference is, that the Revelation is more extended and diffuse in its descriptions of the great struggle between the powers of sin and holiness. The Old Testament descriptions are rather simple statements of the great result—the glorious triumph of the gospel; while the Apocalypse gives us

the several stages of the triumph, the successive steps of victory. The revelator himself lived in the midst of the contest, "and powerful representation and vivid feeling might have been expected of him in circumstances like these."

Not only in the Scriptures, but also in heathen writers, do we find evident traces of this Scripture doctrine of the final reign of peace and happiness on earth. Who can read the fourth Eclogue of Virgil, and not be struck with the similarity of some of its sentiments to the Christian doctrine of the Messiah and his reign? Especially to the passage which begins thus:—

"Ultima Cumaei venit tam carminis aetas;
Magnus ab integro Saeclorum nascitur ordo."

Lactantius* and Constantine† the Great, together with some moderns, as Chandler, Whiston, Cudworth, and Lowth, have looked upon it as a genuine *Messianic* prediction. But we may go still further back than Virgil and the classics to find this idea of a general ἀνοικτὸς πᾶσις or restoration. We find it unequivocally in the Zend Avesta of Zoroaster, who flourished about the time of Darius Hystaspes, about the middle of the sixth century before Christ. In the theory‡ of Zoroaster sometimes good prevails and sometimes evil prevails during the four ages of the world, until finally the earth is to be burned up and purified, a new heaven and a new earth are to come forth from the conflagration of the old—the wicked will be punished in a dreadful manner, and the triumph of good will be complete. The similarity of this to some points of the Scripture doctrine will be readily observed by almost every reader.

The Bible presents us every variety of style, as might be expected from a book which deals in so great a variety of subjects. It is a book of history, a book of law, a book of *poetry*. It is didactic and prophetic, and reveals the secrets of the spiritual world. It is, therefore, in its style necessarily figurative and symbolical; for things spiritual can only be explained by things natural. The style of the later prophets, as Ezekiel, Daniel, and Zechariah, is more strikingly symbolical than Jeremiah and Isaiah. The Hebrew, like other languages, presents differences during the different ages in which it flourished. Many new words and some new grammatical forms were introduced, especially after the captivity. A great change was introduced, as Prof. Stuart ably argues, in regard to the prophetic style from and after the date of the Jewish

* Inst., vii, 24.

† Orat. ad Sanct. in Euseb. Vita Constant., c. xix.

‡ For a more particular description of the theory, see the work of Prof. Stuart.

captivity. The latter prophets are especially symbolical, while the earlier, as Isaiah and Jeremiah, are more simple and direct. "Ezekiel from beginning to end is almost an unbroken series of symbolical representation." The Book of Daniel is, if we except a little of it which is occupied with historic narrative, *nothing but symbol* from beginning to end. The same is substantially true of Zechariah. From these facts we are disposed to accord with the professor, that there was a great change in and after the captivity in the prophetic style, induced, probably, by a change in the tastes and habits of their readers, who had imbibed, by their eastern sojourn in Babylonia, Persia, and Media, a love for the peculiar imagery and symbolic style of those countries.

The conclusion is finally arrived at, that *the taste and manner of the Apocalypse are the taste and manner of the Hebrew prophets, and of the age in which John himself lived.*

If it be objected, that the Saviour himself and the apostle Paul did not employ the symbolic method in their predictions, the author answers, "That the *prophetic* declarations of both are exceedingly brief, rarely comprising more than a few sentences, and in declarations of such a character there is not room for composition of such a nature as John exhibits." Besides, it may be said the *parables* and *similitudes* of our Saviour, together with the description of his coming to punish the Jews, in Matt. xxiv, is a very similar mode of writing to the *symbol* of the Apocalypse.

But now arises a question of much interest:—Are there other writings contemporaneous with the Apocalypse, which show a like taste and mode of composition? We answer, There are many writings of this character belonging to the first century, both of heathen, Jewish, and Christian origin, which are now extant, and many others which, during the long night of ignorance in the dark ages, have probably perished irrecoverably; and their titles are only known to us from the works of ancient writers, whose productions have been more fortunate in being preserved till the present day. A catalogue is given, together with what is known of them severally, by our author. For the information of our readers, who may not have the work, we subjoin the titles in a note below.*

* The following is a list of the apocryphal Apocalypses which are not known to be now extant. (1) The Apocalypse of Elijah. (2) The Apocalypse of Zephaniah. (3) The Apocalypse of Zechariah. (4) The Apocalypse of Adam. (5) The Apocalypse of Abraham. (6) The Apocalypse of Moses. (7) The Prophecies of Hystaspes. (8) The Apocalypse of Peter. (9) The Apocalypse of Paul. (10) Revelations of Cerinthus. (11) The Apocalypse of St. Thomas. (12) The Apocalypse of Stephen the Martyr.

The apocryphal revelations still extant are as follows. 1. The Ascension of Isaiah the prophet. 2. The Book of Enoch. 3. The Fourth Book of Ezra. 4. The Sybilline Oracles. 5. The Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs. 6. The Shepherd of Hermas. 7. The Apocryphal Apocalypse of John. A long and elaborate synopsis, in all comprising near one hundred pages, is given of each of these works; and many passages are quoted of much interest and instruction, as to the peculiarly symbolical style which prevails in these writings, often, it must be acknowledged, very similar to that of the Apocalypse of John. In this synopsis Prof. Stuart has rendered a most acceptable service to the theological public. Of these works, some of which have never been translated into our language, and none of which we believe have been published in this country, very little has been known among us. And though the discussion of them seems to occupy a very large space in the Introduction to the Commentary, yet we feel very grateful to the professor for so large an amount of information concerning these rare productions. Many new and striking illustrations are brought forward of many passages in the Revelation, and the same oriental and highly figurative and symbolical style abounds in these works, which clearly sustains the position that *the taste and manner of the Apocalypse are the taste and manner of the age in which John lived*. With these remarks we must leave the subject of these apocryphal writings, and consider some things in the form and arrangement of the Apocalypse.

The first peculiarity in the form and arrangement of the Apocalypse is what Prof. Stuart calls its *numerosity*; that is, "the Apocalypse throughout, with scarcely any exception, is so arranged, that either the number 3, or else 7, 4, 10, and 12, control its modes of development, that is, the arrangement of its parts, greater and smaller,—the grouping of its objects, the assignment of attributes to them, the expegetical clauses, and the order of action, main and subordinate. Above all the number THREE stands conspicuous in the whole plan, in all its parts, considerable or minute. Next to this stands the so-called sacred number *seven*, then *four*, then *twelve*, and lastly *ten*."

As a specimen of the trichotomy, or tripartite divisions and groups in the Apocalypse, we will quote the first leading divisions of this nature as presented by Prof. Stuart. The book is thus divided:—

"(1.) (a) The prologue, chap. i-iii. (b) The visions, or main body of the work, iv-xxii, 5. (c) The epilogue, xxii, 6-21. Each of these divisions exhibits trichotomy, moreover, in all its gradations throughout its appropriate subdivisions.

"(2.) THE PROLOGUE.—After the title of the book, (which is joined with a brief historical reference to its author, and a commendation to the notice and study of the reader,) follows, (a) The dedication of the work to the seven churches of Asia, i, 4-8. (b) The christophany, or manifestation of Jesus to John, i, 9-20. (c) The Epistles to the Seven Churches.

"The portions *a* and *b* are too short and too terse with descriptive matter to permit of subdivision; but not so with the epistles. Each of the latter is divided into three parts: (a) A description of him who addresses the churches, by the mention of some of his attributes, ii, 1; ii, 8; ii, 12; ii, 18; iii, 1; iii, 7; iii, 14. (b) Disclosure of the characteristics of each church, with appropriate admonition or reproof; (in the sequel to each of the preceding texts quoted.) (c) Each epistle closes with excitement to obedience, rendered more urgent and efficacious by promises of reward, or by threatenings. In these respects there is an entire uniformity through the whole of the epistles.

"(3.) THE VISIONS.—On these (iv-xxii, 5) there are three great *catastrophes*, to which all else has reference and is adjusted. (a) That of Sodom *spiritually* so called, that is, 'the place where our Lord was crucified,' or Jerusalem, (xi, 8,) comprising chap. iv-xi. (b) That of mystic Babylon (Rome,) chap. xii-xx, 3. (c) That of Gog and Magog, chap. xx, 4-10. Each of these catastrophes has a prologue or proem: (a) chap. iv, v; (b) chap. xii; (c) chap. xx, 4-7. Where the thousand years and the end of them stand as introductory to the loosing of Satan."—Vol. i, p. 131 et seq.

This subject has been almost entirely overlooked by writers on the Apocalypse, except Ewald and Züllig. These writers, however, have done but little on the subject; and Prof. Stuart claims that his developments and conclusions are altogether his own, discovered by a long-continued and oft-repeated study of the book. To one whose attention has not been drawn to this subject, there will be much in this that is new and surprising. The trichotomies seem to reign everywhere, in almost every chapter and section. So far is this numerosity carried, that it verges almost to the cabbalism of the Jewish rabbies; and one feels, in the developments of this matter by Prof. Stuart, that there was really some foundation for their numbering propensity. Prof. Stuart himself has felt this, and forthwith defends the Apocalypse from any fancies of this kind.

But is there anything like this in any other part of the Scriptures? Prof. Stuart contends that there is; and that the Book of Job especially exhibits many of these trichotomies. And this, indeed, would be natural, for as Job is the epic of the Old Testament, and the only one, so is the Apocalypse the epic, and the only one, of the New. A part of the first paragraph, in which the proof of this is exhibited, we deem of sufficient importance to quote.

"The first grand division of it is into (a) Prologue. (b) The poem proper. (c) Epilogue. Then (i) The prologue is subdivided into accounts, (a) Of Job's prosperity. (b) Of his losses. (c) Of his sickness and trials. Then (ii) the poem proper is divided into three leading parts: (a) The dispute of Job with his friends. (b) The address of Elihu, who proffers himself as umpire. (c) The closing address of Jehovah. Next as to subordinate *triplicities*, we are presented with three friends who come to console Job, &c. * * * The epilogue closes the piece, which consists (a) Of Job's justification. (b) Of his reconciliation with his friends. (c) Of his final prosperity."—Vol. i, p. 140.

So, also, there are many instances in the New Testament of triplicity; but for the examples we must refer the reader to the work itself. We might find fault with some of the *triplicities* quoted by Prof. Stuart, but the great mass of them must be admitted. They are so on the surface of the composition, and appear evident to the most casual reader. For the examination of the heptades and groups of four and twelve, we must refer the reader to the work itself.

Nor is this numerosity a mere matter of style, especially the trichotomy part of it. Important results depend upon it in the criticism and elucidation of the book. It settles the question in Prof. Stuart's mind, whether there is more than one catastrophe in the book.

He thus presents it:—

"This is a great question. It decides, moreover, in regard to subordinate parts of the book which are of the like tenor, how far they extend, and in many cases whether they sustain a near relation to each other. It extends itself to the interpunction of many passages, deciding how the writer grouped them in his own mind, and how we also should group them, and consequently how we should distribute the interpunction; e. g. in xii, 18, the usual printing is thus: δοῦναι μισθὸν τοῖς δουλοῖς σου, τοῖς προφήταις καὶ τοῖς ἁγίοις καὶ τοῖς φοβουμένοις τὸ ὄνομα σου, τοῖς μικροῖς καὶ τοῖς μεγάλαις. This is plainly wrong. There are two groups of three each; the first is the generic τοῖς δουλοῖς σου, with the expegetical or specific προφήταις and ἁγίοις; the second is the generic τοῖς φοβουμένοις, (corresponding plainly to τοῖς δουλοῖς σου,) followed by the specific μικροῖς and μεγάλοις. And so of not a few other places in the book. In fact, the hasty reader, and even any one who does not enter minutely upon the examination of the book, can scarcely conjecture how much the smaller points of interpretation, as well as not a few of the larger, are affected by the numerosity of the book."—Vol. i, p. 149.

Thus far we have gone along with Prof. Stuart without finding any serious occasion for differing from him. But we find some views advanced in the tenth section, which we do not feel at liberty to pass over without strong animadversion. He has advanced,

though, it must be confessed, in a very cautious manner, some views on the subject of the *inspiration* of the sacred writers, which we believe are far from being true and Scriptural. We are compelled to believe that this venerable teacher in Israel has advocated loose views on this all-important subject, and we feel compelled to withstand him, notwithstanding the great respect we have for his powers and attainments.

The doctrine of a verbal inspiration of the sacred writings we had supposed was the doctrine of all orthodox divines, and the doctrine which has been generally received in the evangelical churches, and that not the thoughts only were inspired, but the *writing*; that the sacred writers were not merely in an inspired *state*, but were *moved* and *excited to action* in writing by the Holy Ghost. 2 Peter i, 21. But such does not seem to be the view of Prof. Stuart. He asserts that inspiration is a *state* and not an *act*. And that the reader may see we do not join on a false issue with the professor, we will quote his own statements.

"The result of all my researches into the nature of inspiration is a full belief that its influence is rather to be considered as resulting in a *state* than in an *act*. What I mean, is, that by inspiration the state or condition of him who is the subject of it is affected; his mind is enlightened respecting things proper to be said, of which he was before totally or partially ignorant; his views and affections are elevated; his powers of mind are in a degree quickened and heightened; things sensual, and deluding, and degrading, recede, and for the time being cease to annoy him; and his judgment, as to what he is to communicate, becomes not only more discerning, but more sound and safe. The *inspired* John, for example, is the same individual as the *uninspired* John, and retains all the innocent peculiarities of his character and habits; but the inspired John is elevated, enlightened, quickened, keen of discernment, even to such a degree that future things can be seen from his elevated condition; and he is so guided by all the combinations of influence upon him, that he will communicate nothing but truth. Were I to choose a simile for illustration, I should say that the inspired man ascends an intellectual and moral eminence, so high that his prospect widens almost without bounds, and what is altogether hidden from ordinary men is more or less distinctly within his view."—Vol. i, p. 107.

Here we have the views of this venerable teacher and expounder of God's word in respect to the theopneusty, or divine inspiration, of the Holy Scriptures. We read the extract above, together with several pages which follow, with mingled feelings of surprise and regret. The paragraphs on this subject are written with much caution, and we feared, on the first reading, that our impressions of his doctrine might be erroneous. But on carefully re-reading

what he has written on this subject, our impressions became still stronger that Prof. Stuart gives up the doctrine of a *verbal inspiration*; and even scarcely admits that which is technically called the *inspiration of illumination*. The professor says, "the inspired man ascends an intellectual and moral (?) eminence;" not that he is taught by the Spirit of God, but he is elevated in respect to his understanding, and improved in respect to his moral powers. Inspiration is a "*state*" of the sacred writer's soul, and not the "*act*" of the Holy Spirit. The "inspired writer is not the mere *passive* instrument of the Spirit of God," so as to write "what is dictated to him *verbatim et literatim*." The office of the Spirit of God is not so much to teach man what to write, as to elevate his soul, so as to prepare him to write the truth.

With Prof. Stuart *truth* seems to be that which is inspired, and not the *words* and *costume* of the sacred writers. For an illustration of his views he refers to the eighteenth Psalm for an example. He remarks:—

"If we peruse attentively the eighteenth Psalm, we shall soon see that the picture there given of the descent of the divine Majesty, of his bowing the heavens, shaking the earth, riding upon a cherub, surrounding himself with dark clouds, and lightning, and thunder, scattering the enemies of David by hailstones and coals of fire, laying bare the deepest abysses of the sea, and drawing the chosen king out of many waters—that all this is plainly *costume*. The simple truth that lies under all these symbols, is, that God appeared for David, that is, manifested his favor toward him, oftentimes and in an extraordinary manner, and delivered him from enemies and persecutors. No one who well understands the nature of poetry and the use of symbols will object to this view; and surely no one can regard all this as in any measure derogatory to the dignity and truthfulness of the sacred writings."—Vol. i, p. 170.

He proceeds now to apply these views to the Apocalypse, and asks the following questions, which, it is evident in the professor's mind, should be answered in the affirmative:—

"Is the Apocalypse now only a more protracted series of symbols, which are of the like nature? Are the visions themselves and all the objects of them merely the drapery thrown around the body of truth that lies within? Do all these things depend merely on the judgment and imagination of the writer, as to the manner in which he should develop the views which he entertained?"—Vol. i, p. 170

"All these things," that is, the symbols and the visions, and of course the language in which they are conveyed,—"*all these things depend merely on the judgment and imagination of the writer.*" Let it be remarked, he says they depend *merely* on the *judgment* and *imagination* of the writer. This we conceive to be next door

to a total denial of the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures,—or of the inspiration of them in a proper sense. “It is enough,” says the professor, “that he (the sacred writer) is guarded from error, and that truths beyond his natural powers are impressed upon his mind.” And even then, when the sacred writer would reveal “truths beyond his natural powers,” he only “ascends an intellectual and moral eminence.” By what means this is done we are not distinctly informed.

To say the least of these views of inspiration by Prof. Stuart, they are exceedingly loose, and in our opinion decidedly dangerous. This is not the time for us who love and reverence the Bible as the word of God, to give an uncertain sound on this subject.

There is a numerous class of persons who are mostly made up of German theologians, (we might better say, perhaps, German *Neologians*,) such as Schleiermacher, Dewette, and many others, both of Germany and of this country, who reject all miraculous inspiration, and attribute to the sacred writers what Cicero attributes to the poets; *afflatum spiritus divini*, “a divine action of nature, an interior power like the other vital forces of nature.” Prof. Stuart does not belong to this class, but seems to approach nearer to those who hold to the inspiration of *superintendence* and *elevation*, where the thoughts of the writers are preserved from error, while their language is altogether human.

It is to this latter view that we must earnestly object. In regard to the other view referred to above, though we consider it altogether erroneous, we do not consider it important at present to travel out of our way to refute it. We have to do especially at present with the author of the Commentary on the Apocalypse. That his views are wrong on this subject we as fully believe as we believe those of Dewette and Schleiermacher are wrong; and wrong at this point, that he does not admit a full, a plenary inspiration of the very words and imagery, as well as the thoughts, of the sacred writers.

In confirmation of this doctrine of inspiration we need only refer to a few plain passages of the Scriptures themselves. In 2 Peter i, 21, it is said, *The prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost*. By “prophecy in old time,” is meant the Old Testament Scriptures. These (*οἱ ποτε*) never came by the will of man,—man’s will had nothing to do in originating them; neither were they written by man’s will, but holy men of God *spake* as they were *moved* by the Holy Ghost. That is, holy men even uttered the words of their prophecy as they *were moved* (*φερομενοι*, being borne

along, as a vessel is moved or borne on the waters by the wind) by the Holy Ghost. Here is involved not only verbal inspiration, but also *passivity* in him who is inspired; both of which ideas Prof. Stuart does not seem to admit.

Again, in the Second Epistle to Timothy iii, 16, the apostle Paul declares that "all Scripture," *Πᾶσα γραφή*, all the sacred writing is, *θεοπνευστος*, by divine inspiration. But how can the *writing* be said to be by divine inspiration, if the words are not inspired as well as the thoughts? It is for this reason that the sacred writings are called *αἱ γραφαί*, the *Scriptures*, by way of eminence, because the very *writing* is given of God. But if this passage be not thought perfectly conclusive, we would adduce the declaration of the apostle Paul to the Corinthians, ii, 13: "*Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth; but which the Holy Ghost teacheth.*" Thus we find, remarks Mr. Watson, that the claim which the sacred writers make on this subject is, that they were in truth what they have been aptly called, "the penmen of the Holy Ghost;" and that the words, in which they clothed "the wisdom given unto them," were "words taught" by the Holy Spirit.

Prof. Stuart also objects to *passivity* in the inspired writer. It is not necessary to suppose that the sacred writers were always, or even generally, passive in their prophetic communications; but as a fact, it appears to have been the case sometimes. Job tells us "*he uttered what he understood not.*" Job xlii, 3. Daniel also tells us, that when he wrote his last pages he did not himself know what the Spirit had caused him to write. Dan. xii, 8, 9. When Caiaphas uttered his prophecy, it is said, "*He spake not of himself,*" that is, he was a passive instrument in the hand of God, having neither the knowledge nor understanding of what God made him speak. John xi, 51. When Balaam went three times to the summit of the rock to curse Israel; and three times words of blessing proceeded from his lips in spite of himself, "*because the Most High had met him and put these words in his mouth.*" Num. xvi, 16. The language of the prophets, "The hand of the Lord was strong upon me," Ezek. iii, 14; "I was carried out in the Spirit of the Lord," Ezek. xxxvii, 1; "and I was carried away in the Spirit," Rev. xvii, 3; are phrases which show the power of the Spirit, and the comparative weakness of the prophet in moments of inspiration. Mr. Watson judiciously remarks, that "the same force of inspiration, so to speak, was not probably exerted upon each of the sacred writers, or upon the same writer throughout his writings, whatever might be its subject. There is no necessity that

we should so state the case in order to maintain what is essential to our faith,—the plenary inspiration of each of the sacred writers. It is sufficient that every thought and every word be communicated under the influence and direction of the all-wise Spirit.”

That this is, and ever has been, the doctrine of the orthodox body of the church in every age may be clearly proved. Our limits, however, will not permit us to enter upon this extensive field of investigation. We must content ourself to refer the reader to a late admirable work on the theopneusty of the Holy Scriptures, by S. R. L. Gaussen, professor of theology in Geneva, which was ably reviewed in a late number of this Quarterly, for full satisfaction on this interesting subject.*

If these views, expressed above, be correct, we must conclude that our learned and excellent author of the Commentary on the Apocalypse has wandered to some length from the true doctrine on the subject of the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. In a late work on the Old Testament Canon, Professor Stuart has labored to show that some of the inspired books have been lost. His low views of inspiration may serve to account for so extraordinary an hypothesis. On some future occasion we intend, Providence permitting, to enter upon an examination of this last-named work. At present it would be drawing us too far from the original object of this paper.

The principles of interpretation, as laid down by Prof. Stuart as applicable to the Apocalypse, we believe, are the only true ones. He very ably shows the folly of those interpreters who would make the images and symbols of this book a mere syllabus of civil history. “John was no chronicler of *civil* events. He was no sooth-sayer like those of Delos and Delphos. Such things, and such only, as relate to the *spiritual* welfare and prosperity of the church are the objects of his prophetic vision.” Some writers on the thirteenth chapter of the Apocalypse have seen in the first beast the city of Rome, the pope and his adherents; and in the second beast the Church of England!

“But a multitude of expositors are not content with finding even minute *ecclesiastical* matters in the Apocalypse. They must needs find profane as well as sacred history. The Goths, the Vandals, the Huns; petty kingdoms and states of remote ages; battles fought centuries after John was dead; local famine even, and pestilence, earthquakes,

* Theopneusty, or, the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, by S. R. L. Gaussen, professor of theology in Geneva. Translated by E. N. Kirk. New-York: John S. Taylor & Co., 115 Nassau-street.

droughts, volcanoes, tornadoes, and other evils, at divers times and places, are all to be found in the pages of the Revelation."—Vol. i, p. 204.

We agree with Prof. Stuart that no man of sober discretion, who has ever studied Hebrew prophecy, can give ear to such interpretations as these. An expositor, for example, finds in Rev. vi the description of a certain war or pestilence. What now is his reason for making his specific application? Is it not because he finds certain things in the Apocalyptic picture which might tally well with the subsequent events in question? But the difficulty with this is, that it might tally equally as well with any other war, or any other pestilence, as with that to which he applies it. The truth is, the Apocalypse is designed simply to encourage the church by the prophetic assurance that Christ shall eventually reign over all his foes; and these pictures and symbols declare this in a *generic*, rather than in a *specific*, way. Besides, it is one continuous and connected composition; and to suppose that John, in his brief description of the church's victories, should turn aside to note minor incidents in civil or natural history, which are only very remotely or in no respect connected with the great subject in hand, is plainly inconsistent.

The more we have studied, the more we are disposed to accord with the views of Prof. Stuart, that there are three catastrophes in this book. The first is the downfall of the Jewish persecuting power; the second is the downfall of the Romish persecuting power; and third, the downfall of Gentileism—of Gog and Magog, and Satan and his hosts. All that exalts and opposes itself against Christ must at length be destroyed. Now if the pope and his adherents resemble the beast and the false prophet, and oppose themselves to Christ and his cause, they must be overthrown. Or if any other power, whether civil or ecclesiastical, oppose itself to the progress of Christ's kingdom, the Lamb in his wrath shall trample them down,—*he shall dash them in pieces as a potter's vessel*. It is not necessary to suppose that the writer of the Apocalypse had the Romish hierarchy, or the English hierarchy, or any other, definitely before his mind when he wrote. Nor is it necessary to suppose that John, when he wrote, had distinctly before him any future civil occurrences, as the irruptions of the Goths, Vandals, and Huns, or the destruction of the Mohammedan empire. It was sufficient for the then afflicted and distressed churches of Asia and Europe to know, bleeding under the cruel wounds of that heartless and abominable tyrant, Nero, that the end of their sufferings would come, and that Christ, their prince, should reign victorious over all his foes.

The able and earnest reasoning of Prof. Stuart in support of the above theory must commend itself to every candid mind ; and we believe the time is not distant when an entire change will come in the views of Christian and theological writers in respect to the applications of the Apocalyptic prophecies.*

The question as to the time when the Apocalypse was written, is elaborated and discussed by Prof. Stuart with equal care and ability. Very much depends on the decision of this question. If it was written near the close of the apostle's life, after the destruction of the city of Jerusalem, which is the commonly received opinion, then Prof. Stuart's theory of the three catastrophes, viz., the downfall of the Jewish persecuting power, and of the Roman persecuting power, and of Gog and Magog, falls to the ground. If the work was written by the apostle after the destruction of the city of Jerusalem, then there could be no prophecy of that event ; and the prophecies, from chap. vi to chap. xiii, cannot refer to that event. Prof. Stuart maintains that the Apocalypse was among the earliest of John's writings, and that it was composed before the destruction of the city of Jerusalem, as it appears to us on good and substantial grounds. The evidence for both of these opinions is ably and fairly presented, and the conclusion is finally made up with great power, that John wrote the Apocalypse in the time of Nero, about the year of our Lord 68.

The fourth argument of Prof. Stuart, that this book was written in the reign of Nero, is so conclusive that we cannot forbear quoting it in part:—

“Rev. xvii professedly undertakes to explain the symbols of the beast, introduced at the commencement of the second catastrophe in the Apocalypse, chap. xiii, 1, seq. The last verse of this chapter leaves no room for mistake as to the application of the symbol. ‘The woman sitting upon the beast, means ‘the great city which hath dominion over the kings of the earth.’ When John wrote the Apocalypse, no city but Rome could be thought of as corresponding to this description. Besides, in ver. 9 the seven heads are said to symbolize ‘the seven hills on which the woman sitteth ;’ that is, the seven hills on which Rome was built, the *septicolis Roma* of the Latin writers. There is no room for mistake here. And as little room, it seems to me, is there for mistake in another part of the same explanatory chapter, viz., ver. 10. Here it is said, that the seven heads of the beast also symbolize *seven kings*, viz., of Rome. The writer proceeds : ‘Five are fallen ; one is ; the other has not yet come ; but when he shall come he shall remain but

* We would especially commend to the reader's consideration the twelfth section on the hermeneutical principles applicable to the Apocalypse, wherein the above view is maintained.

for a short time.' That the Roman emperors were usually styled βασιλεῖς by the Greeks, needs no proof. That the line or succession of *emperors* is here meant, and not the primitive kings of Rome, is certain from the connection of the five with the one *who is*, and the one *who is to come*. We have only to reckon then the succession of emperors, and we must arrive with certainty at the reign under which the Apocalypse was written. If we begin with Julius Cæsar it stands thus: Cæsar, Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius; these make up the five who have *fallen*. Of course the Apocalypse was written during the reign of Nero, who was the sixth."

The above argument is clear and conclusive. There are others quite as clear and convincing as the one above, that the Apocalypse was written in the time of Nero, as the testimonies of Epiphanius and Andreas, and the inscription to the Syriac version. Did our limits permit, we should be glad to give at least an abstract of them.

If the evidence is so conclusive, the reader will be ready to inquire, how happens it that the opinion is so common, that the Apocalypse was written near the close of the first century, and near the apostle John's death? This opinion seems to rest almost altogether on the supposed testimony of Irenæus, in *Hæres.*, v. 30, who lived at the close of the second century, and who is the first writer that we know of who has said anything expressly on the point before us. The testimony referred to is as follows: οὐδε γὰρ πρὸ πολλοῦ χρόνου εἰσάραθαι [ἡ Ἀποκάλυψις], ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας γενεᾶς, πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῆς Δομετιανίου ἀρχῆς; that is, "*the Apocalypse was seen not long ago, but almost in our generation, near the end of Domitian's reign.*" These words of Irenæus are cited verbatim by Eusebius, in his *Ecclesiastical History*, iii, 18, and v, 8, who flourished about one hundred years after Irenæus; and Jerome, who wrote about seventy years after Eusebius, has quoted his account, (in *Catal.* v,) and thus this supposed testimony, that John saw his vision in the reign of Domitian, has been handed down from writer to writer till Dr. Lardner, apparently without ever supposing that there might be any mistake in their understanding of Irenæus. But so it turns out;—or at least it is exceedingly probable, that the whole stream of Christian writers have misunderstood the testimony of Irenæus. It has been suggested recently by an acute German critic, Guericke, that when Irenæus says, "that when the Apocalypse was seen not long ago, but almost in our generation, πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῆς Δομετιανίου ἀρχῆς," that the adjective Δομετιανίου (for *adjective* it may be, says Prof. S., and if so, it is one which is *generis communis*, and not the proper name of Domitian,) belongs in accordance with the Greek formations to the

name *Domitius*, and not to Domitian, which would make an adjective of the form *Δομιτιανικός*. If it were a proper name, he says it should be written *τῶν Δομιτιανῶν*. Now Nero's name was *Domitius* Nero, and not Domitianus, which is the name of the latter emperor. It follows, of course, that Irenæus himself has testified to the fact, that the Apocalypse was written in the time of Domitius Nero. Prof. Stuart adds :—

“If he is right in his criticism on the word *Δομιτιανῶν*, past opinions in respect to it present one of the most singular cases of long-continued and oft-repeated philological error which has ever come to my knowledge.”

As to the time in which the Apocalypse was written, Mr. Benson says nothing; and Dr. Clarke, after quoting Dr. Lardner to some length, who advocates the common opinion, remarks :—“If the date could be settled, it would be of the utmost consequence to the right interpretation of the book; but amid so many conflicting opinions this is almost hopeless.” But Prof. Stuart in our opinion has set this matter quite at rest. On such a subject it may be impossible to attain to absolute certainty as to the year; yet that it was antecedent to the destruction of the city of Jerusalem seems altogether clear from the internal evidence, as adduced by Prof. Stuart.

The great labor of Prof. Stuart, in composing his Introduction and Commentary, cannot be too highly praised. He seems to have waded through all the Greek, Latin, and German literature which relates to the Apocalypse. He has attentively considered every objection which could be, or has been, advanced against his views. He answers, with great pains-taking and care, more than sixty objections against the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse, culled out of various German writers. As a specimen of his labor in answering these objections, we would quote the twenty-ninth on page 385, vol. i. Ewald objects that the apostle John was not the author of the Apocalypse, because *composite* verbs are much more frequent in his Gospel than in the Apocalypse. Prof. Stuart answers :—“I have been through *the whole Greek Concordance* in order to see whether this is correct; and find it to be so far from being so, that even the contrary position, viz., the Apocalypse makes the more frequent use of them, is nearer the truth.”

The twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh sections of the Introduction have been to us the most interesting and instructive parts of it. In these sections are presented a short historical account of the estimation in which this book has been held in different ages of the

church; also an historical sketch of its interpretation. These sections are written in Prof. Stuart's most lucid and spirited style, and, from his long attention to the Apocalyptic literature, he has brought together a mass of information here, which entitles him to the hearty thanks of every student and investigator of this most interesting portion of God's Word. We would gladly, did our limits permit, give the reader a synopsis of this part of the work. But as it is, we must be content to refer him to the work itself.

To prevent the establishment of error, as well as to sustain and propagate truth, is the solemn duty of every Christian writer. And when error comes indorsed by such a man as Prof. Stuart, it is the more dangerous and needs a more vigorous and caustic remedy. There is one more topic brought to view in the Introduction to the Commentary which seems to call for animadversion. He says, "What *moral* and *spiritual* edification is derivable from such portions of Scripture?" e. g., as the architectural directions for building the tabernacle, the minute details of rites and forms under the Levitical priesthood, &c. What, thought we, as we read the paragraph from which the above is taken, has this learned professor forgotten what God says by the apostle Paul to Timothy, that *all Scripture is profitable for doctrine*, &c.? But we were in some degree relieved, though not altogether, by an explanation on a succeeding page, where he admits that even such Scripture is profitable for doctrine, &c., in an indirect way. Our impression is, that Prof. Stuart yields too much oftentimes in his writings to the heterodox, the skeptic, and the infidel. He oftentimes gives too much place to the devil. Holy Scripture is too sacred and too precious to be given up or abandoned in one jot or tittle.

But so signal are the attainments of Prof. Stuart as a commentator, so earnest, so candid, so learned, and withal, in general so judicious, that we have regretted to mark anything as spots on the work on the Apocalypse, lest we should unduly diminish respect for it with the readers of this Review. We intended to take up several passages in the Commentary, and present our views at length on several controverted passages. We do not agree with Prof. Stuart in all these, especially on Rev. xx, 6. But in his main principles, in his views as to the general object of the book, — *the coming and completion of the kingdom of God*, in his view of the catastrophes, we go with him heart and soul. His work is the most candid, most clear, most learned, and altogether the most satisfactory of any on the Apocalypse we have ever read. We hope and believe it will put an end to those profane uses made of this sacred book by intelligent Christian ministers and

writers, in making it a syllabus of civil history. We consider this the *chef d'œuvre* of Prof. Stuart, an honor to him; and that it will prove an honor and blessing to the church of God in this land and throughout the world. We would it might be in the hands of every intelligent layman, and of every minister—and especially of every *young* minister—in the land.

Pine Plains, N. Y., Oct. 10, 1846.

ART. II.—1. *The Works of Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Alban, and Lord High Chancellor of England.*

2. *Life of Sir Isaac Newton.* By Sir DAVID BREWSTER.

3. *Macauley's Miscellanies; Art. Lord Bacon.* [Edinburgh Review. 1837.]

THE name of Bacon marks an era of light in the history of science. He did not introduce, it is true, the great revolution which has taken place in the state of human knowledge; but he alone fully comprehended it. If he did not begin that revolution, he imparted the true aim and direction to its resistless energies. He, above all other men, felt its mighty impulse; and, by still mightier impulses of his own, he extended and deepened its influence. This impulse became, in his mind, something more than a dark feeling and sense of want; it became a rational and enduring conviction, giving rise to a hope too great and too firm to be shaken. He saw that the most magnificent anticipations of the human mind might be realized; nay, he comprehended and pointed out the precise method in which they would be realized. All the honors justly due to the immortal labors of his predecessors can, therefore, detract nothing from the glory of Bacon. Some of his predecessors are worthy of our veneration and gratitude; but yet he has been generally, and we believe very justly, regarded as the great restorer of true learning and science.

It is a great advantage of those who have made discoveries in the mathematics, or in the physical sciences, that the extent of their services can be accurately measured and universally appreciated; while the services of those who have labored to improve philosophy, which is the science of the sciences, are continually open to cavil and objection. Accordingly, the fashion has been set, of late, to depreciate the lofty pretensions of the Baconian philosophy; and it remains to be seen whether or not it will be extensively followed. We can no longer say with Dugald Stewart, that "the merits of

Bacon, as the father of experimental philosophy, are so universally acknowledged, it is superfluous to notice them." But, after all, though the remark of Aristotle, that philosophies seem destined to rise and set like the stars, may be true in general, we have no serious fear it will ever prove true in regard to the philosophy of Bacon. The unexpected opposition, however, which has been raised to this philosophy, proceeding, as it does, from authors of undoubted learning and ability, is worthy of a respectful consideration. This we shall accordingly bestow upon it, in the survey which we are about to take of the commentators and critics of the Baconian philosophy.

David Hume is the most distinguished of those philosophers who have exerted their ingenuity to lessen the splendor of Bacon's reputation. He has ventured to express the opinion, that, as a philosopher, Bacon was "inferior to his contemporary Galileo, perhaps even to Kepler." It is not our intention at present to dwell upon the peculiarities of Bacon's genius, or endeavor to show wherein he greatly excelled all other men; for we are now concerned only with his commentators and critics. Hence we shall confine our vindication of his fame against the unfavorable judgments of his critics to an examination of the reasons on which these judgments are founded. We may very easily dispose of the reasons assigned by Mr. Hume. "The Englishman," says he, "was ignorant of geometry; the Florentine revived that science, and excelled in it." This is true; but geometry, however important as a branch of science, is only one element in the character of a philosopher. Tried by this test, both Galileo and Hume would have to give place to their inferiors in philosophy. Descartes was superior to the former as a geometer; and almost any geometer is superior to the latter. The position of philosophers cannot be determined by their attainments in the mathematics. Neither Plato nor Aristotle could extract the cube root of numbers, and yet they were greater philosophers than Mr. Pike.

It is also alledged, that Galileo not only pointed out the road to philosophy, but made, himself, considerable advances in it. But it should be remembered, that Galileo pointed out the road to philosophy only by a finger-board placed at the entrance upon it; whereas Bacon mapped out this road from beginning to end. And, besides, he indicated the many by-paths which had led all his predecessors astray, and the many pit-falls in which thousands had perished. He showed how the dangers of the road might be shunned, and its difficulties overcome; and, above all, he animated the world with hope, by revealing, in the clear sunlight of his own

prophetic genius, the inexhaustible treasures to which it would inevitably conduct the traveler. If Galileo made considerable discoveries in one branch of science, Bacon generalized the process by which he made them, before he knew what his great cotemporary had done, and showed how discoveries might be made in all sciences. The navigator who pursues the right course to discover, and actually discovers, a single island, deserves well of mankind. But still greater honor is due to the man who confidently points out the region in which vast continents may be found, and induces mankind to give credit to his apparently wild prediction, though they should not be really discovered until long after his death. Though Columbus had never touched upon the shores of America, yet the grand conception which always occupied his mind, and the almost supernatural confidence with which he never ceased to proclaim it, would have conferred a far greater benefit on mankind than was ever derived from any other navigator of the seas. Bacon was the Columbus of modern science; and his visions, as magnificent as those of his great prototype, and as confidently proclaimed to a narrow-minded and unbelieving world, have been as fully and as triumphantly realized.

We admit that Bacon rejected the Copernican system, and that Galileo was one of its most powerful advocates; but it is not true that he rejected it "with the most positive disdain." This coloring is given to the position of Bacon, we suppose, from Mr. Hume's passion for artistic effect; it certainly has no foundation in truth. The opinion of Copernicus, said Bacon, touching the rotation of the earth, "*is not repugnant* to any of the phenomena." The opposite system, said he, "*at present*, appears to us the truer *hypothesis*."* His rejection of the Copernican theory was not, as has been commonly supposed, founded on a vulgar prejudice; he withheld his assent, not because he was a narrow-minded "bigot of common sense," but because he believed there was not, at that time, sufficient evidence to establish a rational conviction. Though Galileo had for a long time rejected the Copernican system, to use his own words, "as a piece of solemn folly," yet he afterward atoned for this conduct by the activity with which he collected, and the sagacity with which he weighed, the evidence in its favor, after he had been persuaded, by a person whose name is unknown to philosophy, that it was a subject not altogether worthy of contempt.

As to the style of Galileo and Bacon, the only remaining point in which Mr. Hume has compared them, we think it hardly worthy

* Theory of the Firmament.

of being taken into consideration in estimating the intellectual character of two great philosophers. Galileo was undoubtedly a more "lively and agreeable writer" than Bacon. In this respect, they have both been excelled by Addison and Washington Irving. Mr. Hume has compared their style in no other particular; and in regard to this, we are very happy to agree with him. Indeed, through the whole of this famous parallel, Mr. Hume has studiously compared those things for which Galileo was the most distinguished with those in which Bacon was the most deficient. He has compared the brightness of the lesser light with the spots on the glory of the greater. We may truly say of this parallel, therefore, what Gibbon has so emphatically said of Mr. Hume's *History of England*, to wit: "It is specious, but superficial."

No one has gone further in denying the importance and the influence of Bacon's philosophy than Sir David Brewster. We have derived so much pleasure from his interesting *Life of Newton*, his excellent treatise on "Optics," and his fascinating work on "Natural Magic," that we are sorry to find ourselves opposed to him on the subject of Bacon's claims to the gratitude of mankind. His position on this important subject is certainly a most anomalous one for a cultivator of the physical sciences; but we are at no loss to account for it; he has himself fully revealed the secret. That profound thinker and beautiful writer, Dr. John Playfair, had spoken of Bacon "as a man who has had no rival in the times which are past, and as likely to have none in those which are to come." This was more than the biographer of Newton was disposed to bear. Hence he exclaims, "In a eulogy so overstrained as this, we feel that the language of panegyric has passed into that of idolatry; and we are desirous of weighing the force of arguments which tend to depose Newton from the high priesthood of nature, and to unsettle the proud destinies of Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler." Sir David, in an eloquent passage at the opening of his *Life of Newton*, has placed him "at the head of those great men who have been the ornaments of their species;" and he has used language in regard to him fully as strong as that which Playfair has applied to Bacon. He even thinks there is no "extravagance" in the encomium which Halley pronounced on Newton,—

"Nec fas est proprius mortali attingere Divos."

"So near the gods—man cannot nearer go."

It is to be suspected, then, that it is not so much the sin of idolatry which has given the offense, as the circumstance that it was not

committed in the worship of the right object. But we have not the least idea that either party has committed any such sin. And as to the controversy between them, we are decidedly of the opinion that both are in the right. Bacon is without a rival, and so is Newton. Bacon was the first teacher of the human race who effectually taught the sublime art of creating sciences; and no other philosopher can ever achieve anew the glory of having taught it, until the name and memory of Bacon shall be forgotten. In like manner, Newton was the first philosopher who solved the stupendous problem of the world; and the glory of every subsequent solution must be merged and lost in the recollection of the first. Lagrange solved this problem; and yet he sighed that Newton had solved it before him. The language which Dr. Playfair has, so well applied to Bacon may, therefore, be applied to Newton with equal propriety; for "if a second [Newton] is ever to arise, he must be ignorant of the first."

The discrepancy between Sir David Brewster and Mr. Macauley is very remarkable. The latter does not consider Bacon's analysis of the inductive method "a very useful performance;" because "it is an analysis of that which we are doing from morning to night, and which we continue to do even in our dreams;" because it "has been practiced ever since the beginning of the world by every human being." On the other hand, Sir David is of the opinion that it was "never tried by any philosopher but Bacon himself."* And the example he has given us of its application, he continues, "will remain to future ages as a memorable instance of the absurdity of attempting to fetter discovery by any *artificial* rules." "It is an elaborate and correct analysis," says the one, of a process so perfectly natural, that all men practice it; and "it is not likely to be better performed merely because men know how they perform it."† It is so unnatural and artificial, says the other, that no philosopher ever tried it but the author himself, and he only to make a blunder, for the warning and instruction of future ages. It is of no value, says the one, because it is natural; it is of no value, says the other, because it is artificial. No man ever made a discovery in any other way, objects the one; no man ever made a discovery in this way, objects the other. If we may believe the one, the plain man, who seeks the cause which has put his stomach out of order, "proceeds in the strictest conformity with the rules laid down in the second book of the *Novum Organum*," no less than the philosopher who explores the profound mysteries of nature. If we may believe the other, "the impatience

* Life of Newton, p. 297.

† Macauley's *Mis.*, vol. ii, p. 474.

of genius spurns the restraints of mechanical rules, and never will submit to the plodding drudgery of inductive discipline."* Both, certainly, cannot be in the right; and, if we are not mistaken, it may be shown that both are very clearly in the wrong.

But before we proceed to do this, we must notice a still more remarkable discrepancy between Sir David Brewster and—himself. He contends that the successors of Bacon did not derive "the slightest advantage from his precepts."† And yet he confidently affirms that "the necessity of experimental research, and of advancing gradually from the study of facts to the determination of their cause, *through the ground-work of Bacon's method*, is a doctrine which was not only inculcated, but successfully followed, by preceding philosophers. In a letter from Tycho Brahe to Kepler, this industrious astronomer urges his pupil 'to lay a solid foundation for his views by actual observation, and then, by ascending from these, strive to reach the causes of things;' and it *was no doubt under the influence of this advice that Kepler submitted his wildest fancies to the test of observation, and was conducted to his most splendid discoveries.*"‡ Now herein is a very wonderful thing. It is not that the author has contradicted himself in affirming, in one place, that no philosopher ever tried this method but Bacon himself; and, in another, that it was successfully followed by preceding philosophers. It is this:—Sir David says, "that Bacon was a man of powerful genius, and endowed with varied and profound talent—the most skillful logician—the most nervous and eloquent writer of the age he adorned, are points which have been established by universal suffrage." This great man exerted his matchless powers, during a long life, in order to bring his system to perfection; he recommended every part of it by an eloquence which has never been surpassed. His successors derived not "the slightest advantage from his precepts;" and yet a hint respecting the very same method which he recommended, contained in a single sentence from Tycho Brahe, conducted Kepler "to his most splendid discoveries." Such are the inconsistencies into which the best writers are inevitably betrayed whenever they have any other object in view but truth. She is a jealous mistress, and will divide her honors neither with a Newton nor a Bacon.

Sir David Brewster strenuously maintains the position that Newton would have pursued the right method, and "enriched science with the same splendid discoveries, if the name of Bacon had never been heard of." We do not wish to deprive Newton of

* Life of Newton, p. 299. † Ibid., p. 296. ‡ Ibid., p. 295.

his honors in order to deck the brow of Bacon. The glory of Bacon needs no borrowed effulgence. But we think the statements of Sir David are quite too broad and unguarded. He even declares, that "nearly two hundred years have gone by, teeming with the richest fruits of human genius, *and no grateful disciple has appeared to vindicate the rights of the alledged legislator of science.* Even Newton, who was born and educated after the publication of the *Novum Organum*, never mentions the name of Bacon or his system; and the amiable and indefatigable Boyle treated him with the same disrespectful silence."—P. 297.

The silence of Newton proves nothing. First, because his philosophical writings are so exceedingly brief and condensed in their form, that they did not admit of general speculations about philosophy and philosophers. And, secondly, Newton was a member and president of the Royal Society, which was instituted for the express purpose of trying "the new experimental philosophy;" and which, from the time of its foundation, resounded with the praises of Bacon.

There is testimony on this subject, however, quite as strong as could be desired. Dr. Henry Pemberton, in the introduction to his "View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy," has given an elaborate analysis of the Baconian method; and he concludes by saying, "This is that method of induction whereon all philosophy is founded." He ascribes the splendid discoveries of Newton to the circumstance that he adopted and pursued the method pointed out and recommended by Bacon. This is the most unexceptionable testimony, because Dr. Pemberton was a great admirer of Newton, as well as of Bacon; and, besides, the former had so high an opinion of his learning and ability, that, after the death of Cotes, he employed him to edit the third edition of the *Principia*. This is not all; *for the work of Dr. Pemberton was read by Newton himself, and received his approbation.*

"An Account of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophical Discoveries" has likewise been given by Maclaurin—a man universally admired for the greatness of his genius. He was one of Newton's most ardent admirers. In this production, we are informed that Newton "used to call his philosophy the *experimental philosophy*, intimating, by the name, the essential difference there is between it and those systems that are the product of genius and invention only."—P. 25. We are not to conclude from such language, however, that either Newton or his disciple intended to deprive Bacon of the glory of having founded the experimental philosophy. The meaning is, that this was Newton's philosophy *by adoption*; for

Maclaurin does not hesitate to say, in the same volume, that "Sir Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, who was contemporary with Galileo and Kepler, is justly held among the restorers of true learning, but more especially as the founder of the *experimental philosophy*. . . . He saw there was a necessity for a thorough reformation in the way of treating natural knowledge, and that all theory was to be laid aside that was not founded on experiment. He proposed his plan in his *Instauratio Magna*, with so much strength of argument, and so just a zeal, as renders that admirable work the delight of all who have a taste for solid learning."—P. 59. Neither Pemberton nor Maclaurin, then, deemed it any detraction from the glory of Newton to ascribe to Bacon the honor of having founded the philosophy under whose guidance he was conducted to his sublime discoveries.

We have still more conclusive testimony, however, to show that when Newton called the experimental philosophy his philosophy, he merely meant it was his by adoption. In the preface to the second edition of the Principia, Cotes has said, that there are three classes of philosophers; and after disposing of two, he adds,—“There is left the third class, *which profess experimental philosophy*.” Having alluded to the method of this philosophy, he says,—“This is that *incomparably best way which our renowned author most justly embraced before the rest, and thought alone worthy to be cultivated and adorned by his excellent labors*.” It is well worthy of remark, that this edition of the Principia by Cotes was prepared under the eye of Sir Isaac Newton himself, and received his entire approbation. Indeed, the preface itself was written by Cotes at the special request of Newton. Now, if Bacon was not the father of the experimental philosophy, which Newton embraced before the rest, and determined to cultivate, to whom shall we award so great an honor?

We do not say that Sir David Brewster is bound by these high and impartial authorities, two of which received the sanction of Newton himself; but it seems to us, that they should have precluded the assertion, that “nearly two hundred years have gone by, teeming with the richest fruits of genius, and *no grateful disciple has appeared to vindicate the rights of the alledged legislator of science*.” Where, then, is Pemberton, and Maclaurin, and Playfair, and Herschel, and Stewart, and Leibnitz, not to mention a hundred other names, who have contributed to swell the full chorus of Bacon's universal praise? We may truly affirm, that no “legislator of science,” whether ancient or modern, whether real or pretended, has ever received more generous applause than has

Bacon from a host of illustrious disciples. His reputation has been absolutely overwhelming. If his rights have not been heretofore vindicated, it is because they have not been assailed.

If Boyle had never read the works of Bacon, nor derived any advantage from them directly, this would not prove that he had not been greatly benefited by them. It is well known that he was a great admirer and student of Gassendi, who, in his turn, was an ardent admirer and devoted disciple of Bacon. We have no doubt that the greater part of Bacon's influence has been exerted in acting upon those who have acted upon the world. But it is not true that Sir Robert Boyle has derived no advantage directly from Bacon's works, or that he has passed over his name in silence. No person familiar with the writings of Bacon can read those of Boyle without perceiving that he is greatly indebted to "the master of wisdom." The pages of his admirable treatise on the "Usefulness of an Experimental Philosophy of Nature" are, in particular, not unfrequently enriched with wisdom, and even adorned with imagery, which must have been suggested to his mind by the writings of Bacon. And in this very treatise he has quoted Bacon as an authority, and called him "that great and solid philosopher."

It is remarkable that, in his attempts to preserve "the proud destiny of Copernicus," Sir David Brewster has objected to the philosophy of Bacon, that it was known before his time. Now this objection, if it has any weight in it, would entirely undermine all the glory of Copernicus. In the preface to Sir Isaac Newton's profound work on "The System of the World," (a work which we have no doubt Sir David has repeatedly read,) the author has mentioned several ancient philosophers by whom the Copernican theory was maintained. It is well known that Copernicus was not the first who conceived the system which goes by his name. He revived that system; he saw its evidences more clearly, and he grasped its commanding positions more firmly than the rest of mankind; and he caused the world to awake to its importance. Such, precisely, is the nature of the services which Bacon rendered to experimental philosophy. It is no derogation from the glory of either, that the truth for which they contended had been advocated, with unequal ability, by preceding philosophers. They have both founded philosophies, which other men had labored in vain to establish.

"It has been attempted by some," says Sir John Herschel, in his most delightful and instructive "Preliminary Discourse to the Study of Natural Philosophy," "to lessen the merit of this great achievement by showing that the inductive method had been prac-

ticed in many instances, both ancient and modern, by the mere instinct of mankind; but it is not the introduction of inductive reasoning, as a new and untried process, which characterizes the Baconian philosophy, but his keen perception, and his broad and spirit-stirring, almost enthusiastic, announcement of its paramount importance, as the alpha and omega of science, as the grand and only chain for the linking together of physical truths, and the eventual key to every discovery and every application. Those who would deny him his just glory on such grounds, would refuse to Jenner or to Howard their civic crowns, because a few farmers in a remote province had, time out of mind, been acquainted with vaccination, or philanthropists, in all ages, had occasionally visited the prisoner in his dungeon."—P. 114. Such was the manner in which Sir John Herschel replied to the objection in question, before it was reproduced by either Sir David Brewster or Mr. Macauley. Those who object to Bacon's services on such grounds should certainly not do so in order to uphold the fame of Copernicus, whose system was maintained long before his time. If they would be consistent, they should even withhold the honor which is due to Columbus, because he received hints from preceding navigators, and deduced an argument from the flight of birds.

Sir David Brewster has admitted, it is true, that the greatness of Bacon's genius is established by universal suffrage; but yet if his remarks are true, we should entertain a very mean opinion of Lord Bacon's ability. For he says, that although Tycho Brahe was "skillful in the observation of phenomena, his mind was but little suited to investigate their cause;" and yet he has, according to Sir David, compressed, by anticipation, "the whole Baconian philosophy into a single sentence." Lord Bacon devoted many years of meditation to his philosophy. The first book of the *Novum Organum* was written over twelve times with his own hand. It would require a greater than Tycho Brahe to compress the whole of it into a single sentence; or else Lord Bacon must have exerted his great powers to render it as thin and attenuated as possible. We shall now take leave of Sir David; and if we have been at all severe or harsh in our strictures on a particular portion of his excellent *Life of Newton*, it is not because we admire Brewster less, but Bacon more.

Everybody has read Macauley's splendid dissertation on the philosophy of Bacon, which first appeared in the *Edinburgh Review*, and afterward in his *Miscellanies*. It is impossible, however, that our admiration should be unqualified, when we perceive that

the brilliant effect of antithesis has been so often substituted for the sober light of truth. Whenever the writer seizes the truth, no one can present it to the mind of the reader with greater fullness or vividness of illustration; but it is seldom that he does seize the truth while treating of the philosophy of Bacon. The reader of this remarkable performance will find it as impossible to forget the bright things which the writer has said, as he will to learn from it the sober things which Bacon has taught. We can hardly resist the conviction, while perusing it, that the author has read the *Novum Organum* in order to write about it, and has not written about it because he had read it. His account of the philosophy it teaches is certainly the most brilliant, the most showy, and the most superficial thing he has ever written. It is a pity that so beautiful a production should not be true, we admit; and we should not attempt to dispel the fascination and the charm, if we did not agree with the author himself, that "an acre in Middlesex is better than a principality in Utopia."

Mr. Macauley has made himself merry with the inductive method, by presenting it in connection with trivial and insignificant instances. Thus, says he, "it is constantly practiced by the most ignorant clown, by the most thoughtless schoolboy, by the very child at the breast. That method leads the clown to expect that if he sows barley, he shall not reap wheat. By that method, the school-boy learns that a cloudy day is best for catching trout. The very infant, we imagine, is led by induction to expect milk from his mother or nurse, and none from his father. . . . A plain man finds his stomach out of order. He never heard Lord Bacon's name. But he proceeds in the strictest conformity with the rules laid down in the second book of the '*Novum Organum*,' and satisfies himself that minced pies have done the mischief." Nay, it even seems that it is "induction which leads us to the conclusion that the presence of the sun is the cause of our having more light by day than by night." It is one thing, we have been accustomed to suppose, for a plain man to ascertain the cause which has put his stomach out of order, and quite another for a philosopher to discover the law which keeps the universe in order. It is one thing for an infant to ascertain that it has derived milk from its mother, and not from its father; and quite another for a learned commentator to determine what he has derived from Bacon, and not from himself. The plain truth is, Bacon's method was not designed to teach how infants know the mother's breast, or to teach men that the sun gives light by day. These are discoveries which both children and men make, because they cannot

help making them. These are depths into which all may safely venture, without needing any support from the arm of a Verulam. That he never designed to afford us aid in such cases, must be as plain to every diligent and impartial student of his works, as is the noon-day sun itself. Bacon freely admits, that many things may be easily discovered without the aid of his philosophy, "but," he adds, "*before we are allowed to enter the more remote and hidden parts of nature it is necessary that a better and more perfect use and application of the human mind and understanding should be introduced.*"—*Preface to the Novum Organum*. Indeed, if after so many years of meditation, Bacon had merely analyzed the process by which such discoveries as those indicated by his reviewer are made; and then ushered his performance into the world with the magnificent boast, "I have now held up a light in the obscurity of philosophy, which will be seen long after I am dead," he would have deserved anything rather than our admiration.

The reason why Mr. Macauley sets so little value on the philosophy of Bacon, is, that he does not understand it. Take, for example, the following representation of the inductive method of Bacon. Says he,—“We have heard that an eminent judge of the last generation was in the habit of jocosely propounding, after dinner, a theory, that the cause of the prevalence of Jacobinism was the practice of bearing three names. He quoted, on the one side, Charles James Fox, Richard Brinsley Sheridan, John Horne Tooke, John Philpot Curran, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Theobald Wolfe Tone. These were *instantia convenientes*. He then proceeded to cite instances *absentia in proxime*,—William Pitt, John Scott, William Wyndham, Samuel Horsley, Henry Dundas, Edmund Burke. He might have gone on to instances *secundum magis et minus*,” &c., &c. After selecting other kinds of instances, the writer concludes, “Here is an induction, corresponding with Bacon’s analysis, and ending in a monstrous absurdity.”

Now, with the learned judge, who “jocosely propounded” this induction, we have no quarrel; it might be well, however, if learned judges would be more careful in future how they joke after dinner, if their jokes are to be mistaken for sound philosophy. The above induction, so far from “corresponding with Bacon’s analysis,” is an open and flagrant violation of every principle of it.

To set out with a preconceived hypothesis of any kind, and then select such instances as will serve to establish it, overlooking the

rest, is the very course condemned by Bacon. He has repeatedly, and most eloquently, denounced this practice of rising from a few particulars to a general proposition, as "the source of all error." He exhorts us to lay aside every preconceived opinion, and come with clear, unbiassed minds to study the works of God. This is the very first lesson to be learned in the school of Bacon. It is flagrantly violated in the induction produced by Mr. Macauley. The learned judge set out with a *preconceived absurdity*; he found in the kingdom of Great Britain six Jacobins with three names, and six anti-Jacobins with two! No very wonderful discovery this! The induction in this case did not lead to the "monstrous absurdity"—the absurdity led to the monstrous induction.

As the supposed induction of Mr. Macauley imbodyes a popular error in regard to the analysis of Bacon, we shall proceed still further to expose its violations of that analysis. The above specimen of inductive reasoning is clearly and broadly distinguished from every other mode of induction, whether ancient or modern. The facts on which it is based would authorize a rational being to conclude, that there are some Jacobins with three names, and some anti-Jacobins with two. This is all he should conclude from his facts. Now, let us suppose that the learned judge had gone further, and, instead of six instances, he had found a thousand, in which Jacobins had three names, and as many in which their opponents possessed only two; nay, let us suppose that the same thing were true in relation to all the Jacobins and their opponents throughout the kingdom. He might then have concluded, as a matter of fact, that Jacobins have three names, and their opponents two; but this would not have been a Baconian induction. It fulfills the conditions laid down by Aristotle, who says, "Induction is an inference drawn from *all* the particulars which it comprehends;" but, as we shall see, it is far from meeting the requisitions of the *Novum Organum*. If we should examine a thousand roses, and, finding them all red, we should conclude that roses are red; this might be an Aristotlean induction, but not a Baconian. It would be an exceedingly frail structure; the very next rose we came across might be white. This method of framing inductions proceeds by the way of simple enumeration: it merely counts up or enumerates all the objects on which it is based, and, finding them to have a *common property*, it states this fact in a compendious form of expression. It simply affirms, that roses are red—that Jacobins have three names. This kind of induction is most emphatically condemned by Bacon. "In forming axioms," says he, "we must invent a different form of induction

from that hitherto in use ; not only for the proof and discovery of principles, (as they are called,) but also of minor intermediate ; and, in short, every kind of axioms. *The induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is puerile, leads to uncertain conclusions, and is exposed to danger from one contradictory instance.*" —*Nov. Organ.*, book i, aph. 105. To show how utterly puerile, in the estimation of a real Baconian, is the kind of induction furnished by Mr. Macauley, we shall quote from the same page on which it is recorded. "If the learned author of the theory about Jacobinism," says Mr. Macauley, "had enlarged either of his tables a little, his system would have been destroyed. The names of Tom Paine and William Wyndham Grenville would have been sufficient to do the work." Thus, the very induction which the writer says perfectly corresponds with the analysis of Bacon, he himself demolishes by the application of a test which he has unwittingly drawn from the *Novum Organum*.

This is not the only principle on which, as disciples of Bacon, we should condemn the induction of the learned judge. If we had observed that every known Jacobin had three names, this might enable us to say, that Jacobins, *so far as we had observed*, have three names. This would be a very wonderful coincidence, if it existed, but not a discovery in science. We could not conclude from such a coincidence, that "the practice of bearing three names is the cause of Jacobinism." The inductive method of Bacon presupposes that man is a rational animal ; that given by Mr. Macauley presupposes him to be devoid of reason and common sense. It is what Bacon calls an empirical induction ; and its deficiency is very clearly marked by him. "The empiric school," says he, "produces dogmas of a more deformed and monstrous nature than the sophistic or theoretic school ; *not being founded in the light of common notions.*" —*Nov. Organ.*, book i, aph. 64. And again, — "We must not only search for, and procure a greater number of experiments, but also introduce a completely different method, order, and progress of continuing and promoting experience. For vague and arbitrary experience is (as we have observed) *mere groping in the dark, and rather astonishes than instructs.*" —*Nov. Organ.*, aph. 100. The process pursued by the learned judge, perfected and held up by Mr. Macauley as a true specimen of the Baconian method, could not have been more clearly described, or its puerility and folly more impressively pointed out by Lord Bacon, if it had been actually before him. We might point out other particulars if it were necessary, and our limits would permit, in which the example in question very widely departs from the

directions given by Lord Bacon; but surely these are sufficient.

The learned writer does not seem to have caught the most distant glimpse of the grand problem which Bacon proposed to himself, and which the *Novum Organum* is designed to solve. A knowledge of this problem will place the key to the Baconian method in our hands, and serve to correct many erroneous notions in regard to it. Let us, then, see what it is. Preceding philosophers, in the opinion of Bacon, had attempted to obtain a knowledge of nature in one of two ways. According to one method, they set out with certain abstract conceptions, or universal propositions, or ideas, from which they had attempted to deduce the nature and order of things in the external world. This is called by Bacon the sophistic or theoretic method. Those philosophers who have thus spun systems of the world out of their own brains, he compares to spiders that spin their web out of the substance of their own bowels. "The wit and mind of man," says he, "if it work upon matter, *which is the contemplation of the creatures of God*, worketh according to the stuff, and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, *then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of the thread and work, but of no substance or profit.*"—*Advancement of Learning*, book i, pp. 170, 171.

The other, in the language of Bacon, is "the empiric method." This rejects "the light of common notions," which he elsewhere calls "reason." Hence it is "a mere groping in the dark." It feels its way instead of seeing it. It has no guiding principle—no polar star—no compass. It is confined to the dark shore; it dare not explore the great ocean of discovery. What it handles and feels, it knows; and beyond this it cannot pronounce. This method, says Bacon, "produces dogmas of a more deformed and monstrous nature than the sophistic or theoretic. . . . This kind of experience is nothing but a loose fagot, and mere groping in the dark, as men at night try all means of discovering the right road; while it would be better, and more prudent, either to wait for day, or procure a light, and then proceed."—*Nov. Organ.*, book i, aph. 82 Those who have pursued this method, he compares to ants, that are careful to deprive whatever they collect of the power to germinate, so that it is unfruitful and barren. The inductions, formed according to this method, are as blind and arbitrary as that of the learned judge who constructed the theory about Jacobinism.

Now, seeing that philosophers had, in all ages, followed the one

or the other of these partial and exclusive methods, to the infinite detriment of human knowledge, Lord Bacon undertook to establish a real and legitimate union between them. He did not wish to grope in the dark with the blind empiric, nor to soar in the blaze of grand abstractions with "the well-bred sophister." He wished to study nature, to contemplate the creatures of God, "in the true and genuine humiliation of the human soul," both in the light of reason and the light of experiment wisely combined. There never was a false notion, though it is a common one, that there is an affinity between the Baconian philosophy and empiricism. The most eloquent passage which has ever been penned on such a subject, he concludes with the lofty declaration, that "we think we have established for ever the real and legitimate union of *the empiric and the rational faculties, whose sullen and inauspicious divorces and repudiations have disturbed everything in the great family of mankind.*"—*Preface to the Novum Organum.*

If Mr. Macauley's account of the Baconian philosophy be correct, it entirely rejects and repudiates the rational faculty. It pursues an absurdity with as much zeal as it does a rational conception. Bacon the father of the empiric school! Empirics are, and ever have been, too prone to call themselves Baconian philosophers; and it is to be regretted that the most brilliant and fascinating writer of the Edinburgh Review should have given his sanction to their absurd pretensions.

As Mr. Macauley, in his attempt to do the contrary, has so clearly shown what the inductive process recommended by Bacon is *not*, let us see what it really is. This may be best seen in a single case, which fulfills and illustrates the conditions prescribed by Bacon. Sir Isaac Newton, then, having examined twenty-two different substances, found that the forces with which they refracted light were very nearly proportioned to their densities. He observed a remarkable exception to this law in several substances; all of which were combustible. It occurred to him, that there might be, and probably was, some connection or bond of union between the high refractive power of these substances and their combustibility. Hence, he conjectured that the *diamond*, which likewise possessed a high refractive power, was an inflammable substance. This conjecture, it is well known, was afterward verified by experiment. The same law was also found, by Sir David Brewster, to obtain in relation to phosphorus; and it was still further extended, by M. M. Arago and Biot, to hydrogen. Thus, the induction is established, that substances possessing high re-

fractive powers, when compared with their densities, are inflammable.

Now let us mark the wide difference between this induction and that of the learned judge. The one seeks to establish a *preconceived absurdity*; the other, to verify a *rational* conception. The one proceeds not in "the light of a common notion;" the other proceeds under the guidance of a connection between things, *which is suggested by observation, and not contradicted by reason*. The true induction fairly appealed to experiment, in order to obtain a knowledge of things; the false, carefully selected its *instantiæ convenientes*, in order to support a wild and crazy phantom of the brain. The one supposes that man is possessed of a rational faculty, for which he has some use; the other supposes that he is a poor blind empiric, equally in love with monsters and fables as with the truth itself. In short, the one is a Baconian induction, and the other is a Macaulean.

The difference between the induction which led to the "monstrous absurdity" about Jacobinism, and one which leads to a discovery of truth, consists, says Mr. Macauley, "not in the kind of instances, but in the number of instances." And he asks, "What is slight evidence? What collection of facts is scanty? Will ten instances do, or fifty, or a hundred?" We answer, If he would convince us that "the practice of bearing three names is the cause of the prevalence of Jacobinism," neither ten, nor fifty, nor a hundred instances will do. If he would persuade us out of our reason, the collection of a thousand facts would be scanty. It is plain, that the difference between such an induction and one leading to truth, does *not* consist in the number of instances, but in the nature of the induction. No number of instances could ever convince us that the crowing of the cock is the cause of the sun's rising.

Since Mr. Macauley entertained so imperfect a notion of the method analyzed by Bacon, it is no wonder he should have believed that Bacon had been anticipated by Aristotle. This remark has been repeatedly made since the publication of the Analysis of Aristotle's works by Dr. Gillies; but it has been made by no one, we believe, who had formed correct views of the induction of Aristotle and that of Bacon. It is very remarkable that this objection, which has been anticipated and fully answered by Bacon himself, should be so often reproduced by authors who have taken no notice whatever of Bacon's reply to it. "Others may object," says he, "that we are only doing that which has already been done, and that the ancients followed the same course with our-

selves. . . . But to any one," he truly adds, "not entirely forgetful of our previous observations, it will be easy to answer this objection, or rather scruple."—*Nov. Organ.*, book i, aph. 125.

But it is objected, as we have seen, that the process analyzed and recommended by Bacon "has been practiced ever since the beginning of the world by every human being." Every human being has tried to practice some such process, we admit; but yet have even ingenious men very often mistaken a process like that of the learned judge for a true induction. But suppose the above assertion were perfectly true, to what does it amount? It is not pretended that all men have performed the inductive process equally well; and hence the necessity of giving direction and assistance to their efforts.

Every art has preceded its corresponding science. Men talked, and reasoned, and declaimed, before grammar, or logic, or rhetoric were reduced to principle. They fought battles before the science of war and fortification was heard of. They traded, and grew richer, or became poor, before political economy was ever dreamed of as a science. Indeed, no art can be mentioned which was not practiced before its corresponding science had an existence. Nothing can be more futile, then, than to object to the usefulness of any science, that the art which it is designed to cultivate and perfect was practiced before the science was known. If this objection is good against one science, it is good against all; and all scientific learning must be swept away.

Locke spurns the logic of Aristotle, because he is quite sure that the Almighty did not merely make us two-legged creatures, and leave it to Aristotle to make us rational beings. But neither Aristotle nor Bacon imagined that they were going to make rational creatures of us. If these philosophers had undertaken to analyze and describe any process which is not natural to the mind, they would have conferred no benefit upon us. They would have laid down laws for the operation of the human mind, which nature itself would have rendered it impossible for us to pursue. The very circumstance, then, which should have formed the subject of their praise, has been made the ground of their censure. It was not their design to render man a rational being, but to reveal to him the processes of his own mind, in order that he might perform them with the greater certainty, and more uniform effect, as well as to point out his manifold dangers in order that he might escape them. Nature might have been left to herself if she had not been eternally drawn from her course by the operation of mighty causes, whose influence had not been suspected. They

wished to lay no artificial restraints upon nature, but to take off those restraints which had rendered her course so unequal, and her efforts so unavailing. This was the avowed design of Bacon. He condemns "the induction which the logicians speak of;" because "it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt nature;" and "he that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge," shall find "that the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they describe it."—*Advancement of Learning*. And again, in relation to the *Novum Organum*, he says, "It is at least new, even in its very nature; but copied from a very ancient pattern, no other than the world itself, and the nature of things, and of the mind."—*Letter to King James*. If any one would judge Bacon, let him not do so on principles which he has expressly repudiated. He has professed to copy from nature; and let not this be objected against him until it be shown to be a defect; until it be shown that he might have found a better model than the work of God.

Lord Bacon did not lay so great stress on the second book of the *Novum Organum* as we should be led to suppose from the writings of those who have endeavored to lessen his merits. Sir David Brewster and Mr. Macauley, in particular, have passed over the first book entirely, and directed their animadversions against the second. This is exceedingly unfair; especially as the first has always been regarded as by far the most valuable, and as it was so regarded by Bacon himself. It is in the following language (with which he concludes the first book of the *Novum Organum*) that he shows what estimate he placed on "the elaborate and correct analysis" of the second:—

"But it is time for us to lay down the art of interpreting nature; to which we attribute no absolute necessity (as if nothing could be done without it) nor perfection, although we think our precepts most useful and correct. For we are of opinion, that if men had at their command a proper history of nature and experience, and would apply themselves steadily to it, and could bind themselves to two things—1. To lay aside received opinions and notions; 2. To restrain themselves, till the proper season, from generalization, they might, by the proper and genuine exertion of their minds, fall into our way of interpretation without the aid of any art. For interpretation is the true and natural act of the mind, *when all obstacles are removed*; certainly, however, everything will be more ready and better fixed by our precepts."

Now, it was the object of the first book of the *Novum Organum* to bind the mind to these two things, and to remove all obstacles out of the way; and, hence, if any man will follow it, he will,

according to Bacon himself, stand in no need of the analysis contained in the second. Newton stood in no need of that analysis; he could proceed without it; but it does not follow from hence, that he derived no advantage from the philosophy of Bacon.

Having considered the objections of Mr. Macauley to the Baconian philosophy, we shall now proceed to notice what he has said in its praise. "The chief peculiarity of Bacon's philosophy," says he, "seems to us to have been this,—that he aimed at things altogether different from those which his predecessors had proposed to themselves. . . . The more carefully his works are examined, the more clearly, we think, it will appear that this is the real clue to his whole system; and that he used means different from those used by other philosophers, because he wished to arrive at an end altogether different from theirs. . . . What, then, was the end which Bacon proposed to himself? It was, to use his own emphatic expression, 'fruit.' It was the multiplying of human enjoyments and the mitigating of human sufferings. . . . Two words form the key of the Baconian philosophy—utility and progress. . . . We conceive that from this peculiarity all the other peculiarities of his system directly, and almost necessarily, sprang." We might quote various other passages in which the writer asserts that "the useful" is the grand object of pursuit which is proposed by the philosophy of Bacon; and that if other men had proposed the same end, they would have been led to adopt the same means; but we presume that the above extracts are amply sufficient to set his views, on this subject, in a clear and satisfactory light. Are those views correct? This is a deeply interesting question; for the end which a philosopher proposes to himself is all in all.

It is a very remarkable circumstance, that Bacon supposed he would be misconceived, and that he would be unjustly reproached for having made "the useful" the chief end of his philosophy. He did not dream that this would ever be held up, not only as the grand peculiarity, but as the distinctive glory of his philosophy. Since he is so directly in conflict with Mr. Macauley respecting the chief end of his philosophy, we must give this striking passage in his own words. Says Bacon,—

"Another objection will, without doubt, be made, namely, that we have not ourselves established a correct, or the best goal or aim of the sciences, (the very defect we blame in others.) For, they will say, that the contemplation of truth is more dignified and exalted than any study or extent of effects; but that our dwelling so long and anxiously on experience and matter, and the fluctuating state of particulars, fastens the mind to earth, or casts it down into an abyss of confusion and

disturbance, and separates and removes it from a much more divine state, the quiet and tranquillity of abstract wisdom."

Now, does not Bacon reject such reasoning with scorn? Does he pour the contempt upon it which his reviewer uniformly makes him pour upon all speculation that has no direct or immediate use in view? His reply, we are aware, will shock Mr. Macauley's sense of propriety; but the question is not what is proper, but what has Bacon taught. He instantly adds, "*We willingly assent to their reasoning, AND ARE MOST ANXIOUS TO EFFECT THE VERY POINT THEY HINT AT AND REQUIRE.*" Yes, Bacon was most anxious, as his whole philosophy shows, to exalt the truth above utility or any extent of effects. We are most anxious to accomplish this very end, says he, in a noble strain of eloquence,—

"For we are founding a real model of the world in the understanding, such as it is found to be, not such as man's reason has distorted. Now, this cannot be done without dissecting and anatomizing the world most diligently; but we declare it necessary to destroy completely the vain, little, and, as it were, apish imitations of the world, which have been formed in various systems of philosophy by men's fancies. Let men learn (as we have said above) the difference that exists between the idols of the human mind and the ideas of the divine mind. The former are mere arbitrary abstractions; the latter, the true marks of the Creator on his creatures, as they are imprinted on, and defined in, matter, by true and exquisite touches. Truth, therefore, and utility are here perfectly identical, and THE EFFECTS ARE OF MORE VALUE AS PLEDGES OF TRUTH THAN FROM THE BENEFIT THEY CONFER ON MEN."

Bacon was not a utilitarian; he was a philosopher. Utility and progress are not the two words which form the key to his philosophy; they are—truth and utility.

Bacon has taken the utmost pains to guard against such a misconception of his philosophy. In the most elaborate attempt which he has ever made to state its end and aim, he bestows the most exalted praise upon all useful arts; but yet he is careful to add, that "*the contemplation of things as they are, free from superstition or imposture, error or confusion, is much more dignified in itself than all the advantage to be derived from discoveries.*"—*Nov. Organ.*, book i, aph. 129.

We do not deny that the philosophy of Bacon is deeply imbued with the spirit of that *philanthropia*, which was so rooted and "fixed in his mind that it could not be removed." This, unquestionably, forms one of the grand and distinguishing features of his philosophy. His great soul, yearning over the sad condition of the human race, often seems to labor to give utterance to his in-

tense desire "to relieve man's estate." This spirit was imbibed neither from the school of Plato, nor of Aristotle; it was drunk in at the feet of an humble Nazarene. He delighted to repeat, that the great Physician of the soul did not disdain to be also the physician of the body: as his doctrine was delivered for the good of the one, said he, so his miracles were wrought for the benefit of the other. Hence, "the majestic humility," of which Mr. Macaulay has so well spoken, "the persuasion that nothing can be too insignificant for the attention of the wisest, which is not too insignificant to give pleasure or pain to the meanest." This feeling of divine sympathy with mankind has inspired some of the finest bursts of eloquence to be found in Bacon's writings. He says,—

"It may be truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy, religion, or other discipline, which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is communicative, and depress the good which is private and particular, as the holy faith; well declaring, that it was the same God that gave the Christian law to men, who gave those laws to inanimate creatures, that we spake of before; for we read that the elected saints of God have wished themselves anathematized and cast out of the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion."—*Advancement of Learning*.

But how desirous soever Bacon may have been to mitigate the sufferings, and to multiply the enjoyments, of the human race, we deny that he made the useful the great end of his philosophy. This is not its distinguishing peculiarity, "from which all its other peculiarities naturally flow." To exhibit his philosophy in this light, is to represent it, not "such as it is found to be, but such as it is distorted." If, in painting a portrait, all the features should be merged in the mouth, or compressed into the nose, however beautiful that particular feature might be in itself, it would be the picture of a monster rather than of a man. In like manner, to represent utility as the first and all-comprehending element of the Baconian philosophy, is violently to distort the admirable proportion and relation of its parts.

In truth, the Baconian philosophy is divided into two parts, namely, "Speculative Natural Philosophy" and "Operative Natural Philosophy." The object of the first is the discovery of truth; the object of the second, the application of truth to human uses. By the one, we make "inquisition of causes;" by the other, we secure "production of effects." By the one, we obtain a knowledge of the secrets and powers of nature; by the other, we bend down these great powers, and compel them to do the

work and drudgery of man. The one is the eye, and the other is the hand, of his philosophy. They are co-ordinate members thereof; and if either is subordinate, it is the operative branch; for, as we have seen, "the effects are of more value as pledges of truth than from the benefit they confer on men." Such may not be the philosophy of others; but such is the philosophy of Bacon.

As for truth, this is to be sought first, and for the intrinsic satisfaction and delight it affords the mind. Says Bacon,—

"The pleasure and delight of knowledge and learning far surpasseth all other in nature. . . . We see in all other pleasures there is satiety, and after they are used, their verdure departeth; which sheweth well they be but deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures; and that it was the novelty which pleased, and not the quality: and, therefore, we see that voluptuous men turn friars, and ambitious princes turn melancholy. But of knowledge there is no satiety, but satisfaction and appetite are perpetually interchangeable; and therefore appeareth *to be good in itself simply, without fallacy or accident.*"—*Advancement of Learning.*

So far from having represented "the useful" as the *alpha* and *omega* of philosophy, nobly has he rebuked those who have corrupted and retarded the progress of truth by their premature and extreme devotion to it. He says,—

"We must by no means omit observing that all the industry displayed in experiment has, from the very first, *caught with a too hasty and intemperate zeal at some determined effect*; has sought, (I say,) *productive rather than enlightening experiments, and has not imitated the divine method, which on the first day created light alone, and assigned it one whole day, producing no material works thereon, but descending to their creation on the following days.*"—*Pref. to Nov. Organ.*

And again, those noisy empirics, those little contracted utilitarians, who can neither perceive the intrinsic majesty and glory of truth itself, nor grasp the great idea of Bacon's philosophy, that "TRUTH IS NEVER BARREN," have been more finely reproved by the author of the *Advancement of Learning* than by any other philosopher. How is the sound of the "*cui bono*," which they are eternally ringing in the ears of the cultivator of "the speculative philosophy," drowned and lost in the following strain of masculine and dignified eloquence:—

"If men judge that learning should be referred to action, they judge well; but in this they fall into the error described in the ancient fable, in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach had been idle, because it neither performed the office of motion, as the limbs do; nor of sense, as the head doth; but yet, notwithstanding, it is the stomach that digesteth and distributeth to all the rest: so

if any man think philosophy and universality to be idle studies, he doth not consider that all professions are from them served and supplied. And *this I take to be a great cause that hath hindered the progression of learning, because the fundamental knowledges have been studied but in passage.* For if you will have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it is not anything you can do to the boughs, but it is the stirring of the earth, and putting new mold about the roots, that must work it."—*Advancement of Learning.*

When we pass from the pages of Lord Bacon, in which we find so much in praise of a simple inquiry after truth, to those of his distinguished reviewer, we cannot but feel that we have undergone a painful descent, and that we breathe a wholly different atmosphere. "If others had aimed at the same object with Bacon," says he, "we hold it to be certain that they would have employed the same method with Bacon. It would have been hard to convince Seneca that the inventing of a safety lamp was an employment worthy of a philosopher. It would have been hard to persuade Thomas Aquinas to descend from the making of syllogisms to the making of gunpowder. But Seneca would never have doubted for a moment that it was only by a series of experiments that a safety lamp could be invented. Thomas Aquinas would never have thought that his *barbara* and *baralippton* would enable him to ascertain the proportion which charcoal ought to bear to saltpetre in a pound of gunpowder. Neither common sense nor Aristotle would suffer him to fall into such an absurdity." Thus, it seems, that the learned reviewer of Bacon would, in theory at least, have philosophers to lay aside the framing of brilliant conceits, like those of Seneca, and abstruse speculations, like those of Thomas Aquinas, and betake themselves to the constructing of safety lamps, the making of gunpowder, and such like useful occupations. This may be very sound philosophy; we call it not in question now; but is it the Baconian philosophy? Does "the master of wisdom" teach us to abandon ourselves at once to "productive experiments," in order to find our way to "enlightening experiments?" Does he teach us to study the fundamental knowledges in passage? Does he teach us to bestow all our labor upon the boughs of the tree, and none upon the roots? Does he teach us to lop off and strike out the great central and digestive function of human knowledge, by which truth is first discovered and elaborated, in order to be afterward carried off and applied to use? We have already answered these questions out of Lord Bacon himself; and we shall only add the following from his tract in Praise of Knowledge:—"Shall we not as well discern

the riches of nature's warehouse as the benefit of her shop? Is truth ever barren?"

It is very plain, we think, that Mr. Macauley is greatly enamored of the operative branch of philosophy, and has but little affection for the speculative. The former alone is properly termed philosophy, the great end and aim of which is the discovery of truth; the latter should be called art, the great object of which is to produce the useful and the beautiful. If the speculative branch was unduly elevated by some of the ancients at the expense of the operative, the latter has been as extravagantly magnified by Mr. Macauley at the expense of the former. Indeed, his intense scorn of all speculation, which has not a direct palpable use in view, has given point and piquancy to some of the most brilliant antitheses of his production. The fine sayings which blaze on the pages of Seneca, especially, seem to have called down the severest strokes of his ridicule. "We shall next be told," exclaims Seneca, "that the first shoemaker was a philosopher." "For our own part," replies Macauley, "if we are forced to make our choice between the first shoemaker, and the author of the three books 'On Anger,' we pronounce for the shoemaker. It may be worse to be angry than to be wet. But shoes have kept thousands from being wet; and we doubt whether Seneca ever kept anybody from being angry." With all Mr. Macauley's "love of the vulgar useful," we doubt whether he ever made a pair of shoes. We are certain he has framed conceits as splendid as those of Seneca himself; and we doubt whether they are vastly more solid or useful.

We do not object to the useful. In its proper place, it cannot be too highly esteemed. But we do not wish it to intrude into our inquiries after the truth. We wish it to be an after-thought and an after-work. Let art appropriate every truth, if possible, in the whole range of science, and apply it to every use which can, in the least degree, tend to alleviate the suffering or promote the enjoyment of man. Herein is the sphere of the useful; and here let it reign supreme. But let it not be set up as the end of philosophy, as the goal at which we are to aim in our inquiries. The love of the useful is the good genius of the arts; it is the evil genius of science. It is the little, sneering demon, which has attended every great discovery. It mocked at the "*swing-swangs*" of Hooke; and yet the swing-swangs of Hooke led to an improvement in the clock, as well as other valuable inventions. It poured ridicule on Boyle's experiments on the elasticity of the air; and yet experiments on the elasticity of the air continued to be made

until they ended in the steam-engine. It looked down with a sovereign sneer on the grave philosopher, who, with sapient eye, curiously pried into the jerking of a frog's leg : but the philosopher went on with this prying, which seemed to be the most unpromising of all idle curiosity, until the truth which he discovered enabled him to construct the "Voltaic pile," that mighty instrument of modern times ; by which the science of chystology has been created ; the wonders of chemistry revealed ; the *materia medica* enriched beyond all conception ; in short, by which the world has been incalculably benefited. Appolonius was governed by the love of abstract truth alone, when he spent his days and nights in discussing the properties of the conic sections. He did not dream of the sublime uses to which, two thousand years afterward, his discoveries would be applied, in helping to unveil the mechanism of the heavens, and to display the inconceivable wonders of creative wisdom. And but for some superficial uses, which must have struck the minds of all, the German who industriously constructed his glasses, and put them together, in order to look through them at distant objects, would have met with the ridicule and scorn of the same little spirit of utilitarianism. But his labors led Galileo to construct the telescope, with which he pierced the depths of the universe, and beheld the glory of its "wilderness of suns."

In one word, the whole history of science shows the absurdity and folly of setting up the useful as the guiding principle of inquiry. In philosophy, the great question is, What is truth ? The philosopher well knows, that apparently the most insignificant truth may be attended with important results, of which he can, at first, form no conception. It may lead to a hundred uses of which he does not dream ; these uses may lead to the discovery of other truths ; which, in their turn, may be followed by other uses ; and so on in endless and wide-spreading progression. The man, then, who would fetter discovery, by our perceptions of the useful, is not the benefactor of his fellow-man. He would, indeed, extinguish the light of science, and cripple the energies of art. He would devote the one to blindness, and the other to barrenness.

Mr. Macauley has well said, that "the knowledge in which Bacon excelled all men, was a knowledge of the mutual relations of all departments of knowledge." He saw precisely the relation of the true and the useful. The first was the great end of his philosophy. The *Novum Organum*, or New Machine, as he has called it, was not a new machine for the making of shoes, or the constructing of steam-engines, but for "the building up of the sciences." It was an instrument designed to help the human mind

in "the interpretation of nature," the constructing of "axioms," the discovery of truth. This, we repeat, was the great leading object of his philosophy. It was not the pursuit of new continents, but the pursuit of new truth, which enabled him to bear up under all the difficulties that surrounded him. He says,—

"We, for our part at least, overcome by the eternal love of truth, have committed ourselves to uncertain, steep, and desert tracks, and, trusting and relying on divine assistance, have borne up our mind against the violence of opinions, drawn up, as it were, in battle array against our own internal doubts and scruples, against the mists and clouds of nature, and against fancies flitting on all sides around us; that we might at length collect some more trustworthy and certain indications for the living and posterity."

Yet the mistake of Mr. Macauley is not unnatural. It is very evident that "the vulgar useful" is the great end and aim of his philosophy; and, hence, in contemplating the philosophy of Bacon, he very naturally concluded that the little planet in which he himself dwells is the great centre of the system.

We have been greatly surprised to find Bacon placed at the head of the sensuous philosophy. We have before us an exceedingly valuable little "History of Philosophy," which forms a part of the Harpers' Family Library, and which contains the following passage:—"The principle laid down by Bacon, *that sensations are the sole matter of which the tissue of human knowledge is formed*, contained a whole psychology; but, before it could develop itself completely, this principle was applied to cosmology by Gassendi, to morals and politics by Hobbes. Then it produced its proper psychology in the works of Locke and Condillac."—Vol. ii, p. 31. This little work is, in general, very correct; but in this particular it is greatly at fault. No evidence is produced in support of the above assertion; and we can only say, at present, that although we have repeatedly read all the writings of Lord Bacon, we have never met with a single passage in which any such principle is laid down, or from which it can be fairly deduced. There is as great an affinity between Plato and Bacon as there is between Bacon and Hobbes. Indeed, Bacon represents the harmonious combination of the two opposite philosophies of which Plato and Hobbes are the principal types. Hobbes has merely appropriated the sensuous elements of Bacon's philosophy, and despised the other, for the same reason that the cock in the fable preferred the barleycorn to the gem. It has fared with Bacon not otherwise than it did with Aristotle; he has been often judged and condemned, as well as praised and admired, for the errors and follies of his pretended disciples.

The sharp and striking contrasts which Mr. Macauley has presented between Plato and Bacon, seem to us better calculated to produce an effect than to elucidate the truth. "To sum up the whole," says he, "we should say that the aim of the Platonic philosophy was to exalt man into a god. The aim of the Baconian philosophy was to provide man with what he requires while he continues man. The aim of the Platonic philosophy was to raise us far above vulgar wants. The aim of the Baconian philosophy was to supply our vulgar wants. . . . Plato drew a good bow ; but, like Acestes in Virgil, he aimed at the stars ; and, therefore, though there was no want of strength or skill, the shot was thrown away. His arrow was indeed followed by a dazzling track of radiance, but it struck nothing. Bacon fixed his eye on a mark which was placed on the earth, and within bow-shot, and hit it in the white." It is true, that the philosophy of Bacon aims to supply our vulgar wants, and not to raise us above them ; but it also has as high and lofty an aim as the philosophy of Plato, or any other philosophy. If it be praise to have one's highest aim "set on the earth," it is praise to which Bacon is not entitled. In imitating the spirit of Him who wrought miracles for the good of the body, he did not forget that "his doctrine was delivered for the benefit of the soul." "The main and primitive division of moral knowledge," saith he, "seemeth to be into the exemplar or platform of good, and the regiment or culture of the mind ; the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto." The exemplar of good which he proposes as our model is no less than the character of God himself. "Aspiring to be like unto God in power," he says, "the angels transgressed and fell ; by aspiring to be like unto God in knowledge, man transgressed and fell ; but by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or shall transgress. *For unto that imitation we are called.*"—*Advancement of Learning*. It is not easy to conceive how a higher aim could possibly be proposed. It is set far above the earth. It looks infinitely higher than our vulgar wants.

It was not the fault of Plato's philosophy that it aimed at the stars ; it was the fault of human nature that it did not reach so high an aim. There is an old adage, in relation to moral conduct, which says, "*Aim at the stars*, and your arrow will fly higher than if you take a meaner aim." It is not the business of the moral philosopher to recommend errors and imperfections to our imitation. Notwithstanding all the scorn and ridicule which have been

poured on the precepts of Seneca, we cannot doubt his wisdom in saying, that "it is the mark of a generous spirit to aim at what is lofty; to attempt what is arduous; and ever to keep in view what it is impossible for the most splendid talents to accomplish." An infinitely wiser than Seneca has said, "Be ye perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect."

Mr. Macauley admits that what Bacon has done for the inductive philosophy, has never been too highly estimated; but he places his sole and exclusive merit in this, that he set up the vulgar useful as the great end of philosophy. By this feature, his philosophy is distinguished from that of all his predecessors. What! was Bacon the first utilitarian? Did the nature of man undergo a great and radical transformation about his time? Does not Mr. Macauley himself tell us of the scorn with which Plato regarded "the vulgar crowd of geometricians," who "have practice always in view?"

It is well known that Socrates brought down philosophy from heaven to earth; because he deemed the study of moral and political science to be highly useful, and the study of natural philosophy to be vain and fruitless. It was under the guidance of the principle of utility that Socrates effected a great revolution in philosophy; and hence, this could not have been the distinguishing peculiarity of Bacon's labors, when he brought about a counter-revolution, and carried philosophy back from earth to heaven, or, rather, extended her dominion over both the heavens and the earth.

"True to this principle," says Mr. Macauley, "Bacon indulged in no rants about the fitness of things, the all sufficiency of virtue, and the dignity of human nature." As for the last, Bacon well knew that the dignity of human nature consisted in the hope set before it, and not in its possessions. Of the sufficiency of virtue he has said no less than this: "Certainly, it is heaven upon earth to have a man's mind move in charity, rest in providence, and turn upon the poles of truth." We doubt if a loftier or more beautiful sentiment can be found in any writer of antiquity. It is true, Bacon says nothing about "the fitness of things;" he merely speaks of "the harmony of nature." Indeed, all the great philosophers of all ages have been deeply impressed with the idea, that the most perfect order and harmony prevail in the world; and this conviction is everywhere manifested in the writings of Bacon. There is this difference, however, between Plato and Bacon. Plato first drew his ideas of order and perfection from his own mind and then expected to find this model realized in the uni-

verse of God. Bacon considered that this was an error, which sprung from a too great and "superstitious reverence of the human intellect;" and being fully persuaded, that the order and harmony which God had actually established was more wonderful than anything that had entered the imagination of man, he sought for the true model, not in "the little world within," but in "the great world without." In order to obtain a view of the divine harmony which pervades that, he wished to destroy all "the vain, little, and, as it were, apish imitations of the world, which had been formed in various systems of philosophy by men's fancies."

"Nature delights in harmony," he has repeatedly said, "and scarcely admits of anything isolated or solitary." He did not profess to have obtained a view of this harmony; but he longed to behold it. In his estimation, there is no pleasure on earth like that which the mind would derive from an ability to rise above the apparent darkness and perturbation of the world, and to behold the real order and harmony which God had established in the universe. If the sublime idea of Newton, that all things in heaven and earth are governed by the same law, was first suggested to his mind by the falling of an apple, it must have been, because he had not read all the writings of Bacon. In his *De Augmentis* he says,—

"Whosoever shall reject the feigned divorces of the superlunary and of the sublunary bodies, and shall intently observe the appetites of matter, and the most universal passions, (which, in either globe, are exceeding potent, and transorbate the universal nature of things,) *he shall receive clear information concerning celestial matters from the things seen here with us!* and contrawise from those motions which are practiced in heaven; he shall learn many observations which now are latent, touching the motions of bodies here below; not only so far as these inferior motions are moderated by the superior, *but in regard they have a mutual intercourse by passions common to both.*"

And again,—

"Our chiefest hope and dependance in the consideration of the celestial bodies, is, therefore, placed in physical reasons, though not such as are commonly so called; *but those laws, which no diversity of place or region can abolish, break through, disturb, or alter.*"

How widely does this last sentiment differ from the doctrine of Aristotle, which placed the superlunary and sublunary bodies under entirely different laws; and how high does it rise above the conceptions of Galileo on the same subject, as well as of every other philosopher who preceded Newton! No philosopher ever entertained a more profound conviction of the union and harmony of all nature than Bacon; and if he never spoke "of the fitness of

things," it was because the language was too small for the grandeur and magnificence of his conceptions.

We must now take a reluctant leave of Bacon and his critics. We might have noticed many other strictures which have been offered upon his philosophy; but we have wished to confine ourselves to those which present questions of the greatest interest and importance to our consideration. Having derived our knowledge of Bacon's philosophy from a careful study of his works, we have been greatly surprised at the gross caricatures and misrepresentations of it which are afloat in the world; and we have been desirous to correct them. If our imperfect endeavors in this way shall have the effect of inducing other persons to study for themselves those great and wonderful productions, from which we have derived so much instruction and delight, our object will be fully attained. The student of Bacon will often find himself transported with views of the grand and beautiful, but never lost or bewildered in the cloudy heights of the transcendental. He says,—

"We do not desire to assume or acquire any majestic state for these our discoveries, by the triumph of confutations, the citing of antiquity, the usurpation of authority, *or even the veil of obscurity*, which would easily suggest themselves to one endeavoring to throw light upon his own name, rather than the minds of others. . . . *We exhibit things plainly and openly*, SO THAT OUR ERRORS CAN BE NOTED AND SEPARATED BEFORE THEY CORRUPT ANY FURTHER THE MASS OF SCIENCES."

Nor, on the other hand, will he who carefully and candidly studies this great master ever find himself shut up in the narrow confines of a sensuous philosophy, which necessarily excludes the light of a spiritual world, and of all divine things. In one word, he will find that Lord Bacon is the master of no school or sect; but that he is as he has been well called, "the master of wisdom."

ART. III.—*On certain Prejudices existing in the Community against Labor, against educated and professional Men, and against Men of Wealth.*

THERE are often found in communities constituted like our own certain prevalent notions or prejudices, as they may be termed, which have their origin in the circumstances and modes of thinking that pertain to different classes and orders of society, and which, if cherished and suffered to gain strength and widely diffuse themselves, are attended with danger. At least they tend to hinder that mutual co-operation, that carrying forward together of the common work, which the prosperity of each individual, of each class, and of the whole, imperiously demands. They tend also to mar the happiness and disturb the quiet of the social state, creating jealousies and strifes, and arraying against each other those who should dwell together as brethren. And when, as it sometimes happens, these prejudices connect themselves with civil divisions, and serve as the foundations of political parties, they even threaten the ruin and overthrow of the state. Such was the Agrarian party in ancient Rome; and such were some of the factions which led to the overthrow of the French monarchy. It will readily occur, that the prejudices of which we speak are the results of limited views, of looking at subjects in wrong lights, and through an obscuring and distorting medium. Hence, all which seems required to set the mind free from these wrong biases and erroneous notions, is to get on to higher ground, to rise above obscuring mists and deceitful shadows, and, looking over a wider and more extended field of vision, to see better the bearings of things,—to discern not only how they may affect our own interests, but their bearings on the welfare of others, and on the public good.

Let us then consider some of the more obvious and widely diffused prejudices of the kind to which we have referred. Let us endeavor distinctly to learn what these erroneous impressions are, in what views they have their origin, and what can, and may, be done for their correction and removal.

And here we may incidentally remark, that there is especial need of this attempt in a free, representative government, such as we enjoy. Divisions and parties will indeed always be found in a republic; for those who have freedom of thought and speech on questions of national policy will not always think alike on such topics. But it is ever deemed important that the grounds of party divisions should have as little of permanency attached to them as possible.

And such in truth they most generally are ;—mere foundations of sand heaped together by some strong conflict of elemental strife, to be scattered by the succeeding commotion. But let a party in the state be based on some principle permanent in its nature, and one which deeply interests the feelings and affects the prospects and standing of a large class in the community, and we are in the midst of danger. Little abiding evil is to be apprehended from the agitation of a presidential election, or from the allotments of the loaves and fishes of office to one individual or to his rival ; but let there spring up in a self-governing community a rich men's party, or a working men's party, and other distinctions based on the permanent relations of the social state, and no assurance remains for security or peace.

Entering, then, upon our proposed subject with a sense of its importance as connected with the public good, we would first ask the attention of our readers to an impression which, to some extent, prevails at the present day, that the laboring classes of the community have interests differing in some degree from those of other classes ; and that there is something less eligible—less to be desired in the condition of those thus occupied, than in that of others ; in fact, *that there is something rather degrading in labor.* We do not affirm that this opinion is often or ever distinctly avowed and defended. Few, indeed, would venture to express an opinion disparaging those to whose exertions they are indebted for the supply of so large a proportion of their wants, and to whose hands, it may be, they look for the bestowment of the coveted honors and emoluments of office. Still, we may detect the existence of the opinion to which we have referred, in the fact, that many hesitate to do for themselves or their friends, before others, those offices which, able-bodied men and at leisure as they are, they might perform. They would be ashamed to be caught in the soiled dress of the working-man ; and, if found with an ax or a spade in their hands, would be very ready to assure the passer-by that they were working for exercise. We may, also, detect the existence of this impression in the reluctance of so many of our young men to share their fathers' toil on the farm and in the workshop, preferring rather to crowd the ranks of professional life, or to press in throngs to our cities, urged on by the adventurous spirit of mercantile pursuits.

That labor and laborers should be lightly esteemed in slaveholding communities might reasonably be expected. The association is an easy one which connects the employments of the slave with his degraded condition. In those countries, too, where the distinc-

tions of rank are strongly marked, where an hereditary nobility and the ceremonials of a court are found, there will be those who think it degrading for a man to be engaged in any useful employment. At least, they will esteem it disreputable to one of noble birth to be thus engaged, as if to belong to a class of society, the end of whose existence is to do nothing, were to be of a privileged order. But it should not be so in a community of freemen, of those of equal rights and privileges, and whose dependence on each other in the social state is close and mutual. The idea, that there is anything degrading in any honest employment, which ministers to the general good, and tends to the supply of the common wants, is opposed to the spirit of our free institutions. It is also at variance with the economical interests of the community. A large proportion of our national supplies is derived from national industry. Here also is the main source of that increase of national capital, which is the attendant and index of national prosperity. By the estimate of one of our political economists, at least three-fourths of the annual national income is drawn from the industry of the people. Another able statesman has asserted, that the value of the work done in the single state of Massachusetts is more than one hundred thousand dollars every day. What then must be the ruinous effect of an impression which leaves in listless idleness or unprofitable amusement a large class of the inhabitants of a land? Besides, who sees not, as is sufficiently obvious to all, that there is in reality no ground for a distinction of the nature we are considering, since the dependencies of life are mutual? Of what avail are the treasures of the affluent to their possessors, if they are not surrounded by those skillful and able to minister to their wants? Indeed, of the two, is not he far more independent, who can help himself to the supplies furnished at nature's feast, than he who receives these supplies through the medium of another?

Why, then, the inquiry returns upon us, if this mutual dependence exists, and no honest employment is to be disparaged in this land of freedom and equality, why do we find so prevalent the prejudice against labor, of which we have spoken? We can offer in reply no better explanation than to say, that it is to be traced to certain associations which, even here, are wont to connect themselves with the employment and condition of the laborer. To some of these associations we will now advert; at the same time endeavoring both to show that they rest upon no good foundation, and to offer some suggestions which may tend to their removal.

Labor, then, is looked upon as degrading, because there is, in

most cases, a necessity that it be performed. It is the condition on which those who labor obtain their daily bread, and this idea of dependence and compulsion is by no means a grateful thought. Indeed, a different condition, that of wealth, or at least of competency, is ever looked upon as desirable; it is the aim of most during a great portion of their lives. Perhaps, too, in this connection, the thoughts sometimes wander back to the sentence pronounced upon guilty Adam and his race,—“In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return unto the ground;” and they thus recur to the doom of man with any feelings rather than those of self-abasement and humility.

But here it may well be asked, Are these opinions as to the relative advantages of different conditions of life well founded? Is it certain, that he who feels no necessity for exertion resting upon him, is a happier man than his willing, plodding neighbor? Put this inquiry to the man of wealth, and he will acknowledge that his views on this subject differ much from those which he entertained in an earlier part of his course. He will have much to say of his cares and anxieties, his fears of losing, and his perplexities and vexations in the management of his multiplied concerns. Perhaps, if we could look into his heart, we should find him almost ready to envy him who is, as he once was, a poor man. At least, he will assure us that the satisfaction of acquiring far exceeds that of possessing.

And then again as to this necessity of labor, from which so many would be free, we have only to look at the human constitution, both mental and physical, to be persuaded that an exemption of this kind is by no means desirable. Man must have employment. He is made for daily toil. Deprive his mind or body of action, and they are at once shorn of their glory. The former sinks into idiocy or madness, the latter becomes enfeebled and diseased. The necessity, then, that men should labor, arises not from any condition in life. It is not imposed by man on his fellow-men. It is one which God imposes, and it must be obeyed. Even those who do not devote themselves to any useful toil, must, and do, seek employment. Hunting, fishing, riding, and even gambling and fighting, are only means, some of them objectionable enough, of obeying this fixed law of our natures.

A second unfavorable association, which in the minds of some is connected with labor, leads them to look upon the operations of industry as of a mechanical nature; or, we might rather say, to look upon the laborer himself as a machine,—perhaps a part of a machine. Hence they readily associate with labor, ignorance and

mere imbecility; and look upon a life spent in daily toil as an unthinking, degraded existence.

It is not to be denied, that the condition of the laboring population in some countries affords too much reason for this unfavorable impression. One may find in the crowded manufacturing population of Europe those thus degraded—those, whose lives from infancy to premature decrepitude are spent in ignorance and mindless toil; and of whom it may truly be said, that the whole history of their existence is comprised in a single line,—that they have been employed in making the eighteenth part of a pin. But thank Heaven such laborers are not found in this land. We have no human machinery here, and while our system of common schools, the rich legacy left us by our fathers, shall continue to be cherished and maintained, we never shall have. True, indeed, our laboring men cannot be men of learning, of literary and scientific attainments,

“ Knowledge to their eyes her ample page
Rich with the spoils of time did ne’er unroll.”

Still, they may be, and they are, men of intelligence, of sound judgment and quick apprehension, well acquainted with whatever pertains to their own business in life, and conversant with the occurrences and agitated subjects of their day. Converse with them on questions of public policy, and they will soon show that they know their own rights and are not ignorant of what pertains to the public welfare. They will give good evidence, also, that on moral and religious subjects they are not without understanding—that they know how to read their Bibles, and to learn from this pure source what is duty and what is truth.

There is not, then, in New-England, at least, any necessary connection between a life of manual labor and ignorance, and there never need be this connection. Let the days of childhood and youth, the favorable season for mental improvement, be spent in the school-room, and in later periods of life let the fragments of time be gathered up and turned to good account; especially let the many opportunities for gaining useful information, presenting themselves in our villages and towns, be improved—the lyceum, the newspaper, and the scientific journal—and there need be no fear that there will not be knowledge enough diffused through our whole population, to be the stability of our times. And here let us add, that it is the duty of every one who knows the elevating influence of knowledge and the intimate connection between its general diffusion and the public welfare, to see to it, that his influence be felt in the cause of education and good learning.

But we will not consume more of the time and patience of our readers in thus defending labor from unjust and ill-founded associations. We would speak of it in another strain—we would claim for it respect. He, and he only, who spends his days in toil—in toil, either of the body or mind, fulfills the purposes of his being, and gives good proof of manhood. If man is to do nothing, why were his noble powers of mind bestowed upon him? Why was he made a thinking, contriving, reasoning being? For what purpose, too, is the cunning craft of the hand, the telescopic eye, the vocal chamber of the ear; why this complicated structure of joints and muscles, the very handy-work of God? Look also at man in his social relations, as a member of the community. How vast the amount to be provided for the supply of a nation's wants! How much work is to be done! And has he not a fair title to respect who ably and faithfully performs his share of this work? Where, too, shall we look for brighter examples of those virtues which truly ennoble our race, than are to be found in the laboring classes of society? A life of labor is a life spent in encountering difficulties and overcoming obstacles, in bringing to bear the energies of our nature for the accomplishment of important ends. And is there here no call for self-denial, for resolution, nothing allied to that nobleness of spirit which can boldly undertake great objects, and go forward unhesitatingly in their accomplishment? And here, too, we might speak of virtues of a different class, those homelier, lowlier virtues, which spring up and shed abroad their rich fragrance in the more humble walks of life. Beneath the rough exterior of the laboring man there throbs a heart alive to others' woes, and that toil-worn hand is ever ready to extend itself to succor and to aid. And what is it that sustains and animates the laborer in his daily toil? He is thinking of his home and of the loved ones there.

“His wee bit ingle, blinkin bonnily,
His clean hearth-stane, his thriftie wifie's smile,
The lisping infant prattling on his knee,
Does a' his weary carking care beguile,
An' makes him quite forget his labor and his toil.”

We have thus far spoken of what relates more particularly to those engaged in manual labor; but there is another class of laborers against whom an impression of evil tendency is abroad in our community, and one which requires to be corrected. We refer to a *prejudice against educated and professional men*, those whose employments are of a mental kind. Every one is aware that, to some extent, a feeling of this kind exists, especially among the

mass of the population who are occupied in manual labor. Not unfrequently, indeed, does it manifest itself either in the form of sarcasm and reproachful remark, or in feelings and acts of opposition to the interests of education; at least in the undervaluing of its importance, and this not merely where we should expect to find such feelings and thoughts, in scenes of both mental and moral degradation, but among those who have influence in society, and sometimes even in the halls of legislation. Hence, the unwillingness to afford needed aid and support to the institutions of learning, and the opinion maintained by many, that whatever is thus expended is lost to the community. Sometimes, also, attempts have been made to connect prejudices of this kind with our political agitations; and we have had in some portions of our country our working men's party, and some have even thought to exclude from the halls of national and state legislation an important class of professional men.

Fully to account for the rise of this prejudice, it might be necessary to look into the depths of the human heart and to bring out to public view some of the unlovely traits of character found there. But such exhibitions, it is well known, are by no means grateful, neither would this be the wisest way in which to attempt the removal of unfounded prejudice. We will direct our attention rather to the errors of the head than of the heart.

There are, then, two erroneous impressions pertaining to mental employments, on which, we are persuaded, the prejudice we are considering is mainly founded. One of these impressions is, that educated and professional men are not laboring men. They are not looked upon as belonging to the working part of the community. On the contrary, it is supposed, that they pass their time in indolence; or, at least, that when occupied, it is for their own amusement only that they employ themselves. But is this impression a correct one?

That there are educated men who are not working men, is not to be denied. Neither will it be denied, that there are uneducated men who are not working men. The truth is, there are found in every class of society those who are indolent, who dislike work, and who, so far as absolute necessity is not laid upon them, will not work. But does the concession here made authorize the conclusion, that educated men, as a class of the community, are not working men? What is work? Is it laboring with the hands, putting forth the powers of the body only? Man is made up of mind and body. He has intellectual as well as physical powers; and when these mental energies are called into full action, con-

stantly directed to the accomplishment of some object, and tasked to the utmost, is not he who is thus occupied a laborer? We may take as a standard of labor the effects produced on the human system—the exhausting of its powers, the impairing of its energies, and in this view we would ask, whether those employed in mental toils are not laboring men? Else, why are there found so many in this class of society with enfeebled, shattered constitutions? Why so many who sink into a premature grave?

The other impression, to which reference has been made, is, that educated men are, in a great measure, useless members of the community; at least, that they do little or nothing toward furnishing the supply of the common wants, and promoting the general welfare: in fact, they are rather looked upon as drones in the hive, who consume, indeed, their share of the sweets, but gather them not.

That intelligent men, those acquainted with the relations and dependencies of man in the social state, and with the connection between science and the arts, and who have liberal views as to human wants and employments, should maintain an opinion of this kind, can hardly be supposed. Still, it may be expedient to offer some statements which may show its incorrectness.

Let us look, then, first at professional labor; and look at it in its connection with the general prosperity, the economical interests of the community.

A lawyer investigates and establishes one's title to his farm. By papers drawn up according to legal forms and properly certified and recorded, the individual is enabled to hold possession of this farm for his own use and benefit, to the exclusion of all others. And now would he be ready to esteem the man an important help, who should aid him to place a fence around this farm, that his crops may be in safety against the inroads of brute force, and would he look upon *him* as effecting nothing for his advantage, through whose instrumentality he is made secure against intrusion and loss in other forms? A laborer is sick, and for successive days is unable to pursue his daily toil. Does *he* effect nothing toward the common good, who directs him to a remedy which restores an effective laborer to soundness and his accustomed health and strength? That men may dwell securely, and that the processes of industry may be successfully conducted, there must be good laws—laws which derive all their binding force from the power of public opinion. Does not he then promote the prosperity of a nation, who, by diffusing abroad a healthful moral and religious influence, makes secure these foundations of public justice, and gives

strength to the arm of public authority? But we have not time to dwell on these views, neither is it necessary. The truth is, professional men are working men, having the same interests, and carrying forward a part of the same great work in which other laboring men are engaged.

But it may here occur, that there are educated men who are not professional men; who are rarely or never seen abroad in the walks of life, but who pass their days in the retirement of their studies, conversant for the most part with books only, or occupied with the investigation and development of the laws of nature. And here, perhaps, those who entertain the prejudice we are examining, may think it difficult to show a connection between the labors of such and the interests of the community, or, at least, to point out their direct bearing on the general good.

But let us look for a moment at this point; and first, as to men of science. Every one must have noticed to what extent men in civilized life avail themselves of the assistance of nature, in carrying forward those processes by which the wants of the great national family are supplied; and this, not only where natural agency is directly employed, as in agricultural processes, but in other instances in which man avails himself of the properties of natural objects about him, and of the laws of nature, in furnishing himself with tools and machinery. But how are these properties and laws to be found out and turned to the best account? Evidently, these are no easy tasks. They require long-continued, patient investigation, oft-repeated and skillfully conducted experiments, and much thought; and unless there are those devoted to these pursuits, those who have time and ability to investigate, and experiment, and reason, none of these important results are to be looked for. Here, then, is labor, and appropriate labor for educated men; and labor most intimately connected with the public prosperity.

It might be interesting in this connection to refer our readers to the history of inventions, and thus to place before them the testimony of facts to the close connection between scientific labors and the arts of life. What aid has been given to the agriculturist in the investigations made by Sir Humphrey Davy and others, of the properties of different soils! How much has been effected by the same science within a few years for the improvement of the process of tanning hides! The same is also true of the art of dyeing cloth. How, without the aid of chemistry, would the products of the loom be tinged with hues, fixed and made permanent, and various as the fancies of the fair!

Every farmer knows that some soils are better adapted to the

raising of certain crops than others; but how to remedy these defects, what course of cultivation should be followed, and what applications should be made to different soils, that they may be rendered fertile, it is the office of the chemist to determine. But here it may occur to some, that many important inventions and discoveries are the result of accident, or have been made by practical men, who are directly employed in conducting processes of manual labor.

This is indeed sometimes, though not always, the case. Many important inventions have resulted from long-continued experiments alone; and most of the discoveries that have been made of those great laws and principles of the natural world which serve as the foundation of useful inventions, have been imparted to the world by scientific laborers.

It is also here to be noticed, that in those instances where accidental discoveries and inventions have been made, it is science which has perfected these inventions and tested their value, by referring them to the great principles of nature, and by applying them to the various purposes they may be made to subserve. We might here refer to that wonder of our age, the steam-engine. Any man sitting by his kitchen fire might be the discoverer of the expansive power of steam; but it is science which has investigated the laws by which this mighty agent is governed, and has subjected it to human control. And then, when the power is created and ready to do our bidding, what mechanical knowledge and skill are required in its various applications! Think, for a moment, of the different directions which are given to this power, and of the different offices it is made to perform. Now it reaches down to the depths beneath, and brings up to the regions of light the hidden treasures of the mine;—and now, burying itself in some subterranean cell, it sends up its Herculean arm and Briarean hands and fingers of iron to do its wonders of skill and of power in the workshop above. At one time it conceals itself beneath the deck of the vessel, and the huge mass, which lies “floating many a rood,” becomes instinct with life and motion; like leviathan of old, “it maketh the sea to boil like a pot, and out of its nostrils goeth smoke and sparks of fire leap out.” At another time, “swifter than a post,” it speeds its way over hill and valley, hurrying onward, in its rocket-like course, its train of rattling cars. But it is not only in the perfecting of inventions, and in multiplying the useful application of discovered powers, that the aid of science is felt. We might speak of its importance as it teaches men the limits of discovery and invention, telling them not only what may be done, but what may

not be done. How much time and useless labor are thus saved! How many highly raised expectations are shown to be delusive! But we must not dwell longer on this topic, for we have to speak of another class, whose labors are of a mental kind. We refer to those whose employments are more strictly of a literary nature, the historian, the poet, the essayist; and it may be that in the minds of some the connection between the labors of such and the welfare of the community may not be obvious. But here let us ask ourselves, In what way is the general welfare to be promoted—what are the wants of a community? Is it simply that man may be sheltered from the storm, and have food and raiment convenient for him? Are there no other constituents of his happiness, nothing else for which he may reasonably toil and spend his strength? Has the intellectual part no wants to be supplied? Are there no gratifications to be ministered to the mind? But apart from these considerations, which, it may be seen, look rather to the individual than to the community, we may ask, does not literature tend directly and powerfully to the public welfare? Are not the benign influences she exerts intimately connected with a nation's prosperity and happiness? What made ancient Greece and Rome differ from other nations around them? Why had they more elevation of character, more kind feeling, more of mental enjoyment, and of the charities of life? Eloquently has one of our own orators answered these inquiries by telling us what Greece owes to her first-born of song. A nation was cast in the mold of one mighty mind, and the land of the Iliad became the region of taste, and the birthplace of the arts.

But we need not refer back to ancient nations in proof of the refining influences of literature. We speak of a people as civilized, and we think of a region around which civil government has placed its defenses, and where the arts of life are cultivated, and its decencies are regarded, a region over which knowledge and religion shed their combined radiance. But there is still another principle at work, of powerful and benign efficacy. It is that which makes itself seen in the order and beauty spread over the whole face of the country, which gives a grace and charm to the civilities of social intercourse, and which shows itself in the habitations, the furniture, the dress,—all that even the useful arts contribute for the accommodation of men. And this pervading principle is taste. Most obviously then, whatever tends to the cultivation of the taste is justly to be ranked among the most efficient causes in the great work of civilization. Such, in an eminent degree, is literature. If it were necessary to establish this position, we might here refer

you to England. She has been called the land of classical scholars; and, without doubt, the influence of her literature is widely felt in almost every class of her population. And who that wanders over her fields, and looks on her villages and towns, her cottages and her palaces, her scenes of moral elegance and civic splendor, sees not around him the fruits of a refined and cultivated taste? Who that enters her dwellings and marks the manners of her inhabitants, and the objects around them in their domestic retirements, will fail to discover even here the traces of a refined taste? At least we may ask, who that reads the sketches of these scenes and objects, as they are delineated by one who is the ornament of our own literature, will doubt, that the land of literature is the dwelling-place of taste? We may, then, claim for those who rank themselves as the followers of literature some title to the respect and gratitude of their country. Milton, and Shakspeare, and Addison, did not live in vain, and spend their strength for naught.

There remains one other impression injurious to the interests of the community, to which we would invite your attention. It is *a prejudice against men of wealth*. Many, indeed, there are around us on whom Heaven has bestowed Agur's desired blessing, giving them neither riches nor poverty; still, in this country, as in all other communities where the rights of property are respected, the distinction of rich and poor is known. Here, too, as in other lands, spring up some of those jealousies and heart-burnings which have their origin in these diversities of outward condition. But it is not to the repinings and murmurs of discontent that we would now advert: neither is it our present object to adduce considerations which may moderate the earnestness with which the riches of earth are sought. We would look rather at the bearings of the subject on the public safety and welfare, persuaded, as we are, that let the prejudice, to which we have referred, become deeply fixed and widely diffused, and there is just reason for apprehension of danger. Those who think themselves defrauded of their just share of the national wealth, and who are ready to think that a more just and equal distribution should be made, will not long hesitate to assert and maintain what they esteem their just rights. It will soon be found out that here is work for the reformers of our age. Such indications have already shown themselves among the signs of the times. And it is because attempts have been occasionally made in some parts of our country by political demagogues and ranting partisans, to call out these prejudices in aid of their selfish and dangerous purposes, that we deem it important to mention this topic in this connection.

And here the first thought that occurs to us is, that in every civilized community the distinction of rich and poor will be found. It grows out of the nature of man and the constitution of civil society. Wherever the rights of property are regarded and men are made secure in their possessions, some will acquire and accumulate more than others; and so long as men differ in their habits of industry and frugality, in enterprise, and skill, and good management, this must ever be the case.

And not only is this arrangement necessary, it is beneficial. Many are the processes of industry; and those, too, most intimately connected not only with the prosperity, but with the comfort and existence, of a large community, which could not be conducted without the accumulation of capital. Without capital where would be our internal improvements, our railroads and canals; where our commerce, and our manufacturing establishments, and the multiplied powers of machinery by which the powers and objects of nature around us are made to minister most essentially to the aid of man? On these inequalities of wealth are also based, in part, that division of labor without which the social system could hardly exist. There must then be accumulations of capital in every prosperous community. And we may add, that of all the members of a community, none are more interested in its possessing capital, than such as are most ready to join in the cry against those by whom it is possessed.

There is another general proposition which we offer. Every man of wealth, who, to use a common expression, has made his own fortune, in other words, who has by his own industry and use of the productive powers at his command, created the riches which he possesses, every such individual, while he has benefited himself, has at the same time conferred important benefits on the community in which he lives; and hence, instead of being regarded with prejudice, he should be looked upon as a public benefactor.

It can hardly be necessary to dwell for a moment on this proposition. Every one is fully aware, and readily acknowledges, that a man of wealth, who uses his property so as to give employment to those about him, is a benefactor to the town or village in which he is found. And if, too, as often happens, he places before others an example of industry and frugality, of good management and skillful conduct of his affairs, it is an example worthy of all praise and all imitation too.

But here, perhaps, it may occur to some that there are other ways in which men become possessed of wealth, and other ways, too, in which they employ it; and it may be thought that there will

be found in these other ways of obtaining and using wealth some ground for the prejudice we are considering. We will, then, briefly dwell on this view of the subject before us.

Men sometimes obtain wealth by extortion, by oppression and violence, by grinding the face of the poor, and by defrauding the weak and defenseless of their just dues. No one will complain, that a prejudice exists against those who thus become affluent. Let it not only exist, but let it be manifested, till the oppressed go free, till the strong arm of national justice place those who are thus injurious where they can injure and defraud no more.

Nearly allied to extortion and injustice is gambling, in all its forms, whether it be at the fashionable billiard or card table, at the lottery-office, or in those resorts of gamblers emphatically and appropriately called the "hells" of our cities. By such modes of acquiring wealth the community receives no benefit, and many are injured. Small, indeed, is the respect to which the rich gamester may consider himself entitled. Others there are who have acquired wealth by successful speculation. In one of those seasons "when madness rules the hour," they have engaged in some hazardous enterprise, and after venturing all, and having been tossed for awhile by the agitated waves of hope and fear, a fortunate current has brought them, as they think, to a safe and desirable harbor. Hardly knowing why it is, or should be so, they find themselves rich men.

Acquisitions of wealth thus made can hardly be looked upon as attended with any important benefits. Often, indeed, they prove injurious to the speculator himself; for sudden riches bring a snare, and further, as the sad lessons of experience have taught many in our community, to the speculator there often in the end cometh disappointment and perplexity. Evidently, the community is not benefited, because in such acquisitions of wealth there is no creation of value. They are mere transfers from one member of the community to another; and often from the more deserving to those less so. And this is not all the injury done to the public. The established course of things becomes unsettled, the business habits of the community are broken up, and our young men, no longer contented with slow and sure gains, desert the good old ways of their fathers. If to these many evils which attend speculation there is any counterbalancing advantage, it is this, that by these means a new impetus is given to the enterprise and energies of a people; but surely those who dwell in this land of enterprise and exertion need rather the check-rein than the spur.

But having thus adverted to these ways in which the oppressor, the gambler, and the speculator obtain wealth, and having granted

that such have no claim on the favorable regards of the community, let us add, that there is here found no ground for any prejudice which fixes itself on men of wealth as a class. All the concessions now made may be granted, and still we may claim respect for him, who, while he benefits himself, confers benefits on those around him.

And here, had we not already exhausted the patience of our readers, we might speak in the same light of the different ways of using wealth. On the one hand, he who hoards it might receive our pity and contempt; for he who lets his soul so grovel in the dust as to love money for its own sake, can hardly be regarded with other feelings than contempt for his sordid meanness. And surely he who denies himself a reasonable supply of his own wants, who, Tantalus-like, in the midst of flowing streams dies with thirst, is a just object of our pity. He, too, may well be pitied, who, having in his hands the power, knows not the luxury of doing good. On the other hand, we might dwell on the folly and the sin of the spendthrift,—of him who wastes in extravagance and hurtful dissipation a father's frugal earnings, thus becoming a moral pest to those among whom he dwells, and making his own destruction sure. For those who thus use their wealth, we ask not that they should be regarded with favor. Let the finger of public scorn be pointed at them till they learn to respect themselves, and to act more worthily of their obligations and responsibilities. But there are other ways in which wealth may be employed, connecting its possession with the improvement and happiness not only of a community, but of the world. And many there are in our own age and nation, who, by deeds of beneficence, not only show that they well know the true value, the right uses of wealth, but justly claim for themselves and for others of the same class in the community the respect and gratitude of those among whom they dwell.

We have thus adverted to some of the more common prejudices found in the different classes of our community, and have, at the same time, endeavored to effect something toward their removal. If we mistake not, the views presented on these topics well sustain the remark made at the commencement of our article, that what is needed to set the mind free from these prejudices, is to stand on higher ground and enlarge the field of vision. We need to look upon ourselves and others as members of the great national family, and to see in the labors of the individual that which, from the nature of the social relations, must benefit the whole community. We need also to see and to feel what the old trite couplet well expresses,

"Honor and shame from no condition rise,
Act well your part, there all the honor lies."

and this is indeed the sum of the whole matter.

The course of remark that has been followed, must have suggested the intimate connection between an enlightened public opinion and the safety and welfare of our country. More especially is this the case in a self-governing community like our own. Let different individuals and different classes of society understand their relation to each other, and their own true interests in their connection with the general prosperity, and we trust there is virtue and patriotism enough in our country to secure the permanency of our institutions and social arrangements.

ART. IV.—*Evangelische Homiletik*. Von CHRISTIAN PALMER. Zweite verbess. Aufl. (*Evangelical Homiletics*. By CHRISTIAN PALMER. Second edition.) Stuttgart: J. F. Steinkopf. 1845.

(Translated from the German of Hüffell, in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, for October, 1845. By Professors M'CLINTOCK and BLUMENTHAL.)

[WE know of no good treatise on the art of preaching in the English language. Dr. PORTER's "Lectures on Homiletics" stand, doubtless, at the head of our books on the subject; but that work falls far short of the scientific accuracy which so important a theme demands. The same may be said of GRESLEY's recent "Treatise on Preaching," which, although it contains much useful and instructive matter, is discursive and immethodical, as well as incomplete. STURTEVANT's "Preacher's Manual" has been of late republished in this country, much to our sorrow; for it would be hard to find a worse book in any department of scientific theology. A vast mass of materials is accumulated by this author, it is true, but he does not know how to use them; there are bricks and mortar enough, but no building.* A scientific treatment of homiletics in English is a thing yet to be accomplished.

In this field, as in most others, the Germans have outstripped us. The most learned and philosophical treatise which they have

* In this wholesale sentence of condemnation we do not agree with the excellent and learned "translators" of the following able article. We may yet have translated from the German a better work than *Sturtevant's*; and when it comes, we shall hail it as a prize—but if we may judge from the review of *Palmer's* work, which we here present to the reader, that will scarcely be the one.—EDIT.

yet produced is, "Die Theorie der Beredsamkeit," &c., (Theory of Eloquence, with special Reference to the Eloquence of the Pulpit,) by the late Professor SCHOTT, of Jena. An abstract of its fundamental principles may be found in the "Bibliotheca Sacra," for February, 1845, which we heartily commend to the attention of our readers. The latest work on homiletics is that placed at the head of this article, the first edition of which appeared in 1842. PALMER's book has obtained a good reputation in Germany, and, indeed, deserves it. In depth and comprehensiveness of thought, as well as in vigor and freshness of expression, it presents a marked contrast to the dry and soulless compilations which English readers have to put up with. It will be seen, from the following article, that PALMER is the exponent of a reaction against rhetorical preaching, which has been going on for some time in Germany, and which has even advanced so far that many preachers eschew all order and form in their discourses. The writer (HUFFELL) is himself the author of a treatise on the "*Character and Calling of the Gospel Preacher*," (Wesen und Beruf des evangelisch-Christlichen Geistlichen,) which has passed through four editions. It will be seen that while he holds very just views in regard to the use of rhetoric in preaching, assigning to it its proper place as a means only, not as an end, he yet combats the views of the new school so far forth as they tend to encourage a loose and careless style of preaching, and urges the importance of the laws of thought and speech in the pulpit. As PALMER's book will probably be translated and published in this country, we have thought that a translation of this article might be acceptable to the readers of the Quarterly.—THE TRANSLATORS.]

It cannot be denied that nearly all that has been done in homiletics, at least until of late, has been the offspring of sheer empiricism. We have treatises upon sermon-making, with directions and propositions enough—all simply because *sermons are preached*; but rarely has the question been raised *why* we preach thus and not otherwise, or, indeed, why we preach at all. To be sure, in all these books we can recognize some dim outlines of a consciousness that preaching is a very necessary and important thing; but sadly discordant results have followed from all attempts to give shape and form to these unsubstantial shadows.

Neither can it be denied that the prevailing mode of preaching (we mean the *rhetorical* form) has had too wide a sway; a sway, however, to be easily accounted for. Eminent masters of rhetoric

led the way, and it was easy, especially for men who thought that the true *material* of preaching had been exhausted, to follow in their footsteps. The masters, it is true,—the REINHARDS and the THEREMINS,—held fast the Christian elements of the sermon amid all the graces of oratory in which they arrayed it; but their successors have not always imitated them thus far, and many of their sermons are nothing else than mere specimens of rhetorical art-work.

Of late a better spirit has arisen, and under its influence we have begun to see our old errors: in a word, a reaction, in many respects both necessary and just, is taking place in our midst. But we fear that this movement, like most reactions, is in danger of going too far, and of subsiding into a one-sided theory, just as bad as the old one. Formerly, the rhetorical form was *everything*; there is danger now that we shall end with making it *nothing*. How often, in the history of the race, has truth suffered by these sudden leaps of human thought from one extreme to the other! Too often the newest passes for the best.

We have had frequent occasion of late to lament the sad negligence, both in point of logic and language, which has characterized many printed sermons that have come under our eye; for, in spite of innovation, we still remain of our old opinion that neither sound logic nor true rhetoric is incompatible with evangelical preaching. But the first attempt at a scientific development of the new principles is, perhaps, to be found in the work before us, the “Evangelical Homiletics” of Christian Palmer, a work to which we give our attention the more readily, not only because it presents many clear and truthful views, but also because it attempts (though without a strictly scientific execution) to unite into one whole the straggling and scattered elements of the reaction to which we have referred. We do not intend fully to review Palmer’s work, or even to give a complete exhibition of its contents, but principally to make use of it for the development and extension of our own views. And while we shall be compelled to assail some of his positions, we are sure that our excellent friend will only rejoice to find that his book is producing such stirring effects in us, and in others, through our means.

Our object in this article is to answer the questions, why preaching is kept up at all in the Christian church, and why the *form* of preaching is such as it is. But a few preliminary remarks must be offered before we enter upon the main topic of inquiry.

It is an error, we think, to ascribe the low estimate in which preaching, and indeed Christian worship generally, may be held at

any particular period, to faults either in the form of our preaching or the nature of our worship. The evil lies far deeper than this. It must be looked for in the decay of vital piety; men undervalue preaching, because they do not sympathize with its objects; men neglect worship, because they have no heart for it. Attempts may be made to remedy this state of things by greater attention to the external garb of the sermon and the worship, and we do not censure them; but yet, we repeat, that the real cause of this crushing evil is to be looked for elsewhere. Reinhard was a very refined and elegant preacher, it is true, but his audience was doubtless as much edified, so long as he set forth the gospel message—the one thing needful, with clearness and power, as the audience of any other preacher, even though his style were the very reverse of Reinhard's. We are thus compelled, in the very outset, to come into conflict with the views of Palmer, who is continually attacking Reinhard and his school on the ground of the rhetorical form of their sermons; although he finds himself constrained at last to admit the necessity of a *proper* attention to logic and rhetoric. More of this hereafter. It is more to our purpose just now to cast a glance at the notions of our author in regard to the true conception of the sermon, and consequently to the grounds of its preservation in Christian worship. "The idea of the sermon," says he, "presupposes that of a congregation and its worship. . . . The sermon of the missionary, and that of the preacher to a Christian congregation, differ entirely from each other, although the same gospel is to be preached in both." Our author says that the rationalists hold a different conception of preaching. We are no rationalists—though we think we could raise a strong *Christian* objection here—we let it pass, however, for the present, hoping by and by to convict our author of false conclusions from his own premises. He continues:—

"It is clear, then, if preaching is what we have represented it to be, that it cannot be placed at the mercy of the transient impulses of any and every member of the church. To form clear and vigorous conceptions of Christian truth, and to express such conceptions in appropriate language, requires high endowments of nature, and not less the culture of art (?) Hence the necessity of a special profession of theology, and of a special education thereto."—P. 9.

But on page 315 our author states that preaching is kept up in the Christian church simply because this special form of interpreting the word of God is sanctioned by *ecclesiastical usage*. Now, granting to the word "usage," in this connection, even the full benefit of the sense which Schleiermacher attaches to it when he

calls Christian "morals," Christian "usage;" we can yet make nothing more of it than "habit," "custom," "prescription." According to this notion, then, we preach, simply because there is a congregation before us, with certain "usages" to which it has been accustomed. Just as truly might we say that the mass is kept up in the Catholic Church only because it is the "usage" of that church to perform it. And, moreover, the idea of the congregation and of worship presupposes that of preaching, just as much as the idea of preaching presupposes that of the congregation and worship. Palmer himself seems to feel this when he speaks as follows of the interpretation of Scripture:—

"The original WORD, the revelation of God in Christ, is set forth, and its history is given, in the sacred writings. But the word of God is further, and continually, uttered by divinely inspired men—that word of God, whose beginning and pattern is the testimony of the apostles, especially as laid down in the epistles, and which, in Christian worship, is uttered in *preaching*, where it blends itself, in perpetual freshness, with human individuality. Now the relation between these two, namely, God's revelation and man's utterance thereof in preaching, gives us of itself the true notion of interpretation, which is identically the same in essence with preaching itself. Interpretation, then, in the Biblical sense, takes place whenever God, the invisible, manifests himself to men."—P. 62.

Now, after such a statement as this, can Palmer assert, without inconsistency, that "ecclesiastical usage" alone is the rule of preaching, even as to its outward form? But, says he,—

"The second point involved in the nature of preaching is 'ecclesiastical usage,' by which the individuality of the preacher (which forms the *punctum saliens* of the sermon) is limited, without being robbed of its liberty. Heretofore we have only spoken of interpretation in general terms, without reference to the particular form which evangelical preaching assumes in the work of interpreting. If we have spoken of themes, divisions, subdivisions, &c., it has only been because things must be separated in scientific discussion, which in the realities of life are not separated at all. The definite form which exposition has received from ecclesiastical usage is (like all usages) as much the work of intrinsic necessity as of chance. . . . The practical points involved in the matter group themselves as follows: (1.) Preaching connects itself with the order of Sundays, festivals, and occasional services, which are indispensably interwoven with the spiritual life of the congregation; and so we have an order of sermons not specially connected with any order of Scriptural exposition, but deriving their origin from ecclesiastical usage. (2.) As the whole word of God is the property of the congregation, and thus the proper object of exposition, there is no obvious necessity for culling select passages for *texts*; nevertheless, ecclesiastical usage enjoins upon the preacher the

use of a text as the foundation of his sermon, and even goes so far as to fix special texts for special occasions. (3.) Ecclesiastical usage demands a regular arrangement of the sermon; it demands a *theme*, which must be developed in the *subdivisions* of the discourse, and be rounded off by an *exordium* and *peroration*. But all this is owing, not to any necessity arising from the nature of exposition, but solely to ecclesiastical usage. (4.) Finally, the *delivery* of the sermon is not left to individual taste; e. g., whether the sermon shall be delivered with, or without a manuscript; for usage has settled it that the manuscript must not be taken into the pulpit."—P. 315.

Let us take up these four points in order. As to (1,) we are inclined to reverse our author's position, and—instead of saying that preaching connects itself with the order of Sundays, festivals, &c.—to assert that these latter have connected themselves with preaching. Where, without preaching, should we find, not to say the *order* of Sundays, festivals, &c., but even Sundays or festivals themselves? The pillar and ground of all these—nay, of the very life and being of the church itself—is the *preaching of Christ*. As to (2,) we must again reverse our author's position. There could be no *sermon* without the word of God for a foundation; for what else is preaching but the "testimony of God," (1 Cor. ii, 2,) and where can this find its ground except in the word of God? And in dividing the word of God into separate passages for exposition, we do not obey the demands simply of ecclesiastical usage, but of the necessity of the case. Could a man interpret the whole of God's word at once? Usage, even though it may be of as gray an antiquity as the times of Ezra, did not introduce the use of *texts*; for preaching could never have existed without the text, any more than without the word of God itself. Our author's point (3,) is, that "ecclesiastical usage demands a regular distribution of the sermon into theme, development," &c. Ecclesiastical usage demands no such thing; it is the inherent necessity of an address to a congregation that demands exordium, theme, and peroration. But we cannot here resist the inquiry, What has our author, who wishes to banish all rhetoric from preaching, to do with such demands as these? For what are arrangement, theme, and subdivision, but *rhetoric* and *logic*? We should like to see the preacher, who, without rhetoric and logic, or (since names are of no moment so long as we have the thing) without a definite arrangement and distribution of his subject, can preach an instructive and edifying sermon. Even our author himself calls the sermon a work of art in another place. Yet we agree with him in believing that the preacher must not mount the pulpit simply as an artist, must not make art the predominant feature of

his preaching, but must seek its chief excellence in the faithful exposition of his text. But of this more hereafter.

After these preliminary remarks, we now take up the question proposed in the outset, namely, *Why is preaching kept up in the Christian church?*

The answer is to be found in the express injunction of the founder of the church: "Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." Matt. xxviii, 19, 20. We preach, then, because the gospel is to be taught to all men; because the Holy Ghost connects its energy with the word and with the sacrament; and, finally, because the congregation of believers cannot *stand* except upon the knowledge of the truth derived from the preaching of Christ. "Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the gospel which I preached unto you, which also ye have received, and *wherein ye stand*; by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you." 1 Cor. xv, 1, 2. "So, then, faith comes by hearing, but hearing by the word of God."

Hence, then, the existence of preaching in the church is not due to ecclesiastical usage, but is a continuation (absolutely necessary) of the preaching of Christ and his apostles. And this view of its necessity assigns both its matter and its form.

Let us now look at the *matter* of the sermon a little more closely. It might be objected (in the spirit of a mode of preaching now obsolete) that "if the *matter* of preaching must remain in all time one and the same, as in its origin, then all edification must stand still, and we need speak no more of a progress and development of Christianity." To such an objection we should answer, that no other matter than that of which we have spoken (the preaching of Christ) has any *right* in the Christian church, nor indeed in theology either. As to the question whether rationalism, supernaturalism, or simple Biblical faith, be the most correct view of Christianity, there may be dispute; but there can be none as to the question which of these has *right* on its side; the Bible-trusting faith alone is sustained by church history. And preaching is so interwoven with the elements of Christian faith, that it must stand dumb without them. Occasional deviations in the church from Bible truth are not to be regarded in settling this question; they are, as deviations, violations of an acknowledged right. The development of Christianity is, indeed, hindered by our view of it, if by *development* is meant apostasy; but no hinderance is offered to the *progress* of Christianity by means of the growth of genuine

Christian piety. And for this progress how wide, how endless a field is offered! How long has our Christian knowledge moved only over the surface of the ocean of truth, and how slowly do its depths reveal themselves even to believers! Here, then, is the true matter of preaching; matter, ever old, yet ever new, adapted to all times and to all men; compassing, in its wide embrace, all that concerns the life of mortals, without the least change of its own immortal essence. We find around us, ever, sinners such as those to whom Christ offered repentance and forgiveness; and we ourselves stand ever in need of the same rest which he offered to the weary and heavy laden.

So much for the *matter* of preaching. As to its *form*, it may be supposed that, although we are commanded to teach, the manner of our teaching is fixed rather by usage than by any intrinsic necessity. The contrary, however, is the case. According to the express command of Christ, above cited, the congregation is to be instructed; and this must be done either by the catechism or the sermon. The instruction, commenced by the catechism, must be followed up by constant warning, encouragement, and reproof. With the older part of the congregation, catechetical instruction would be not only impracticable, but unsuitable. There remains only the method of free discourse; the essential elements of a free discourse (speech) must be found in the sermon, and thus its form is necessarily fixed. An intelligible speech must include unity of conception, (the *theme*,) a connection of thoughts, and arguments, (*arrangement*,) language adapted to the audience, (*style*;) and, finally, a corresponding delivery, (*elocution*.) Thus, then, these characteristics of a sermon are not burdens laid upon it either by rhetoric or by ecclesiastical usage, but spring from the very nature of the sermon itself, as an oral address to an audience; usage, indeed, plays quite a secondary part in the business.*

On the same ground, also, is the manifestation of genuine *eloquence* in preaching abundantly justified. When we address a congregation, we *discourse*; that is, we do not merely talk, in the language of common life, but we use a peculiar and definite form of language, which was extant among men before either church or church-usage existed; and which, with the other forms of language, poetry and prose, will remain long after church-usage shall have passed away. We use a form of language, which becomes

* Surely no one would think of asserting that the character of speeches in parliaments, public meetings, &c., is fixed by usage. They carry their necessity within themselves, and take only certain external features from usage.

an oration, not merely in virtue of its treating connectedly of a certain subject, but also because the speaker, feeling an intense interest in his subject, (an interest in this case given by the Holy Spirit,) seeks to awaken a correspondent feeling in the minds of his hearers. Is this objectionable? Bring your objection, then, against the will of the Creator, who saw fit to endow man with the faculty of speech, and with an interest in truth. Silence, then, the preaching of the word in the congregation, and adopt other means in its stead. Must we divest our preaching of eloquence, that is, in plain terms, of all interest either on the part of the speaker or his hearers, because, forsooth, it has come to be a cry that rhetoric must be banished from the pulpit? It is to this issue that our modern innovators are hurrying unawares. Without repeating what we have said before, we freely, and with deep conviction, admit that there are elements of oratory which cannot find place in the pulpit; that rhetoric, even in its best sense, must play only a subordinate part there; must be regarded as a means, not an end; and that the preacher, whose sole desire is to figure as an orator, is utterly unworthy of his office: but we can never grant that preaching can attain its full objects without any rhetoric whatever, or that the preacher who makes a just use of it, thereby ceases to be a minister of Christ. We allow that the school of Reinhard was too rhetorical. But Reinhard himself has told us, and all his printed sermons confirm the assertion, that in the subject matter of his preaching he adhered strictly to the Scriptures and the confession of faith.* Reinhard, then, was not led astray by his style; and the same may be said of many of his followers; if others have erred, their error must be charged upon their false theology and upon the spirit of the age. Reinhard's fault was that he considered theology more in its relation to the head than to the heart; in the pulpit he was rather a thinking dogmatist than a feeling interpreter of God's word; more a supernaturalist than a pietest, in the elevated sense of that word; more intent upon bringing out certain definite theological conceptions than upon stirring the affections of his hearers.

To return. We have, in another place,† given our opinion freely in regard to the abuse of rhetoric in the pulpit. But we have before remarked in this article that the guilt of the excessive influence of art in modern times lies not at the door of rhetoric, but is due to the want of *religion*. When Christianity found no place in the pulpit, rhetoric had to be all in all. When the preacher

* Reinhard's *Geständnisse*, (Confessions,) p. 90, seq.

† Character and Calling of the Gospel Preacher, vol. i, § 27.

had no *matter* for his sermon, he had, of necessity, to make use of *form* for a substitute: abandoned by the Holy Ghost, he took refuge in the arms of art. But, on the other hand, now that Christianity is reinstated in her rights, is it necessary that art should be rudely jostled from her position? A wise discretion will rather use her as a handmaid and auxiliary, for which office alone she is fitted by her nature. Preaching still is, and ever must be, *a discourse*, and the preacher an *orator*, though an orator of God. Preaching is, and must be, in its formal development, a work of science and art; when it ceases to be this, it will cease to be itself.

If it be granted, then, (as it must be,) that preaching is, in its essential principle, a discourse before a congregation, all that we demand as the results of that principle must be granted also. Among these necessary results are *invention*, *arrangement*, *development*, and *delivery*,—departments essential to every discourse before an audience.

The doctrine of invention treats first, of the theme, as the synthesis of the subject; and secondly, of the matter for the development or analysis of the fundamental proposition. As it is not every proposition which can be formed into a sermon, rhetoric demands of the theme certain essential qualities, viz., *unity*, *precision*, *clearness*, *matter*, (in amount corresponding to the extent of the sermon,) *interest*, *dignity*, &c. Is the theme to be without these attributes? Can it possibly be without them? True, it is often the case now, when the nature of preaching *as a discourse before an audience* is lost sight of, that themes are presented to which these attributes are wanting; but what is the consequence? A theme without unity is a logical contradiction, and can lead an audience to no unity of knowledge: a theme without precision or clearness is a speaking proof of the lack of clear conceptions in the preacher, and a rack for hearers' brains: a theme without purport contains nothing on which a congregation can lay hold; and, finally, a theme without interest can awaken none in the hearer. If the text be made the theme, the product will be a homily, a style of preaching deservedly esteemed in its proper sphere. We hope that the coming better times will introduce it anew; for the interest and edification of a homily, when it is what it ought to be, is vastly greater than that of purely synthetic preaching.*

The next element of preaching *as a discourse before an audience*,

* Palmer, as an advocate of the homily, (p. 448,) gets into trouble with his "ecclesiastical usage," which admits the homily only as an exception, although the old usage of the church is decidedly in its favor!

is the arrangement, or disposition. We have already shown how strikingly PALMER owns the necessity of a definite order and of subdivisions in the sermon; nay, even of the proper finish to be given to the whole by the introduction and conclusion. But he evidently mistakes the true ground of this necessity, when (p. 319) he ascribes it to ecclesiastical usage. On the contrary, the necessity of a logical arrangement arises from the simple fact, that whatever is said without apparent arrangement cannot have been clearly conceived; and whatever is not clear in the conception of the speaker, cannot be made so to the minds of his auditors. Ecclesiastical usage had nothing to do with originating this law. Even the apostle (1 Cor. xiv, 27) gives his warning against unintelligent speech. "If any man speak in an unknown tongue . . . let one interpret. But if there be no interpreter, let him keep silence in the church." The real ground, then, on which we demand a logical arrangement is, that the *speaker must be intelligible to his hearers*; and this end is hindered, to some extent, even by trifling deviations from a logical order, the very least of which cannot but disturb the connection of thought in the mind of an intelligent hearer. Yet in these days how often is a theme advanced in one way, and treated in quite another: divisions and subdivisions made with no other object, apparently, than to conceal the preacher's purpose: parts introduced that have no connection whatever with the theme: repetition following repetition, and digression succeeding digression, until the poor audience, deluded and forsaken, longs for the amen! Now we do not insist upon any approved or stereotyped form of division; we do not ask (after the old type) for a fivefold application to every sermon; but we do demand of every preacher a definite arrangement of his material, and an obvious connection of thought throughout his discourse. We grant to the speaker liberty to adopt what precise system of arrangement he pleases, but on *any* system his discourse must combine unity, order, and clearness, if he would not disgrace his sacred functions. Every theme within the legitimate province of the preacher has various sides from which it can be viewed, and here is full scope for him to exercise his liberty; but then again every theme presents certain *indispensable* views which must not be lost sight of. To take a simple illustration: if we are preaching on the "love of our enemies," and fail to set forth clearly what we mean by such a love, developing the idea fairly with proper limitations and explanations, we shall do little but beat the air in searching for motives to lead our hearers to practice a duty which they do not understand; and wind up, perhaps, at last, with empty exclamations,—an O! here, and

an Ah! there. True, a momentary edification may result from a mere grouping of the principal thoughts of a text, made up by the arbitrary choice of the preacher, without any strict analysis of the parts; but certainly such preaching can never be permanently useful, can never promote a clear and distinct *knowledge of the truth*, which, after all, is the only trustworthy basis of genuine Christian edification. It may cause a transient glow of feeling; it may produce an evanescent religious sentiment; but it cannot "root and ground" the hearer in the "truth as it is in Christ Jesus!" We generally come to the conclusion, on hearing a preacher who indulges in this way of treating sacred themes, that he himself is not well grounded in the principles of the gospel, and seeks, by this wavering and vacillating presentation of his subject, to escape the necessity of bringing out his views in clear and sharp outlines.

The *introduction*, or *exordium*, falls also within the sphere of arrangement. On this point we can concede little to Palmer's "ecclesiastical usage." Usage may decide whether the sermon shall begin with a prayer, or an exordium, or both; or whether the transition from the text to the theme shall be regarded as an introduction. Yet, after all, usage cannot settle the whole matter; for, in general, the necessity for an exordium is unconditional: you cannot plunge your audience at once *in medias res*.* PALMER opposes introductions energetically. A passage occurs in our treatise, before cited,† to the following effect: "Whatever matter the preacher may select must be foreign, if taken apart from the context, and the exordium only brings it back to its proper connection. We use the exordium, not merely, as Cicero and Quintilian express it, *auditorum attentum, docilem, benevolum reddere*; but to reveal the circle of thought, within which we intend to discuss the matter proposed." On this PALMER asks, "Why not refer to the text?"—and then continues: "No,—on the contrary, when we choose a text, we always bear in mind its connection with the context;‡ the text itself reveals the circle of thought within which we intend to move; and the matter is *not* foreign, for the text makes us acquainted with it." But does the text of itself reveal the view which the preacher intends to take of it? Has not every text, as we have before said, various sides on which it may be examined? And how

* Reinhard was by no means the originator of introductions: the older homiletics attached great importance to them. Cf. *J. J. Rambach, Præcepta Homiletica*, 1736.

† Wesen und Beruf, &c.

‡ True, but do the *hearers* always bear it in mind?

is the hearer to follow or comprehend you, when, without disclosing the stand-point from which you contemplate the subject, you leap at once from text to theme, without so much as a transition to supply the place of exordium?

As for the question whether the introduction should precede or follow the text, usage may have some weight: our own preference, however, is strongly in favor of the former. A well-managed introduction, before the announcement of the text, excites the audience to interest, and even anxiety, to listen for the text itself, and fixes their attention upon it far more forcibly than its bare announcement can ever do.

We turn now to the *development* of the discourse and its *delivery*. PALMER objects to the usual doctrine of disposition, that it consists only in a scheme of divisions and subdivisions, which the development is to complete into a whole. Especially (and with distinct reference to the author of this article) does he object to the *topic*; although he soon finds that he cannot carry out his objection. On page 522 he asks, "Are we wholly to reject such categories as *origin, character, results, &c.*? Nay,—but we still stand in need of the categories, both in cases where the text is so short and simple that it offers no variety, and in cases where it is desirable to dilate upon the ideas of the text according to the form which they have assumed in the theme." Consequently, (we may add,) *always*. It is useless, then, to contend against the use of *topics*. We adhere to our old view of the nature of the sermon and its elementary parts; viz.—*invention* brings out the theme synthetically from the text, and thus provides the materials for the sermon; *disposition* (arrangement) gives to these materials their necessary organic connection; and *development* (by the aid of style) fills up the outline and completes the work. Let us illustrate our thought by the work of a painter. He selects as his subject a landscape or a figure,—that is his *theme*: he forms first his outlines,—the *arrangement*; and lastly, throws in light and shade, life and expression, into his composition,—the *development*. Can he omit either of these and yet produce a perfect picture? Just so we require matter, outline, and finish, to produce a perfect sermon.

In regard to *style*, ecclesiastical usage is silent, but science is not. Style is nothing but the peculiar form which we give to our expression; the plastic representation of our thoughts and feelings. Science demands correctness and purity of language, perspicuity, brevity, simplicity, dignity, and finally beauty, in the expression of the speaker. We say science demands these,—the style of the preacher must be cultivated, not that he may shine as an orator,

but that he may give the most appropriate and worthy garb to the great thoughts and emotions with which he is charged as the ambassador of God, not for *his own* sake, but for the sake of the congregation. It is sad, indeed, to find the great truths of the gospel made repulsive by rude and unworthy language in the preacher; yet how often is this done of late? At the present rate of downward progress it will not be long before we get back to the times of Geiler of Kaisersburg, who, in a certain sermon, having compared the body to an old ass, and the soul to a young one, exclaimed, "Now saddle both body and soul for the Lord, that he may ride upon them." Some, too, may be captivated by another of his elegant figures. "There be three geese that bite us; the first is *pride*; big, gray, and coarse: the second is *lust*; black, filthy, &c." In the mean time we think that PALMER's opposition to style is not very hearty, for he himself quotes a passage from Hofacker as very happy, though it is nearly all made up of tropes. "O sweet sleep on the bed of earth, and under a covering of stone,—if it be a sleep in the arms of Jesus! O happy death! when Jesus, the conqueror of death, stands by the couch and covers the departing soul with the wings of his mercy! O glorious victory of life over death, when the worn pilgrim hears, with his spirit-sense, the rustling palms of the conquerors that have gone before!"

Finally, we have to speak of the *delivery* of the sermon. It is true, as PALMER says, that ecclesiastical usage has decided that the discourse shall be spoken freely, and not read from the desk; but there is a deeper reason for this than mere traditional usage. Although, as a mere matter of taste, we might prefer a good sermon read from the manuscript, to the stupid balderdash which is so often thrown out in extemporaneous preaching, yet nothing can be more certain than that a free discourse, unfettered by notes or reading, seems more obviously to offer the genuine outpourings of the heart, and is therefore more effective than a written discourse can be. Moreover, the delivery can never be easy and natural, when the speaker must cast occasional anxious glances at his half-concealed manuscript; and every such glance is an annoyance to his auditors. Not merely usage, then, but nature and necessity, dictate free-speech in the pulpit in preference to read discourses. So, too, with gesture,—the ground of its employment lies far deeper than ecclesiastical usage, whose only real influence indeed is, by confining the preacher to a pulpit, to restrict his action to the upper part of the body, especially the arms and hands. Some gesture there must be, whatever usage may say, if the speaker would be natural and truthful: every heartfelt emotion will seek for some

outward expression in the countenance and gesture. It is folly, indeed, to refrain from this natural and effective expression, simply because some men fall into bad habits.

In conclusion, we sum up what has been said in a few words. We preach in the Christian church, because the WORD OF GOD exists and SPEECH exists. The Word of God is to be kept before the people, that they may "be built up on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone." And, as speech is the fittest means of keeping this word before the people, speech must be used, according to its own laws, in the fittest way to accomplish the great end of edification. A truly scientific homiletics can occupy itself only about these two great points—the Word and its utterance; and will remember that ecclesiastical usage can alter or remove nothing that is essential to these. We hope that PALMER, to whom we cordially extend the right hand of fellowship, will elevate his mind to a greater unity of conception, and will employ the valuable materials which he has collected in the preparation of a new and scientific Homiletics,—a work to which he evidently has a decided calling.

ART. V.—*Reply to Rev. T. M. Hopkins on Jasher.*

WE took occasion, in a former number of the Review, (October, 1845,) to consider a series of arguments which had been adduced in the Biblical Repository of January, 1845, purporting to demonstrate that the passage in Joshua, which declares that *the sun and moon stood still*, is an interpolation. Our object was to seek and embrace the truth; to defend the integrity of our sacred Scriptures where they are not manifestly corrupted; and to rebuke the rashness that would yield, for slight reasons, to reject a portion of what is written therein.

The writer in the Repository, Rev. T. M. Hopkins, has seen fit to reply in a way which demands from us a brief notice.

We are sorry Mr. Hopkins chose to use, on such a subject, only vituperation and smart sayings, that might be considered discourteous if it liked us so to take them. We should have preferred his arguments. For by this means, calmly and candidly used, we may gain a clearer knowledge of Scripture; by the former, we shall mend neither head nor heart.

We are willing he should call himself Homer's frog, for the sake of calling us the snail; we only object to his trying to make

us *hop*. As snail, we like it best to crawl; and claim no *kin* to the *hop*-ping race. But we pass such dainties. Though they constitute the favorite dish of some, we presume the readers of the Review will not greatly relish them.

We propose to give simply a synopsis of Mr. Hopkins' reply, and show, in part, where he has misunderstood us; we will not say *misrepresented*, for that would imply a moral obliquity that we cannot lightly charge on a man and a Christian minister; and we are sorry, again, that he should have felt disposed so to charge us, because, in one place, we omitted a word, the use of which we probably did not perceive. But "the readers of the Methodist Quarterly Review, who may have read the statement" as we made it, shall have the full benefit of the author's own corrections.

He complains of us as "representing the writer [Mr. H.] to have said, that 'not a single expression in Habakkuk, chapter iii, can be, for a moment, supposed to have had reference to an act that ever transpired.' By omitting the word '*literally*' in this sentence," Mr. H. adds, "he has put into the writer's *mouth* what the writer never said."—*Bib. Rep.*, April, 1846, p. 293. Mr. H. will permit us to place by the side of this complaint what we *did* represent. We quoted his language, first, as follows: 'The expression in Hab. iii, 11, "The sun and moon stood still in their habitation," "should *not* be thought to have had a reference to an event which actually took place." And a few lines below: "No one supposes for a moment that a single one of the remaining declarations [of this chapter] ever referred to a transaction which at any time literally occurred." And when, a few lines after, we said in our own language, not using quotation—*reference to any act that ever transpired*—we thought, in the simplicity of our understanding, we embraced all his *meaning*; but if we did not, it was there in his own words. Of course, we would not write as our own language—*literally* transpired—though we did twice quote his expression, "*literally* occurred." We hope our works without words will show that we did not intend to represent unfairly; and we frankly say now to "the readers of the Methodist Quarterly Review" that Mr. H. wishes to say, "Not a single expression in Hab. iii can be, for a moment, supposed to have had reference to an act that ever *literally* transpired."*

* It may not be improper to append here a few of the expressions of which it is so dogmatically asserted that "no one supposes for a moment that a single one of them referred to an event that ever literally occurred." Verse 5. "Before Him went the pestilence; and burning coals (margin, *burning diseases*) went forth at his feet." Now we read in Numbers xi, 33, "The wrath of

Our readers will now see our whole error. We acknowledge it. When quoting his language, we adhered scrupulously to his words—"actually took place"—which is good English—and "*literally* occurred"—a phrase which we could never consent to use in our own name. And because we chose not to imitate an unenglishism, which could add nothing to the sense, we are honored profusely with the charge of "misrepresentation," and *unfairness*, and want of "*veracity*."

We have been thus particular in exhibiting fully, and confessing the whole "head and front of our offending;" and we wish it distinctly noted and remembered, that this is the only instance in which even our lynx-eyed defender of literalities has found any unfairness in our presentation of his views and arguments. We wish it further noted, that he has not pointed out in our arguments a single sophistry, or a fallacy, or attempted a refutation. It will be remembered that in our former article our object was mainly to test the validity of the arguments for this new notion of his. In only three places did we present a proposition, which we argued

the Lord was *kindled* against the people"—(one of the commonest figures to express strong emotion or sensation, that of *heat, fire, burning, ardent, &c.*)—"and the Lord smote the people with a very great plague." Indeed, so great was the destruction, by plague, and the *fiery* flying serpents, and by various calamities, that two only of all that came out from Egypt entered the promised land. The carcasses of a nation fell in the wilderness. We are reminded, too, of the *three days of pestilence* in the time of David, not to mention other so frequent and heavy strokes of public calamity, by pestilence and burning disease, as well as the cutting sword. Was there nothing to which one might *suppose* this to *refer*? These awful judgments are frequently referred to in the other prophets and in the Psalms, in language similar to this of Habakkuk.

Verse 6. "He beheld, and drove asunder the nations." *Drive out*, is the expression commonly used respecting the Canaanites, Jebusites, &c., who were displaced to make room for the children of Israel in the promised land. Who can prevent the association if he would? The mind *will* "*refer*," whether the prophet intended it or not.

Verse 9. "Thou didst cleave the rivers of the earth." Was Jordan parted?

Verse 10. "The mountains saw thee and trembled." Did Sinai quake under the thunderings of the Almighty?

Verse 15. "Thou didst walk through the sea with thy horses; through the heap of great waters." Ay; but which essaying to do, Pharaoh and his host perished.

Verse 11. "The sun and moon stood still in their habitation—thine arrows walked in the light," &c. Not so, says this purifier of holy writ—this is but the prophet's phrensy, and means nothing.

directly. 'The first was,—That in the course of human events it is not only possible, but probable, that after a glorious battle the rhapsodist should sing his song of victory before a history of the event should be written and published; and, in particular, that the history of Joshua was not written till after his day. Mr. Hopkins contents himself with calling it absurd; nay, the sublimity of absurdities, to suppose there could be a space of time sufficient even to wedge in the tiniest ode between the act acted and the history published. And upon this position of his hung his vitalest argument. The second was, to sustain our denial that Josephus refers to Jasher. This entire position of Mr. H., which, if made good, was, in our judgment, his weightiest one, he now abandons, and agrees with us on this point. The third was, that profane tradition *does* attest the miracle. He is evidently in doubt whether to receive the story of Phaëton as veritable tradition, hence originated, or not. For the rest, he has generally misunderstood us.

But we proceed to give the synopsis.

The first argument against the genuineness of the passage that records the miracle, was,—“It is evidently an interruption of the narrative; an interruption which, when considered with reference to its own statement at the close, destroys the credibility of the passage.”

On this Mr. H. says we “*admitted* the first argument in all its force.” If he means such force as would bring us to *his* conclusions, he *misunderstood* us. We admitted his first *premise*, to wit, “It interrupts the narrative;” that is, of the battle, while the writer pauses to insert in its own place an account of the miracle. But from this premise we *denied* that any argument could proceed till this problem is first solved, to wit:—*If* the passage were genuine—for that is the question—how would it the less interrupt the narrative? Our conclusion was stated in these words, which we will do Mr. H. the charity to believe he overlooked:—“It would seem, therefore, that before we could argue this passage to be spurious, from the fact that it interrupts the narrative, it were incumbent to show how it would not interrupt the narrative if admitted to be genuine.”

The other assertion, to wit, that verse fifteenth (which says that Joshua and the army returned to Gilgal) is not reconcilable with the context, we admitted in a qualified sense; not as he *understands* us to have done. But if admitted positively, we denied—that which Mr. H. has not yet attempted to prove—that there is any connection, natural or logical, between the fact of so stupendous a miracle and the question—where the army encamped the

night after the battle. And we stated our conclusion, that "if there be argument here, it certainly resolves itself into this: be cause the context, and the nature of things, seem to forbid the supposition that Joshua returned to Gilgal as stated in verse fifteenth; therefore, the Almighty did not put forth his power to arrest the sun and moon, as stated in verses twelfth and thirteenth."

If, then, this reviser of the sacred canon claims that as his argument, it is very true we admitted it "in all its *force*."

But Mr. H. *misunderstood* us again just here. We did not propose to reject verse 15. We only intimated that it seemed to us more rash in him to reject four verses than in Dr. Horne to reject one. We distinctly stated, that we think the whole difficulty of this verse is in the word *Gilgal*; and suggested two ways by which the difficulty might be relieved; one of which Mr. H. afterward attempted to quote, for a special object. He should have remembered this fact in connection with the gratuitous charge of excision. We are sorry again, now that his memory is so short; for certainly he could not have intended wrong.

We are next taken by an actual surprise. We confess it. Our critic has turned antiquary. He says he has got the book of Jasher—the real Jasher. He says it is as big as a Pentateuch. He says he can give "an extract" from it; and "a larger one than the disputed passage, *yet one that embraces it!*" How Euclidian! And this he utters apparently with the air as if he fancied himself the repository of the mighty secret of the existence of such a book. For, after a complacent pause, he leniently proceeds:—"The reader will, of course, allow himself to smile at the idea just advanced; yet it is most true. 'The Book of Jasher is now'* lying before me; the veritable 'Sepher Hajasher,' (literally 'correct record,') with its chapters and verses, [!] and with the passage in dispute, is at hand.† . . . Presuming the reviewer [that's ourself] will be satisfied with the assurance that it claims to have been," &c. We certainly should be very ungrateful not to make our acknowledgments for such information thus *assured* to us. But he goes on to increase the obligation, thus:—"The reader, it is presumed, and possibly the reviewer, [that's ourself again,] will be glad to see the entire passage from which the verses in dispute are thought to have been taken."

Our astonishment in all this is not at the modest *presumption* and the proffered "assurance," but that a man, and a divine, should

* Does that word *now* imply anything? Perhaps there is another secret.

† *Is at hand* (!) We know what "*is at hand*" means, in the phrase commercial, and the phrase epistolary.

adduce, in such connection, the authority of a book which we thought the learned had long agreed to pronounce a *modern forgery*; in which opinion, it appears, Mr. H. coincides, after giving an extract, at considerable length, which is probably well known to most of "the readers of the Methodist Quarterly Review," of whom he affects or enjoys a complacent ignorance.

We have here to say, that Mr. H. *misunderstood* us again, (for surely he "is an *honorable* man,") in supposing that we claimed for the book of Jasher "authentic antiquity."—P. 272. We affirmed nothing on this point. We said, (p. 510,) "We do not propose to say who was Jasher, or what the book of Jasher, but only to examine what has been said to us." Mr. H. *assumed that it was ancient*, and testified of by Josephus. We denied that Josephus said anything about it; and in this he now agrees with us. He assumed that it "was probably a collection of sacred songs, composed on various occasions; and one of its pieces *undoubtedly* was that recorded in 2 Samuel i," (p. 112,) which certainly makes it synchronous with David. From this opinion we expressly dissented. Though we cannot demonstrate our opinion, we have reasons for it, stronger than any we have seen for regarding it a book of poems. Having assumed the fact, that the book was a compilation of poems, he wishes to argue that its date must have been subsequent to that of the book of Joshua, *because there was no intervening time between the acts and the writing of the history*. At this point we took issue with him, and claimed that *if there was* a national ode to celebrate the victory of Joshua and the miracle, "it was more reasonable to suppose that the poetic effusion should have been antecedent to the prose record; that the flight of the winged Pegasus should have outstripped the tardier movements of the pedestrian muse." We further gave arguments, for which we challenge refutation, that the book of Joshua was not written till some time subsequent to the man Joshua.

"The readers of the Methodist Quarterly Review" shall have the benefit, in full, of his reply to these two positions. It is this: "The man whose credulity can overcome such obstacles will never find anything in the way of a position he may wish to establish." The "obstacles" he means are, the "absurdity" of supposing the ode could be written before the history, and that the history could be written some little time after the deeds of it were done! So absurd! he redoubles upon the track, and finds it the "ultimatum in absurdity" to suppose the poet could compose an ode, or (to conform our ideas to the customs of the age) that the

rhapsodist could utter his *impromptu song* before the historian had accomplished his task! Why, the strains might have been caught by the daughters of Israel, and sent echoing round all the hills of Palestine, ere the general was sufficiently refreshed from battle to withdraw the stylus from his belt, or unrol his parchments. And if our sires and grandams tell us truly, the victories of our revolution were sung all over the land long before men thought of history, save the living history in the conversation of the people.

We are sorry he should have written so rashly—we might be justified in saying, *absurdly*—'twere more just to the fact, however, to say *stupidly*—but we dislike either word.

One other thing, *en passant*. We hope Mr. H. "will be satisfied with the assurance" that we did not intend to unsettle his nerves so sadly by the sight of a Pegasus. We "*presumed*" that a man who could do and undo the writings of antiquity, was too familiar with the whole classical menagery to take fright at the commonest of the herd. Poor Peg! he's a harmless beast in these days. That he did not comprehend the common phrase—not to say trite—*pedestrian muse*, we are satisfied did not result from any will to pervert or misunderstand, but simply from having forgotten the use of it in our standards, and from lack of a dictionary. His error here is no doubt from his memory. A pity for its shortness! If he has forgotten his Quintilian, and his Horace, and our English classics, any good dictionary would have served as a prompter; and would have taught him, that though "professing to know a little of almost everything," (we had judged as much,) he has guessed totally wrong this time.

But perhaps it were as well to stop. These misconceptions and misstatements—unintentional we hope, for the man abhors to misrepresent—yet utter and unjustifiable misstatements—fall frequenter than the pages. A pity for its shortness, we said—his memory's. See how it serves him in a quotation; or better to say, *sub-serves*.

He had said that Josephus gave a full account of Jasher, and recites that account item by item, (p. 110.) We denied that Josephus even so much as intimates that he ever heard of such a book. And, respecting the passage in that author, where he speaks of "the *books* laid up in the temple," from which Dr. Horne deduces a detailed opinion about Jasher, we said this:—

"The inquiry, then, is, What were the *books* laid up in the temple? We can easily conceive that it is not among the wildest of conjectures that have been made, to suppose that the *book* of Jasher was intended; and that point *assumed*, the further con-

jecture, that the *other items* above named must also have been of Josephus's opinion, gains a strength of probability, amounting, perhaps, to inference. But remove this substratum, and the fabric it supports goes with it. And we claim that such a conjecture is entirely independent of the *data* which might have guided it."—P. 512.

Mr. Hopkins quotes us thus: (he means to do it "*literally*," of course:)

" 'Now we can easily conceive,' adds this reviewer, 'that it is not among the wildest of conjectures to suppose that the book of Jasher was intended.' Nay; he admits that '*this opinion* gains a strength of probability, amounting, *perhaps*, to inference.'"—P. 282.

That we call pitiable, *literally* pitiable.

We then showed that, by the *books*, Josephus could have meant no other than the sacred Scriptures. This Mr. H. now admits, abandons his former opinion, and again reiterates that we "admit that it is altogether probable Josephus *did* refer to this book." A *literal* man, no doubt, and an honorable, and who abhors to misrepresent.

Another. On the question, whether the passage is poetry, he quotes us to have said:—"The characteristics by which we are accustomed to distinguish poetry *are these*, to wit: the determination of the verse by a certain number and fixed order of feet, ascertained by the number and quantity of syllables in each." Here he stops; and upon these disjointed fragments of our sentence he remarks:—"Will the learned professor deny that the book of Job (excepting, &c.) is poetry? And can he find here his 'determination of the verse?' &c., &c. Let him look also at the book of Psalms and that of Proverbs," &c. Now the simple thing we said was, that the characteristics above named *are wanting in Hebrew poetry*. We said it thus:—"That all the *obvious* characteristics by which we are accustomed to distinguish poetry, to wit: the determination of the verse by a certain number and fixed order of feet, ascertained by the number and quantity of syllables in each; *in fine, the entire subject of prosody as it exhibits itself from the ancient Greek hitherward, was wholly unknown to the Hebrew*: at least we have no knowledge that it was recognized by them at all." We then noticed the characteristics of Hebrew verse, as defined by all the grammarians, and referred to Nordheimer for a more full exhibition of what we received as the true doctrine. If he dislikes our views, the question is with Nordheimer and Stuart, and the German philologists. But we in-

troduced this to show how *literally* he quotes. He does not attack our argument.*

He next makes us say,—“That which follows the question in verse 13, (‘is it not written?’ &c.) is a little *more* poetical than that which precedes it;” and adds, “There are degrees, then, it seems, in poetry, according to his own standard, and that, too, where there is no poetry at all!” Our sentence was *literally* this. After having noticed the characteristics of Hebrew poetry, and having said, “They had poetic thoughts, poetic diction, we might even say, a poetic style, but no verse;” that is, in the Greek and Latin, and modern sense of the word *verse*; we said,—“The latter clause of the thirteenth verse may be said to be, *in its phraseology, poetic*.” It is surely time to refer this *literal* man, who “professes to know a *little* of almost everything,” to Noah Webster, to renew his extinct memory of the *use* (not *ab-use*) of the “marks of quotation.”

The argument about tradition rests where we left it. He does not attempt to refute it. He quotes a part of it; so as not to exhibit its force, however; but does not misquote under this head, only to make us say something about the flood *which we never said*. If he would not put his constant misstatements in quotation marks, as if we had said so, it would not have been quite so *guilty*. We have not said the half that he has thus marked for us.

We *must* give one more. “The writer of the *Examination*” had found a difficulty in the passage, from the relative position of Gibeon to Joshua; and this difficulty he had invented by *mis-reading* the text—*over* Gibeon, for *upon* Gibeon. We felt, indeed, that it was childish in us to stoop to illustrate the fact, that

* It will be remembered that we did not deny the quotation in verse thirteenth to be poetry. That it exhibits the rhetorical figure of *parallelism* is evident to any one; and so far we said its *phraseology was poetic*; but we reaffirm that this figure is one of the common ornaments of prose, and, therefore, does not sustain the unqualified assertion that the clause is poetry. But if we are to admit any sentence to be absolutely *poetry* on such slight evidence, and then agree with Mr. H. that a poetic clause cannot legitimately stand in connection in prose, we have done a sad work. The knife of excision must at once go through the Gospel histories, cutting them piecemeal from beginning to end. Many of the most pointed and instructive of our Saviour’s parables, and other portions of his discourses, suddenly become, in the hands of such *critics*, modern interpolations from smutty monks’ books! Nay, go through the masters of literature in all languages, and you reduce their synonymy to utter deformity, and annihilate the very idea of art or refinement in prose composition.

if one would look, at evening, to see the sunlight rest *upon* a mountain, he must, of course, look toward the east; and that when the sun is near the horizon, whether east or west, and we say the *sun is upon the mountain*, we always imply that the two objects are in opposite directions from us. Having done this, however, with due gravity, the spirit of burlesque got the better of us for a moment. We said,—“We have read that this preposition, *upon*, once gave rise to an elaborate discussion by all the learned jurists that attend on the two highest courts in the British empire, to determine whether it meant *before* or *after*; and it gained a different decision from each of the august benches. It was not argued at that time whether it might also signify *over*.”—P. 521.

Listen, now, to the man who proffers, and quite urges us to accept, his *emendations* of the sacred text. After complaining that we think so little of his argument, we have *literally* this:—“He has read, as he informs us, somewhere in the course of his researches after wisdom and knowledge, ‘that the preposition *upon* once gave rise to an elaborate discussion in the British *Parliament*,’ to determine whether it meant *before* or *after*.’ This, as it would seem, is sufficient to satisfy him, that when Joshua, standing at Makkedah, near the close of the day, gave command that the sun and moon should halt ‘upon Gibeon,’ a city lying directly east of him, he meant only that the sun should stand still either ‘before’ or ‘after’ Gibeon.”—P. 290.

Now we will not call this *absurd*; for we are convinced, from his use of it, that Mr. H. has forgotten the meaning of that word; nor *misrepresentation*, for that he abhors; nor lack of *veracity*, for he must have but vague notions of that virtue who can question the veracity of another for choosing not to imitate his *bad grammar*, by inserting a word which could add nothing to the sense, in a place where it could not properly stand, though when *quoting his language*, he did it *literally—verbatim et grammaticatim*—we will call it none of these; in fine, we will not name it. A friend at our elbow suggests that it simply looks to him like—*hopeless stupidity*, or *willful perversion*; that he either could not understand simple language, or has deliberately falsified. We affirm not, lest we should not be literally correct.

On page 280, he says we have not noticed a single one of the

* He evidently quotes from memory—and that a very short one, which is as good as *mismemory*. A pity for such a memory! If he will look into the Reports of the Courts of Queen’s Bench and the Exchequer for 1839, he will find the arguments in full.

considerations on pages 110, 111 of the Examination. We are at a loss to know what to make of this, unless it be that the numbers are misprinted. He could not have meant pages 110, 111, for those are the pages in which he treats of the book of Jasher—a topic to which we gave more space than to any other one in the Examination, as may be seen—about four pages. At least we should have believed the error to have been of the printer, had we not had so many similar specimens of his *literal reference*.

In another passage we are happy to do justice to this writer, so fond of literal accuracy. Now it happened that our printer marred us sadly. He has promised to do better, and we forgive him. We caused a copy of our article to be sent to Mr. Hopkins, with the typographical errors corrected on the margin. In citing one of these unfortunate sentences, Mr. H. has amused us by copying the *type literally*, and then suspending the marginal correction as a conjectural emendation of his own. We had hope now, when we saw him following both the text and margin, that he would for once get through the sentence correctly. But, alas! the next three or four lines, simple as they are, are garbled and deformed, till we cannot own them. The sense is not changed, it is true, as is so often done in other places, but the phraseology is not ours. We ask Mr. H., in the name of common sense and common honesty, by what law, whether of usage or literary courtesy, or honor or *morality*, he thus continually marks as quotation from us language that we never used.

But we cease from the bootless task of such exposition. Save the three or four pages occupied with the extract, and description of his new-found book of Jasher, there is barely one page of his twenty-seven (we are thankful for *one*) in which he has not misunderstood, or misstated, or misquoted, or perverted, or falsified (which, we pretend not to say) our words and sentiments. So thick, indeed, do these gems of *literalness* and *veracity* cluster, that sometimes not less than half a dozen on the same page have occurred. We should have preferred his arguments.

We regret exceedingly that it has seemed necessary to dwell so long on matters so ungrateful. We would wish, rather, to look at the merits of the question. Is the passage referred to in Joshua, genuine? Did “the sun and moon stand still in their habitations?”

Recapitulation of the Argument.

Against the reception of that passage, Mr. Hopkins had offered nine several reasons; the sufficiency whereof we did not see, and

accordingly sought to show their invalidity. Our arguments he has not once analyzed or attempted to answer. Let that be remembered. And this also:—In but one instance has he found even a pretext to complain that we failed to present his positions and arguments fairly. We are gratified at this; for we would study, first of all, to be candid and impartial, especially in a discussion concerning the word of God. Yet once we sinned. We confess it. Though we caused the writer's own words to appear distinguished by proper marks—"literally occurred"—we did not choose to say in our own language—*literally transpired*—because we did not understand what quality may inhere in an *act of transpiration*, which should be denominated *literalness*.

Of his nine propositions, we showed that all, except three, *if admitted*, are, in their bearing on this question, merely negative—they would consist equally with either the rejection or retainment of the passage. Of these three, two were founded on a *misapprehension*—this seems to be a favorite figure of the man, and it certainly makes us not a little charitable toward his misknowledges of our meaning—of the text. In one, he supposed the text to mean, that the Lord *had never before heard and answered prayer, and never would again*, in any respect whatever; or that he had never before fought for Israel, and *never would again*! We hope he sees clearer now. The other is in trying to get the sun *over Gibeon*. Our readers have had enough on that point; and from some symptoms of progression in his last article, we do not despair but even Mr. Hopkins may yet learn the meaning of *upon*. We have known wonders accomplished in that way. There is yet one of a positive character; and Mr. H. claims that we admitted it "in all its force." Verse fifteenth says that Joshua returned to Gilgal; but the distance seems too great for the army to have marched after the battle, and immediately subsequent we find them again near the site of the battle; *therefore the sun and moon did not stand still*! The connection between these events necessary to render the syllogism quite Aristotlean, the author of it has not shown us. He has said, indeed, "there is such a marked family likeness in all the parts as to force us to the belief that they belong together."—P. 271. A family likeness! It may be; but not surely

"qualem decet esse sororum;"

else, does the Jasherean sire demean him toward the twain with a very unfatherly partiality; for while one is mounted on a "winged Pegasus," to take its "flight, hap-hazard, through the

heavens," the other is doomed to trudge *cum* "*musa pedestri*." "A plain English translation of which is"—we insert it for Mr. H.'s *understanding*—(see his last article, p. 286)—in the Jasher, by which he now abides, one part is poetry; while the other, separated by a long intervening passage, is "the gravest prose." But as he has not hinted to us in what this family likeness consists, perhaps he sees it in some feature where common observers would not expect it.

Here, then, is the sum total of all the argument he has brought against the genuineness of this passage. It happens, further, that two of his negative propositions have a *positive* side, either one of which outweighs books full of mere negatives. 1. We presume, there are few readers who will not feel the conviction that Habakkuk referred to this event when he says, "The sun and moon stood still in their habitation; thine arrows did walk in the light," &c. 2. We referred to a *tradition* of this event, which was current among some of the ancient nations, and of which the verisimilitude scarcely suffers us to entertain a doubt of its origin. This we showed in detail. Mr. Hopkins has *not attempted* to place *argument* against this *in one particular*. We must understand him, then, as admitting it. And, according to his own declaration, either of these two points made good settles the question.

Though the conclusion from these two arguments cannot be evaded, we yet notice one other consideration which Mr. H. has urged in his last article. He says,—

"Let the supposition, then, be made, that Joshua x, 12-15, is to be retained, because the thing it states is true: Wherefore this citation, then, of another writer? Is it to command belief? Where, in all the word of God, do we find another case like it?" &c.—P. 279.

Why, in the name of truth, does he write thus? Divine though he be, one of common intelligence, and who does *not* "profess to know a little of almost everything," would be tempted to believe that one of the things of which he knows *little*, is—the contents of his Bible. But we bethink us of that sad memory of his. "Where do we find?" In many places. In the historic books of the Old Testament, the so frequently recurring reference for additional facts on the same subject, to "the book of kings of Judah" and Israel; and to "the book of the Chronicles of the kings," &c. That these references were not to the books bearing those titles as they now stand in the sacred canon is evident—first, from the fact that in the book to which, on that supposition,

the reference is made, there are, in some cases, no additional facts given; and, second, there *could not* be this reciprocal reference from one book to the other, *unless each were written before the other*. Of necessity, therefore, we believe Biblical scholars agree that the compilers of these books referred to the same original documents, which were probably the official records of the government.

But, secondly, there is another class of books referred to by their various titles, to wit: a biography of Solomon. 1 Kings xi, 41. In 1 Chron. xxix, 29, we are referred to the histories of Samuel, and Nathan, and Gad, for "the rest of the acts of David." In 2 Chron. ix, 29, "the book of Nathan the prophet, and the prophecy of Ahijah, the Shilonite, and the visions of Iddo the seer." Also 2 Chron. xii, 15, "the book of Shemaiah the prophet, and of Iddo the seer, *concerning genealogies*;" a different work, it appears, from his "visions." Chap. xiii, 22, "the commentary of the prophet Iddo"—still another, by the same author. Chap. xx, 34, "the book of Jehu the son of Hanani;" and so on in other places. "Where, in all the word of God, do we find another case like it?" is the question of the man who "professes to know," &c.

Again, in Num. xxi, 14, we are cited to "the book of the wars of the Lord."

The New Testament writers also. Jude, verse 14, quotes a prophecy of Enoch, known to be from an apocryphal book, called "the book of Enoch," which was known to the Christian fathers; and, though believed for a long time to be lost to the world, has been recovered, and was published a few years ago.

The author of the same epistle, in verse 9, also cites a current tradition, or some book that has since perished. St. Paul does the same thing in 2 Tim. iii, 8.

But more than all this. St. Paul quotes heathen writers in not less than three several places; and this he does precisely as an ordinary man would invoke to his support an acknowledged authority: not that he needed human authority to sustain the truth of his assertions to those who understood his sacred mission and his inspiration, but we think it would naturally tend, under the circumstances, to carry a fuller conviction to the minds of those he addressed.

Mr. Hopkins' present Position.

The "writer of the Examination" takes entirely new ground in his last article respecting the book of Jasher, from that which he

occupied in his first. In that he claimed that the book of Jasher was an *ancient* writing, known to Josephus, and spoken of by him in copious detail, (p. 110.) 2. He claimed that its precise date, at least of some of its contents, was the time of David; and that "one of its pieces was *undoubtedly* that recorded in 2 Sam., chap. i."—P. 112. All this is as clear as language can make it. But what now?

The whole reading world will remember that there was published, a few years ago, a work assuming the title, and claiming to be the "veritable book of Jasher" referred to in the sacred Scriptures.* This novelty excited the attention of the learned; and, of course, its high pretensions were canvassed; and the general judgment, as we have all along understood it, was, that it was a spurious production of the middle ages. This opinion is also adopted by Mr. H. He thinks the book "first saw the light about the commencement of the dark ages."—P. 283. He has justly characterized it as "replete with absurdities, vain and inconsistent surmises—deeply imbued throughout with the smut and moonshine of monkish superstition and folly."—P. 276. But what was our surprise to discover that this thing of absurdities; this, as one has fitly styled it, "illegitimate spawn of an idle monk," Mr. H. now claims as the "veritable book of Jasher," referred to in Joshua and Samuel! That, from such a source, and within these later times, the passage in dispute has been foisted into the sacred text.

Surely it is time to have done with arguments. We will only say that, if Mr. H. was candidly seeking for the truth on this question, the road to it was very short compared to that which he chose to take. We will indicate it.

The process is this:—1. Here is the book of Jasher. 2. It was composed "about the commencement of the dark ages." 3. Was the passage in Joshua taken from *this book*, as a quotation? This is a simple question, easily answered by historic evidence. Let him, then, write to some of his learned friends, and propound this question: Was this passage in Joshua, or the reference to Jasher in the Second Book of Samuel, in the sacred text before the dark ages? The whole problem lies in that nutshell. The question would indeed "be narrowed down to a very small compass;" and notwithstanding he objects to any compres-

* New-York, 1840—edited by M. M. Noah, with a flourish of prefaces, not unprofitable to read for a dyspeptic of a rainy day. It is seldom seen in the book-stores, more for that it is not marketable, than that it is not in market.

sion or restriction of the rambling latitude he had given it, we can assure him it is always safest when inquiring after truth. Or if he does not wish to trouble his friends who are competent to such investigation, a few books, that are in every reader's way, may throw sufficient light on it; as, first, Josephus, in the passage to which Mr. H. himself before referred, says, that "in the books laid up in the temple," from which he takes all his history, and which he calls, in another place, "the Jewish Scriptures," he finds this account of the sun and moon standing still, &c. Aha! was it there in the time of Josephus? and received by the Jewish nation as a part of their sacred Scriptures, which were kept by them with such peculiar care as to render it almost impossible that they should have become adulterated?* Poor monk's book! it must forego the honor of originality!

Another: it appears that he sometimes reads Dr. Clarke. Let him turn to 2 Samuel, chap. i, and he will see, on the authority of that commentator, that Jasher was in the text in that place when the Targum of Jonathan was written—which was probably about the time of Christ. But we have said enough. He would hardly need to call for further light on such a question.

We have, then, these conclusions:—

1. The *fact* of such a miracle is attested by profane tradition; and, that fact admitted, Mr. H. admits the passage.

2. That Habakkuk did refer to this act of the Almighty, we think but one man doubts; and he, because he *has* doubted.

3. This passage was in the text in the time of Josephus; but our objector's basis, and only support to his theory is, that the idea of such a miracle was first invented, and the words first written, by some vagrant monk some time in the dark ages.

If he had stated that proposition in the first place, we should never have lifted a pen to expose an absurdity so puerile. But he

* It will be remembered that the school of the Masorites arose several centuries before Christ—a body of men who devoted their lives to the labor of examining and guarding the purity of the sacred text; descending to the painful *minutiae* of testing the correctness of every new manuscript, by counting the divisions, and even the letters, and marking the slightest variation in a vowel point or accent, or the form or size of a letter: whence it has been justly concluded to be *impossible* that any material corruption could have crept into the Hebrew text after they commenced their labors. In the sixth century after Christ, the doctors of this school published a complete body of the notes that had accumulated by the study of these men so superstitiously scrupulous for a period of about a thousand years. It was in the midst of this period that Josephus lived, and the Targums were written; and before the close of it, copies and versions were everywhere multiplied.

had evidently no such idea when he wrote his first article ; and we hugely suspect that the same big Jasher, "with its chapters and verses," which, he says, *is now at hand*, is as much a novelty to him as he modestly (!) fancied it would be to his readers.

What was the Book of Jasher?

This "Sepher Hajarasher"—"Correct Record," as Mr. Hopkins translates it—what was it? We cannot tell. We are frank, notwithstanding Mr. H. thinks it "somewhat amusing"—these are his words—"and instructive to see our antagonist taking refuge in the obscurity, which he says [we say] hangs over the whole subject of said book." To him it seems clear. He asserted, first, that it was an ancient book of miscellaneous poems. This we doubted; and he now abandons. He now claims it to be nothing more or less than this thing of absurdities, born of monkish folly during the dark ages. Very clear! He further concludes, by a logic peculiar to himself, that inasmuch as this smutty monk's book is now extant, and *called* Jasher's Book, there could not have been an ancient writing bearing the same title. If he had reasoned thus: had there been no ancient, genuine Jasher, there would have been no modern spurious Jasher—that were more probable.

But what *was* the book of Jasher? We have already seen that there were certain documents referred to by the men appointed and inspired of God to write out such portions of the known history of his people, as he chose to preserve as sacred for the instruction of future ages, by the title of "the Chronicles of the Kings;" which documents, we suppose, to be the official records of the transactions of the government. We also learn from many passages, that, under the regal government, there was an officer appointed to the special charge of making such records. See 2 Sam. viii, 16; 2 Kings xviii, 18; 1 Chron. xviii, 15; 2 Chron. xxxiv, 8. That the term *chronicles*, or, as the Hebrew is, "the words of the days," that is, *journals*, designates documents of the character we have supposed, seems placed beyond a doubt by the use of it elsewhere in the Hebrew writers. Thus, when the conspiracy against the life of Ahasuerus was detected, and the conspirators executed, the sacred historian says, "It was written in the book of the chronicles before the king." Esther ii, 23. And some time after, during that sleepless night of his, the king "commanded to bring the book of records of the chronicles; and they were read before the king." Esther vi, 1.

Further: we have never known, and can hardly conceive of, a

regular government carried on without such records. Did the Jews have such during the rule of the Judges? They *must* have had. And do the historians of those times ever refer to them as the subsequent ones do to the regal state documents? and by what title? We think they do; and that this is the very thing meant by the "book of the Just," or, as Mr. H. translates the *Sepher Hajasher*, "Correct Record."

In this view of the subject, then, inasmuch as the book of Joshua was not composed till some time subsequent to the events, it is in nowise marvelous that the author should refer to this *record*, acknowledged by the Jews to be authentic and *correct*, or the work of a *just* and true man. Nay, it is one of the most natural things we have seen. Far more so than that St. Paul when setting forth to the Athenians that God is the common father of us all, should add, for their better persuasion, "as certain also of your own poets have said, 'For we are also his offspring.'"

In this opinion we are not peculiar. We think it is the more common view of the subject, certainly of scholars. Such is Dr. Robinson's*—a man whose authority, we hope, has some weight with Mr. H. Dr. Horne, in one place, albeit quite contrary to what he says in another, teaches the same thing.† Dr. Glassius, in his *Philologia Sacra*, gives a compilation of various opinions, and decides in favor of this same.‡

Let it suffice to have said thus much respecting the miracle and the author quoted. Quite distinct from this, and will ever remain distinct, is the historical, or rather geographical, difficulty in verse fifteenth. We recur to it to show another specimen of the *accuracy* of this rectifier of the Bible for us. He says (p. 294) that we have put forth a *conjecture*, "that verse 15 should read, 'And Joshua returned, and all Israel with him, to the camp at *Makkedah*,' instead of Gilgal." And continues, "The Hebrew letters in '*Hagilgalah*,' he thinks, are so nearly like those which are combined to form the name '*Makkedah*,' that some early, careless transcriber mistook the one for the other."

And, on the next page, he puts in quotation marks as being said by us—*Hagilgalah*, "in the Hebrew character, 'is formed of letters so nearly resembling those in *Makkedah*, as to be easily mistaken, the one for the other.'" Listen, thou reverend man, to our reply. We have not written one syllable of all that. We have never made such a conjecture. We have never uttered such

* See in Calmet, art. *Bible*.

† Vol. iv, p. 1, chap. ii, sec. 2.

‡ Lib. v, tract 1, cap. xiv, pp. 1906, 1907.



a thought. We have said nothing, in any way, like it. We did not write that which could, by any possibility of *mistake*, (adept as he is in the art,) be understood to mean that. It is sheer fabrication or *conjecture*, every word of it. Other and great men have entertained that conjecture, and we do not see but it is about as probable as any; but we did not refer to that opinion at all. Our conjectures—they are two—are recorded on page. 523 of the Methodist Quarterly Review for October, 1845.

We have been not a little affected with pity to see the miserable work of one whom we at first supposed to be candidly seeking the truth, and to whom we kindly proffered our aid; but we confess that, at the present moment, our pity is mingled with a stronger feeling of disgust than we love to harbor—that a *man* should dare to use, in the presence of a just God, such utter disregard of truth and common honesty! His quibblings, and distortions, and perversions, and evasions throughout, (for we have not noticed the half of them,) we call petty beyond ordinary pettiness. But such things as these are fearful. We did not intend to urge him to desperation. We supposed him to be inquiring after truth, and that he would be thankful to have his errors corrected. And we did not wish to do that in an unkind spirit. We certainly did not. Nor in an unkind manner. If we did so, we were wrong; and ask his forgiveness of our weakness. We exhort him to review with candor the whole subject, and see if he does not find reason to abandon his notion as a chimera.

We have done. We have submitted to notice the strange rejoinder of Mr. H., because of the highly respectable character of the Review in which it appeared.

Errata to Art. II. in the Meth. Quart. Review, for Oct., 1845.

Page 504, line 21, for *Joshua*, read *Jasher*.

504, last line, for *Jasher*, read *Joshua*.

505, line 14, for *or*, read *and*.

508, line 9, for *these*, read *three*.

508, line 10, for *by*, read *into*.

509, line 20, for *any*, read *none*.

513, line 13, for *warfare*, read *carnage*.

513, line 11, from bottom, omit *own*.

513, line 5, from bottom, before *passage*, insert *other*.

514, line 22, for *forms*, read *poems*.

515, note, for *Theol. Soc.*, read *Phil. Sac.*

- Page 516, line 10 from bottom, before *the text*, insert *in*.
 518, line 5, for *Homer*, read *Horne*.
 518, line 9, for *strongest*, read *strangest*.
 521, line 9, from bottom, for *unpardonable*, read *unpronounceable*.
 522, line 3, from bottom, before *verse*, insert *in*.
 523, line 2, after *which*, insert *we*.
 523, line 5, for *Mannedah*, read *Makkedah*.
 523, line 19, for *sense*, read *verse*.
 523, last line, before *ten*, insert *these*.
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- ART. VI.—1. *Philosophical Essays and Correspondence of BENJAMIN FRANKLIN*. Philadelphia: 1808.
 2. *Eloge Historique D'Alexandre Volta*, par M. ARAGO, Secrétaire Perpetuel de l'Academie des Sciences, lu à la séance publique du 26 Juillet, 1831.
 3. *History of the Inductive Sciences, from the earliest to the present Times*. By the Rev. WM. WHIEWELL, M. A. 3 vols., 8vo. London. 1837.
 4. *Popular Lectures on Science and Art; delivered in the principal Cities and Towns in the United States*, by DIONYSIUS LARDNER. 2 vols. 8vo. New-York: Greeley & M'Elrath. 1846.

THE literary and scientific fame of its children is part of a nation's glory; and if the renown obtained by martial achievements be regarded as a common inheritance, which a people is bound to preserve and transmit, so should the more fruitful renown which genius confers upon the land of its birth be guarded with an eye no less vigilant, and defended with a spirit no less determined. To say that America has gleaned but a few slender sheaves in the harvest-field of scientific discovery is a poor reason for robbing her of those few; and to assert that her genius is practical and utilitarian, prompt to appropriate the labors of others, skillful in imitative arts, ingenious in applying new discoveries by new inventions, is a still poorer reason for denying her the ability to comprehend the scientific principles on which those arts and inventions are founded. We believe that America can point to her philosophical, as well as to her economical, industrial, and political heroes; and the life and deeds of Benjamin Franklin will attest that all these species of heroism have been combined

in a single individual. This celebrated man—self-instructed, self-made, and self-sustained—left the seal of his wisdom and sagacity on every subject to which he applied his powers. So amiable were his private virtues, so eminent his public services, and so brilliant his philosophical discoveries, that he lived the delight of his friends, and died the idol of his countrymen. Next to the father of his country, the memory of no one of the mighty men among whom he moved, and with whom he acted, is cherished by the American people with more enthusiasm than his.

It is not our purpose, in the present paper, to enter into a general discussion of Franklin's political acts or scientific theories. After a brief summary of the progress of electrical discovery anterior to his time, we propose to vindicate his claim to the honor of discovering the identity of electricity and lightning, and shall review the books whose titles stand at the head of this article no further than they touch upon that question. As Dr. Lardner has examined this subject at considerable length, and with much candor, we shall follow the course of his argument whenever it suits our object, and coincides with the opinions which a careful study of the authorities has led us to adopt.

As a science, electricity dates back but little more than a century. The Greeks had indeed noticed the shocks of the torpedo; but they satisfied themselves with the supposition, that the power of giving these shocks was merely that animal's peculiar mode of attack and defense; and they inquired no further. They had also observed the attractive force of amber excited by friction; but they dreamed not that the fancied soul of the amber was a universal soul. A Roman legion, standing under arms during a thunder-storm at night, had observed a luminous appearance upon the points of their spears;* and they hailed the phenomenon as an auspicious omen from the gods. Seamen had observed flame playing upon the tops of their masts; and they offered thanks to Castor and Pollux, the guardian deities of mariners, for their divine protection. A Gothic chieftain had seen sparks and flashes of fire upon his garments; but he either regarded them as scintillations of his own fierce and fiery spirit, or as harbingers of his approaching apotheosis. All these facts were disconnected and misunderstood. They took no root in the human intelligence, and therefore produced no fruit. They were the lights which science hung out upon the portico of her temple, to show the way to the inner sanctuary of her truths; and though men saw her signals, they misconstrued their import, and refused to enter.

* *Cæsar de Bello Africano*, cap. vi.

But after Francis Bacon had taught the right method of interrogating nature in order to extort her secrets, men began to question her more closely and earnestly, to seek the true meaning of the language of her phenomena, and to arrange and classify the results of observation and experiment, so as to discover the hidden laws of her action. In the enthusiastic cultivation of physical studies, which was the immediate fruit of Bacon's method, electricity could not be long neglected. As early as the beginning of the seventeenth century, a step was made in the generalization of electrical facts, by William Gilbert of Colchester. This distinguished physician discovered that the attractive power, which had been long observed in amber, could be excited in a great variety of bodies,—such as sealing-wax, resin, sulphur, jet, opal, amethyst, sapphire, diamond, and many others. He was unable to excite the force in metals, bones, wood, and some other substances; and thus established the distinction between what were afterward called *electrics per se*, and *non-electrics*. Robert Boyle extended the list of electrics, and discovered that the attraction is mutual between excited bodies and non-electrics placed near them. He also observed that the attractive power continues for some time after the friction has ceased. Otto Guericke constructed a rude electrical machine, which was nothing more than a sphere of sulphur, mounted on an axis, turned by a crank, and rubbed with the hand. He discovered that a body, after contact with an excited electric, is repelled; and that after repulsion, if it touches another body, it is again attracted. He was the first who observed the light which accompanies the electric spark, and that bodies, placed within the sphere of influence of an excited body, are themselves excited without contact with it. Newton substituted a globe of glass for the sulphur one of Otto Guericke, and observed that if one of the surfaces of a glass disc be rubbed, the opposite surface will attract. Francis Hawksbee contributed numerous facts to the science, among which were the illumination of rarefied air by electrical light, and the power of electricity to render certain opaque bodies translucent.

But of all the earlier cultivators of electricity, none pursued the subject with more industry and enthusiasm than Stephen Gray. He performed some experiments as early as the year 1720; but his principal discoveries were made between 1729 and 1736. Of these, the most important in the progress of the science was the fact that the bodies usually called non-electrics are *conductors* of electricity; while those which are excitable by friction obstruct its passage along their substance, and are therefore *non-conductors*.

Accounts of his experiments were published, from time to time, in the Transactions of the Royal Society, of which he was a fellow. In reading these papers, an electrician cannot fail to remark how frequently he placed himself on the very threshold of nature's choicest arcana, and then stumbled away without perceiving the treasures by which he was surrounded. Had he possessed the acuteness and sagacity of Franklin, he might have anticipated the discoveries of the latter; and, like him, have disarmed the clouds. But with all Gray's zeal and ardor, he was deficient in the highest trait of philosophical genius—the power of generalization. He multiplied experiments and accumulated facts, but failed to deduce the formulae which are expressions of their laws, and to follow them out in their consequences. He propounded his questions to nature in sufficient number, and with adequate skill; but knew not how to translate the language of her answers. Cotemporary with Gray was the distinguished French philosopher, Dufay, member of the Academy of Sciences, and superintendent of the Royal Botanic Garden at Paris. He applied the non-conductors, discovered by Gray, to insulate all sorts of bodies, (himself among the rest,) and found that every substance, when suspended or supported in dry air by such non-conductors, was capable of being electrified by contact with an excited electric. He also informs us that he “discovered a very simple principle, which accounts for a great part of the irregularities, and, if he may use the term, of the caprices, which seem to accompany most of the experiments on electricity. This principle is, that electric bodies attract all those that are not so, and repel them as soon as they are become electric, by the vicinity or contact of the electric body. Thus leaf-gold is first attracted by the tube, and acquires an electricity by approaching it; and of consequence is immediately repelled by it. Nor is it re-attracted while it retains its electric quality. But if it chance to light on some other body, it presently loses its electricity; and consequently is re-attracted by the tube, which, after having given it a new electricity, repels it a second time. On applying this principle to the various experiments of electricity, one is surprised at the number of obscure and puzzling facts it clears up.” This is a generalization of the discovery of Otto Guericke.

“Chance threw in M. Dufay's way another principle, more universal and remarkable than the preceding, and which casts a new light upon the subject of electricity. This principle is, that there are two distinct electricities very different from each other; one of which

• • Abridged Transactions of the Royal Society, vol. vii, p. 640; see also Lardner's Lectures, p. 108.

he calls vitreous, and the other resinous electricity. . . . The characteristic of these two electricities is, that a body of the vitreous electricity repels all such as are of the same electricity, and attracts all those of the resinous; while a body of the resinous electricity will repel those which are resinous, and attract all such as are vitreous. From this principle we may deduce the explanation of a great number of phenomena; and it is probable that this truth will lead to the further discovery of many other things.”*

Such was the first conception of a theory which has since been greatly modified, but which still bears the name of its author. Du-fay did not perceive that one of these kinds of electricity could not be excited without at the same time exciting the other. It was not till twenty-five years afterward, that Robert Symmer distinctly conceived that bodies, in their natural state, remain unelectrified from an equal balance of those two powers within them;† and that the excitement of two bodies, by the friction of one upon the other, does not consist in adding anything to their natural electricities, but in the destruction of the equal balance of these electricities by the accumulation of one of them on one body, and the other on the other. It is only by the modification of Symmer that the theory of two electricities becomes capable of explaining the facts of the science; and this will sufficiently account for the neglect of Du-fay's theory by electricians, till it was molded into its present form by the labors of the English philosopher.

Several improvements were next made in electrical machines. The prime conductor was added by Prof. Boze of Wittemberg; a cushion was substituted for the hand, as a rubber, by Prof. Winkler of Leipsic; and a glass cylinder was first used instead of a sphere by Prof. Gordon of Erfurt. But in the year 1745 a new impulse was given to the science by the invention of the Leyden jar. Dr. Lardner attributes this invention to Prof. Muschenbroeck and his associates in 1746; and Franklin, in one of his letters, calls the jar “Muschenbroeck's wonderful bottle.” There is, however, in the *Transactions of the Royal Society of London* for 1746, a letter from Mr. Trembley, F. R. S., dated at the Hague, Feb. 4th, 1745, in which an account is given of the experiments of M. l'Allamand, one of which is as follows: M. l'Allamand electrified a tin tube by means of a glass globe; he then took in his left hand a glass full of water, in which was dipped the end of a wire; the

* Abridged *Transactions of the Royal Society*, vol. vii, p. 610; see also Lardner's *Lectures*, p. 108.

† Abridged *Transactions of the Royal Society*, vol. xi, p. 414.

other end of this wire touched the tube. He then touched the tube with his right hand, and drew a spark from it. At the same instant he felt a most violent shock all over his body, so that he lost the use of his breath for some moments. The same experiment was repeated by Muschenbroeck with similar effect.*

L'Allamand's glass of water was the Leyden jar in embryo; the water being the inner coating, and the hand which held the glass the outer. Dr. Bevis soon after placed a metallic coating upon the outside of the jar to increase the conducting surface, and found that the shock was thus rendered more powerful. Sir William Watson dispensed with the water, and placed a metallic coating on the inner surface. The jar was then complete.

In 1747, Franklin, having received some apparatus from England, applied himself to the study of electricity at Philadelphia. In the space of a few months he repeated most of the experiments of his predecessors, and contrived many of an ingenious and novel character. He sent an account of these experiments to his friend and correspondent, Peter Collinson, F. R. S., of London, in a series of letters, which are equally remarkable for perspicuity and vivacity, and for philosophical acuteness. These letters were at first treated rather cavalierly by the Royal Society, but were soon afterward published in London, translated into most of the continental languages, and read with avidity and admiration by all the electricians of Europe. The ardor with which Franklin engaged in his new career may be inferred from a passage in his first letter to Collinson:—

“For my own part, I never was before engaged in any study that so totally engrossed my attention and my time; for what with making experiments when I can be alone, and repeating them to my friends and acquaintance, who, from the novelty of the thing, come continually in crowds to see them, I have, during some months past, had little leisure for anything else.”—*Essays and Correspondence*, p. 2.

This letter is dated March 28, 1747. In July following, Franklin describes “the wonderful effect of pointed bodies, both in drawing off and throwing off the electrical fire.” Here we find the germ of the splendid discovery which he soon after made, and the guide which pointed to the application of it for the benefit of mankind. He also states his opinion that electricity is not created by friction, as some had supposed, but that it is “an element diffused among, and attracted by, other matter, particularly by water and metals;” and that it is collected by friction, so that more than the natural quantity is accumulated upon electrics, and

* Abridged Transactions, vol. ix, p. 200.

upon insulated conductors in contact with excited electrics. The experiment on which he founded his reasonings may be briefly stated as follows :—A. and B. are insulated by standing upon wax. A. rubs a tube of glass, and B. draws the electricity from it without touching A. C., standing upon the floor, applies his knuckle to B., and a spark passes. He next applies his knuckle to A., and a spark passes. Now, says Franklin, the tube has collected electricity from A., and communicated it to B.; B., then, has more than his natural quantity, and A. less. When C., who is in communication with the floor, touches B., B.'s excess passes through C. to the earth, which is a common reservoir of electricity. But when C. touches A., electricity passes through C. to B., and by thus supplying his deficiency, restores the electrical equilibrium. B. was electrified *positively*, or *plus*, and A. *negatively*, or *minus*.

Such was the origin of the Franklinian theory—a theory remarkable for its simplicity and beauty, and which appeared to offer an easy explanation of most of the phenomena of this subtil and mysterious force. It had, however, a weak point, which did not escape the sagacity of its author; for in a subsequent letter he admitted that the repulsion of two negatively electrified bodies sadly puzzled him. We shall enter into no discussion of the comparative merits of the theories of one, and of two fluids, because there is now hardly any probability that either of them can stand in the light of future science. The opinion, that electricity consists of lines of force, in which action and reaction are equal and opposite, seems to be gaining strength among electricians, and may, at no distant day, receive full confirmation.

In his letter of September 1st, of the same year, Franklin applies his theory to explain the action of the Leyden jar. He proves that the outer surface is negative, and the inner surface positive, when the wire communicates with the prime conductor of the machine; and that the glass confines the fluid accumulated in the interior. He shows that the bottle cannot be charged if the outer coating is insulated, and concludes that as much as enters the interior, so much is driven away from the exterior surface, and that the jar actually contains no more electricity after it is charged than before. The equilibrium between the inner and outer surface is destroyed, but may be restored by making a communication between the two surfaces by means of a conductor. The elastic fluid will then rush violently from the surface on which the fluid is plus, to that on which it is minus, just as air, expelled from one vessel, and condensed in another, will rush from the plenum

to the vacuum as soon as an aperture is made from one to the other.

A paper, which Franklin informs us was written first in 1747, enlarged, and sent to England in 1749, contains a conjecture that the sea is the grand source of electricity, and that the electric fire is carried up into the air with the ocean vapors, the condensation of which forms electrified clouds. These clouds discharge their electricity into the mountains against which they are driven, and into the land clouds with which they come in contact, thus producing the phenomena of thunder and lightning. In the same paper he mentions several analogies in support of his opinion that electricity is the same thing as lightning. Among these, are the crooked form of the spark; the striking of prominent and pointed bodies; the ignition of combustibles; the fusion of metals; and the rending of imperfect conductors. Here is an example of a false hypothesis leading to the discovery of a great physical truth. Franklin afterward retracted his opinion that the sea is the great laboratory in which electricity is generated; but the truth, which that erroneous conjecture suggested, he soon demonstrated.

There is, indeed, no department of physical science in which the benefits arising from adventurous speculation have not been seen and felt. On this subject Dr. Roget has made some remarks, which are not more eloquent than true. "The human mind is so constituted as to refuse being restrained within the boundaries of a rigid inductive philosophy. Incited by an irresistible desire of exploring the secrets of nature, it scruples not as to the means of forcing her to disclose them; and, borne on the wings of imagination and conjecture, presses forward with an eagerness which often betrays it into courses widely deviating from the truth. Yet good is often found to result from these erratic excursions of our faculties: they infuse fresh interest into the pursuit of knowledge; they inspire with the hope of success; they invigorate those powers which must be exerted to attain it. The spark which kindles a train of light is sometimes struck out in the conflict of discordant speculation; and amid a multitude of attempts, some effort, more happy than the rest, elicits an important discovery. No great or comprehensive fact in science was ever established without being preceded by a bold, though sagacious conjecture. Hypothesis of some kind or other is invariably the precursor of truth."*

In July, 1750, Franklin's ideas had assumed a more definite shape. He found that electricity is distributed uniformly over the surface of a sphere; but that, in an angular body, it may be drawn

* *Treatise on Magnetism*, p. 32.

off with greater facility from the angles, and most easily from the angle which is most acute. When a body terminates in a sharp point, it is incapable of retaining electricity, and throws it off, through the point, into the surrounding air. He also repeated and varied the experiment, which he had first made in 1747, on the power of a pointed conductor to draw off the fire from an electrified body more rapidly than a blunt one. He suspended a scale-beam by a pack-thread from the ceiling of a room, and to the ends of the beam he attached a pair of large brass scales by silk cords. One of the scales was electrified, and an iron punch was set on the end upon the floor. The scales moved round in a circle by the untwisting of the pack-thread; and when the charged scale came over the punch, it dipped toward it, and discharged its electricity in the form of a spark. But when a needle was fastened to the end of the punch, the electricity was discharged silently, without the scale dipping toward the point.

Now, says Franklin, if the fire of electricity, and that of lightning, be the same, as I have endeavored to show at large in a former paper, these scales may represent electrified clouds. The horizontal motion of the scales over the floor may represent the motion of the clouds over the earth; and the erect iron punch, a hill or high building; and then we see how electrified clouds, passing over hills or high buildings at too great a height to strike, may be attracted lower, till within their striking distance. And if a needle, fixed on the punch with its point upright, will draw the fire from the scale silently, at a much greater than the striking distance, may not the knowledge of this power of points be of some use to mankind in preserving houses, churches, and ships from lightning? Would not pointed rods of metal, extending from the highest parts of those edifices to the earth or water, probably draw the electrical fire silently out of a cloud before it came near enough to strike, and thereby secure us from that most sudden and terrible mischief?*

So fully is this sagacious man possessed of the idea that lightning is electricity, that he immediately proceeds to describe the experiment by which their identity may be demonstrated. His directions are as follows:—

“On the top of some high tower, or steeple, place a kind of sentry-box, big enough to contain a man and an electrical stand. From the middle of the stand let an iron rod rise and pass, bending out of the door, and then upright, twenty or thirty feet, pointed very sharp at the end. If the electrical stand be kept clean and dry, a man standing on

* *Essays and Correspondence*, p. 48; see also *Lardner's Lectures*, p. 121.

it, when such clouds are passing low, might be electrified, and afford sparks, the rod drawing fire to him from a cloud."—*Essays and Correspondence*, p. 49.

Franklin also brings forward in this paper some new analogies between the effects of electricity and lightning. Lightning had been known to strike people blind; he made a chicken blind by an electric shock. Lightning melts metals; he melted gold leaf by the electrical discharge. In a subsequent paper, written in 1751, he notices the power of electricity to reverse the poles of a magnetic needle, and to give polarity to needles that had none. Lightning had been long before known to do the same.

The reason that Franklin did not immediately put his hypothesis to the test of experiment, was his belief that the pointed rod should be erected upon a very high edifice. While he was waiting for the completion of such a building in Philadelphia, he lost the opportunity of being the first to draw electricity from the clouds. M. D'Alibard, desirous to satisfy himself of the truth of Franklin's views, erected a pointed iron rod, forty feet high, in a garden at Marli-la-Ville, in strict accordance with Franklin's directions. He left the apparatus in charge of a carpenter, named Coiffier, with instructions to try whether he could draw sparks from the rod whenever a thunder-cloud should pass over the place. On the 10th of May, 1752, a thunder-storm occurred, and the carpenter succeeded in obtaining numerous sparks from the rod. He immediately hastened to Paris to inform his employer of the result, and three days after, D'Alibard read a memoir to the Royal Academy of Sciences, in which he gave a full description of the apparatus and the experiment. In this memoir he ascribes the honor of the discovery entirely to Franklin; and probably never dreamed that the next generation of his countrymen would claim it for himself. On the 18th of May, M. De Lor repeated the same experiment at his own house in Paris, by means of a rod, ninety-nine feet high, standing on a cake of resin.*

About a month afterward, ignorant of what had been done in France, Franklin made his well-known experiment with the kite, and thus demonstrated the truth which he had proclaimed three years before—the identity of electricity and lightning.

We shall pursue no further the history of Franklin's experiments, but proceed to the question which we proposed at the outset, and which we are now prepared to discuss—whether or not

* Franklin's *Essays and Correspondence*, pp. 82, 87; *Abridged Transactions of the Royal Society*, vol. x, p. 290; Lardner's *Lectures*, p. 123

the credit of the splendid discovery, usually attributed to Franklin, actually belongs to him. Dr. Lardner sums up his argument in the following manner:—

“In 1708, Dr. Wall mentions a *resemblance* of electricity to thunder and lightning.

“In 1735, Mr. Gray *conjectures* their *identity*, and that they differ only in *degree*.

“In 1748, the abbé Nollet reproduced the conjecture of Gray, attended with more circumstantial reasons.

“In 1749, Franklin strongly maintains their *identity*, and accurately describes two ways of experimentally testing it; and sends his instructions to Europe, to enable others, with better local opportunities than he possessed, to try it.

“In 1752, M. M. D’Alibard and De Lor, in France, make the preparations prescribed according to one of Franklin’s methods; and Franklin makes in Philadelphia preparations according to the other method.

“On the 10th of May, 1752, Coiffier and the curate make the experiment as directed by Franklin, and obtain the results foretold by Franklin.

“In June, 1752, Franklin makes the same experiment in Philadelphia, according to the other method, with like results.

“If the credit of the discovery is due to him who first *conjectured* the identity of lightning and electricity, then it is due to Mr. Stephen Gray.

“If it be due to him who showed the method of making the capital experiment by which the identity must be either established or refuted, it belongs to Franklin.

“If it be due to the persons at whose expense Franklin’s apparatus was first constructed, then it must be shared between Franklin, D’Alibard, and De Lor.

“If it be due to him who first, in person, *performed* the experiment proposed by Franklin, then it must be accorded to the carpenter and dragoon, Coiffier.”

The conclusion which Dr. Lardner draws, ascribing the credit of the discovery to him who first clearly and distinctly pointed out the means of making it, is just and impartial; but we think that his summary of the case is in some respects erroneous. Dr. Wall, describing the snap and light produced by rubbing amber, says, “The crackling is full as loud as that of charcoal on fire; and it seems, in some degree, to represent thunder and lightning.”* Stephen Gray, speaking of the effect produced by placing the finger near the surface of electrified water in an insulated metallic dish, says, “By these experiments we see, that an actual flame of fire, with an explosion, and an ebullition of cold water, may be

* Transactions of the Royal Society, No. 314, p. 69.

produced by communicative electricity; and though these effects are at present in minimis, it is probable that in time there may be found out a way to collect a greater quantity of it; and consequently to increase the force of this electric fire, which, by several of these experiments, *si licet magnis componere parva*, seems to be of the same nature with that of thunder and lightning.”*

It has generally been supposed that these passages were intended as mere comparisons; and it is certain that they were so understood at the time of their publication. Wall and Gray perceived a single point of resemblance between the *effects* of electricity and lightning; but they probably did not conjecture that the *causes* which produced these effects were themselves *identical*.† Franklin, on the contrary, not only perceived many points of resemblance between the two classes of phenomena, but also reasoned from *similarity* of effects to *identity* of cause. At all events, it is obvious that neither Wall, in 1708, nor Gray, in 1735, had any firm grasp of the idea, of which their language was so faint a foreshadowing, that it did not even attract sufficient attention to excite the public ridicule. If such indefinite expressions as theirs are to be taken for proofs of the discovery of truth, the philosophers of modern times have established hardly a principle in physics in which they were not forestalled by the ancient Greeks.

The claim of the abbé Nollet to the honor of having first clearly conceived the identity of electricity and lightning is more plausible, and we shall consider it on a subsequent page. Dr. Lardner has, we believe, fallen into an error, when he alledges that, in 1749, Franklin accurately describes *two ways* of making the proposed experiment. We have not been able to find any proof that he thought of using a kite for this purpose till 1752; nor that he revealed the thought to any one, except his son, till after the experiment had been successfully performed. He had been too heartily laughed at, by the members of the Royal Society and others, for making what seemed to them so wild a conjecture, to expose himself to public ridicule by recommending what would be considered, in case of failure, so whimsical a scheme to test it.

We next hasten to notice the extraordinary allegations and reasonings of M. Arago, which Dr. Lardner has examined and refuted with much ability. The perpetual secretary of the French Academy of Sciences claims all the credit of the first conjecture, that electricity and lightning are the same, for his countryman, the

* Transactions of the Royal Society, No. 436, p. 16.

† Arago. 'Eloge de Volta, p. 11.

abbé Nollet; and all the honor of the verification of that conjecture for his countryman, D'Alibard. After remarking upon the uncertainty which attaches to the language of Wall and Gray, and which we have alluded to above, he proceeds as follows:—

“This doubt, however, could not apply to the remarks inserted by Nollet, in 1746, in his *Leçons de Physique*. In that work the author represents a thunder-cloud, over terrestrial objects, as nothing else than an electrified body placed near bodies which are not electrified. Thunder, in the hands of nature, is electricity in the hands of philosophers. Many resemblances in their action are pointed out; nothing, in a word, is wanting to this ingenious theory except the only thing which a theory cannot dispense with, in order to take a place definitively in science,—the sanction of direct experiments.

“The first views of Franklin upon the analogy of electricity and lightning were, like the earlier ideas of Nollet, mere conjectures. Then, all the difference between the two philosophers is reduced to a method of experiments, (un projet d'expérience,) of which Nollet had not spoken, and which seemed to promise conclusive arguments for or against the hypothesis. This experiment consisted in observing, during a thunder-storm, whether a metallic rod, insulated and terminated by a point, would give sparks similar to those which are drawn from the conductor of a common electrical machine.

“Without aiming a blow (sans porter atteinte) at the glory of Franklin, I may remark, that the proposed experiment was almost useless. The soldiers of the fifth Roman legion had already performed it during the African war, when, as Cesar relates, the points of all the javelins seemed on fire in consequence of a storm. Castor and Pollux had also been seen by many navigators, either upon the metallic extremities of the masts, or of the yards, or upon other prominent parts of their ships. In fine, in certain districts of country, in Frioul, for example, at the chateau of Duino, the sentinel executed precisely what Franklin desired, when, according to orders, and for the purpose of deciding when he ought to ring a bell in order to apprise the country people of the approach of a tempest, he went to examine with his halberd whether the iron of a pike, placed vertically upon the rampart, would give sparks. Nevertheless, whether these circumstances were unknown, or were not looked upon as conclusive, some direct trials seemed necessary; and for these, science is indebted to our countryman, D'Alibard. On the 10th of May, 1752, during a thunder-storm, the large rod of pointed metal, which he had erected in a garden at Marli-la-Ville, gave small sparks, as does the conductor of an electrical machine when an iron wire is brought near it. Franklin did not realize this same experiment in the United States, by means of a kite, till a month later. Lightning rods were the immediate consequence of the discovery. The illustrious American philosopher hastened to proclaim it.”—*Eloge de Volta*, pp. 11–13.

Does M. Arago imagine that the courteous epithet, which, in the last sentence, he applies to the American philosopher, will make

amends for robbing him of whatever could impart to that epithet any appropriate significance? Does he expect thus to disarm the indignation of those friends of science who cherish the memory of Franklin, and to heal a mortal stab with a honeyed phrase? M. Arago, a lover and distinguished cultivator of science, is not deficient in knowledge of the history of its progress. We will, therefore, put the most favorable construction upon these remarkable paragraphs, and presume that his partiality for France made him partial to French philosophers, and led him to do unintentional injustice to the foreign competitor of one of his own countrymen.

M. Arago asserts that Nollet's conjecture was made in 1746. To this we answer, that the passage on which the claim is founded is contained in the fourth volume of his *Leçons de Physique*, which was not published till 1748. On this point we have the testimony of the abbé himself. On June 6th, 1752, after the experiments of D'Alibard and De Lior, he claims the honor of the new discovery by referring to the opinions "which he had conceived, and which he ventured to publish more than four years before."* It would be puerile to reply that, as six is more than four, Arago's date may be correct. Had it been so, the abbé would certainly have asserted that his views were published six, or nearly six, or more than five years before. The paper which contains Franklin's first conjecture was written, as we have seen above, in 1747, enlarged and published in 1749. It is a rule among scientific men, in questions of priority, to take, for the date of a discovery or theory, the date of its publication; and as we have no direct proof that Franklin distinctly conceived the idea in question till 1749, we admit Nollet's claim to priority in making the conjecture, so far as the passage on which he founds it is worthy to be called a conjecture. That the reader may form his own estimate of this celebrated passage, we take the liberty, not having the original work at hand, to transcribe Dr. Lardner's translation of it, (*Lectures*, p. 118,) which strikes us as being more accurate than a translation given in the *Transactions of the Royal Society* for 1752.

"If any one should undertake to prove, as a clear consequence of the phenomenon, that thunder is, in the hands of nature, what electricity is in ours,—that those wonders which we dispose at our pleasure are only imitations on a small scale of those grand effects which terrify us, and that both depend upon the same mechanical agents;—if it were made manifest that a cloud prepared by the effects of the wind, by heat, by a mixture of exhalations, &c., is, in relation to a terrestrial object, what an electrified body is in relation to a body near it not

* Abridged *Transactions of the Royal Society*, vol. x, p. 295.

electrified, I confess that this idea, well supported, would please me much; and to support it, how numerous and specious are the reasons which present themselves to a mind conversant with electricity! The universality of the electric matter, the readiness of its action, its instrumentality, and its activity in giving fire to other bodies; its property of striking bodies externally and internally, even to their smallest parts, (the remarkable example we have of this effect even in the Leyden jar experiment, the idea which we might truly adopt in supposing a greater degree of electric power;) all these points of analogy which I have been for some time meditating, begin to make me believe that one might, by taking electricity for the model, form to oneself, in regard to thunder and lightning, more perfect and more probable ideas than any hitherto proposed."—*Leçons de Physique*, tom. iv, p. 315.

If Franklin's experiment had been unsuccessful, would this passage ever have been cited to prove that the abbé Nollet had entertained so chimerical an idea as the identity of electricity and lightning? He does not, as Arago alledges, tell us that "lightning in the hands of nature is electricity in ours;" but that if any one would undertake to prove this, he himself would—what? find his own opinions confirmed? hail the demonstration of a truth of which he is already confident? Nothing of this: but the abbé would be much pleased! Do the analogies which he mentions enable him to take hold of the truth with a firm and steady grasp, and induce him to express it in the direct terms of honest conviction? Or do they rather give him an obscure glimmering of something which assumes no definite shape or hue, the existence of which he is equally prepared to believe or disbelieve, and which he describes, or rather shrouds and mystifies, in the language of oblique hints and hesitating suggestions? They have only taken sufficient root in his understanding to make him *begin* to believe that one *might*, by taking electricity for the model, form to oneself, in regard to thunder and lightning,—not a demonstration of their identity with electricity—but, more perfect and more probable ideas than any hitherto proposed.

How different from these Jesuitical inuendos is the bold, simple, straightforward language of Franklin one year afterward!

"Electric fluid agrees with lightning in these particulars: 1. Giving light. 2. Color of the light. 3. Crooked direction. 4. Swift motion. 5. Being conducted by metals. 6. Crack or noise in exploding. 7. Subsisting in water or ice. 8. Rending bodies it passes through. 9. Destroying animals. 10. Melting metals. 11. Firing inflammable substances. 12. Sulphureous smell.—The electric fluid is attracted by points. We do not know whether this property is in lightning. But since they agree in all the particulars wherein we can already compare them, is it not probable they agree likewise in this? Let the experiment be made."—*Essays and Correspondence*, p. 138.

There is no proof or probability that when Franklin sent his paper of 1749 to Peter Collinson, he had seen Nollet's book, or heard of his conjecture. While, therefore, we concede to Nollet the credit of having first published a suggestion that electricity and lightning might be the same, we claim for Franklin the honor of having, by independent experiments and reasonings, and by an array of analogies that, in moral questions, would have been regarded as conclusive, first proclaimed this truth to the world in a clear and distinct form.

But even if the conjecture of Nollet had been not only anterior to that of Franklin, but also equally authoritative, there was still a wide difference between the two philosophers in another respect. Franklin's hypothesis suggested to him the means of its own demonstration; Nollet's conjecture remained an undeveloped germ, and brought forth no fruit. Franklin, as we have seen, had described with great precision the way of conducting the experiment which D'Alibard subsequently, and in strict accordance with his directions, executed with success; and if, as Arago pretends, this was the only difference between Franklin and Nollet, still the difference is so great as to confer on Franklin all the honor of the discovery, except a priority in conjecturing that the discovery might be possible. To assert that a thing may be done, and to show how to do it, are two very different matters. Was the astronomer who first conceived the possibility of ascertaining the distance of the sun entitled to the same distinction as he who showed that observations on a transit of Venus would furnish data for the solution of the problem? To conjecture, from the irregularities of the motions of Uranus, that another and more distant planet revolves around the sun, was highly creditable to its author, and implied correct notions of physical astronomy; but did that conjecture render the calculations of Le Verrier unnecessary, or detract the title of a hair from the merit of his wonderful discovery?

But, says Arago, the experiment was almost useless, for it had been already several times performed; as, for example, by Cesar's fifth legion. This, to say the least, is a most singular and extraordinary allegation for a man of science to make. We are bold to say that it is based on a principle which never has been, and never will be, admitted by the pioneers of science, and which M. Arago would himself repudiate. Was the man who first noticed the double images formed by Iceland spar the discoverer of the polarization of light? Perhaps Eve saw an apple fall from the tree of knowledge; did Eve, therefore, anticipate the discoveries of Newton, and render his labors useless? In a word, can the

accidental notice of a fact, without any attempt to comprehend it in its scientific relations, ever constitute a discovery in philosophy?

But, finally, if the experiment were necessary, the credit of having first made it belongs to D'Alibard, and not to Franklin. This assertion is a conclusion from the principle, assumed for the occasion, that the honor of a work belongs not to the head that devised it, but to the hand that executed it. Let us apply this principle in some other cases, and show its absurdity. A geologist, reasoning from observation and analogy, assures a miner that by digging through certain strata of rocks he will find coal; the miner follows the instructions of the geologist, and the coal is found. The miner is the discoverer of the coal-bed! A chemist, from his knowledge of the effect of small metallic tubes in preventing the communication of flame, instructs an artisan to cover a lamp with wire-gauze, and see if it may not be placed in explosive gases without setting them on fire. The artisan is the inventor of the safety-lamp! A mathematician concludes, from a laborious and complicated analysis, that a planet, hitherto undiscovered, must be in a particular place in the heavens, and he requests a star-gazer to turn his telescope in that direction, and forthwith a star is seen which is not found in any of the catalogues. The star-gazer is the discoverer of the new planet of 1846! But it is useless to dwell longer upon this point. If Arago denies the honor of the discovery to Franklin, he must, for the same reason, if he would be consistent, deny it to D'Alibard, for neither Franklin nor D'Alibard was the first actually to perform the experiment. He must accord it to the poor discharged dragoon, Coiffier, who probably never had a philosophical idea in his life, but who obeyed the instructions of Franklin, received at second-hand from D'Alibard, and drew down, with his own hand, the first spark from the fiery magazine of the clouds!

That we may not seem to do injustice to D'Alibard, it is proper to state, that, in his *Memoir to the Academy*, he attributes the honor of the discovery entirely to Franklin. He commences the paper thus:—"Following the direction which Franklin has marked out for us, I have been completely successful." He concludes the paper by saying,—“The idea which Franklin has entertained, ceases to be a conjecture. Behold it a reality; and I dare believe that the more attentively any one will examine what he has published upon electricity, the more one will perceive how much physical science is indebted to him for that part.”*

* *Memoire de M. D'Alibard; Lu à l'Academie Royale des Sciences, le xiii, Mai, 1752.*

We might here submit the case to the judgment of impartial men; but we are unwilling to pass by the characteristic remarks of Professor Whewell on the same question without a brief notice:—

“Franklin, about 1750, had offered a few somewhat vague conjectures respecting the existence of electricity in the clouds; but it was not till Wilke and Lepinns had obtained clear notions of the effect of electric matter at a distance, that the real condition of the clouds could be well understood. In 1752, however, D’Alibard, and other French philosophers, were desirous of verifying Franklin’s conjecture of the analogy of thunder and electricity. This they did by erecting a pointed iron rod at Marli; the rod was found capable of giving out electrical sparks when a thunder-cloud passed over the place. This was repeated in various parts of Europe, and Franklin suggested that a communication with the clouds might be formed by means of a kite.”
—*History of the Inductive Sciences*, vol. iii, p. 18.

Is this all that a cultivator of science, and a man of learning, who undertakes to write a history of the progress of the inductive sciences, can tell us of one of the most brilliant discoveries of modern times, and of the philosopher who made it? If his purpose had been, under the semblance of historical impartiality, to “damn with faint praise,” while he kept Franklin’s real merits out of sight, he could hardly have framed a paragraph better suited to his aim. The passage is erroneous in several particulars, and conveys erroneous impressions in others. What with its sins of omission and of commission, it is about as sinful as anything, claiming to be history, that we have ever seen. The conjectures were published, as we have shown, in 1749. They were not vague as to the existence of electricity in the clouds, but as to its *origin*, and the *mode* of its existence. Franklin’s letter of 1750 is remarkable for definiteness and precision. It is not a “conjecture of the *analogy* of thunder and electricity,” but an *argument* to prove their *identity*, sustained by a multitude of analogies, not hypothetical, but well established. Professor Whewell informs us that D’Alibard verified Franklin’s conjecture; why does he not tell us that Franklin devised the apparatus by which D’Alibard did this, and described the manner of using it? Professor Whewell knows that Franklin *suggested* the kite, does he not know that Franklin did somewhat more?

In the following extract the historian instructs his own, and future ages, what estimate to place upon the American philosopher:—

“Franklin’s real merit as a discoverer was, that he was one of the first who distinctly conceived the electrical charge as a derangement

of equilibrium. The great fame which, in his day, he enjoyed, arose from the clearness and spirit with which he narrated his discoveries; from his dealing with electricity in the imposing form of thunder and lightning; and partly, perhaps, from his character as an American and a politician; for he was already, in 1736, engaged in public affairs as clerk to the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, though it was not till a later period of his life that his admirers had the occasion of saving of him,—

‘Eripuit cœlis fulmen, sceptrumque tyrannis.’”

History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. iii, p. 33.

Had Franklin lived somewhat nearer to Cambridge, and had he not “wrested the sceptre from tyrants,” as well as “the lightning from the heavens,” perhaps he might have made a different figure in Professor Whewell’s octavos. Without mentioning the discovery on which Franklin’s reputation as a philosopher chiefly rests, Mr. Whewell makes his merit to consist in being *one* of the first to propose a mechanical theory of electricity, which, in a subsequent part of his *History*, he attempts to overthrow.* In plain terms, he concedes to Franklin a share with some others in the honor of conceiving a false theory of electricity! Now whether Franklin’s theory be true or false, it is his own. In 1748, Sir William Watson did indeed claim that he had suggested the idea of a plus and minus state of electricity in a paper which he read to the Royal Society about the time that Franklin’s paper of July, 1747, was written.† In that paper he conjectures that there is a simultaneous afflux and efflux to and from an electrified conductor, and that the afflux causes attraction, and the efflux repulsion. He also suggests that a quantity of electricity, equal to that accumulated in excited bodies, is furnished by the nearest unexcited non-electrics; so that electricity, or what he calls the elastic electrical ether, may be more dense in one body, and less dense in another. But that he did not comprehend the disturbance of the electrical equilibrium, in the Franklinian sense, is plain from the application which he makes of his hypothesis to explain the action of the Leyden jar. He says that when a man holds in one hand a Leyden jar, whose wire communicates with the prime conductor of an electrical machine, and touches the conductor with the other hand, a part of the electricity of his body goes through one arm to the conductor, and through the other arm to the jar. He also supposes that the electricity which the man’s body thus parts with, is instantly replaced from the floor; and he ought, therefore, to

* *History of the Inductive Sciences*, vol. iii, pp. 40, 41.

† *Abridged Transactions of the Royal Society*, vol. ix, p. 454.

*receive no shock if he stands upon any insulating substance.** Franklin's theory never could have led to a statement so preposterous as this.

Professor Whewell is sorely puzzled to account for the great fame which, *in his day*, Franklin enjoyed, and taxes his ingenuity to ascribe it to anything rather than to his philosophical discoveries. It is certainly a novel idea that a man's political success is likely to add much to his scientific reputation; and the time seems to have gone by, when being an American citizen could give prestige to a philosopher's name in England. Professor Whewell is determined that Franklin's fame shall extend as little as possible beyond "his day," and therefore attributes it, not to his having matters of importance to *narrate*, but to his *manner of narration*! The History of the Inductive Sciences was designed to go down to posterity as a standard book of reference on all questions relating to the progress of physical discovery; but we question strongly whether posterity, with no other source of information than this book, would ever learn that Franklin had contributed anything to the advancement of science, more than to make a lucky guess, and to play a skillful game at the politician's trick of telling more than he knew.

ART. VII.—*Biblical Exegesis.*—*St. Paul's Doctrine of the Law.*

VARIOUS definitions have been given of *law*. According to Blackstone, "law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action; and is applied indiscriminately to all kinds of action, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational. Thus we say, the laws of motion, of gravitation, of optics, or mechanics, as well as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is that rule of action which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey." The law with which we have to do at present is the *moral law*, or that rule of action which God has given to his intelligent creatures, and which is founded in the relations which they sustain to him. When man came from the hands of his Creator, he was necessarily indebted to him for all his powers, and responsible to him for their exercise and improvement. God could not require of him less than he had invested him with ability to perform, and his justice and goodness would preclude his requiring more.

* Transactions of the Royal Society, No. 484, p. 704.

This law must necessarily be permanent and unchangeable in its nature. For no circumstance could possibly occur to remove the foundation upon which it is based. Man's relation to God as a dependent creature, and as his offspring, must of necessity remain the same to all eternity, unless we suppose the possibility of his annihilation. And, by consequence, the law of God founded upon and growing out of this relation, must remain in full force while man continues in being. No change in the character or circumstances of man, effected by the exercise of his own free agency, could possibly alter his relations to God as his creature; and, consequently, no such change could release him from the obligations of that perfect obedience which the law requires. And hence the original law of God, which he first gave to man, and which he had previously given to angels, still remains, and will continue eternally in all its integrity.

But by this we do not mean to deny that the divine law has been imbodied in various formularies, and combined in different systems. It took one form of outward expression in the garden of paradise, another on Mount Sinai, and still another upon the mount of Olives. These varying forms of expression involve the same great principles of love and obedience to God. The diversity of outward development was designed to suit the different periods in the history of the race and in the great plan of divine government.

There is one essential element of law which is uniform and invariable, and that is, that it furnishes no remedy for past offenses against its requirements, or for the ruined or vitiated character of the offender. It shows no mercy—it knows not to forgive or restore. The terrible penalties of the divine law lie in full force against all offenders, pronouncing upon them the sentence of death for the least departure. It is inexorable and impartial, hurling its thunderbolts against every violator, high and low, rich and poor, learned and ignorant, strong and feeble—all, all transgressors are under its withering *curse*.

St. Paul has treated the subject of the divine law specifically, and of set purpose, in his Epistles to the Romans and the Galatians. It shall be our object in this paper to endeavor to ascertain the views which he has presented upon this important topic in these two epistles.

The purpose which the apostle has in view in discussing this subject, is to exhibit the true ground of salvation, and to explode and refute the vain notion of justification and sanctification upon the principles of legal obedience. He first meets and refutes the

position of the Gentiles—showing that their philosophy had wholly failed to conform them to the requirements of the law. (See Rom. i.) He then proceeds to prove that the Jews are equally far from standing fair with the law; but while they “judge,” the Gentiles “do the same thing,” and are equally cut short from all hope upon the principles of law. (See chapters ii and iii.) He next proceeds to contrast the impracticable mode of *salvation by the law* with the easy and efficient plan of the gospel—that of *salvation by faith*. We now invite the attention of the reader to the following passage:—

“19. Now we know, that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law; that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God. 20. Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin. 21. But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; 22. Even the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe; for there is no difference: 23. For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; 24. Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: 25. Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God; 26. To declare, I say, at this time his righteousness; that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus. 27. Where is boasting then? It is excluded. By what law? of works? Nay; but by the law of faith. 28. Therefore we conclude, that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law. 29. Is he the God of the Jews only? is he not also of the Gentiles? Yes, of the Gentiles also: 30. Seeing it is one God which shall justify the circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith. 31. Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law.” Rom. iii.

We understand the term *νομος law*, as it stands in this passage opposed to *πίστις faith*, to refer to the *great moral rule of duty which binds universal man to the love and service of God to the utmost of his capacity*. Indeed, this is the sense in which this term is most generally employed by the great apostle. When used in a specific sense, it is qualified by some epithet, or by the connections in which it is found. That the apostle, in the above passage, is not discussing the *cereemonial law*, is obvious from the general offices which he assigns to it. He speaks of a law that addresses itself to “all the world,” and by its sentence of just condemnation stops “every mouth”—a law which “all” have violated: “for,” says he, “all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God.” The sense is varied in two instances in the section

under consideration. The first is in verse 21, where "the law and the prophets" means the Old Testament scriptures; and the second is in verse 27, where "the law of faith" refers to the gospel method of salvation. In both these instances, the sense is perfectly plain. But let us more closely analyze the language of the passage in question, and see what are its obvious doctrines.

1. The law justly condemns the whole world. Ver. 19. Consequently all men are cut off from all grounds of hope upon the provisions of law.

2. None can be justified in the sight of God "by the deeds of the law," as the law only gives "the knowledge of sin," without providing any remedy for it. Ver. 20.

3. "The righteousness of God"—or God's method of saving sinners—"is manifested" without that obedience which the law requires, making another condition. Ver. 21.

4. Righteousness, or justification, is only attainable "by faith of Jesus Christ." Ver. 22.

5. This condition is equally applicable to all men: "for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God." Ver. 23.

6. This justification is so far from being conferred upon principles of law, that it is bestowed "freely by his [God's] grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." Ver. 24.

7. This redemption was achieved by the "blood" of "Christ Jesus," who is "a propitiation," and *εἰς ὑπόδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ*, for a demonstration of his righteousness. Verses 25, 26.

8. And that through this "propitiation" men are "justified by faith without the deeds of the law." Ver. 28.

9. That the blessings of justification are extended equally to "the Jews" and to "the Gentiles"—to "the circumcision" and to "the uncircumcision." Verses 29, 30.

10. And, finally, that though men are to expect justification by faith alone, without the deeds of the law, still the law is not made "void." Ver. 31.

The position taken in verse 31, that we do not "make void," but really do "establish the law, through faith," is one of great importance. It is a negative to the most weighty and most natural objection of the legalist to the apostle's doctrine of justification by faith alone. And of so much importance does the apostle think it to refute the slander, that the system of justification which he maintained was of a licentious tendency, that he resumes it from time to time, and sustains the opposite position by arguments strong and numerous. Indeed, the great truth which the apostle labors

through the subsequent part of this epistle to establish is, that the tendency of the gospel is to holiness of life.

The apostle next proceeds (chap. iv) to an illustration of his doctrine of justification by faith alone, by the case of *Abraham*. He had discarded "the works of the law" (chap. iii, 20) as a condition of justification; and he now proceeds to show that Abraham was justified by "*faith*" without "*works*." "For if Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God." For, "to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt." So that if we could claim perfect obedience to the law, our salvation would be a matter of sheer justice—a debt that would be due to us, and no affair of *grace* at all. But he urges, in carrying out this argument, that, instead of offering pardon, "the law worketh wrath." As all have become involved in sin, as he had previously proved, and the office of the law is only to prescribe the rule, and to condemn those who fail of its requirements, it lays no rational ground of hope for any fallen son or daughter of Adam, but thunders against all its just penalties.

In the *fifth* chapter we have a further statement and illustration of the doctrine of justification by faith; and in the *sixth* a discussion, or rather the opening of a discussion, of the doctrine of sanctification, or holiness of heart and life. The apostle introduces this latter topic by calling up the objection which he had previously noticed, namely, that the doctrine of salvation by grace through faith, without the works of the law, makes void the law, and makes Christ the minister of sin. He even proves his doctrine, of the holy tendency of the gospel, from the very fact that the legalist would make the ground of the opposite conclusion, namely, deliverance from the law. "For," says he, "sin shall not have dominion over you: for ye are not under the law, but under grace. What then? shall we sin, because we are not under the law, but under grace? God forbid." Verses 14, 15. As much as to say,—If you were under the law, having failed to keep it, and having lost your power perfectly to meet its requirements, you would then, indeed, be under the "dominion" of "sin;" but being "under grace," you are delivered from its power. By this argument the apostle dexterously turns the objection of the legalist against himself. The law provides no remedy for sin; but the gospel does provide such a remedy: therefore it is the legal system which "genders to bondage," while the gospel, or the gracious economy, tends to spiritual liberty and holiness. Having pursued this argument to its legitimate results,

the apostle next proceeds (chap. vii) to a further illustration and enforcement of his position against the efficacy of the law as the instrument or the condition of life; and, at the same time, giving it its true office and work. We will quote and analyze his language:—

“1. Know ye not, brethren, (for I speak to them that know the law,) how that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth? 2. For the woman which hath a husband is bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth; but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband. 3. So then if, while her husband liveth, she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress: but if her husband be dead, she is free from that law; so that she is no adulteress, though she be married to another man. 4. Wherefore, my brethren, ye also are become dead to the law by the body of Christ; that ye should be married to another, even to him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God. 5. For when we were in the flesh, the motions of sins, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death: 6. But now we are delivered from the law, that being dead wherein we were held; that we should serve in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter. 7. What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet. 8. But sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. For without the law sin was dead. 9. For I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died. 10. And the commandment, which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death. 11. For sin, taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it slew me. 12. Wherefore the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good. 13. Was then that which is good made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me by that which is good; that sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful. 14. For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin.” Rom. vii.

The apostle's position here is, that we “are become dead to the law by the body of Christ.” He had prepared the way for this distinct proposition by an illustration taken from the law of marriage. The death of one of the parties puts a period to the conditions of the union; so that the survivor is at liberty to contract another matrimonial engagement. “Wherefore, my brethren, ye also are become dead to the law by the body of Christ; that ye should be married to another, even to him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God.” Here we have the application of his illustration, showing the effects of the atonement—“the body of Christ”—upon the condition and prospects of true believers. The believer has become dead to the law as a

condition of life, and is affianced to Christ; not that he may live after the flesh, and remain under the dominion of sin, but that he may "bring forth fruit unto God."

Next the apostle proceeds to show, from facts and experience, the inefficacy of the law as an instrument of life. "For when we were in the flesh, the motions of sins, *which were by the law*, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Verse 5. Being "in the flesh" here means, being in a carnal or unrenewed state. (See chap. viii, 8.) When they were in their unregenerate state "the motions"—*παθηματα* *passions*—"of sins, *which were by the law*"—which were awakened and irritated by the law—"did work in their members to bring forth fruit unto death." So far, then, was the law from sanctifying and saving those who were under its power, that it only aroused their inward corruptions to fiercer opposition to its claims.

After this statement, the apostle very naturally and advantageously resumes his position upon the superior advantages of the gospel as a means of sanctification, and shows the strong contrast there is between those who are "delivered from the law," that they may "serve God in newness of the spirit," and those who are under its power, striving for sanctification "in the oldness of the letter." Ver. 6.

Naturally anticipating an objection to what he had said (ver. 5) of the operations of the law upon an unrenewed mind, that if the law were the means of arousing the corruptions of the human heart, it must be an instrument of sin, he now proceeds to vindicate it from such a charge, and to show its true nature, design, and use, under the gospel dispensation.

1. As to the nature of the law, it is *holy, just, good*, and *spiritual*. Verses 12, 14. So far then is the apostle from depreciating the law, that he confers upon it epithets expressive of the highest sense of its true dignity and divine origin.

2. The original design of the law was to preserve the subjects of it in a state of spiritual life. "The commandment which [*was ordained—or intended*] for life I found [*to be*] unto death." Ver. 10. "Doubtless," says Mr. Wesley, "it was originally intended by God as a grand means of preserving and increasing spiritual life, and leading to life everlasting."—*Notes*.

3. The application and uses of the law. And,

First. It gives the knowledge of sin. "I had not known sin but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, 'Thou shalt not covet.'" Verses 7, 8.

Secondly. It shows the strength of sin. "For without the law

sin was dead." Ver. 8. The strength of the current is not felt until we attempt to stem it. So the power of our corruptions is not appreciated until the law brings us to a discovery of their deadly nature, and, alarmed by its denunciations, we begin to struggle against them.

Thirdly. It shows us our utter helplessness and ruin, and induces despair of relief on the ground of our own merit or works. "For I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died." Ver. 9. When God's law, in all its breadth, is applied to the sinner's heart and life, he feels himself helpless within the coils of sin, and hope expires.

Fourthly. The law shows the monstrous evil of sin. "That sin by the commandment might become exceeding sinful." Ver. 13. Sin takes its character or magnitude from the holiness of the law it violates. And when the sinner sees that the law is *holy, just, good*, and *spiritual*—that sin is a violation of such a law—that it is a wide departure from the straight line therein drawn, he sees its *exceeding sinfulness*.

Such, then, according to St. Paul, are the offices of the law. To prove that we are right in supposing that the law referred to by the apostle, in the passage under consideration, is the unchangeable rule of moral obligation—in other words, the *moral law*, properly so called—it is only necessary to direct attention to its attributes and offices. What law is it that is *holy, just, and good—spiritual*—ordained to life—which gives the knowledge of sin—shows its strength—our utter helplessness and ruin—and displays the exceeding sinfulness of sin? Can it be any other than that great moral rule which prescribes the duties which man owes to God—or, in other words, the *moral law*? Again: it may be observed that the apostle refers, in his account of the offices of the law, to a specific precept of the decalogue. Says he, "I had not known sin but by the law; for I had not known lust, except *the law had said, Thou shalt not covet.*" This surely is no part of the ceremonial law; or any other law wholly, and in every sense, abrogated. It is a portion of the ten commandments, "written and engraven on stone," and which, though not the condition of life under the gospel, are of universal and perpetual obligation, and will always be necessary to convict sinners of sin, and show them their need of a Saviour.

Now is there any inconsistency between these views of the offices and uses of the law, and what the apostle had said before of our being "dead to the law by the body of Christ?" The two positions taken by the apostle will appear perfectly consistent with

each other when we advert to what we have seen to be the scope of his argument. His object is to explode the law *as an instrument or a condition of justification or sanctification*. Of course we must take what he says as extending no further than the limits of the proposition which he argues. In attempting to prove that the law cannot justify or sanctify, he says we are dead to the law by the body of Christ. Now we can understand no more by this, taken in its connections, than that the law has ceased to be the rule or condition of justification, or the instrument or condition of sanctification. We cannot make him mean more without perverting his sense and making him contradict himself. To cut off all such constructions of his language as would imply that the law is wholly abrogated, the apostle proceeds immediately to exalt it, and to show its perpetual necessity as an exhibition of God's holiness, and the instrument of the sinner's conviction of the evil of sin. The result from the whole is, that though the law is still in full force as an exhibition of our duty as the creatures of God, it is "*dead*," and "we are delivered from" it, as a *covenant of works* or a *condition of life*.

A fallacy is sometimes practiced by the use of the qualifying word *moral* in connection with the law. As this term is not found in the Bible, but has been used merely for the sake of distinction, men take the liberty to affix to it their own signification; some using it with a greater, others with a less latitude of meaning. Some apply it to the decalogue; others, to all the moral rules of the Bible, embracing both Testaments; and others use it in a general sense *for the great rule of the divine government which binds all moral agents to love and obey God to the extent of their powers*. We do not say that the ten commandments are not moral laws, nor that the law of love, given by our Saviour, is not moral; on the other hand, we would explicitly concede that these are particular formularies which express, in a comprehensive form, the requirements of the moral law. And, moreover, we equally maintain that there are a multitude of particular precepts scattered through the Scriptures which are of a purely moral character. Restricting the origin of the moral law to the Mosaic code seems to us unauthorized and little less than absurd. For then it would have had no existence before Moses. Our first parents in paradise, and the long line of patriarchs from Adam to Moses, would have been without it, which would be too absurd a supposition to be entertained for a moment. Again: St. Paul evidently supposes the moral law to be known, to some extent, where the Mosaic code was not known. "For," says he,

"when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." Romans ii, 14, 15. According to this view, the great moral code is not confined to the Biblical formularies, but is, in its spirit at least, inscribed upon the conscience of dark and degraded heathen, "accusing or else excusing" them, according as their conduct is conformed or not conformed to its claims. The light of the heathen, we know, is exceedingly dim; but still if St. Paul is right, they have at least enough to make them responsible.

And in this view we have the sanction of Mr. Wesley. His sermon on the Law, already quoted, is founded upon a portion of the section now under discussion, (Rom. vii, 12;) and in relation to the law spoken of, he says,—

"The nature of that law which was originally given to angels in heaven and man in paradise, and which God has so mercifully promised to write afresh in the hearts of all true believers, was the second thing I proposed to show. In order to which I would first observe; that although the 'law' and the 'commandment' are sometimes differently taken, (the commandment meaning but a part of the law,) yet, in the text, they are used as equivalent terms, implying one and the same thing. But we cannot understand here, either by one or the other, the ceremonial law. . . . It remains, that the law, eminently so termed, is no other than the moral law."

By *ὁ νομος* the law—and which we take the liberty to call the moral law—we mean the great rule of moral obligation binding all dependent intelligences to perfect obedience. Mr. Wesley says,—"The law, eminently so termed, is no other than the moral law:" and then proceeds to give us a most graphic view of its character. "Now," says he, "this law is an incorruptible picture of the high and holy ONE that inhabiteth eternity. It is he, whom, in his essence, no man hath seen or can see, made visible to men and angels. It is the face of God unveiled; God manifested to his creatures as they are able to bear it; manifested to give, and not to destroy, life—that they may see God and live. It is the heart of God disclosed to man. Yea, in some sense, we may apply to this law what the apostle says of his Son, it is *ἀπαύλασμα τῆς δόξης, καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς υποστάσεως αὐτοῦ*—the streaming forth [or out-beaming] of his glory, the express image of his person."—*Sermon on the Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law.*

As to the origin of this law, this great divine tells us it "is not, as some may have possibly imagined, of so late an institution as the time of Moses. Noah declared it to men long before that time, and Enoch before him. But we may trace its original higher still, even beyond the foundation of the world, to that period, unknown indeed to men, but doubtless enrolled in the annals of eternity, when 'the morning stars [first] sang together,' being newly called into existence."—*Ibid.* And that this is the law—the law which we, with the sanction of our venerable founder, call "the moral law"—of which the apostle speaks in the passage under discussion, we have already given sufficient reasons abundantly and beyond all controversy to prove. As we shall have occasion to call up this point again, we wish the reader to bear in mind the explicit language of Mr. Wesley in relation to it, and the incontrovertible reasons by which his views are supported.

Having exhibited the ineffectual struggles of a convicted sinner under the law, in the latter verses of the seventh chapter of Romans, the apostle proceeds, on the opening of the eighth, to another declaration of the true source of deliverance.

"1. There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. 2. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death. 3. For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin condemned sin in the flesh: 4. That the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." Rom. viii.

Here is a strong contrast drawn between the weakness and inefficacy of the law for the purposes of sanctification, and the strength and efficiency of the gospel system.

1. "There is no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus"—those who are "married" or united to Christ by faith are *justified*. The law, as we have seen, cannot justify, but the gospel can.

2. "For the law of the Spirit of life"—the gospel—"hath made me free from the law of sin and death"—hath taken me from under the power and bondage of the law, which, as it gives the sinner no relief, but leaves him under the power of sin, and condemns him to death on account of it, is called "the law of sin and death."

3. "For what the law could not do"—toward justifying and sanctifying the sinner—"in that it was weak through the flesh,

God" hath done,—“sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for”—a sacrifice for—“sin condemned sin in the flesh:”—showing its evil, and providing for its destruction—“that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.” Through the sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, made known by the gospel, God has achieved the complete emancipation, from the condemnation and the power of sin, of all those who so believe and receive the atonement as to bring forth the fruits of holiness—a thing which the law, in its weakness, “could not do.”

It is a question of some importance to determine in what sense “the righteousness of the law” is “fulfilled in us who walk,” &c. There are two classes of views upon this point, between which commentators are divided. One class refers the fulfillment of the righteousness of the law to Christ—condemning sin in the flesh; and the other, to the practical obedience of the sanctified. Those who take the latter view, suppose a *qualified* fulfillment of the righteousness of the law to be intended; such as is implied in loving God with all the heart—the same sense in which “love is the fulfilling of the law.” Among these we rank many of the Arminian commentators, and some of the Calvinistic. But several of these—such as Locke, Benson, Turner, Pyle, and others—take special care to guard against the supposition that a perfect satisfaction of the claims of the law is to be understood; asserting that only the degree of obedience which a fallen being in a sanctified state is able to render, and which God, through Christ, will graciously condescend to accept, instead of such perfect righteousness as the law requires, is intended. This is a safe construction, and there seems some reason for it; but it has its difficulties: *δικαίωμα του νομου*, *the righteousness of the law*, in the proper sense, must imply a *perfect righteousness*. Nothing less than this could possibly meet the claims of the law, and no one who has ever sinned can attain such righteousness. For the law requires sinless perfection,—making no allowance for the smallest departure from its high and holy requirements, and extending no mercy to past failures. Who, then, can ever, in himself and by his own works, practically meet the claims of God’s holy law? “The righteousness of the law” not only requires that we should not sin in future, but that we *should never have sinned in days past*—it must imply Adamic perfection, and nothing less. But it may be said that the atonement of Christ meets the demands of the law, so far as the past is concerned, pardoning our trespasses and washing away our stains: and it is only for the future—subsequent to our entire sanc-

tification—that we are expected to fulfill the righteousness of the law. To this it may be answered, that it does not agree with the position maintained. That position is, that the righteousness of the law is fulfilled *by us*,—as they render *εν ημίν*,—who walk, &c.; making the fulfilment of the righteousness of the law *personal*—*the result of our own works*. If the righteousness of the law is in a proper sense fulfilled *by us*, there is nothing left to be done by Christ. The difficulty of this interpretation is, that, while it makes the atonement of Christ in some unexplained, and, to us, inconceivable, way, to render it possible that we should fulfill the righteousness of the law, it gives the atonement no part in the work of fulfilling that righteousness. Now, we learn from the Scriptures that CHRIST “magnified the law and made it honorable,” and “brought in everlasting righteousness;” that he is “the Lord our righteousness,”—that he is “our wisdom, *righteousness*, sanctification, and redemption.” But that the righteousness of the law can, in any proper sense, be fulfilled *by a fallen being*, is what we must, at least for the present, hold as doubtful.

We have no doubt but that obedience to the requirements of the gospel, and a perfect fulfillment of its conditions, are practicable. But then the question is, whether this is the meaning of the text under consideration. Nor have we any doubt but that the righteousness of the law is fulfilled, or completely vindicated, in the final salvation of the believer; but then we suppose this is done by the divine atonement, and not by his *perfect* obedience to its requirements.

Could we suppose a man at any time in a condition to fulfill the righteousness of the law, we would scarcely suppose him any longer to stand in need of the atonement. For what though the atonement put him in the condition—pardoned his sins and renovated his nature—if he meets the entire claims of the law for ever after, though he may have cause of gratitude and praise for his being raised to his present elevated position, what need will he have for a constant application of the blood of Christ? While perfectly meeting the highest claims of the divine law, he could scarcely

“Every moment, Lord, I need
The merit of thy death.”

From these considerations we are not prepared to adopt the construction of the passage under consideration, which attributes the fulfillment of the righteousness of the law to men who “have sinned and come short of the glory of God.” The reader will not understand us as objecting to the *orthodoxy* of those commentators and divines who adopt the construction of the text from which we dissent.

We are aware that men have adopted this construction whose shoelatchets we are not worthy to loose. But we cannot follow commentators implicitly in their criticisms and paraphrases. We must see with our own eyes that the sense they give the divine Word is sustained by the language and scope of the sacred penmen, or we cannot follow any of them. At the same time we wish it distinctly understood, that with the *doctrinal views* which some of our own commentators suppose to be involved in the text in question, we most perfectly harmonize. Our only question is, whether these views can be legitimately deduced from the text. A doubtful argument never should be relied upon in proof of a doctrine—a text never should be employed *as a proof-text* which fairly admits of a construction which would render it wholly inapplicable to our purpose. And above all, should we avoid a construction of a text of Scripture given for the proof of a disputed doctrine, which, if it can be made to bear at all, will make it prove *too much*,—and so by a dexterous opponent can be run into the grossest absurdity. By such ill-advised methods of defending the truth, a decided advantage is often given to its adversaries.

In the latter part of the *ninth* chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, the apostle concludes from the premises which he had previously laid down, that the Gentiles had attained to the law of righteousness, even the righteousness of faith: “But Israel hath not attained to the law of righteousness, because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law.” The converted Gentiles had obtained justification because they sought it by faith alone; but the unbelieving Jews had not obtained justification, because they sought it by the impracticable method of legal obedience.

Naturally concluding that this position would be supposed by the Jews to imply some want of regard for his brethren of the house of Israel, he opens the *tenth* chapter with a strong declaration of his steady attachment to his “brethren,” his “kinsmen according to the flesh.” He thus proceeds:—

“2. For I bear them record, that they have a zeal of God, but not according to knowledge. 3. For they being ignorant of God’s righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God. 4. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth. 5. For Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law, That the man which doeth those things shall live by them. 6. But the righteousness which is of faith speaketh on this wise, Say not in thy heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? (that is, to bring Christ down from above :) 7. Or, Who shall descend into the deep?

(that is, to bring up Christ again from the dead.) 8. But what saith it? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart: that is, the word of faith which we preach: 9. That if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. 10. For with the heart man believeth unto righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation. 11. For the Scripture saith, Whosoever believeth on him shall not be ashamed." Rom. x.

Here he first declares that their great error was, that "being ignorant of God's righteousness"—God's method of justification and sanctification—"and going about to establish their own righteousness"—their own plan of salvation by the law—they had "not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God." Their *doctrinal* error had become *practical*, and so they were still unsaved. He next proceeds to another statement and illustration of "God's righteousness,"—or the gospel method of salvation.

"For," saith he, "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth." Ver. 4. Two points of inquiry naturally arise upon this position. *First*, what law does the apostle refer to? And *secondly*, in what sense is Christ the end of that law? Mr. Wesley is so explicit upon these points, that we shall introduce his language as the best exposition of the whole subject which we have to offer.

"QUEST. 1. How is 'Christ the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth?' Rom. x, 4.

"ANS. In order to understand this, you must understand what law is here spoken of; and this, I apprehend, is, 1. The Mosaic law, the whole Mosaic dispensation; which St. Paul continually speaks of as one, though containing three parts, the political, moral, and ceremonial. 2. The Adamic law, that given to Adam in innocence, properly called 'the law of works.' This is in substance the same with the angelic law, being common to angels and men. It required that man should use, to the glory of God, all the powers with which he was created. Now, he was created free from any defect, either in his understanding or his affections. His body was then no clog to the mind; it did not hinder his apprehending all things clearly, judging truly concerning them, and reasoning justly, if he reasoned at all. I say, *if he reasoned*; for possibly he did not. Perhaps he had no need of reasoning, till his corruptible body pressed down the mind, and impaired its native faculties. Perhaps, till then, the mind saw every truth that offered, as directly as the eye now sees the light.

"Consequently, this law, proportioned to his original powers, required that he should always think, always speak, and always act

precisely right, in every point whatever. He was well able so to do: and God could not but require the service he was able to pay.

"But Adam fell, and his incorruptible body became corruptible; and ever since, it is a clog to the soul, and hinders its operations. Hence, at present, no child of man can at all times apprehend clearly, or judge truly. And where either the judgment or apprehension is wrong, it is impossible to reason justly. Therefore it is as natural for a man to mistake as to breathe; and he can no more live without the one than without the other: consequently no man is able to perform the service which the Adamic law requires.

"And no man is obliged to perform it; God does not require it of any man: for Christ is the end of the Adamic, as well as the Mosaic, law. By his death he hath put an end to both; he hath abolished both the one and the other, with regard to man; and the obligation to observe either the one or the other is vanished away. Nor is any man living bound to observe the Adamic, more than the Mosaic, law. (I mean it is not the condition either of present or future salvation.)

"In the room of this, Christ hath established another, viz., the law of faith. Not every one that doeth, but every one that believeth, now receiveth righteousness, in the full sense of the word; that is, he is justified, sanctified, and glorified."—*Plain Account*.

Now, if it should be questioned whether Mr. Wesley intends to embrace *the moral law* in his statements, it is very easy to prove the fact beyond the possibility of a rational doubt. Under his first head he embraces "the Mosaic law," which, he says, "St. Paul continually speaks of as one, though containing three parts, the political, *moral*, and ceremonial." Here he explicitly embraces *the moral law* as combined in the "Mosaic dispensation." And under the second head he embraces "the Adamic law—that given to Adam in innocence, properly called the law of works—in substance the same with the angelic law, being common to angels and men." Compare this language with a passage we have already quoted from Mr. Wesley, and the fact that he refers to the moral law is clearly made out.

"I shall endeavor to show the original of the moral law, often called 'the law,' by way of eminence. Now this is not, as some may have possibly imagined, of so late an institution as the time of Moses. Noah declared it to men long before that time, and Enoch before him. But we may trace its original higher still, even beyond the foundation of the world, to that period, unknown indeed to men, but doubtless enrolled in the annals of eternity, when 'the

morning stars [first] sang together,' being newly called into existence."—*Wesley's Sermons*, vol. i, p. 307.

Who does not see that what he calls "the Adamic law" in the Plain Account, he calls "the moral law" in the sermon? In one instance he says it is the law which is "common to angels and men;" and in the other he traces "its original" to the period when the morning stars sang together, being early "called into being;" and explicitly calls it "the moral law." There is no confusion here. *The moral law* generically embraces both the Adamic and the *moral* part of the Mosaic law. By the Adamic law, he means one specific form and manifestation of the moral law; and by the part of the "Mosaic law" which partakes of the nature of *moral law*, he refers to another; and when speaking generally, he embraces the law which is not only common to Jews and Gentiles—the patriarchal, the Mosaic, and the Christian dispensation—but, also, "common to angels and men."

Let us next look at what this great divine says of the *abolition* of this law. He says, "Christ is the end of the Adamic, as well as the Mosaic, law. . . . Nor is any man living bound to observe the Adamic more than the Mosaic law. (I mean, it is not the condition either of present or future salvation.)" This is precisely what we understand to be the doctrine of Paul, and to be aimed at directly throughout his whole argument upon the law in his Epistle to the Romans. *The law*, in any form, in all forms, is "abolished" "as a condition of present or future salvation. . . . In the room of this, Christ hath established another, namely, the law of faith."

St. Paul proceeds immediately from the position upon which we have presented the commentary of Mr. Wesley, to draw a contrast between the way of salvation by the law, and that of salvation by faith. He says, "Moses describeth the righteousness which is of the law, that the man which doeth those things shall live by them. But the righteousness of faith speaketh on this wise." Or, as Mr. Wesley says, "Not every one that *doeth*, but every one that *believeth*, now receiveth righteousness, in the full sense of the word; that is, he is justified, sanctified, and glorified." *The law of faith*, as "the condition either of present or future salvation," is directly opposed to the *law of works*, both by St. Paul and Mr. Wesley; and, according to them, while the one is perfectly practicable, the other is so far above or below us that we cannot attain unto it, and we are not to direct our attention toward it for a moment. "Say not in thine heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? or who shall descend into the deep? the word is nigh

thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart: that is, the word of faith which we preach—for with the heart man believeth unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation." Salvation upon the condition of law is fairly beyond our reach, but on the condition of faith it is near—brought down to our helplessness and ruin.

A similar train of reasoning upon the law is pursued by the apostle in his Epistle to the Galatians; a few passages from which we shall next proceed to quote and expound:—

"16. Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified. 17. But if, while we seek to be justified by Christ, we ourselves also are found sinners, is therefore Christ the minister of sin? God forbid. 18. For if I build again the things which I destroyed, I make myself a transgressor. 19. For I through the law am dead to the law, that I might live unto God. 20. I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me. 21. I do not frustrate the grace of God: for if righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain." Gal. ii.

1. The apostle first states the doctrine of justification by faith, and the utter *impossibility* of justification by the works of the law. Ver. 16.

2. That if the Galatians, seeking justification by faith, were found deficient in their moral and religious character, the gospel would not be to blame, but the fault would lie upon them. Verses 17, 18.

3. That through the application of the law to his life he had been brought to so full a conviction of the impracticability of salvation upon the ground of legal obedience, that he had wholly renounced it as the condition of present or future salvation, and had embraced Christ as his only remedy. "For I through the law am dead to the law, that I might live unto God." Ver. 19.

4. He is so effectually united with Christ that he is "crucified with" him, and he so holds his connection with him as to derive from him spiritual "life," only "by the faith of the Son of God." Ver. 20. Observe here, that the apostle himself, though justified and sanctified, does not consider it practicable for him to stand in this grace on the condition of perfect obedience to the law. But he says, "I am dead to the law—I am crucified with Christ—and the life which I now live—I live by the faith of the Son of God." So that his *continued* justification, and the *perpetuity* of his spiritual life, were by *faith*, and not by *legal obedience*.

5. Lastly, he affirms that if righteousness could come by the law, the death of Christ would be in vain, and he would "frustrate," or make void, "the grace of God."

In the opening of the *third* chapter, the Galatians are charged with having foolishly left Christ and gone back to the law. And after demanding of them (ver. 2) whether they had "received the Spirit by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith," and offered some illustrations, he proceeds:—

"10. For as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse: for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them. 11. But that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God, it is evident: for, The just shall live by faith. 12. And the law is not of faith: but, The man that doeth them shall live in them." Gal. iii.

1. He asserts that those who depend upon the law for salvation are under its curse—and this he proves by a quotation from Moses, (Deut. xxvii, 26,) which will as effectually cut off from the hope of salvation those who are now justified as those who are not, unless they can hope never to offend against *any* of "the things which are written in the book of the law." For if they trespass in the smallest matter they come under the curse.

2. He next proves, by another scripture, that present and continued justification is by faith. His proof is, "The just shall live by faith." Hab. ii, 4. He cannot mean here, only to say that sinners are at first justified by faith. This is a doctrine which he had repeatedly asserted, as we have seen elsewhere. But now he evidently speaks more especially of continued justification: for his proof would not be applicable to any other view, nor would it well agree with the scope of his argument. He is chiding the Galatians for going back from faith to the law, and laboring to show that there is no point where they can safely put themselves upon the condition of law: "for," says he, "the just shall live by faith. And the law is not of faith: but, The man that doeth them shall live in them." Verses 11, 12. You cannot expect to retain your justification on the condition of law, for the just enjoy their spiritual life by faith. "That is," says Mr. Wesley, "the man who is accounted just or righteous before God, shall continue in a state of acceptance, life, and salvation, *by faith*."—*Notes*.

"The interpretation of Macknight and others, 'The just by faith shall live'—[i. e., those who are justified by faith shall live]—is very properly rejected by Bishop Middleton, who observes that thus we should have had *ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως*, or else *ὁ ἐκ πίστεως δίκαιος*. Besides, continues he, to say that he who is just,

or justified by faith, shall live, amounts to very little; but to affirm that the good man, he whose obedience, though imperfect, is sincere, shall reap life everlasting from faith, (as opposed to a law of works,) and from faith alone, is a most important declaration; and it agrees exactly with the context: that no man, says the apostle, is justified under the law, is evident; for one of the prophets hath said, 'The just shall live by faith.'—*Bloomfield's Critical Digest*.

Our apostle next proceeds to anticipate and answer an objection:—

"21. Is the law then against the promises of God? God forbid: for if there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law. 22. But the Scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe. 23. But before faith came, we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which should afterward be revealed. 24. Wherefore the law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith. 25. But after that faith is come, we are no longer under a schoolmaster. 26. For ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus." Gal. iii.

1. First, he says "the law" is not "against the promise of God." They perform wholly different offices. The promise gives "life," which could the law have done, it would supersede the promise, and then "verily righteousness should have been by the law."

2. All are "under sin," and consequently under the condemnation of the law, and can only be saved by "faith."

3. "Before faith came"—that is, before the promise of a Saviour—"we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith," &c.—held in duress by the law until faith brought relief.

4. But the law is not hence to be considered useless. For "the law was our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ, that we might be justified by faith." Ver. 24. The law teaches the need of justification, but does not confer it. It can only be received "by faith."

5. But after we have passed through the law-work—the law has awakened and convicted us, and thus shown us our utter helplessness, and we have been brought to Christ for justification—we are no longer either under the bondage of this "schoolmaster," nor under the necessity for those offices which are superseded by a faith that works by love and purifies the heart.

Having passed through the particular examination of the principal passages upon the subject of *the law*, found in the two

epistles in which St. Paul treats the subject of set purpose, we shall now proceed to draw several conclusions which seem to us to result from his positions.

1. We have seen that *the law*, of which the apostle treats, is *the moral law*—the great rule of human duty given, in various forms and at various periods, by God to man. It is not exclusively the Adamic law nor the Mosaic law, but it embraces the former, and portions of the latter, and even includes the law written upon the hearts of heathen.

But it must be remembered that in all this the law is to be understood separately from the mediatorial system. It was by the law without the atonement, that the Jews sought to be justified, and this was the system which it was the special object of the apostle to show was utterly impracticable. "The law," says *Flavel*, "in Scripture is taken strictly for the moral law only, considered abstractedly from the promises of grace, as the legal justiciaries understood it. These are two different senses and acceptations of the law." After quoting these words, *Mr. Fletcher* adds:—"Apply this excellent distinction to the refinements with which the doctrine of the law has been perplexed; and you will easily answer the objections of those who, availing themselves of St. Paul's laconic style, lay their own farrago at his door. For instance, when he says, 'As many as are of the works of the law, are under the curse; for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things,' &c., he means (to use *Flavel's* words) the law 'considered abstractedly from the promises of grace;' for, in that case, the law immediately becomes the Adamic covenant of works, which knows nothing of justification by faith in a merciful God, through an atoning Mediator; and, in this point of view, the apostle says with great truth, 'The law is not of faith, but the man that doeth these things shall live in them,' without being under any obligation to a Saviour."—*Equal Check*.

2. We have found that this law *no longer exists* AS A COVENANT OF WORKS—that it is *not the condition of justification or sanctification*. No truth, it seems to us, is taught more explicitly than this. It was important to the apostle's argument, in the epistles above named, fully to show this truth. He is urging the perfect fitness and the exclusive claims of the gospel; and when he meets the objections of those who set up the claims of *the law* in opposition to those of *the gospel*, it seems necessary that he should show, in a clear light, the utter inefficacy of the law for the purposes of human salvation. It was necessary to show not only that we cannot obtain justification and sanctification by the law, but that it

would be equally impossible for us to *retain* these blessings by perfect obedience to its claims. Hence his argument is addressed not merely to unconverted sinners, but to justified and sanctified believers. He consequently quotes with emphasis the words of the prophet: "The just shall live by faith." The same doctrine is most explicitly taught in a passage not yet quoted. "Therefore," says he, "being justified by faith, we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ: by whom also we have access by faith into this grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God." Rom. v, 1, 2. Here we are taught that "we have access into this grace"—the grace of justification—"wherein we stand," "by faith." Justification is a *state* as well as a *change*. And we have constant "access into this grace *wherein we stand*," "through our Lord Jesus Christ," and "by faith" in him. Faith in Christ is as really the condition of our continued justification as it is of the commencement of this blessed state; in other words, as much the condition of the *state* as of the *change*. But there is this difference between the faith by which the sinner is justified and that by which the justified *stand in this grace*: the first instance of faith is that which produces submission to Christ, and reliance upon him for the pardon of all past sins; and the faith which follows adds to these, *practical obedience to the precepts of the gospel*. Good works follow, and evince the existence of *justifying faith*.

It has been erroneously supposed by some that because we are required to do God's commandments—to be doers of the word, &c.—we are therefore, subsequently to our justification, put upon the condition of obedience to the moral law. The precepts of the moral law are obligatory upon all Christians; but then it must be borne in mind that they are incorporated into the mediatorial system. *First*, that this system furnishes them with many helps to aid them in their duties; and, *secondly*, that it supplies them with an atoning sacrifice to make amends for their involuntary shortcomings. Without these, who could stand for a moment upon the ground of obedience to the law? The law requires unflinching obedience—it can accept nothing short of *perfect conformity* to all its claims. If we have no atonement to rely upon we must fail of heaven. For who can, in all things, meet the claims of God's holy law? Our errors in judgment and involuntary mistakes, as we are taught by our venerated fathers to believe, need the atoning blood of Christ. But how do they need an atonement if they are not offenses in the eyes of the law still in force as a rule of duty? If the law even makes allowance for

these infirmities, and requires no more than our enfeebled powers are adequate perfectly to perform, why then it is possible for us to live in such strict conformity to its demands as not constantly to need the blood of atonement. For if a man perfectly meets the high claims of the law for any given period, he will stand, for that period, legally, and upon the ground of justice, clear from all charge, and cannot be supposed dependent upon atoning merit for his continued justification.

Should it be urged that, upon the ground that the moral law is now impracticable, it is unjust to require perfect conformity to its claims, and that the enforcement, even in the gospel, is wholly useless, if not absurd; it may be answered, that the constant exhibition and enforcement of the law show to all, even to the most perfect Christian—for even such must be conscious of many shortcomings—the constant necessity of the atoning merit of the Lord Jesus. For, as has been urged, if the law were wholly abrogated, or should bring down its claims to a level with our present fallen condition, we should have no standing monument before us of the inflexible and unchangeable holiness of God; nor do we see how we could feel the present constant need of the merits of Jesus Christ to sustain our hopes, and finally to grant us eternal life.

But before we leave this branch of the subject we would say that *the good works*, commandments, &c., of the gospel, embrace and principally refer to the exercise and fruits of *faith*. As St. John says, "And this is his commandment: that we should believe on the name of his Son Jesus Christ, and love one another." 1 John iii, 23. It is "a loving, obedient faith" which constitutes the condition of our continued acceptance and final salvation—a faith that begets love to God and man, and which, when *perfected*, is accompanied by that "*perfect love*" which "*casteth out fear*." This is the position of our standards, as, had we space, we might abundantly prove. Though they go strongly against *solifidianism*—from *sola fide*, sole faith—they still hold faith as the basis of all the Christian graces, and hold to obedience and holiness of life in a way not to be implicated in *legalism*. It is the Antinomian doctrine of continued justification and final salvation by a dead, inoperative faith that they make the butt of their most decided assaults. But when they, against the Antinomians of the day, plead for the practicability of the evangelical law, the necessity of obedience, and of good works, &c., we are not to suppose that they maintain that *perfect* obedience to the moral law is the condition of continued justification, or that it is at all practicable to a fallen being.

Mr. Wesley says, "Faith working, or animated by love, is all that God now requires of man [that is, as "the condition of present or future salvation;"] he has substituted (not sincerity, but) love in the room of angelic perfection."—*Plain Account*.

Mr. Fletcher says, "Nor yet under a Christless law with Adam, but under a law to Christ, that is, under the law of our royal Priest, the evangelical law of liberty: a more gracious law this, which allows of sincere repentance, and is fulfilled by loving faith."—*Last Check*.

"And that Christians shall be eternally saved or damned according to their keeping or breaking this mediatorial law of Christian perfection; this law of Christ, this royal law of Jesus the king of the Jews, we prove," &c.—*Ib*.

So that, according to these great divines, it is not the law, properly so called, but the Mediator's law—the evangelical law, or law of liberty—which contains the conditions of both present and future salvation, and is practicable by fallen humanity.

In this view is embraced the provision for "sincere repentance" through a Mediator. The "mediatorial law of Christian perfection" includes all the redeeming merit and all the restoring influences of the new and better covenant. Consequently, the term *law*, when used by our divines, as above, means something more than *a mere rule of duty enforced by penal and promissory sanctions*. It embraces *a plan of salvation*—something which the moral law proper does not embrace or contemplate.

We do not deny but these authors frequently urge the claims of *the law*, and the necessity of obedience to it, without applying to it the qualifying epithets above referred to. But it is an "*evangelically* sinless" obedience which they mean. This we are warranted in inferring from two facts. *First*, they most generally qualify their meaning as above—especially when pressed with the objection that man, in his fallen state, cannot perfectly keep God's holy law; and, *secondly*, because they can in no other way be at all consistent with themselves. For they constantly declare that the most perfect Christians sin against "the perfect law," and consequently have need, every moment, of the atoning blood of Christ. We will here give a clear and most decisive paragraph from Mr. Wesley. Speaking of those who "love God with all their hearts," he says,—“Yet as, even in this case, there is not a full conformity to the perfect law, so the most perfect do, on this very account, need the blood of atonement, and may properly for themselves, as well as for their brethren, say, ‘Forgive us our trespasses.’”—*Plain Account*. This is entirely conclusive. The

fact, or the possibility of perfect obedience to "the perfect law," cannot be inferred from anything he has said elsewhere without making him contradict himself.

But here it may be inquired whether Messrs. Wesley and Fletcher do not embrace the whole moral law in their views of the gospel? Certainly they do. But they give to the law a distinct work to perform. It convicts men of sin, and shows them their need of Christ—it is "our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ." The law proper, and the gospel proper, have each their distinctive work to perform; though they perfectly harmonize, the latter only doing what the former cannot do. They do not conflict with each other, nor should they be confounded together. The following extract, from *Dr. Fisk's* sermon on "the properties of the law and the gospel distinguished," sets the subject in a clear light.

"The gospel implies the law, and acknowledges its claims—they harmonize together in their general design, but are altogether distinct in their character and offices."

"That the gospel presupposes the law, is evident from the fact already established—that it is an expedient to meet both its penal and preceptive claims. But for the law, therefore, there would have been no gospel. Hence, when the gospel comes proclaiming salvation, it always directs the sinner to the purity and rigor of the law; it clears his spiritual vision, that he may see his danger, and quickens his moral sensibilities, that he may feel his guilt. The gospel detracts nothing from the extent of these claims, and pleads nothing in extenuation of the sinner's criminality. But while it gives full credit to the demands of the law, it spreads open its own appropriate provisions to meet these demands. It points the sinner, first to his poverty, and then to the 'riches of grace, in Christ Jesus;' first to his moral defilement, and then to the blood that 'cleanseth from all sin.' Both, therefore, have the same object in view, viz., holiness of heart and life. The difference is in the manner of accomplishing this object. And this grows out of the different conditions of man. The law is suited not only as a rule of conduct, but as a condition of life for the holy; but the gospel is designed, as we have seen, as a provision of life for the unholy. While the law, therefore, curses sinners, the gospel blesses them. If the law could bless sinners, there would be no need of the gospel; and if the gospel could curse sinners, then indeed we might dispense with the law. But as the law preceded the gospel, and contains in itself all that was necessary as a rule of life, and all the penalty necessary to punish the transgressor; and, as has been shown, is unrepealed and unrepeatable, there was no need of ad-

ditional penalties and new moral codes in the gospel. Therefore the gospel, strictly speaking, is not law. It may indeed be objected to this, that the gospel is sometimes called law in the Scriptures. Our text calls it 'the law of the spirit of life.' St. James speaks of 'the perfect law of liberty.' St. Paul calls it 'the law of faith'—and declares, (Rom. ii, 12, 16,) that 'as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men, according to my gospel,' and that 'the Lord Jesus shall be revealed in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that *obey not the gospel* of our Lord Jesus Christ.' 1 Thess. i, 8. In reference to these and similar passages, it may be remarked, that so far as the gospel is used as a term to convey the idea of the whole divine administration under the new covenant, it may very properly be said to include both the precepts and sanctions of law. And so the Scriptures sometimes use the term. But this is a mode of speech in which a part is put for the whole: the whole system is spoken of under the name of one of its prominent features. So the biography of Christ, and all the incidents recorded by the evangelists, go under the general name of *gospel*, because their leading object is to proclaim the '*good news* of great joy, which shall be unto all people,' viz.; that 'unto them is born a SAVIOUR, who is Christ the Lord.' It should also be recollected that the gospel, as has been already shown, implies the law; and to preach it, therefore, with effect, it is necessary to proclaim the law in all its terrors, and describe it in all its claims. Hence, the apostolic commission runs thus,—'Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved; he that believeth not, shall be damned.' The gospel is as active in pressing the sinner's danger upon him as it is in holding up its own provisions. Because, by this, the sinner is convinced of the nature of his wants and of his need of the gospel. But this no more proves that the gospel curses the sinner, and will finally damn him if he continues impenitent, than the representation which the physician makes to the sick man of his disease and danger, is the cause of that danger. If, in this case, the physician should say,—'Unless you submit yourself to my care and receive my medicine, you must die;' would any man of a sound mind say it was the remedy which sentenced him to death? So neither is it the gospel that condemns the sinner, though it proclaims, 'he that believeth not shall be damned,'—and though it makes known most explicitly, that 'God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ.' And indeed in this passage, (chap. ii, 16,) where the apostle states, that 'God shall judge the secrets of men

according to the gospel,' he is careful to tell us that this judgment is by the law, ver. 12; and it was according to his preaching, when he exhibited to them the necessity and advantages of embracing the gospel. This view of the subject will show what St. James means by the 'perfect law of liberty.' He is speaking of the word preached, embracing, doubtless, the whole range of truth implied in the gospel scheme. Now, whosoever looketh into this exhibition of divine truth and giveth heed thereto, &c., that man shall be blessed in his deed. There is not even an intimation in the text or context, that the 'perfect law of liberty,' here spoken of, is the gospel, properly so called. The gospel is, doubtless, implied in it, because all the word preached is implied in it. As it respects the clause in our text, in which the gospel is called 'the law of the spirit of life,' this no more means that the gospel is law, properly so called, than the phrase, *law of sin and death*, in the other clause of the sentence, means law, properly so called. In both cases, probably, the term, law, is used in an accommodated sense, to represent a *strong controlling influence*. Such are the habits of sin when once formed, and such the energetic operations of the gospel upon the heart. This accommodated use of the term, law, in the text, may, in a good degree, explain other passages where the gospel is called law. For that it is not used for the divine law, in a proper definition of the term, is evident from the fact, that it is set in contrast with the law, and performs a distinct work, which the law cannot do. And it is here contrasted with the very law, too, under which man is placed, the guilt of which he feels when convicted of sin, and from which the gospel alone frees him when he is *justified* and born again. If, therefore, the law of the spirit of life in the text means the gospel, (as who can doubt but it does?) then, indeed, is the gospel distinguished from the law by all those strong marks of difference and striking traits of contrast hinted at in the preceding discourse."

3. The next deduction which we make from St. Paul's language is, that the law which is superseded as a condition of justification and sanctification, is still in being as a rule of action.

Let the reader here revert to the language of the apostle in the *seventh* of *Romans*. Here he declares we "are become dead to the law by the body of Christ." And after proceeding to show the workings of the law upon the unrenewed, and making out that "the motions of sin were by the law," that is, the law excited evil *passions* without curing them, he brings in an objector, asking, "What shall we say then? Is the law sin?" And in answer to this he proceeds to eulogize *this very law*, and to attribute to it

attributes absolutely inconsistent, as we have already seen, with the idea that it is wholly abrogated. He clearly asserts its divine origin and perpetual utility. Now there is no harmony or truth in the apostle's reasoning in all this upon the hypothesis that he here speaks of two different laws. Upon the supposition that he, in the first instance, declared that we are dead to the *ceremonial* law or any other law that has been wholly done away, and, in answer to an objection made to his positions, proceeded to assert the continued existence and great practical utility of the moral law, or some other law that is not abrogated, would he reason logically? Would he not stand convicted of playing upon an equivocal term? We can never concur in a construction of St. Paul's language which will make him play the part of a sophist. We must believe that he prosecutes his argument logically, and that he meets all objections fairly, and can never consent to the construction which makes him answer the objection that he depreciates one law by showing that he honors another.

If, then, the apostle here speaks of the same law in both instances, the only consistent conclusion is, that he views it in the two instances in two different respects. In the *first* he finds the law ineffectual, and superseded as a covenant of works—as a condition of salvation; and in the *second*, he recognizes in it an indestructible principle of righteousness—a rule of moral conduct to moral beings.

If it should be urged here, that man, having lost his ability to keep the law, God cannot now hold him under obligation to do so without gross injustice; we answer, that obligation does not always imply an ability to perform. A debtor may not be able to pay a just debt, but this want of ability does not cancel the obligation, nor would it be proper to say in such a case that the debtor does not owe the creditor. The account, or his bond, stands against him as an evidence of indebtedness, though he may never be able to make payment. But should the creditor offer to compound the matter, or to discharge the debt on certain conditions, he would be morally bound to make such conditions as he considered within the limits of the debtor's means. So that, though the gospel, which is a restoring system, must be presumed to make no conditions not within the scope of our assisted powers, the same cannot be inferred of the law. The gospel is a covenant of grace—proffers pardon to ignorant and guilty sinners upon terms which it furnishes them with the means to understand and strength to perform. If Christ, as a great restorer, had not adapted the plan of salvation to our fallen condition, but required of us, as

the condition of acceptance, the performance of works which could only be performed by unfallen beings, the offer of salvation, upon such terms, would be characterized by a want of sincerity and moral justice. Upon this principle man could not justly be condemned finally for the want of what the gospel requires. The result of this reasoning is, that *although obligation does not in all cases imply an ability to perform, yet a covenant of promise does imply such an ability.*

Some suppose the law changes and relaxes its claims as moral agents lose their power to obey—that as men pervert their moral nature and become morally enfeebled, the law abates its demands. Now we object wholly to this view, for the following reasons:—

(1.) It frees the sinner from all obligations to the law the moment he shall have proceeded in the way of sin beyond the possibility of recovery.

(2.) It does away with the necessity of an atonement in all possible or supposable cases. For if, after transgression, the law immediately brings down its claims to a level with the sinner's fallen nature, all that it requires is such future obedience as he can render. The law making no claims that the sinner cannot meet by future obedience, where the necessity of the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ? This may be Deism or Socinianism, but it is not Christianity.

(3.) This view destroys the force of the law as an instrument of conviction. It has no claims upon the sinner for his past transgressions—only demanding what he is now able to do—and fully releasing him from all its former demands and the consequences of all his failures. There is, upon this system, no thunder, or lightning, or wrath in the law. It comes to the sinner at every step he takes in his downward course, with claims diminished in the exact ratio of his loss of moral power, saying, *Do this—that is, just as much as you can now do of what I originally required, for I now demand no more—and you shall live.*

(4.) This notion would bring the law into contempt, and indeed turn it into a solemn farce. What respect or attention could a law command which has no claim upon the transgressor for his buried talent—for the obedience which he once had power to render, but which, by his own fault, he has lost the power to perform? Such a law would be unworthy of the name of a law—it would be a universal license to sin. The following paragraph from *Mr. Fletcher's Appeal* is a clear and indubitable expression of his views upon this subject:—

“Some indeed flatter themselves that ‘the law, since the gospel

dispensation, abates much of its demands of perfect love.' But their hope is equally unsupported by reason and Scripture. The law is the eternal rule of right, the moral picture of the God of holiness and love. It can no more vary than its eternal, unchangeable Original. The Lord 'will not alter the thing that is gone out of his mouth.' He must cease to be what he is, before his law can lose its power to bind either men or angels; and all creatures shall break sooner than it shall bend; for if it commands us only to 'love God with all our heart, and our neighbor as ourselves,' what just abatement can be made in so equitable a precept? Therefore man, who breaks the righteous law of God as naturally as he breathes, is, and must continue, under its fearful curse, till he has secured the pardon and help offered him in the gospel."

I must now hasten to my last conclusion from the apostle's teaching upon the law.

4. I infer, from all the foregoing, that the standard of Christian perfection is not the law, but the gospel of God our Saviour.

We understand *perfect* obedience to the law to amount to *Adamic perfection*. It is not material whether we suppose man never to have sinned and fallen from original purity, or that he has been raised up to that state by the restoring power of the new covenant. If he, by any means, reaches the *perfect obedience* of the law, he is, of course, as perfectly exempt from all kinds of offenses and short comings as Adam was before his fall. This state we say, with our fathers, is not attainable in this world. The law makes no allowance for infirmities and short comings, either voluntary or *involuntary*. But we may not expect to be exempt from infirmities while we tabernacle in clay. Consequently, we never can stand perfectly acquitted in the eyes of the law.

We call the perfection which the law requires—that is, the present practical fulfillment of all its requirements—*legal perfection*. Others may not use the epithet *legal* in the same sense. Let them take their course, and we will take ours. We do not wish, if we can possibly avoid it, to contend about words. If others, by *legal perfection*, mean the perfection of beings who have never sinned—perfect obedience to the law from the beginning—we have no quarrel with them. But we still claim the right to call that perfection which implies perfect obedience to the law, no matter how attained, or how short its duration, *legal perfection*. We so denominate it in opposition to *evangelical perfection*, which implies, loving God with all the heart—understanding by this simply, rendering to God our little all—*just what we, with all our infirmities, are capable of doing, and no more.*

And this is what we understand the apostle to urge in the *sixth* of *Romans*. The whole is embraced in these few words: "Reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord." Rom. vi, 11. It is the death of sin, and the life and freedom of faith and holiness, according to the gospel, that are held up as our privilege by the great apostle. And all this is within the reach of the poorest and the feeblest child of God.

The following propositions I have received from a worthy correspondent whose name I am not permitted to use. They will constitute a very appropriate conclusion to this article, although they were not originally designed by the author for publication.

"1. God never has had but one moral law, and that law is necessarily immutable.

"2. Anything less than *perfect obedience* to that law, upon the part of man, is necessarily a *moral failure*, which, without the atonement, brings upon him its condemnation.

"3. This perfect obedience has become impracticable by the fall; hence salvation, without the application of the atonement, is impossible.

"4. The atonement has made no provisions to *supersede* or *dispense with any part of the law*, but to *pardon offenders*, and purify the depraved by faith in Christ.

"5. The unconditional demands of the gospel cover *exactly* the grounds of man's *gracious ability*, which is less than his legal or natural ability would have been. (See prop. 3.) Violations of these demands are *conditionally* pardoned.

"6. The moral failures which grow out of man's fallen state necessarily, and which are unavoidable, are provided for in the atonement, and thus lose their power to condemn.

"7. Man's gracious ability is the true standard of Christian perfection. Conformity to this standard makes a *perfect Christian*; whereas, perfect conformity to the moral law, according to man's original natural ability, would make a *perfect man*. In the absence of this natural ability there are no *perfect men*. In the presence of this gracious ability there are many *perfect Christians*."

ART. VIII.—(*Authorized*) *Abstract of the Proceedings and Final Resolutions of the Conference, held in Freemasons' Hall, London, on August 19, 1846, and following Days.*

THE London Conference is now matter of history; and whatever may be its final results, no movement since the great Reformation has called forth so much interest, and been matter of so much commentary. That an alliance of evangelical Christians should be formed, without serious difficulties, no rational mind could ever have imagined; and that, when formed, it would meet with opposition from many quarters, must have been anticipated by the most sanguine of its friends. The difficulties with which the conference was beset were not small, but were overcome by patience, perseverance, charity, and prayer.

The above tract is the first "authorized" publication of the doings of the conference, and the only one which has as yet reached us. We took full notes of the acts of the conference, and of many of the speeches, but shall make little public use of them at present. When we shall receive the full account of the proceedings and speeches, we may resume the subject. For the present our readers must be satisfied with a meagre sketch. The "authorized abstract" commences thus:—

"The conference for the formation of THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE was opened in Freemasons' Hall, London, on Wednesday morning, August 19, 1846, at ten o'clock, and continued its sittings till the evening of Wednesday, September 2.

"The conference consisted of nine hundred and twenty persons, of whom about seven hundred and eighty-six came from Great Britain and Ireland; eighty-seven from the American continent and islands; and forty-seven from the continent of Europe and other parts of the world.

"Each sitting was commenced with devotional exercises, over which the following members of the conference presided."

Here follow nineteen names, which we shall not copy. We next have the names of *seventy* members who "took part in the devotional exercises."

"Sir Culling Eardly Smith, Bart., was requested to preside over the deliberations of the conference. During the brief seasons of his unavoidable absence, the chair was occupied successively by the Hon. Justice Crampton, Sir T. W. Bloomfield, Bart., Thomas Farmer, Esq., James S. Blackwood, Esq., LL. D., R. C. L. Bevan, Esq., Frederick Wills, Esq., John Henderson, Esq., J. M. Strachan, Esq."

At the first session the standing committees were appointed, namely, "the general arrangement committee—the business com-

mittee—the public meeting committee—the finance committee—and the nomination committee.” The business committee matured and proposed the order of business for each day. And the whole organization assumed a truly business character.

The history of the proceedings of the conference is marked by three crises. The first was when the act of formation was passed. The great problem had been before the world for more than a year, and had been differently regarded. Even the friends of the measure had many doubts with regard to its feasibility. Committees had labored with much painful anxiety, and the elements of which the Alliance was to be composed had come together. Animated discussions had taken place in the aggregate committee, and it was perceived that there would be great difficulties to surmount. But in view of all that had passed, and all that might occur, “the Evangelical Alliance” was formed without any one dissenting. All now felt that they were committed for everything within the bounds of reason and Christian consistency that might be necessary to the complete accomplishment of the work for which they had assembled. They had *dared to do the deed* which must be succeeded by much more that would require concession, forbearance, and mutual toleration in matters about which perfect agreement in judgment could not be anticipated. We call this a *crisis*: and such it was, because it was a bold and manly entrance upon the first of a series of new and advance positions, all of which had their uncertainties and their perils; and it was also a development of moral courage to proceed and grapple with them in the true Christian spirit. Light seemed then to break in upon the future. All could see that such a body of men would be likely to accomplish what they felt a desire and purpose to do. The moment was an interesting one, and the scene which followed was inspiring and heavenly. The members shook hands, sung praise to God, and united in prayer; and none who were present could feel the least restraint or reserve. All seemed to be brethren. Pure Christian sympathy pervaded the body, and every eye sparkled with hope. The members now seemed to be more sensible than ever of the sublimity of the object, and more confident that it was truly of God. A deep religious feeling pervaded the assembly—tears flowed—prayers ascended—praises were uttered in tremulous and subdued tones—and all felt truly that it was good for them to be there. These remarks refer to the passage of the first section of the “authorized abstract,” which is as follows:—

"I.—*The Formation of the Evangelical Alliance.*

"Resolved, I. That this conference, composed of professing Christians of many different denominations, all exercising the right of private judgment, and, through common infirmity, differing among themselves in the views they severally entertain on some points, both of Christian doctrine and ecclesiastical polity, and gathered together from many and remote parts of the world, for the purpose of promoting Christian union, rejoice in making their unanimous avowal of the glorious truth that the church of the living God, while it admits of growth, is one church, never having lost, and being incapable of losing, its essential unity. Not, therefore, to create that unity, but to confess it, is the design of their assembling together. One in reality, they desire also, as far as they may be able to attain it, to be visibly one; and thus, both to realize in themselves, and to exhibit to others, that a living and everlasting union binds all true believers together in the fellowship of the church of Christ, 'which is his body, the fullness of him that filleth all in all.'

"II. That this conference, while recognizing the essential unity of the Christian church, feel constrained to deplore its existing divisions, and to express their deep sense of the sinfulness involved in the alienation of affection by which they have been attended, and of the manifold evils which have resulted therefrom; and to avow their solemn conviction of the necessity and duty of taking measures, in humble dependence on the divine blessing, toward attaining a state of mind and feeling more in accordance with the word and spirit of Christ Jesus.

"III. That, therefore, the members of this conference are deeply convinced of the desirableness of forming a confederation on the basis of great evangelical principles held in common by them, which may afford opportunity to members of the church of Christ of cultivating brotherly love, enjoying Christian intercourse, and promoting such other objects as they may hereafter agree to prosecute together; and they hereby proceed to form such a confederation, under the name of 'THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE.'

The next crisis which was attended with much anxiety was the passing of "the basis." Upon this there were several classes of opinions. Some thought there should be no basis but the naked word of God, every man being left to his own construction of it. Others wished one article, namely, that of the 'right of private judgment in matters of religion. Others were in favor of several of the proposed articles, but opposed to the rest. Others were pleased with the eight articles which were proposed, and wanted no more; while there were others who proposed a ninth (now the eighth) article. How all these discordant opinions were to be harmonized was with many a problem of difficult solution. But a temperate and kind discussion of all the articles of the basis resulted finally in their unanimous adoption. The eighth article, which was moved by Dr. Cox, of Brooklyn, and seconded by the

venerable Dr. Beecher, of Cincinnati, occasioned more discussion than all the rest; but was finally concurred in with only one exception, and the dissentient, we believe, left the convention, no more to return, and has since published his reasons for doing so.

After the explanations which follow the basis were fully discussed, the whole came up for action in the gross. *Rev. Edward Bickersteth*, a pious clergyman of the Church of England, moved that the conference now adopt the basis, with the explanations which follow. The manner of this devoted man at this moment, and a few sentiments to which he gave utterance, were remarkable. He arose with a smiling countenance, though with moist eyes, and, after a moment's hesitation, exclaimed, "Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost!" and then continued: "I am happy that the whole basis has been so thoroughly and patiently considered: I thought the original articles were enough, and needed no alterations; but I approve of all the amendments—we owe much to our American brethren for the aid they have afforded us in this interesting and critical discussion. Well, then, now we are about to pass this part of our plan, and after so free an interchange of sentiments, and so harmonious an action on the several articles, I hope we shall have grace to pass the whole in the gross unanimously."

Dr. Cox, of Brooklyn, arose, and seconded the motion, after which he remarked, "We are about to pass the basis of this *holy Alliance*—I say *holy Alliance*. There has been one *un-holy Alliance* in Europe; when this passes—and I hope it will unanimously, by rising—there will be a *holy Alliance*, and we shall prove to the world that Protestantism has a *unity*—that there is one community which has a unity deep and high"—and closed with some Latin poetry. The motion passed *nem. con.*

The president gave out, and the conference devoutly sung,—

"All hail the power of Jesus' name."

Now, for the second time, the members indulged in mutual congratulations and warm expressions of gratitude to God; hoping that all perils were now passed, and that they had before them a clear sea. The following is the doctrinal basis and explanations, of the history of which we have above given an imperfect sketch:—

"II.—The Basis of the Evangelical Alliance.

"*Resolved*, I. That the parties composing the Alliance shall be such persons only as hold and maintain what are usually understood to be evangelical views, in regard to the matters of doctrine understood, namely,—

"1. The divine inspiration, authority, and sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures.

"2. The right and duty of private judgment in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures.

"3. The unity of the Godhead, and the trinity of persons therein.

"4. The utter depravity of human nature in consequence of the fall.

"5. The incarnation of the Son of God, his work of atonement for sinners of mankind, and his mediatorial intercession and reign.

"6. The justification of the sinner by faith alone.

"7. The work of the Holy Spirit in the conversion and sanctification of the sinner.

"8. The immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, the judgment of the world by our Lord Jesus Christ, with the eternal blessedness of the righteous, and the eternal punishment of the wicked.

"9. The divine institution of the Christian ministry, and the obligation and perpetuity of the ordinances of baptism and the Lord's supper.

"It being, however, distinctly declared: first, that this brief summary is not to be regarded, in any formal or ecclesiastical sense, as a creed or confession, nor the adoption of it as involving an assumption of the right authoritatively to define the limits of Christian brotherhood, but simply as an indication of the class of persons whom it is desirable to embrace within the Alliance; secondly, that the selection of certain tenets, with the omission of others, is not to be held as implying that the former constitute the whole body of important truth, or that the latter are unimportant.

"II. That this Alliance is not to be considered as an alliance of denominations, or branches of the church, but of individual Christians, each acting on his own responsibility.

"III. That in this Alliance, it is also distinctly declared, that no compromise of the views of any member, or sanction of those of others, on the points wherein they differ, is either required or expected; but that all are held as free as before to maintain and advocate their religious conviction with due forbearance and brotherly love.

"IV. That it is not contemplated that this Alliance should assume or aim at the character of a new ecclesiastical organization, claiming and exercising the functions of a Christian church. Its simple and comprehensive object, it is strongly felt, may be successfully promoted without interfering with, or disturbing the order of, any branch of the Christian church to which its members may respectively belong.

"V. That while the formation of this Alliance is regarded as an important step toward the increase of Christian union, it is acknowledged as a duty incumbent on all its members carefully to abstain from pronouncing any uncharitable judgment upon those who do not feel themselves in a condition to give it their sanction."

But the conference was destined to pass another *crisis* still more perplexing and dangerous than any which had preceded. The question of *slavery* was introduced by an English member. It was proposed to make non-slaveholding a term of membership in the Alliance. After a somewhat earnest discussion, the subject was

referred to a large committee. This committee deliberated upon it nearly the whole day, while the brethren of the convention were engaged in prayer for the blessing of God upon their labors. A compromise article was agreed upon and adopted by the conference, which did not in reality suit either party. The question was raised again the next day, and another committee appointed. After anxious deliberation for several hours, it was agreed to dismiss the subject, and to do everything necessary to the completion of the organization, except making arrangements for another general conference, which was to be left to the several branches, after they should be fully organized. The plan proposed by the committee was adopted, and there terminated the final difficulty. The following is the plan of organization adopted:—

“III.—*The Organization of the Evangelical Alliance.*

“Resolved, I. That whereas brethren from the continents of Europe and America, as well as in this country, are unable, without consultation with their countrymen, to settle all the arrangements for their respective countries, it is expedient to defer the final and complete arrangement of the details of the Evangelical Alliance, of which the foundation has now been laid, till another general conference.

“II. That the Alliance consist of all such members of this conference, and members and corresponding members of the divisions of the provisional committee, as shall adhere to the principles and objects of the Alliance. Persons may be admitted to membership of the Alliance by consent of all the district organizations, or by a vote of a general conference, and to membership of any district organization by such mode as each district organization may determine.

“III. That the members of the Alliance be recommended to form district organizations in such manner as shall be most in accordance with the peculiar circumstances of each district. Provided, however, first, that neither the Alliance, nor the respective district organization, shall be held responsible for the proceedings of any district organization; secondly, that no member of any district organization shall, as such, be a member of the Alliance; and, thirdly, that whenever a district organization shall be formed, the members of the Alliance, within that district, shall act collectively in its formation. That, in furtherance of the above plan, it be recommended, for the present, that a district organization be formed in each of the following districts, viz.:—
1. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 2. The United States of America. 3. France, Belgium, and French Switzerland. 4. The North of Germany. 5. The South of Germany, and German Switzerland. 6. British North America. 7. The West Indies.

“IV. And that additional district organizations be from time to time recognized as such by the concurrence of any three previously existing organizations.

“V. That an official correspondence be maintained between the several district organizations, and that reports of their proceedings be

interchanged, with a view to co-operation and encouragement in their common object.

"VI. That a general conference be held at such time and place, and consist of such members of the Alliance, as, by correspondence between the district organizations and under the guidance of divine Providence, shall hereafter be determined by their unanimous concurrence. Provided, first, that any member of the Alliance who was entitled to attend this conference, and shall retain his membership, shall be entitled to attend the next also; and, secondly, that all questions relating to the convening of it shall be determined by such members only of the district organizations as shall also be members of the Alliance. A conference of any two or more of the district organizations may be held by mutual agreement."

We have no space for further commentaries and explanations. We now give the fourth division of the official report.

"IV.—*The Objects of the Evangelical Alliance.*

"Resolved, I. That inasmuch as this proposal for union originated, in a great degree, in the sense very generally entertained among Christians of their grievous practical neglect of our Lord's 'new commandment' to his disciples, to 'love one another,' in which offense the members of the Alliance desire, with godly sorrow, to acknowledge their full participation; it ought to form one chief object of the Alliance to deepen in the minds of its own members, and, through their influence, to extend among the disciples of our Lord Jesus Christ generally, that conviction of sin and short-coming in this respect, which the blessed Spirit of God seems to be awakening throughout his church; in order that, humbling themselves more and more before the Lord, they may be stirred up to make full confession of their guilt at all suitable times, and to implore, through the merits and intercession of their merciful Head and Saviour, forgiveness of their past offenses, and divine grace to lead them to the better cultivation of that brotherly affection which is enjoined upon all who, loving the Lord Jesus Christ, are bound also to love one another, for the truth's sake which dwelleth in them.

"II. That the great object of the Evangelical Alliance be, to aid in manifesting, as far as practicable, the unity which exists among the true disciples of Christ; to promote their union by fraternal and devotional intercourse; to discourage all envyings, strifes, and divisions; to impress upon Christians a deeper sense of the great duty of obeying their Lord's command, to 'love one another;' and to seek the full accomplishment of his prayer: 'That they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee; that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me.'

"III. That, in furtherance of this object, the Alliance shall receive such information respecting the progress of vital religion in all parts of the world as Christian brethren may be disposed to communicate; and that a correspondence be opened and maintained with Christian brethren in different parts of the world, especially with those who may be engaged, amidst peculiar difficulties and opposition, in the cause of

the gospel, in order to afford them all suitable encouragement and sympathy, and to diffuse an interest in their welfare.

"IV. That, in subserviency to the same great object, the Alliance will endeavor to exert a beneficial influence on the advancement of evangelical Protestantism, and on the counteraction of infidelity, of Romanism, and of such other forms of superstition, error, and profaneness, as are most prominently opposed to it, especially the desecration of the Lord's day; it being understood that the different organizations of the Alliance be left to adopt such methods of prosecuting these great ends, as may to them appear most in accordance with their respective circumstances, all at the same time pursuing them in the spirit of tender compassion and love.

"V. In promoting these and similar objects, the Alliance contemplates chiefly the stimulating of Christians to such efforts as the exigencies of the case may demand, by publishing its views in regard to them, rather than accomplishing these views by any general organization of its own.

"VI. That reports, minutes, and other documents in promotion of the above objects be published by the Alliance at the time of its meetings, or by its order afterward; and that similar documents may be issued from time to time by its various organizations, on their own responsibility."

The conference also adopted sundry *GENERAL RESOLUTIONS*. For want of space we can give the reader but two of them.

"IV. That, when required by conscience to assert or defend any views or principles wherein they differ from Christian brethren who agree with them in vital truths, the members of this Alliance will aim earnestly, by the help of the Holy Spirit, to avoid all rash and groundless insinuations, personal imputations, or irritating allusions, and to maintain the meekness and gentleness of Christ, by speaking the truth only in love.

"VI. That the members of this Alliance would therefore invite, humbly and earnestly, all ministers of the gospel, all conductors of religious publications, and others who have influence in various bodies of Christians, to watch more than ever against sins of the heart, or the tongue, or the pen, toward Christians of other denominations; and to promote more zealously than hitherto a spirit of peace, unity, and godly love, among all true believers in the Lord Jesus Christ."

A few remarks upon the importance of the movement, in a practical point of view, shall close what we have to say upon the subject at present. The objections to the Alliance we cannot now undertake to meet or even state. Some of our reasons for favoring it are the following:—

1. It affords an opportunity to evangelical Christians to show to the world that they agree in essentials. The articles of the basis are not framed in the language of Scripture, but are so worded as clearly to embrace the great doctrines of Christianity in the light

in which evangelical Christians hold them in common. The article upon the atonement, as stated, is held both by Arminians and Calvinists. It was not designed so to construct that article as to exclude those who believe in a limited atonement. This, as all will see, would preclude any union between the two classes. This being understood, neither party give up their peculiar theory. Still by the words, "sinners of mankind," both mean the same thing, and that is simply, *fallen men*. Here we all pause. Neither could proceed further to a definition of the *extent* of the atonement without separating from the other. The Calvinist still holds that Christ died *only for the elect*, while the Arminian and new School Presbyterian hold that he died for *all men*; but we agree to waive the point of difference as not essential to Christianity, and, consequently, as something upon which we may differ in opinion, and still love and hold fellowship with each other.

2. It furnishes an opportunity for evangelical Christians to become acquainted with each other. We have hitherto been too much estranged—have had too few opportunities for Christian intercourse, and for realizing that our differences of opinion are consistent with a high state of religious enjoyment. By religious intercourse we see—we *feel*—that our agreements are more numerous and important than our differences, and that we have hitherto made too little of one and too much of the other.

3. It will have a tendency to increase our love for each other. And as the bad feeling which is engendered by our controversies is what constitutes their greatest evil, it will greatly meliorate, if not entirely cure, the evils of religious controversies. Brotherly love and mutual confidence will change the character of all our discussions. As a learned Scotch divine observed in a speech at one of the public meetings in Exeter Hall, speaking of the influence which the intercourse of Christians with each other would be likely to exert,—“I am sure, if I should find it necessary to oppose any of the doctrines of the Wesleyan Methodists, I should have my beloved and venerated friend, Dr. Bunting, always before me. And I could not have it in my heart to write a sentence which would give him just occasion of offense.” When Christian men become well acquainted, and love one another as they should, they will not employ language calculated to wound each other's feelings. Men who are angry at each other, and wish to remain so, keep as far apart as possible.

4. It will silence the objections of infidels and of the world to Christianity—and will equally meet one of the strongest objections of Romanists to Protestantism.

5. The sacrifice of our sectarianism will, we most seriously believe, be acceptable to God, and will bring down the blessings of Heaven upon the evangelical churches of Christendom.

6. By a cessation of our mutual hostilities, we shall have more time and more moral power to employ in the common cause of our holy Christianity.

7. By the cultivation of brotherly love, we shall really come more nearly together in our doctrinal views. For it is not to be doubted that many of our differences are mere matters of feeling, or sectarian pride, or exist more in appearance than in reality. Charity will annihilate all such differences for ever—yea, “for ever and ever.”

8. It will be a means of mutual instruction. By this means we shall learn much from each other; and, without doubt, shall find, in many instances, that in the matters in which our brethren differ from us, they may be right, or, at least, they may have some rays of light which we can advantageously borrow from them.

9. It will increase our religious zeal—the power and consistency of our piety—and, by consequence, our religious enjoyment, and our meetness for heaven.

10. It is carrying out the true spirit of catholicity, taught us both by the precepts and examples of our sainted fathers, the Wesleys, Mr. Fletcher, and a host of their coadjutors.*

For these reasons, and many others, each of which would admit of great enlargement and numerous illustrations, we are most heartily in favor of the Evangelical Alliance.

* “And I beseech you, brethren, by the mercies of God, that we be in no wise divided among ourselves. Is thy heart right, as my heart is with thine? I ask no further question. If it be, give me thy hand. For opinions, or terms, let us not destroy the work of God. Dost thou love and serve God? It is enough. I give thee the right hand of fellowship. If there be any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of love, if any fellowship of the Spirit, if any bowels and mercies; let us strive together for the faith of the gospel; walking worthy of the vocation wherewith we are called; with all lowliness and meekness, with long-suffering, forbearing one another in love, endeavoring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace; remembering, there is one body, and one Spirit, even as we are called with one hope of our calling; ‘one Lord, one faith, one baptism; one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all.’”—*Character of a Methodist, Wesley’s Works*, vol. v, p. 245. See also a sermon by the same author, on a “Catholic Spirit.” *Works*, vol. i, p. 316; and published as a tract, (No. 116,) at the Methodist Book Room. See also *Fletcher’s Works*, vol. ii, pp. 352, 353.

ART. IX.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *A Comprehensive Lexicon of the Greek Language, adapted to the Use of Schools and Colleges in the United States.* By JOHN PICKERING. Third edition, greatly enlarged and improved, pp. 1468. Boston: Wilkins, Carter, & Co. 1846.

THIS is a new and greatly improved edition of the Greek and English Lexicon published at Boston in 1826. Since that time the course of Greek studies in our colleges has been enlarged, and we have been supplied by our own scholars with critical editions of the comedies of Aristophanes, the tragedies of Eschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the dialogues of Plato; most of which were once considered beyond the range of an ordinary classical education.

Such an advanced state of Greek studies called for a lexicon more copious in its vocabulary, and philosophical in its arrangement, than those heretofore in use. For the preparation of such a work we had no American scholar more competent than the late Mr. Pickering.

The basis of the first edition was the Greek and Latin Lexicon of Schrevelius, which had been in use for a long time both in England and in this country. In the preparation of the present edition Schrevelius has been almost entirely laid aside. Constant reference has been had to the larger lexicon of Liddell and Scott, as well as to the original German of Passow's own masterly work, and to the new and enlarged edition of it by Professors Rost and Palm, the publication of which is, we believe, now going on in Germany. Use has also been made of other Greek and German lexicons, and of that immense repository of Greek literature, Stephens's Thesaurus, which is now in course of publication at Paris.

From Mr. Pickering's reputation as a Greek scholar and general philologist, we should have been disappointed had he produced an inferior work. So far as we have been able to examine this volume, it has added to our high estimate of the sound scholarship of its author. We will refer to a few particulars. It has been said in reference to the Greek particles, that "the whole connection of a writer's thoughts, the method of his logic, and the force of his argument, depend upon the manner in which they are rendered." Mr. Pickering has shown that he had a clear discernment of their nicer shades of meaning; and to decide upon the merits of the work, it is only necessary to examine his full explication of the different particles.

Though not designed as a lexicon of the New Testament dialect, still this work will be found serviceable to the student of theology, as it contains the Hebrew and Syriac words which are used in the New Testament, and in the Septuagint version of the Old. Reference has also been had to the writings of Josephus and the early Christian fathers.

We think this work deserves the attention of the lovers of classical literature, and we believe its merits will be appreciated by them. It does honor to American scholarship, and will remain a monument of the industry and sound learning of its lamented author, who devoted the last days of his life to its completion.

2. *A Universal and Critical Dictionary of the English Language; to which are added, Walker's Key to the Pronunciation of Classical and Scripture Proper Names; much enlarged and improved: and a Pronouncing Vocabulary of Modern Geographical Names.* By JOSEPH E. WORCESTER. 8vo., pp. 1032. Boston: Wilkins, Carter, & Co. 1846.

THERE are so many English dictionaries of different degrees of merit now in use, that it does not seem desirable to increase the number, unless we could be furnished with very marked improvements. The most important work on English lexicography that has appeared since Johnson is unquestionably Dr. Webster's large dictionary; a work of great learning and research, and possessing a more complete vocabulary of the language than Johnson's. "But the taste and judgment of the author were not generally esteemed equal to his industry and erudition."

Mr. Worcester has had more than ordinary advantages for the prosecution and accomplishment of his object; and we are glad to find, upon examination of his work, that it has been carried out so successfully.

This volume contains not only a complete vocabulary of the language, but also, in the "Introduction, may be found remarks on orthoepy or pronunciation, orthography, etymology, or the derivation of words, grammar, archaisms, provincialisms, Americanisms, and on various other points of philology and lexicography." These preliminary dissertations add much to the value of the work. Besides, Walker's Key, without which an English dictionary would seem incomplete, Mr. Worcester has added, as the result of his own labors, a pronouncing vocabulary of modern geographical names, which will prove very serviceable to scholars.

The limits of the work are not such as to allow the discussion of every doubtful point, or of much verbal criticism; but the design has been to give the greatest amount of useful matter in the most condensed form.

We are glad to learn that the work has been so well received, for though published but a few months since, the third edition has been called for.

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3. *Gesenius's Hebrew Grammar.* Fourteenth edition, as revised by Dr. E. RÜDIGER. Translated by T. J. CONANT, Professor of Hebrew in Madison University, Hamilton, N. Y. 8vo., pp. 400. New-York: D. Appleton & Co.

WE have given this large and elegant volume as thorough an examination as our time has permitted, and we are prepared to speak of it in the highest terms, as decidedly the best Hebrew grammar now before the public. This opinion is based on two grounds, the one material, and, of consequence, the other secondary, and comparatively unimportant, yet well deserving attention.

First, then, as to the matter of the book. We have here the con-

centrated labors of two of the best Hebraists and oriental scholars which modern times have produced. Gesenius stands at the head; and though tinged with neological views, and therefore not always safe where interpretation is brought in question, is still the most profound laborer in the mine of Hebrew learning to which that profound nation of scholars, the German, has given birth. And as for Rodiger, he is a worthy successor of a great master. These two men, eminently qualified, have spent years and years in making and improving, by constant revision, a grammar of the noble Hebrew tongue—that tongue which patriarchs and prophets spake and wrote, and which contains some of the most sublime poetry which is to be found in any language. By almost universal confession they have succeeded in accomplishing all that they undertook; and their grammar is just what such a book should be, clear, concise, exact, and copious,—neither so full as to be prolix, nor so brief as to become ambiguous and unsatisfactory.

It is precisely on this latter ground, namely, the peculiar skill shown in the arrangement of the grammar, that we are disposed to praise Gesenius's volume above all others in our language. There are many learned men in the world of letters who could no more write such a book as this than they could compose *Paradise Lost*; not that they do not thoroughly understand the language, but simply because they have not the peculiar qualifications needful to make a good writer on grammar; they have not the power of condensation, the happy tact of seizing upon the points necessary for the learner to know first of all, and then leading him on step by step to an exact acquaintance with the language of the Old Testament Scriptures. Learning alone is not sufficient to make a good instructor; while no man *without* learning can be a competent teacher, it is by no means every one *with* learning who can impart knowledge to others. And this, by the way, is a reason why many an erudite professor makes but a sorry teacher: aptness to teach does not always accompany profound scholarship. Where the two are united in one man he is the perfection of his class, and his influence is proportionably wide and powerful.

The other ground on which we commend this volume is not so important, yet is by no means to be underrated. It is on account of the superior style in which it is got up, the clearness of type, the goodness of the paper, and the accuracy with which it is printed. Now, though these are not in themselves competent to make a good book out of an indifferent one, yet still they add most materially to the value of one which, like the present, is renowned for the skill and acumen displayed in its arrangement and execution. To those who remember the early state of Hebrew learning, and the books published at that time in the United States on this branch of literature, the bare mention of the fact is sufficient; though we doubt if we could impress the present race of students with the full conviction of the marvelous change which time and enterprise have produced.

We must not forget to call attention to another valuable feature of the present volume; we mean the addition of a Chrestomathy and Hebrew Reading-Book, which makes it suited in all respects to the wants as well of beginners as of more advanced students.

4. *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise; with Notes of a Sojourn on the Island of Zanzibar: to which is added a brief History of the Whale Fishery, its past and present Condition.* By J. ROSS BROWNE. Illustrated by numerous Engravings on Steel and Wood. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS is an imposing volume, handsomely printed and admirably embellished by engravings on steel and wood. The main purport of the writer appears to have been to exhibit in strong colors the abuses which exist in our whaling service, of which, indeed, he presents some appalling pictures; and which, for the honor of humanity, we should hope are to some extent at least exaggerated. Doubtless, there needs some reform in this department of our commerce, and we, therefore, are the more disposed to commend this *exposé* by Mr. Browne; although we cannot but regret that a more correct taste had not governed the *manner* in which it has been executed. We refer to the use of expletives which we know, alas! are but too commonly in use with sailors, but which we think it would have been better to omit in the book. With this exception, the work is an exceedingly interesting and attractive one; it supplies us with a large amount of really novel and important information respecting countries and coasts of which we are comparatively ignorant; besides which, it reveals the very eventful and remarkable career of the author during his voyages. As a book of mere entertainment, therefore, it may take rank with Dana's "Two Years before the Mast," and that is praise enough to render it a general favorite with those who read merely for amusement. The aim of the author, however, reaches beyond this, and we, therefore, commend its perusal to all who wish to know anything respecting life on board a whaler.

5. *The Life of John Wicliff, D. D. Compiled from Authentic Sources.* By DANIEL CURRY. 18mo., pp. 326.

THIS is a timely and exceedingly interesting volume. The materials have been mostly drawn from the great work of Dr. Vaughan, which is the only complete history of the *John the Baptist* of the Reformation. Mr. Curry has performed a good work for the church, and we hope it will be highly appreciated and amply rewarded. Let this Life of Wicliff be found in all our families.

6. *Recollections of the Past.* By REV. ABNER CHASE. Of the Genesee Conference. 18mo., pp. 147.

THE great fault of this small volume is, that there is *too little* of it. The author is an old friend of ours—a leading member of the Genesee Conference at the time we were admitted into that body. We have devoured his *Recollections* with great eagerness, and were only sorry that he had not greatly enlarged them from the ample store which we are certain still remains. We earnestly recommend the work to all who wish to know how our fathers labored, and suffered, and succeeded. God bless those of them who still linger upon the shores of time!

7. *Observations on Congregationalism and Methodism: or, a Review of Rev. Z. K. Hawley's Work on that Subject.* By REV. WM. C. HOYT. 18mo., pp. 194.

WE regret exceedingly that such a work should be called for at this time. This is not the period when Christians and Christian ministers may do battle with each other without good and substantial reasons. But, as it is, we are happy that the work has fallen into so able hands. Mr. Hoyt shows himself master of his subject, and has treated it ably. The work abounds in irony, but its spirit is, upon the whole, as kind as the nature of the case seems to admit. We hope the work may contribute to a better understanding of Methodist economy.

8. *A Treatise on Algebra: containing the latest Improvements. Adapted to the Use of Schools and Colleges.* By CHARLES W. HACKLEY, S. T. D., Professor of Mathematics and Astronomy in Columbia College, N. Y. 8vo., pp. 504. Harper & Brothers. 1846.

THIS work is received, and will be reviewed in our next number.



THE HON. JAMES M. SMITH
U. S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

THE
METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1847.

EDITED BY GEORGE PECK, D. D.

ART. I.—*Religion; Natural and Revealed: or, the Natural Theology and Moral Bearings of Phrenology and Physiology; including the Doctrines taught, and the Duties inculcated, thereby, compared with those enjoined in the Scriptures. Together with the Phrenological Exposition of the Doctrines of a Future State, Materialism, Holiness, Sin, Rewards, Punishments, Depravity, a Change of Heart, Will, Foreordination, Fatalism, &c., &c.* By O. S. FOWLER, Practical Phrenologist, &c., &c. 1846.

SKEPTICISM and infidelity have become very pious now-a-days. Their mode of warfare against religion has materially changed. Strategy and covert movements have taken the place of open hostility. Christianity, as a matter of science, is firmly established in the legitimate convictions of the understanding. Its beneficial, social, and moral influence has become a matter of recorded and unquestioned history. To skepticism and infidelity, then, no other avenue of access to the public mind is left except through the gateways of religion. Hence those, who aim most malignant blows at Christianity, do it by stealth. They put on the livery of heaven to serve the devil in. They insinuate the deadly virus through a thousand insidious avenues—all the while professing the most unbounded veneration for *true* religion, and the most expansive love to mankind. In the open field, infidelity has suffered a signal discomfiture. What shall be the result of its present mode of attack, the future must determine. But we have faith in the controlling providence of God, and firmly believe that he will make even the wrath of man praise him.

Before us lies "Fowler on Religion." The above reflections have been started in our mind by a perusal of its pages. We will not say that those grave charges, either in part or in whole, lie

against this work. We shall content ourselves with a dissection of the work; and when the carcass has been threaded, the observer may draw his own conclusions. Let us premise, however, that we wage no war against Phrenology—none against the science proper, kept within its legitimate bounds. We may even assent to many of its general principles—many of the results to which the experiments and researches of scientific men seem to have led them. But our author must pardon us if our credulity fails when we attempt to follow him through some of the varied applications he has sought to give to it. We may believe that Brandreth's pills—when eaten in sufficient quantities—will do a good service as a purgative; but when their author attempts to palm them off upon us as a universal curative, what shall hinder our contempt of his charlatanism? So, when Phrenology is presented as the sovereign antidote of our bane, as the real moral solvent, the genuine philosopher's stone, how can we do less than inquire of him who knocks at the door of our reason for admittance, "Sayest thou this of thyself, or has science revealed it unto thee?" We repeat, however, that we do not condemn the work before us, *in toto*. It contains much that is good—many sound principles are laid down and elucidated with clearness and precision—many practical truths of great moment are forcibly illustrated—and many specific duties are enforced with an earnestness that is highly commendable. But often, in the admission of a partial truth, its counterpart is rudely thrust aside; and, throughout the whole work, there is a strange blending of truth with error, of fact with fable. Victor Cousin has somewhere said, that "every system is composed of part truth; and lives because of the element of truth it contains, and without which it could not have existed." We will not undertake to define the exact proportions of truth and error in the mixture before us; such a process would require an extended analysis—tedious in its details, if not fruitless of good in its results. We will, however, endeavor to point out some of the gross absurdities involved in our author's theory of the relations existing between Phrenology and Revelation; and also to show that that theory is illegitimate, even if the truth of Phrenology, as a science, were admitted.

We must not, however, fail to notice the spirit and style with which our author's task has been executed. He is evidently an amateur in the science of Phrenology. He writes *con amore*. Phrenology is with him the *one idea*—the centre around which his whole intellectual being revolves. From this port he takes his departure, and for this port he sails. Creation aside, furnishes not a speck that can attract his vision. In his style there is a hearti-

ness, an enthusiasm, almost amounting to rhapsody. He writes in earnest, as though he would say,—

“Give me vent, or I burst, my lord.”

‘This is well. The thing is in him, and it must come out. The internal space cannot contain the ever-swelling flood, and it must have vent. It is difficult to determine in which the author has the highest confidence, *himself*, or his *science*. He omits no occasion, on which he may lug in his oft-repeated avowals of perfect recklessness with regard to public opinion. Indeed, this is so often made the theme of declamation, that our author seems to us like some cowardly braggadocio puffing and swelling at the distant danger, and we are half inclined to suspect his moral bravery and independence. *Audendo magnus tegitur timor*. His dogmatism and arrogance are intolerable. He opens his mouth as an oracle, whose sayings are to be received without scruple, and whose authority is the standard of ultimate appeal. He may possess “true science,” but he is woefully deficient in what Dr. Chalmers denominates its “modesty.” “Here is the truth, and nowhere else; and unless you receive it, you are a fool,” is the spirit of the discourse. And that, too, on points still in dispute among eminent Phrenologists—points absolutely discarded, as being without sufficient proof, by men of an intellectual and moral worth, such as our author might justly be proud of. But having ascended the mole-hill of Phrenology, his “brother” seems to be the only intellectual being discoverable within the circumference that bounds his view. They are the two witnesses, by which every Phrenological word is to be established. Hence, the *quod erat demonstrandum*—“I and my brother”—with which the work perpetually abounds.

The object of the treatise before us, is, “a comparison of the religion of Phrenology with the religion of the Bible”—“to place the natural theology and moral bearings of Phrenology, and the theology of the Scriptures, side by side, to see wherein they harmonize, and wherein they differ.”—P. 8. This is a work, great and arduous, requiring a vast amount of research, a critical collation and comparison of facts, and a nice discrimination of deep and far-reaching principles. But our author would have us understand, at the very outset, that he is adequate to the task, that there will be no failure from any inability on his part. As to the scientific, the Phrenological qualifications necessary, he says,—

“He [referring to himself] is thoroughly versed in Phrenology, and especially in that practical department of it which gives him just that very knowledge of the workings, or the manifestations of the moral

faculties, in all their phases and combinations, that is required. That no other man, his brother excepted, is equally well qualified in this respect, is a matter of fact, and not of egotism."—P. 10.

As to the religious part, he must not be suspected of any deficiency there. He comes forth, a champion greaved and helmeted, to his work.

"He [speaking of himself] is not ignorant, either theoretically or experimentally, of what is considered genuine religion. . . . He brings to the discussion of this subject, not only an intimate knowledge of that science in which his deductions are based, but also a minute acquaintance with the commonly received religious notions and practices of the day."—P. 10.

And still our author dreads to enter upon his task: His "pen falters!" He exclaims, "Must I proceed! I feel utterly inadequate to the task." But, why, some one will inquire, why does he, who has just shown himself to be *adequate*, complain of *inadequacy*? Why "falter," when, girt about with strength, he has just entered the lists with the presage of victory already upon his brow? In the first place, he seems to have a benevolent concern lest "the religion of the Bible" should be found *not* to harmonize with "the religion of Phrenology," and then the former *must die*! The hopes of patriarchs, and prophets, and holy men of old, will all be demonstrated to have perished. And even the revelation from God, freighted with the hopes of a dying world, should it strike against the rock—Phrenology—would be split, and founder.

"Phrenology *must, it will, prevail*. It is *demonstrable* science. So great is its moral power, that it will prostrate and ride over *whatever* religious doctrines, forms, or practices conflict with it. If even the Bible could be found to clash therewith, then would the Bible *go by the board*. *Nothing could save it*; for it would war with truth, and must suffer defeat. But if it be found to *harmonize* with Phrenology, then is it based on the rock of truth, and defended and supported by those immutable laws of nature, which the all-wise Creator has instituted for its government; so that neither can infidelity scale its walls, nor atheism find the least support for its monstrosities; both being overthrown by this science."—P. 8.

Who can now wonder that he dreads to break the seal? How awful, if he should actually annihilate "the religion of the Bible!" But, then, on the other hand, how courteous, how really kind that Phrenology should condescend not only to let "the religion of the Bible" live, *if* it will "harmonize" with itself, and come under its wing for protection; but also to overthrow those formidable antago-

nists, which might otherwise destroy it. Thenceforward shall its protection be—not God—but Phrenology. Its truth, too, is to be tested, not by the fact that it came from God, but that it “harmonizes with Phrenology.” Fear not, young man. Spare not thy blows. The oak has withstood the fury of a thousand gales. Its roots are deep, its trunk is mighty, its branches are green and flourishing. It shall not fall for thee. Thou needst not fear. We well remember that the science of geology once proudly said to revealed truth, “You must conform to my facts, or I will crush you.” But when its arrogant fictions were exploded, and its facts defined, lo! they “harmonize” with “the religion of the Bible!” So, we opine, it will ever be with any and every science, whose facts and principles are known. We confess that we have no misgiving, but that if Phrenology, and even Mesmerism, shall be well authenticated, they will not only accord with, but attest, revealed truth.

Another cause of the perturbation of our author, he would have us distinctly understand, is, the moral hardihood required to enter upon the development of principles, “not only new, but also directly in the teeth of all the religious prejudices of mankind.” He is afraid that men will not keep still, and let him tear away from them their religion—the faith in which their fathers have died, and which lies at the foundation of all their hopes. No one before him, he seems to think, has had the hardihood to venture upon the subject.

“It has been studiously, if not improperly avoided. No one has stood in the breach. . . . I know full well that no other task requires more moral courage than this. I know that men will cling with more tenacity to their religion than to all else besides. What enmity is as strong, what prejudices are as inveterate, as those awakened by having one’s religion taken from him? Like Micah, he exclaims, ‘Ye have taken away my gods, and what have I more?’—Pp. 8, 9.

What religion, we naturally inquire, is to be taken away, and what restored? what is to be destroyed, and what built up? Our author gives us a most unequivocal clew to the determination of these questions. That religion, which is based upon revelation, is to be uprooted, and the God of the Bible is to be “taken away;” while that which is based upon human nature, and whose God is the fickle reason of man, is to be established. Let us see:—

“It will force men to abandon their religious errors, and to plant themselves upon the broad platform of the *nature of man*. That nature Phrenology unfolds. Sooner or later must the religion of Phrenology become the religion of man.”—P. 9.

Aside from Phrenology, he avers that men "have no data, no *starting point*, no *base line*, no fixed and settled *first principles*—at which to commence, and with which to compare."—P. 10. Alas for those who lived in that earlier and darker age of the world, before Gall and Spurzheim laid the abiding foundations of a pure religious faith! What avail was it that pious Enoch "walked with God," that Abraham attained to the distinguished honor of ever being known as the "father of the faithful," that Paul abounded in toils, sacrifices, and sufferings for the cause of Christ! Alas! they were destitute of the "first principles" of this refined Phrenological religion! Of what avail was it that Jesus Christ sojourned and suffered among us, when he failed, however pure and useful might have been his teachings, to furnish mankind with the necessary "data" to a religious life? Of what avail, even, is revelation itself without the Phrenological standard by which it may be measured and tested? We had supposed that infinite Wisdom had immutably fixed our "starting point"—laid our "base line"—and settled our "first principles" in religion. We fear, we greatly fear, for the accomplishment of this work, if it be left to Phrenology to settle the "first principles" of our religious faith, when its own principles are so unsettled.

The work of Phrenology, then, appears to be radical. It is to go to the very bottom of things. Old things are to pass away, and all things are to become new. And when the Phrenological millennium shall be ushered in, "unrestrained religious liberty will pervade our happy earth; and all men will see eye to eye and face to face."—P. 9. Our author seems to warm with enthusiastic fervor as he contemplates the near approach of this millennial glory. "The next ten years will witness a moral and religious revolution greater than all past ages put together have ever done before."—P. 10. Then, we suppose, when our race have witnessed this revolution, Sinai and Calvary will be forgotten. The story of redeeming love will cease to be told, and a thousand tongues chant the praises of Phrenology. The ministers of Jesus Christ will have been supplanted by Phrenological lecturers and Mesmeric manipulators; the Bible, antiquated and obsolete, will have been succeeded by the Phrenological chart and the lectures of Fowler. Men will no longer seek doctrine or precept in its pages; but theology, instruction—in fact, "everything that it is necessary for a man to know," may be *seen* and *felt* upon the exterior surface of the skull. Every man will have his Bible always with him—its doctrines and precepts, written, not upon the

fleshy tables of the *heart*, but the bony tablets of the *head*. Our author hails the approach of this day of glory.

"Light is breaking in upon the darkness of all past ages. Ho, ye that would return from your wanderings, or be delivered from your thralldoms and your errors, follow the beacon light hoisted by Phrenology. It will clear up all difficulties. It will solve all moral problems. It will point out that religion which harmonizes with the nature of man, and is most conducive to personal happiness and general moral purity."—P. 18.

In this moral and religious revolution—which is to produce such portentous results within the space of "ten years"—revelation is to play but a subordinate part, if, indeed, it is to be reckoned of any importance at all. It is to be the work and the triumph, not of "the religion of the Bible," but of "the religion of Phrenology."

How far, then, is this religion divergent from that of the Bible? To what extent can they consist together? Our author strikes deep when he says,—

"The chapter on the nature of right and wrong, and the origin or foundation of moral obligation, (or on the constitutional elements of the sinfulness of sin and the virtue of holiness,) as well as on the causes and cure of human depravity, will be not only new, but also directly in the teeth of all prevailing notions on that subject."—P. 13.

All this, however, may be well. Perhaps "all prevailing notions" on those subjects may be founded on a misinterpretation of the Bible, and do not imply any deficiency in revelation itself. Will this solution satisfy our author? Not at all. He professedly strikes at "existing creeds"—at "antiquated errors;" but the contrivance is too shallow to hide from us the fact, that the blow is so directed that, through "the creeds," it falls upon the Bible. Indeed, finding this play upon "the creeds" and "the errors" of men insufficient for his purpose, he advances boldly to the onset, and attempts to prove that the Bible is insufficient as a moral guide, and imperfect as a standard of religious faith and practice.

"Now if the Bible, 'without note or comment,' be an all-sufficient guide in matters of religious faith and practice, why this religious diversity and contention? Why does it not *compel* all to adopt the *same* doctrines and practices, and these the only correct ones? If experiment continued for four thousand years, and tried in all ages, and by a vast majority of Christendom, can prove *any* thing, that experiment, or, rather, its total *failure*, and that, too, under all circumstances, has proved incontestibly that, taking man as he is, and the Bible as it is,

the latter is *not*, and can *never* be, the all-sufficient religious guide and standard of the former."—Pp. 19, 20.

The revelation of God a failure—a "total failure!" And this, too, the revelation "given by God," "that the man of God may be" thoroughly furnished unto every good word and work!" That experiment a "total failure," by which innumerable multitudes have already been enabled to

"Navigate
The sea of life, and gain the coast of bliss
Securely!"

A "total failure!" Ye mighty dead, was it in vain that ye believed?

"Piety has found friends in the friends of science."

Bacon, Newton, and Locke have reverently bowed before the altars of religion, rejoiced in its hopes, and been sustained by its faith. There is no clime, no country, that has not been blessed by its influence. At its magic touch, barren wastes have been transformed into fruitful fields; industry and the arts have sprung up to beautify the face of the earth. It has cheered the abode of poverty, sustained in the midst of trials, soothed and comforted in sickness, and enabled the dying saint to exclaim, "My flesh and my heart faileth: but God is my strength and my portion for ever." Its influence is everywhere felt—all-pervading as the air we breathe. Childhood rejoices in its light; old age is cheered by its love.

And yet "the experiment" is a "total failure!" If this be not an *ex-cathedra pronunciamiento*, we are at a loss where to find one. And on what is this bold assumption based? Why, simply, the fact that Christians who profess to take the Bible as their guide, differ in points of faith and doctrine.

"If it be objected, that the Bible is already an unerring moral guide, and a perfect standard of religious faith and practice, I answer, Then why does every religious denomination in Christendom, and every member of every religious sect, besides multitudes of private individuals, all claim to draw their peculiar doctrines and practices from the Bible, and even quote Scripture therefor, and that though their difference be heaven wide."—P. 19.

The fact that Christians differ in their views upon doctrinal points, we have no disposition to deny or conceal. But what are the legitimate inferences that may be drawn from this fact? And what do these differences of opinion and practice indicate? We

reply, Nothing more, than that investigations, by different persons, have been carried on under the influence of different prejudices and different intellectual biases. It is not that the truth may not be reached, but that we do not reach it. We rest satisfied with superficial investigations, with a partial observance of facts, without sufficiently weighing and measuring, by the gospel standards, our hasty inferences. The fault is *not* in the Bible, if it be a fault even, to differ in opinion, but in us. We build our theories, perhaps necessarily, upon a partial observance of phenomena; one person has observed one class of phenomena, a second has observed another class, hence *two theories* are formed, different, perhaps contradictory. The phenomena were right, but the inspection of them was partial, and the knowledge of them imperfect. But who does not at once perceive that the argument used by our author to demonstrate the insufficiency of the Bible, would also demonstrate the insufficiency of human reason—nay, of his boasted Phrenology itself, as the same fact lies against each? How endless the contradictory vagaries into which philosophers have been led! How contradictory are the views entertained by some of the soundest Phrenologists on some of the fundamental elements of the science! Is our author willing to have his favorite science subjected to the same ordeal, and tried by the same standard, as that to which he has sought to subject the Bible? By his own showing, the guide he would offer is equally unsafe with the one we have chosen to follow.

Nothing is more obvious than the fact, that scarcely any two Phrenologists—we mean those of eminence—agree even on fundamental points; and yet each professes to give the teachings of Phrenology. A few, from among the many instances that might be quoted, will serve to show in what a labyrinth of incongruities, inconsistencies, and contradictions, these professed lights of the world have fallen. And yet each one, for himself, speaks with oracular positiveness. By Mr. Spurzheim the natural laws of the universe are made to originate with God, and to be dependent on him,—“Natural laws are evidently effects of the will of the Creator, or God.”* Mr. Fowler, on the other hand, makes these laws originate in the “eternal and essential fitness of things,” and makes even God himself subject to their dominion,—“The whole universe, God himself included, is governed by immutable, unalterable laws.”—P. 103. Mr. Combe, guided by Phrenology, arrives at the conclusion, that the system of nature “does not appear to be one of optimism,” but “that the world, including

* Phil. Cat. Nat. Laws of Man, p. 8.

both the physical and moral departments, has been constituted on the principle of a progressive system, like the acorn with reference to the oak.”—P. 103. He also scouts the doctrine of the original perfection of the world, and its subsequent derangement, as an hypothesis hardly worthy of notice. On the other hand, Mr. Fowler asserts the original perfection of nature, and especially of man,—“Nothing can be more plain or unequivocal, than that man was made *perfect* at first. He *was* created perfect. His original constitution was perfection itself.”—P. 25. Again, Mr. Combe, indirectly at least, admits the insufficiency of human reason, including Phrenology, of course,—“I do not intend to predicate anything concerning the perfectibility of man by obedience to the laws of nature.”* Contrariwise Mr. Fowler says,—“That [that is, ‘the nature of man’] obeyed, we are as perfect in conduct as we are by creation.”—P. 43. Mr. Combe says,—“I do not intend to teach that the natural laws, discoverable by the unassisted reason, are sufficient for the *salvation* of men without revelation. . . . And I distinctly declare that I do not teach that obedience to the natural laws is sufficient for salvation in a future state.”† But Mr. Fowler says, that such an expositor of our moral nature as is Phrenology, “once found, is our talisman, our philosopher’s stone, in all matters of religious belief and practice. That found, we need nothing else.”—P. 43. And in another place, he says, that obeyed, “the fall, and all its effects, will pass by him. He will need no Saviour, for he will commit no sin.”—P. 25. But this is only a tithe of the discrepancy and contradiction that exists among Phrenologists on the very fundamental elements of morality and religion. If, then, we reject the Bible because men, who profess to take it as their moral and religious guide, differ on some points of doctrine and practice; on the same principle must we reject Phrenology as an insufficient guide—especially as its great exponents, who have penetrated all its depths, and unraveled all its mysteries, have reached conclusions wholly irreconcilable with each other.

But our author stops not here. He pushes the onset a little further, and makes still another effort to bring down the Bible from its high position, as to authority in matters of faith:—

“Modern Christianity makes too much of her Bible, by ascribing to it more than it claims, or was ever designed to accomplish. Christianity, or the doctrines of the Bible, are only the *supplement* of religion, while *natural* theology, or the existence of a God, or the funda-

* Constitution of Man, p. 5.

† Ibid., p. 6.

mental principles of religion to be presented in this essay, are the foundation."—P. 21.

It seems to us not a little queer, that the "supplement" should have preceded the book; that Christianity should so long have existed without any "foundation:" in fine, that Moses, and David, and the prophets—that Jesus Christ and the apostles, should have preceded O. S. Fowler. "Modern Christianity" has reason to think "much of her Bible." She has witnessed the impotent strugglings of the human reason, when unenlightened by its beams, unguided by its counsel. She has seen how wretched man may become, and the anarchy into which society may be thrown, when the restraining influences of "her Bible" are discarded. *She has reason to think much of her Bible!* It is the foundation of her faith; it is the light of her eye; the guide of her reason; the pillar of her support, and the arm of her strength. Tear away "modern Christianity" from her moorings to the Word of life, and a useless hulk, worm-eaten, rotten, and tempest-tossed, she would drift down the tide of time, till her leaden weight could no longer be upborne by its waters.

Still another thrust at the Bible:—

"The human mind requires somewhat more of *proof* than it finds in the Bible. The Bible gives us its *ipse dixit* simply; but the human mind requires *evidence*—requires to understand the *why* and the *wherefore*, and the *philosophy* of that which it receives. That philosophy the Bible does not give—does not even *pretend* to give. It requires belief on the ground of a 'Thus saith the Lord,' and then leaves it. As man is endowed with reason, it is proper, it is imperative, that his reason be satisfied."

"We have religious teaching enough, but not of the *right kind*. Enough of sabbath schools, and Bible classes, and preaching, and revivals, but not of the *right character*. We require more *philosophy*, in which to base it, and with which to enforce it."—Pp. 22, 23.

We cannot but regard the above as a blow aimed at the very root of revealed religion. The reason of Sir Isaac Newton, and of John Locke, could be satisfied with this message from God. The former accounted "the Scriptures the sublimest philosophy." The latter, after his wide survey of the human mind, and of the principles and conduct of reason, affirms,—“In the Bible are contained the words of life; it has God for its author, salvation for its end, and truth, without any mixture of error, for its matter.” We said it was a blow aimed at revealed religion, but it is an insidious blow. There is no open dealing upon this point by the author. The Bible is true, if it harmonize with Phrenology, and because

it harmonizes with Phrenology—not because it came from God. On the other hand, if it harmonizes not with Phrenology, then is it not true, and it must be swept away. Such is the course of our author. He makes no bold, manly attack upon the authenticity, genuineness, inspiration, or authority, of the Holy Scriptures. But then, he insinuates the discrepancy between them and the human reason, in such a manner as to beget distrust in them, and to weaken their authority and influence. We will not say that this is willfully and knowingly done; we are inclined to the more charitable opinion, that it may result from that over confidence in his speculations, which blinds him as to their ultimate consequences.

We may, however, take a little comfort in the idea, that should the dreaded catastrophe really take place, and Phrenology break down revelation and the Bible, still it cannot destroy *religion*. This will stick to man as close, and, in fact, is as essential to his being as the bumps on his head. Nay—more and better—he will not only remain religious, but he will grow more and more religious. Listen to our author:—

“Nor is there any danger, or even possibility, that man will ever become *less* religious than he now is, and always has been, any more than there is danger of his ceasing to become hungry, or to breathe; for religion is engrafted upon his very nature, or, rather, forms no inconsiderable portion thereof. This fact, established by the whole history of man, is demonstrated by Phrenology, in showing that a larger proportion of the brain is appropriated to the development of the moral and religious organs. Till, then, the nature of man is essentially remodeled, that nature will *compel* him to have a religion of *some* kind.—Pp. 15, 16.

In another place, our author says of man:—

“He cannot be otherwise than moral and religious. As well live without air, or food, or life, as live without moral sentiments of some kind, and religious practices of some sort; because they are just as much a part of his constitution as reason, or appetite, or affection, or breathing. Nor can he live without them any more than without a stomach or a brain.”—P. 29.

This, we confess, is driving the nail in a sure place. Certain it is, that to attempt to live “without a stomach or a brain” would be a rather precarious experiment. Hence, then, we have a necessity for the existence of “moral sentiments of *some* kind, and religious practices of *some* sort.” But the natural inquiry arises, To what kind of moral sentiments, and to what sort of religious practices, does Phrenology give preference? Does it enshrine that of the “conceited Chinese”—that of the “benighted Hindoo”—that of the “degraded Ethiopian”—that of the “noble son of the forest”

—or that of “the Bible?” The author leaves us sadly at fault upon this point, though occasionally he seems to huddle them together into one incongruous group, and place them all in the same category. Our author seems unwilling to descend to particulars, and define or point out the elect religion. We suppose, however, great obstacles lay in his way. Should he give the preference to “the religion of the Bible,” offense would be given to the “conceited Chinese.” Should he give it to Buddhism, what a hue and cry would ring through Christendom? We can appreciate the delicacies of our author upon this point. Again, he gives us pretty clearly to understand that extensive modifications must take place in every kind of religion, before they can harmonize with the nature of man—with Phrenology.

But then it may be urged also, that, if our author has not given us his own opinions on these knotty and delicate points, he has given us what is of more value—a key by which we may unfold the labyrinth of every religion; and that is Phrenology.

“We here have a moral touch-stone, by which to try and test every creed and every practice.”

“How shall we know what is right, and what is wrong? By what *standard* shall we try all our creeds, all our practices? By the standard of the nature of man. That nature is all right—is perfection itself—as perfect as God could make it. Hence, to follow that nature in belief, in practice, is to believe *right*—to do *right*.”—Pp. 19, 43.

But Phrenology is not only a test of the rottenness or soundness of “the various creeds;” it is, also, the grand illuminator of our race—the all-sufficient teacher of man, than which “we need nothing else.” It unfolds his whole nature, manifests all his relations, and all his duties.

“But where can we find an unerring expositor of the moral nature of man? Such an expositor, once found, is our talisman, our philosopher’s stone, in all matters of religious belief and practice. That found, we need nothing else. That obeyed, we are as perfect in conduct as we are in creation. Where, then, can that stone be found? In heaven? No, for we cannot get at it there. In the Decalogue? No, it is too short. In the Bible? No, not all of it. But in the *pages of Phrenology*. That dissects, it lays man’s moral nature completely open, and reveals every thread and fibre of it. Every law, every requirement, every doctrine, every action required by the nature of man, will be found in this book of man’s moral and religious nature.”—P. 43.

“Phrenology can tell us of all that man can know as to what is right and wrong, good and bad, sinful and holy. All that can be known of duty, of penitence, and of pardon. . . . All that is (at least all that is to us) concerning the worship of a God. All that can be known of

times, places, and modes of this worship. All that can be known, all that is, concerning its frequency, its character, and its effects."—P. 32.

What need, then, have we of a revelation from God? None, absolutely none. Man has only to put his hand upon his head, and he may instantly know "all that can be known" concerning religion and religious duty. Why have religious teachers been sent to address the ear and impress the heart, when every nook and cranny of the head is thronged with teachers on every topic of human interest—teachers, infallible, all-sufficient? Behold, the very skull is distended with the dormitories where they sleep, the workshops where they labor! What man needed then, was not a revelation, but a bust,—ornamented with Phrenological delineations. How happy we, on whom this glorious science sheds its super-heavenly rays!

But then, this necessity of being religious—this being *compelled* by nature to *worship*, just as she compels us to *eat*, and *drink*, and *sleep*!

"So of veneration. It so is, that man worships, just as it so is, that he eats and sleeps. He worships a supreme Being. He is so constituted. He cannot do otherwise, any more than he can do otherwise than eat, or sleep, or die."—P. 32.

And, indeed, how is it possible for him to do otherwise? With that bump of "veneration" upon his head, the central crown of presiding divinities, how can he be otherwise than devout? This system, at one fell swoop, strips human actions of all moral attributes. It is just as pious to eat, at the bidding of the stomach, as it is to worship—God, or something else—at the bidding of "veneration." The existence of veneration we do not question. But—granting to Phrenology all that our author claims for it as a mere science—his exposition of the function of veneration is unsound, untenable. Veneration prompts us to worship, just as hunger prompts us to eat. But hunger simply requires food; it does not determine what that food shall be—whether flesh or vegetable—whether animal or human flesh. It says nothing of "times, places, and modes." So of veneration: it says, worship; it prompts to worship. But the perception of a God to worship, is the function and office of other faculties—so, also, the determination of "times, places, and modes." Hence, veneration worships whatever these faculties place before it, as the object of worship,—be it an idol, a vegetable, a serpent, the sun, or the great God of heaven and earth. Hunger is appeased, whether the man eat a chicken or a child; so veneration, considered merely with reference to its ori

ginal function, is satisfied, whether the homage is paid to God or to the devil. This is the true interpretation which the science of Phrenology gives to this primitive faculty. All else that concerns worship, all that concerns the object of homage, all that concerns the time, place, and mode of this homage, comes within the range of revelation. Phrenology trenches not a single step upon the province of revelation. Organize man—give completion to his moral faculties even, and leave him without instruction as to the manner, extent, and limitation of their use, and he would still be but a blind creature of impulse. Accordingly, God has never left him—not even in the period of his innocence—without a revelation with regard to his duty.

To turn to another point, it is urged that Phrenology demonstrates religion; that it applies science to its doctrines, and places all upon a scientific basis.

“This science puts all these doctrines, all these requirements, on a *scientific* basis,—on that same basis of positive, actual *fact*, on which the science of mathematics places every mathematical truth; or of astronomy, any astronomical truth; or of chemistry, any chemical truth; or of induction, any matter of inductive philosophy. It is *all* put upon this basis. Nothing is left at loose ends. It is *all exact*, *all demonstrable*, all certain. And all plain, too. No mist envelops any point of it. No dark spot remains upon its horizon. Every fact is as light as the noonday’s sun of eternal truth and unquestionable science can make it.”—P. 43.

These are large promises. Let us look to the *redemption* of them; and see what the science of Phrenology is actually adding to our stock of demonstration on this point. “The existence of a faculty proves the existence of its counterpart.” Good. But this is an axiom of philosophy, as old as philosophy itself. On this very principle Socrates argues the immortality of the soul:—“Man is born to know the truth; but he can never attain to a knowledge of it in this life,—hence the life to come.” Surely Phrenology will not have the presumption to lay claim to its discovery. We very much doubt whether it has even discovered, or made any new application of it. Let us observe how our author reasons from this starting point:—

“As the existence of the eye, and its adaptation to light, presuppose and necessarily imply the existence of that light to which it is adapted; as the existence of the stomach, and its adaptation to food, presuppose and necessarily imply the existence of food adapted to it; the adaptation of the lungs to the air, and the air to the lungs; of causality to the laws of causation, and laws of causation to causality; and so of illustrations innumerable scattered throughout nature, and constituting

a great portion of nature ; so the existence of veneration, and its adaptation to divine worship, presuppose and necessarily imply the existence of a Deity to be worshiped."

"If to this it be objected that 'most men adopt those religious views and practices in which they were educated,' and that therefore religion is *taught*, I answer, that before any one *can* be *taught* anything, he must have some *original, primary quality* capable of *being* taught. Can you teach a dog to be solemn in church, or a swine to pray? But *why* not? For the same reason that you cannot teach a blind man to see, or a deaf man to hear, or a man without limbs to use them; viz., because he has no original, primitive *faculty* capable of *being* taught. And the very fact that men *can* be *taught* to pray and to worship God, proves that they have that very primitive faculty contended for."—Pp. 47, 51.

All this may be good, very good—true, scientifically true. But what light does Phrenology shed upon the subject, beyond what the reflecting world possessed before? The existence of a primitive faculty in man adapted to the worship of God was not a discovery of Phrenology. Its existence was known long before Phrenology had being, as a science. It was not the existence of *veneration*, but of the *organ* through which it acts, to the discovery of which Phrenology lays claim. It shows the *location*, and not the *existence*, of the principle. That was known before. Now, the argument for the being of God rests upon the existence of the principle in the mind, and not upon the existence of its corporeal organ; hence, so far as scientific demonstration is concerned, Phrenology advances us not a step.

There is, however, one discovery, to the credit of which our author is fairly entitled; and for which the religious world must certainly feel greatly indebted to him. The discovery is this:—

"Each modern religious sect has its own peculiar set of Phrenological developments, which harmonizes perfectly with the peculiarities of its creed."—P. 56.

Now, we appeal to our author, whether—applying the principle above discussed—the fact that "each modern religious sect has its own peculiar set of Phrenological developments," does not demonstrate the necessity of the existence of those several sects? "Your *organs* differ, and this diversifies and distracts your religious views and feelings."—P. 55. Why, then, complain of the existence of different sects in religion? Is there not the same necessity for their existence that there is for the existence of religion itself? If "veneration" makes man, from necessity, a religionist—a worshiper, then will "large veneration, with predominant self-esteem

and firmness, and large conscientiousness," of necessity, constitute an "old-fashioned Calvinist:" while "large veneration, combined with predominant benevolence and adhesiveness, and moderate destructiveness," constitute a Universalist: and "large veneration, with predominant benevolence and large ideality, firmness, self-esteem, and social faculties, conscientiousness" middling, constitute an Episcopalian. Alas, for the poor Quakers; we cannot discover, phrenologically speaking, any necessity for their existence as a sect. They "have no characteristic moral developments, and accordingly allow their members to hold any and every belief, provided they *do* thus and so." These are to us new and rare developments. We had before heard of theft, murder, and the like, discoverable in the villainous bumps upon the poor wight's head. But that the Phrenological developments presented a complete gauge of not only one's piety, but also of his speculative views in theology and his sectarian preferences, is to us a new and surprising revelation. How many are the practical and useful purposes to which this discovery may be applied! To mention but one. It should, at once, put an end to all proselytism. Let all candidates for church membership undergo a Phrenological examination, and let their "organs" decide the point. In fine, would it not be well to have the entire community classified, and distributed "scientifically" to the several sects, according to their respective Phrenological developments? This is a rich vein, but we cannot pursue it further.

We have heretofore discussed the essay of our author, in its relations to some of the fundamental principles of religion. We will now view it in its conclusions, with reference to some of the cardinal doctrines taught by revelation, and some of the fundamental duties it enjoins.

The section on "the true religion and the false," is an interesting medley. It seems to be a concoction of all things, good and bad, sound and heretical, grave and ludicrous, solemn and farcical, sublime and ridiculous. Bigoted sectarianism, exclusive religionism, ascetic religionists, rich, proud, fashionable Christians,—all receive merited castigation. But the gist of the whole is, that "the religion of human nature"—of Phrenology—is too little esteemed; churches are not opened for the propagation of its doctrines, ministers refuse to preach it, and hence our author pours out the vials of his wrath upon them.

But to specify particular doctrines of revealed religion;—what says Phrenology about "the fall" and its consequences? Our author seems to admit the fact of the fall, or rather he speaks of it

as the "alleged fall." Of the immediate effects of that "alleged fall," he speaks negatively:—

"No one supposes that his alleged fall *took away* any original moral element, or *added* any new element or faculty of depravity. This fall could only have *perverted* his nature. It could not possibly add or destroy one jot or tittle of nature. It took away no limb, no muscle, no physical organ. It added no Phrenological, or other mental or moral faculty or power. As far as his *original constitution* was concerned, it left him just where it found him."—P. 24.

To show why Phrenology is silent upon the doctrine of the fall, or makes no special provision to meet the emergency occasioned by it, our author further remarks:—

"The fall was *subsequent* to the nature of man. So was the plan of salvation by Christ. So the whole paraphernalia of accompanying doctrines—all the doctrines connected with that salvation, or growing out of it. They are *extraneous* to the nature of man. They are added to it, as far as they are connected with it."—P. 25.

Our author here, at one bound, leaps over a logical chasm of such width and depth, as would have frightened from the attempt any man laden with the weight of more than "one idea."

"And if man will but fulfill all the precepts, and obey all the requirements of his original nature—of Phrenology—the fall, and all its effects, will pass by him. He will need no Saviour, for he will commit no sin."—P. 25.

We should certainly have reasoned in another direction. If "the religion of Phrenology" was antecedent to "the fall," and regards man as a being with faculties *unperverted*, it must be inapplicable to him as a fallen being—with *faculties perverted*. As a system of religion of saving efficacy, Phrenology, reasoning from its own premises, must fall to the ground. We need not stop to point out the glaring contravention of this exposition of the fall and its consequences, with that contained in the Word of God. Our author, indeed, in another place, admits that "few; if any, live up to their original natures;" but he makes no admission of their inability to do it. He admits that their faculties are perverted by the fall, and yet claims that they are able to live as they should have lived with faculties unperverted. The watch is out of order—its parts are perverted; but yet it must keep time. Grant to man this ability in his fallen state, and you belie the Scriptures, you take away the necessity of redemption by Jesus Christ, and charge Heaven with folly. "The plan of salvation by Christ," "extraneous to the nature of man!" It is founded in the very wants of that nature, it was

sent to meet the necessities of that nature, to supply its lack, and heal its deformity.

Let us instance the sabbath;—what says Phrenology about the sabbath? Does it require any sabbath? Does it even require man to set apart any portion of time for religious worship? Our author distinctly propounds these questions; and a few quotations will serve to give the response he makes to them.

“Phrenology answers this question thus:—Man, worship thy God, worship *daily*, worship *habitually*. Exercise thy religious feeling not by fits and starts, not at given times and seasons, but *continually*. Make this worship a part and parcel of thy daily avocations, or, rather, pleasures.”

“Phrenology says, Thou mayest go to church if thou pleasest, or not go if thou objectest. It says that *place* and *mode* are nothing; that the *worship* is the *main* thing. . . . At least it is lawful to walk abroad in the fields on the sabbath, enjoy the fresh breezes, and pick and eat fruit, and what we like. This shutting ourselves up in doors is positively wrong.”

“If the day is too holy in which to take exercise, it is, of course, too holy in which to eat, or breathe, or live. Why does not the heart stop its wonted pulsations the moment Sunday begins, and resume them the instant it terminates? For, if it be right to eat or breathe on the sabbath, it is equally, for precisely the same reason, right that we exercise, recreate, pick flowers and fruits, enjoy nature, enjoy life.”

“‘O but,’ says one, ‘let us at least have a sabbath as a day of rest from the toils and burdens of the week. As a civil institution, it has no parallel in value. Our horses and servants need rest. We all require one day to clean up, refresh our weary bodies, banish the cares and vexations of business, and place our distracted minds on heaven and heavenly things.’ I know, indeed, that *if* men will work too hard one day, they will require rest the next. Not so if they do not *overdo*. Indeed, perfect health requires a given equal amount of labor *daily*. So if a man will eat too much, he will be benefited by fasting. Not, however, when he has eaten just enough. If you do not work your beasts too hard week-days, they will need no rest Sundays. If you do not follow the world too closely six days in the week, you will not feel the necessity of resting from it on the seventh; but will be the better for not resting. So if you will exercise veneration sufficiently during the week, you will need no sabbath to increase its energies. Live just as you ought during the week, and you will require to live just the same on the sabbath.”—Pp. 77, 78.

Now, it will not, we presume, be argued that the sabbath was designed for man as a *fallen* being, inasmuch as it was instituted before the fall—was considered needful for man in his state of original perfection. How much more needful now that he has fallen! Do away the sabbath, or what is the same thing, observe

it according to the teachings of our author, and you will eventually do away with the Christian religion. Let it not be said, however, that Phrenology, as a science, is opposed to the institution and observance of the Christian sabbath. On that subject it is silent—it lies without its true province as a science. We must not confound the vagaries of the priest with the sayings of the oracle.

Again,—*what says Phrenology about prayer?* “Veneration says *pray*.” Mr. Scott gives us the following legitimate and pertinent exposition of the true teachings of Phrenology on the subject of prayer:—“The true Phrenological view of prayer would seem to be the following: three faculties have been bestowed on man, which prompt him to worship a supreme Being; *veneration* and *wonder* directly dispose us to this, while *hope* leads us to the expectation and belief that our prayers will not be altogether ineffectual; but that if they are put up in a manner agreeable to the divine will, they may be favorably *heard* and *answered*. That these are the legitimate promptings of the feelings now mentioned, seems evident from this; that the higher and more perfect the character becomes, the more intense is the desire of the individual to engage in such acts of worship, and to *pour out his petitions to God in prayer*. It thus appears that this disposition to pray, and to expect an answer to prayer, is ‘not a factitious feeling,’ (as Mr. Combe expresses it in reference to another subject,) ‘or a mere exuberance of an idle and luxuriant imagination; but it is the result of certain primitive faculties of the mind, which owe at once their existence and their functions to the Creator.’”*—*Scott’s Harmony of Phrenology with Scripture*. Pp. 324, 325.

The above is unquestionably what Phrenology teaches us concerning prayer, and is *all* it teaches us concerning it. This view, so far as it goes, too, perfectly accords with the teachings of revelation on the same subject. The Bible tells us to *pray to God*: “veneration and wonder directly dispose us” to pray: the Bible says, “Ask, and ye shall receive;” while “hope leads us to the expectation and belief that our prayers will be heard and answered.”

Another class of Phrenologists, however, take, in common with our author, a different view of the subject. They consider the benefit derived from the exercise of prayer to consist, not in the fact that God hears and answers it, but in its tendency to cultivate certain emotions of soul, and also to stimulate us to exertion to secure the object prayed for. The doctrine boldly advocated by Mr. Combe is, that prayer has no effect except by its reflex influ-

* Combe’s System of Phrenology.

ence on the mind of the suppliant; and that its true efficacy consists not in the mere asking, but in its being a means of producing that frame of mind that qualifies us to receive.* Much in accordance with the above is the exposition of our author:—

“Veneration prays. Prayer is, then, our duty, as it certainly is our pleasure. This has been already shown. But it remains to answer the question: Does praying for any given thing have a tendency to bring about the end desired? Does it alter the course of the Deity? Does it change the immutable laws of the Almighty? Does it set aside the laws of cause and effect? No, neither.”—P. 90.

No one, we presume, will contend that prayer will “change the immutable laws of Deity,” or “set aside the laws of cause and effect.” One of the immutable laws of the Deity is, that he will hear and answer prayer. So we understand it. The laws of cause and effect are by no means abrogated. For prayer is one of the causes ordained by Heaven to produce both moral and physical effects. Let us follow the exposition of our author still further:—

“I have my doubts whether the spirit of prayer is fully understood—whether its true analysis has yet been given. The general impression is, that its main object should be to *bring about* something—to supplicate some blessing, to obtain some gift from God. This interpretation cannot be sanctioned by Phrenology. This science shows—all nature shows—that the whole universe, God himself included, is governed by immutable, unalterable laws—that causes and effects reign supreme, and allow not the least chance for prayer to effect the least change in effects, because it cannot change their causes. And to suppose that human entreaties can change the mind, the will, the eternal purpose of the Almighty, is utter folly—is downright blasphemy. These notions are revolting to correct notions of the universe.”—P. 103.

Here we have the universe—God, heaven, earth, hell—bound in chains of the most absolute fatalism. The idea of an answer to prayer, of obtaining *anything*, is utterly discarded. Next, our author defines what, in his view, “is the true function of prayer, and what its effect.” Its function is the exercise of the spiritual feelings. Its object is twofold: first, its influence on the mind of him who prays; second, the diffusive influence it exerts over others. It affects the creature only; has no direct or indirect influence in the court of Heaven. Now we object to this whole theory of prayer:—

1. It is an incorrect interpretation of even the teachings of Phrenology upon the subject. We have already seen what is the true exposition of Phrenology on this subject, and there can be no

* See Constitution of Man.

question as to its harmony with the true theory of prayer as drawn from the sacred Scriptures.

2. It resolves prayer into a mere Mesmeric influence. In its influence upon the individual, our author represents it as inducing a spiritual state "which foreknows the future, and perceives the truth, as by magic." He says,—

"When particularly anxious to perceive and enforce truth, I feel like praying, perhaps not audibly, but like throwing myself into this spiritual state, in which truth flows into my own soul, from which it radiates into the souls of all who hear me."

3. If the above theory be true, it matters not to whom or what men pray—God, the devil, or the Grand Lama—provided the man has confidence in the object to which he prays. The devil worship of Africa may be rendered as effectual as prayer offered to our almighty Father in heaven.

4. Another objection to the above theory is, that prayer made to the God of heaven by Christians who believe it, can be looked upon only as acts of solemn mockery.

5. This theory makes void—nay, absolutely worthless and hypocritical, that solemn prayer offered by our Saviour for his disciples, and for all that should believe on his name in the world. According to this theory, that prayer could do nothing for the world—nothing for his disciples. And as to its reflex influence upon himself, he needed no such stimulus to his piety and zeal. For instances of the Saviour's praying, see Matt. xix, 13; xxvi, 36, 39, 42, 44; Luke v, 16; vi, 12; ix, 18, 28; xi, 1; John xv, 16; xvii; Heb. vii, 25, &c.

6. Another objection to this theory is, it is contradictory to the whole teaching of the sacred Scriptures on the subject of prayer. In both the Old and New Testament we are taught to expect *answers* to prayer—taught to expect that prayer will *avail* with God. "The eyes of the Lord are upon the righteous, and his ears are open to their cry. The righteous cry, and the Lord *heareth* them, and *delivereth* them out of all their troubles." Psal. xxxiv, 15, 17. "Call upon me in the day of trouble; I will deliver thee." Psal. l, 15. "He will be very gracious unto thee, at the voice of thy cry; when he shall hear it, he will answer thee." Isa. xxx, 19. "Call unto me, and I will answer thee, and show thee great and mighty things, which thou knowest not." Jer. xxxiii, 3.* The same doctrine is taught by our Saviour and throughout the New Testament.

* See also in the Old Testament, Psal. cii, 13, 16; cxlviii, 18; xxxvii, 4; xci, 15; xxx, 2; xxxiv, 2; Joel ii, 32; Isa. xlvi, 19; lxv, 24; lxvi, 8; Zech. xiii, 9; Job xxii, 27; 2 Chron. xv, 2, &c.

Indeed, prayer is enforced by the very consideration that it will be *heard* and *answered*. "Ask, and it shall be given unto you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you." Matt. vii. 7, &c. "Draw nigh unto God and he will draw nigh unto you." James iv, 8. "We have not a High Priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin. Let us, therefore, come boldly unto the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need." Heb. iv, 15.* Nothing can be more certain than that, if our author has given the true exposition of Phrenology on the theory of prayer, it is totally irreconcilable and contradictory to that of the sacred Scriptures.

7. A final objection to the above Phrenologico-Mesmeric theory of prayer, is, that prayer *has prevailed* with God. How oft did the prayer of Moses prevail with God! When Israel had been led into idolatry, his intercession turns away the fierce anger of the Almighty, Exod. xxxii, 1-14; when the consuming fire of heaven was devouring the complaining and rebellious people, "Moses prayed unto the Lord, and the fire was quenched," Num. xi, 2; and when he pleads that the great iniquity of his people may be forgiven, "the Lord said, I have pardoned according to thy word." Num. xiv, 20. "Thunder and rain" descend in answer to the prayer of Samuel, 1 Sam. xii, 18; in answer to Elijah's prayer, "the fire of the Lord fell, and consumed the burnt sacrifice," and licked up the very water that filled the trench around the altar, 1 Kings xviii, 30, &c.; in answer to the prayer of Elisha, the Syrian host are smitten with blindness. 2 Kings vi, 18. It would be absolutely impossible to present the multitudinous instances in which prayer has prevailed with God.† Such instances are not only recorded on the pages of inspiration; they enter into the experience of the people of God; they come within the range of their observation; they stimulate and ennoble their faith.

How absolutely puerile and contemptible is this theory of prayer, compared with the sublime aspects in which it is presented in the Word of life! Who that credits this theory could ever pray! He might work himself up into an enthusiasm, a frenzy; but the essential element of prayer he could not possess. This blind theory of prayer, by one fell stroke sunders the most endearing relations that exist between God and man. It is astonishing how far men

* See also James v, 15; Luke xviii, 7; 1 Pet. iii, 12; Rom. x, 13; Heb. xi, 6; Matt. xviii, 19, 20; John xv, 7.

† See Gen. xxxii, 28; xviii, 32; 1 Sam. i, 27; 1 Kings xvii, 22; 2 Kings xix, 20; xx, 5-11; Acts xii, 5; James v, 16, &c.

can depart from all that is true and sound in religion, and yet profess to be Christians—nay, the only men of sound and elevated piety !

In close connection with the above views, our author proceeds to show that neither our righteousness nor our sin can in any way affect the Almighty ; the doctrine of a special providence is denied ; conversions and revivals are denounced ;* and even the mysterious and incomprehensible doctrine of a divine trinity is unraveled and exploded by one touch of our author's wand. We should be glad to follow these and kindred topics out into detail ; but such an extended analysis would be burdensome to our readers. The analysis on the specific doctrines above given may suffice as an example of the whole.

And yet our author invites us to receive his misty, fragmentary, and incongruous ravings, as the only true exposition of the Christian system. All before him have been but dolts and idiots. He first has unfolded the pages of true wisdom, unsealed the fountains of true piety. He invites men—all the world to come—to receive the gospel as delivered by him, to drink from its fountains till their largest desire is satisfied. He exhorts them not to fear their influence, but to drink without stint, without measure. As if he would say,—“ See how pious they have made me ; drink your fill, and they shall make you equally pious.”† With Phrenology, as a science, we have nothing to do. We have neither attempted to prove, nor disprove it. What we object to, is the application of its principles to uses for which they were never designed,—never adapted. This, however, has been the fate of almost every science

* Rather, perhaps, we should say “perverted,” for our author says, “All may be converted, be holy, be happy. Nor should they wait to be operated upon. They must operate upon themselves—must pray—must *spiritualize* themselves. And so we must spiritualize, convert, one another ; for all the organs are capable of being excited.”—P. 111.

† “Those who accuse Phrenology of leading to infidelity and skepticism, either practically or theoretically, have either but a smattering of this sublime, this religious science, or else are incapable of comprehending it. Its influence on my own mind has been to *deepen* my religious feelings, and enlarge their boundaries, not to enfeeble them. True, it has enfeebled my narrow-minded sectarian notions. I thank God that it has. Much that was bigoted, intolerant, contracted, and erroneous, it has abolished. But the gold of Ophir, the wealth of India, the treasures of the whole earth, could be but a drop in the bucket, compared with the value of those religious doctrines and feelings it has *added* to my former religious stock. Nothing could tempt me to return back to that state of semi-darkness from which Phrenology has delivered me. I consider that true religious feeling has been multiplied within me a hundred-fold by this science.”—P. 125.

in its incipient stages. The science of astronomy was used by its first cultivators for the purposes of astrology; and voluminous were the works, and complicated the calculations, that were made to arrive at the means of ascertaining future events by observing the stars. In fact, astronomy had been studied for three thousand years before its true uses were discovered; before it was applied to the uses of navigation, and the determination of the geography of the globe. The uses of the science of chemistry were equally misunderstood through many and long ages. The same was true of the science of geology. The examples which the history of these and other sciences afford, should lead the cultivators of any and every science to guard against rash and premature speculation, confident and empty declamation. They would do well to heed the reproof given by that master-mind in philosophy, Lord Bacon, to those who "disdain to spell, and so by degrees to read, in the volume of God's works, and who, contrariwise, by continual meditation and agitation of wit, do urge, and, as it were, invoke their own spirits to divine and give oracles unto them, whereby they are universally deluded."

The remarks of Mr. Scott, in his reply to Combe, are so just and so clear, with reference to the true relations between Phrenology and revelation, and so forcibly illustrate the light which the former may be expected to shed upon the latter, that we cannot forbear a brief extract.

"In regard to all points connected with revelation, I may now remark, once for all, that there is nothing whatever in Phrenology, more than in any other system of the human faculties, that either affords an objection to any of the conclusions to which we arrive on the ordinary principles of reasoning, or which furnishes us any great additional light to guide us to a right conclusion respecting them. It is perfect delusion to suppose, as Mr. Combe seems to do, that this new science is to produce a total revolution in our theological creeds, and place the Bible and its doctrines in an entirely new light. There is no truth or feasibility in such a supposition. Those parts of Scripture which were before clear and indisputable, remain clear and indisputable still, and derive no additional clearness from Phrenological illustration; and, on the other hand, there is no fact revealed by Phrenology which is at all at variance with any of these points."—*Scott's Harmony of Phrenology with Scripture*, p. 328.

It would be as consistent to apply the doctrines of the calculus to the determination of the authenticity of the Bible, and the truth of its doctrines, as it would the science of Phrenology. We can-

not but suspect the sanity of him who would substitute the teachings of Phrenology for the moral and religious instructions of the Bible. The doctrines of the most eminent Phrenologists are often contradictory, even with regard to fundamental principles—and, we may say, always vague and unsatisfactory. Accordingly, we find Spurzheim and Combe at variance in their attempts to fix the fundamental rule of moral conduct. The former says: "He who possesses the faculties proper to man in the highest perfection, and in whose actions they predominate—he who can *challenge the world to convict him of sin*—has a right to determine moral principles, and to fix rules for moral conduct." But where shall the man be found? who shall decide that he is *the* man? and how shall his authority be enforced? These are questions of great moment. On the contrary, Mr. Combe says: "The dictates of the moral and intellectual powers, which constitute rules of conduct, are the collective dicta of the highest minds, illuminated with the greatest knowledge." But who shall gather and embody these dicta? who shall determine which are "the highest minds, illuminated with the greatest knowledge?" How are these decisions of "the highest minds" to be expressed?

The fact is universally admitted, that every system of morals, devised by man, is imperfect. This is as true of modern as of ancient systems. Volney and Diderot have succeeded no better than Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno. Our author would contend that they failed, because they were destitute of the key to the philosophy of human nature, which the science of Phrenology affords. But, then, how happens it that Spurzheim and Combe, with this identical "key" in their hands, differ at the very first step—differ on the very principles they would establish for the determination of the rules of moral conduct? "The one says a rule can only be given by an absolutely perfect being; the other says it is to be obtained by the collective wisdom of all the highest minds." To whom, then, shall we appeal? To Mr. Fowler? How shall we know that Mr. Fowler is endowed with supreme authority for the determination of these questions? How shall we convince the world that he has become the depository of the only true wisdom, and persuade them to obey his "dicta?" We will not say that the writings of Spurzheim, Combe, and Fowler, contain no exalted moral principles and precepts. They are scattered in fragments throughout their works, glittering like specks of gold in a heap of rubbish. They are often arranged in such a form, and presented in such a light, as to lead the casual beholder to think that the whole heap is gold. But where have they obtained these

principles? They have all—without exception—been stolen from the Bible. There is not, we are bold to say, there is not a high moral principle or duty set forth with distinctness and force, that has not its origin in revelation. And it is a literal fact that when these sage philosophers—the great lights of the world, as they would have us believe—attempt to settle principles without the aid of revelation, they become misty, vague, often absolutely puerile. The rules they prescribe contain nothing definite or certain; nothing, in fine, on which we can place the least reliance. If we take Spurzheim, Combe, and Fowler, as men of “the highest minds, illuminated with the greatest knowledge”—their “dicta” are in many respects contradictory, irreconcilable: who, then, shall arbitrate and decide?

There is another point on which we would offer a passing remark. Mr. Fowler utters the severest anathemas against churches and ministers, because they defer so little to human reason. He would have science, philosophy, anatomy, physiology, and especially Phrenology and Mesmerism, taught from the pulpit.

“I insist upon it, that science should be taught *along with* religion. . . . At all events, I consider clergymen almost culpable for not preaching more physiology and Phrenology. I would have them carry their manikin into the desk in one hand, and their anatomical and physiological preparations in the other—to be followed by herbariums, specimens of animals of all kinds—birds, beasts, insects, fish, and the whole range of nature, animate and inanimate, and preach on astronomy, on electricity, on chemistry, natural history, &c.—on all the works of God—his noblest work, of course, the most.”—P. 67.

A tolerably wide range of topics, one would think. And then the resources for illustration. Every church must have its collection. And the minister, (alas for him!) when he gets his manikin, his anatomical and physiological preparations, his herbariums, into the pulpit, it is only the beginning of sorrows. A place must yet be had where the unwieldy elephant may plant his ponderous feet, and where the huge leviathan of the deep may stretch along his ample length! Alas, what shall we say for the apostles, who made Jesus and him crucified the one theme of their ministry!

But to be serious: these notions are as contrary to reason and science as they are abhorrent to revealed religion. In matters of mere science no one expects to become proficient in all departments—no one undertakes to teach in all. Each professor has his distinct department of science. But our author would have the minister become not only a universal professor of science, but would superadd the teaching of the doctrines and duties of religion.

His work would be the exposition of all science and all Scripture. Let us place Lord Bacon opposite to Fowler. He says: "The prejudice hath been infinite, that both divine and human knowledge have received by the *intermingling* and *tempering* of the one with the other; as that which hath filled the one full of heresies, and the other full of speculative factions and vanities." Let us also place St. Paul opposite to Fowler: "The Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom; but we preach Christ crucified; unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ, the power of God, and the wisdom of God. . . . I determined not to know anything among you save Jesus Christ and him crucified." In reference to the insinuation of our author, however, that religion does not foster science, but stands in opposition to it, we can only denounce it as utterly false in assumption, and wholly unwarranted by fact. On this point, we need only appeal to the history of science and literature, of human learning generally, to show the utter recklessness of such an assertion.

We are never more convinced of the impotence of human reason to fathom, unaided, the mysterious and awful doctrines and duties of religion, than when perusing the speculations of men who place a higher estimate on philosophy than religion, and, as a standard of truth and of duty, place reason before the Bible. This is one of the wrong tendencies—one of the cardinal errors of the age—an undue tendency to place too much reliance upon mere philosophical speculation. How inconceivable is the folly of making our meager philosophical data, our partial and limited knowledge, the balance in which to weigh revealed truth! This folly is only equalled by the arrogance and oracular positiveness with which those pseudo-philosophers assume to speak. They seem to imagine that reason has slumbered from the foundation of the world, and has awoke only with them. They are the great lights of the world. They, and they only, are the possessors of the true philosophy; they, and they only, hold in their hands the keys of true wisdom. The failure, utter and hopeless failure, of earlier speculators, we should imagine, would lead them to be slow, cautious, hesitating, in the propagation of their new theories. But the failure of others, who have passed over the same ground, seems only to imbolden present travelers. Unfeigned modesty and presumptuous confidence are no mean marks of distinction between the true philosopher and the vain speculator.

There is, however, one thing consoling to the pious mind in all this; and that is, however far the human mind may be borne away

from the oracles of truth by vain and idle speculations; however bold may be its assumptions, or arrogant its spirit, time, experience, will bring it back again to the acknowledgment of the truth; or, if the truth be not within its reach, at least to a sense of its impotence and dependence. Here, in the oracles of truth, may be found a system of religion and duty that has stood the test of ages—a living fountain, overflowing with its fullness, and surrounded with perennial verdure, in the midst of the barren wastes of mere human philosophy. Men, it is true, have often deserted this fountain, have wandered far upon the arid deserts, have hewn out to themselves cisterns; but when they have found that they were broken and would hold no water, weary, care-worn, and contrite, they have returned to the forsaken fountain of the divine Word. Human philosophy—systems of morals and religion, based upon man's appreciation of his own nature, and built up by his own reason, fail in their application. They may be apparently faultless in theory, perfect in structure; but when brought to that infallible test, human experience, they must inevitably fail. This is the rock on which all mere human systems have ever split; and it is precisely here that Christianity, the religion of the Bible, has ever triumphed. Aside from its divinity, one great element of its perpetuity is its perfect adaptation to the condition and wants of man. It can never become obsolete, because never inapplicable. The systems of human philosophy, like quicksands on the bottom of the ocean, may fluctuate with the ebbing and flowing of the tide. Every system and every science may go through their various phases of revolution and change. But the word of the Lord is "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever"—durable as the throne of almighty Power, changeless as the essential attributes of his being. Through all ages, and to all generations, it gives utterance to the same eternal truths; and so long as there are immortal spirits to be redeemed, sanctified, and saved, they can never lose their applicability, nor spend their force.

ART. II.—*Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation. A Book for the Times.* By an AMERICAN CITIZEN. With an Introductory Essay. By CALVIN E. STOWE, D. D. Salem: John P. Jewett & Co. Cincinnati: George L. Weed. 1845.

"PHILOSOPHY," says Dr. Webster, "is a general term denoting an explanation of the reasons of things; or, an investigation of all phenomena both of mind and matter. When applied to any particular department of knowledge, it denotes the collection of general laws under which all subordinate phenomena, or facts, relating to that subject, are comprehended." With this definition of the term before him, the enlightened Christian looks with jealousy upon all attempts to philosophize upon religious subjects. Many of the facts or phenomena of religion lie beyond the range of philosophy, and depend for their credibility and authority entirely on revelation. God was under no obligation to give man the reasons for his determinations in the plan of salvation, and he has not always done it. His first act of legislation was distinct and authoritative, both as to the duty it imposed, and the consequence of disobedience; but the reasons for the act were not disclosed, nor was it in the power of human philosophy to detect them with any degree of certainty. And thus, through every dispensation, while he has graciously revealed the reasons for parts of his administration, he has for wise purposes, no doubt, withholden them in relation to other parts; but has in no case excused man from believing and obeying him on this account. Upon this rock many "*vain*" philosophers have split. Attempting too much, they have encountered insuperable difficulties, and often discarded what they were unable to comprehend, instead of modestly abating their pretensions, and admitting that omniscience may range beyond the ken of mortal man, without reporting its discoveries. Where it has been practicable to explain religious phenomena, however poorly, without bringing divine agency into the account, it has been done; while in other cases, where such agency could not be questioned, it has been made as *remote* and *indirect* as possible. Thus have such philosophists said in the studied language of hypothesis, that they would have a religion *without* God, or, at least, one which has as little connection with him as possible. Their investigations, and the results of them, have given much occasion for the graphic description of the labors of philosophy furnished by Cowper:—

"From age to age she toiled;
Shed from her eyes the mist that dimmed them still;

Looked forth on man ; explored the wild and tame,
The savage and polite, the sea and land,
And starry heavens ; and then retired far back
To meditation's silent, shady seat ;
And there sat pale, and thoughtfully, and weighed
With wary, most exact, and scrupulous care,
Man's nature, passions, hopes, propensities,
Relations and pursuits, in reason's scale ;
And searched and weighed, and weighed and searched again,
And many a fair and goodly volume wrote,
That seemed well worded too, wherein were found
Uncountable receipts, pretending each,
If carefully attended to, to cure
Mankind of folly ;—to root out the briers,
And thorns, and weeds, that choked the growth of joy ;—
And showing too, in plain and decent phrase
Which sounded much like wisdom's, how to plant,
To shelter, water, culture, prune, and rear
The tree of happiness ; and oft their plans
Were tried ; but still their fruit was *green and sour*."

There is another point of danger connected with this subject. One extreme often begets another. The wreck of so many unskillful navigators upon the rock we have just noticed has led to the repudiation of all philosophy in connection with this subject. Regarding religion and philosophy as antipodal to each other, many dare not venture beyond the alphabet of thought, or admit any exposition of divine things which does not strictly tally with the grossest literalism. Now, it is believed the channel of truth lies between these two extremes ; and that whoever will content himself to keep it, will secure all the advantages of reason and revelation, without running the dreadful hazards of more daring adventurers. The remarks of the late Rev. Richard Watson upon this point are very apposite. He says :—" Within proper guards, and in strict connection with the whole Christian system, what is called moral philosophy is not to be undervalued ; and from many of the writers above alluded to, much instruction may be collected, which, though of but little efficacy in itself, may be invigorated by uniting it with the vital and energetic doctrines of religion, and may thus become directive to the conduct of the serious Christian. Understanding, then, by moral philosophy, not that pride of science which borrows the discoveries of the Scriptures and then exhibits itself as their rival, or affects to supply their deficiencies, but as a modest scrutiny into the reasons on which the moral precepts of revelation may be grounded, and a wise and honest application of its moral

principles to particular cases, it is a branch of science which may be usefully cultivated in connection with Christianity.

“With respect to the *reasons* on which moral precepts rest, we may make a remark similar to that offered in a former part of this work, on the doctrines of revelation. Some of those doctrines rest wholly on the authority of the revealer; others are accompanied with a manifest rational evidence; and a third class may partially disclose their *rationale* to the patient and pious inquirer. Yet the authority of each class, as the subject of faith, is the same; it rests upon the character of God and his relations to us, and that doctrine is equally binding which is enjoined on our faith without other rational evidence than that which proves it to be a part of a revelation from heaven, as that which exercises and delights our rational faculties, by a disclosure of the internal evidence of its truth. When God has permitted us to ‘turn aside’ to see some ‘great sight’ of manifested wisdom, we are to obey the invitation; but still we are always to remember that the authority of revealed truth stands on infinitely higher ground than our perception of its reasonableness.”—*Institutes*, vol. ii, p. 475.

With these general remarks upon philosophy in its application to religion, we will come directly to the work before us. Of its author, the reviewer knows nothing except what appears in the work itself. The preface announces that in the first part of his active life he was a skeptic. The common evidences of Christianity with which he was conversant did not convince him. A train of circumstances led him to examine the Bible, and the result was a firm conviction of its truth. Having discovered his error, by a process of reasoning altogether new, he addressed a series of letters to a legal friend and former companion in unbelief, embracing the arguments by which he had been brought to a knowledge of the truth. These letters have been remodeled and published, as stated at the head of this paper, for the special benefit of skeptics. The work contains a series of independent propositions, many of which are discussed with great strength and originality. The design of each is to tear away some one or more of the feeble props upon which infidelity depends for support, and bring out the everlasting pillars of Christianity in bold relief. In some of them the author is remarkably successful. His facts and arguments are well arranged and forcibly expressed. Taken as a whole, it is calculated to show the folly of skepticism, and induce confidence in the Scriptures as a revelation from God. The light it throws upon the Jewish dispensation at once demolishes the objections of infidels, based upon some of its arrangements, and clearly illustrates the wisdom

and the power of God therein. And the experimental and practical effects of religion he so well describes, as matters of fact, demonstrate that the system from which they spring, as effect from its appropriate cause, is divine.

But while we cheerfully give the work this general commendation, we cannot conceal the opinion that it is highly exceptionable in some points. In attempting to accommodate certain duties, and their gracious results, to the philosophic taste of his old companion, the author has forced philosophy out of its legitimate orbit, and attributed to its operations what the Scriptures attribute directly to God. And in doing this, he has left several of the brightest features of the gospel system in the back-ground, where they are scarcely seen, if, indeed, they are seen at all, without a full view of which, the "Plan" described, though beautiful in some of its parts, and as a whole, infinitely to be preferred to no religion, is most capitally defective. This we shall endeavor to show in the proper place.

The first chapter is devoted to the elucidation of three propositions. The *first* is, that man is a "religious being,"—that there is something in him, constitutionally or otherwise, in whatever condition he may be found, which leads him to recognize and worship a superior being. *Secondly*, "that by worshipping, he becomes assimilated to the moral character of the object he worships." This is illustrated by numerous facts connected with idolatry, which exhibit its corrupting tendencies. The *third* proposition is, that when he had lost the knowledge of the true God and fallen into idolatry, "there were no means within the reach of human power or wisdom by which man could extricate himself, either by an immediate or a progressive series of efforts." Idolatry had gradually increased, both in its extent and the corruption of its gods and their votaries. The golden days of Greece and Rome—the days of their highest intellectual elevation—were characterized by the most degrading idolatry among the mass of the people, and every attempt at reform only proved the imbecility of all human inventions. The impossibility of recovery by human device or energy, and what was necessary to its accomplishment, are stated thus:—

"The only way, then, in which relief was possible for man, was that an object of worship should be placed before the mind, directly opposite in moral character to those he had before adored. If his heart was ever purified, it must be by tearing his affections from his gods, and fixing them upon a righteous and holy being, as the proper object of homage. But for man to form such an object was plainly impossible. He could not transfer a better character to his gods than he himself possessed. He could not bring a pure thing out of an impure.

The thought of the eloquent and philosophic Cicero expresses all that man could do. He could transfer his own imperfect attributes to the gods, and, by worshiping a being characterized by these imperfections, he would receive in himself the reaction of his own depravity."

"The first thing necessary to be accomplished was, that a *pure object of worship should be placed before the eye of the soul*. Purity of heart and conscience would be necessary in the object of worship, otherwise the heart and conscience of the worshiper would not be purified. But if an object were presented whose nature was infinitely opposed to sin—to all defilement, both physical and spiritual—and who revealed, in his example and by his precepts, a perfect standard to govern the life of man under the circumstances in which he was placed, then man's mind *would be enlightened, his conscience rectified, and the hard and corrupt feelings of his heart softened and purified*, by assimilation to the object of his worship:—as, according to the nature of things, an unholy object of worship would necessarily degrade and corrupt the human soul, so, on the contrary, a holy object worshiped would necessarily elevate and purify the nature of man.

"The second necessary thing in order to man's redemption was, that *when a holy object of worship was revealed, the revelation should be accompanied with sufficient power to influence men to forsake their former worship, and to worship the holy object made known to them*. The presentation of a pure and holy object would not cause men to turn from their former opinions and practices, and become directly opposed in heart to what they had formerly loved. A display of power would be necessary, sufficient to overcome their former faith and their present fears, and to detach their affections from idols and fix them upon the proper object of human homage."

But what is that "*power*" which is necessary to "accompany the revelation of a pure object of worship?" Whatever form it may assume, it must be sufficient to command faith in the object revealed as supreme, and therefore entitled to obedience. As faith is governed by evidence, so conscience is governed by faith, and moral action by conscience. Demonstrate the existence and authority of the Being revealed, and his law will take hold upon the conscience, and probably modify the life. But how could this be done, except by *miracles*? The following extracts not only show the necessity of this kind of demonstration, but that this is the "power" referred to in the foregoing:—

"*Man cannot, in the present constitution of his mind, believe that religion has a divine origin, unless it be accompanied by miracles*. The necessary inference of the mind is, that if an Infinite Being acts, his acts will be superhuman in their character; because the effect, reason dictates, will be characterized by the nature of its cause. Man has the same reason to expect that God will perform acts above human power and knowledge, that he has to suppose the inferior orders of animals will, in their actions, sink below the power and wisdom which

characterize human nature. For, as it is *natural* for man to perform acts superior to the power and knowledge of the animals beneath him, so reason affirms, that it is *natural* for God to develop his power by means, and in ways, above the skill and ability of mortals. Hence, if God manifest himself at all—unless in accommodation to the capacities of men, he should constrain his manifestations within the compass of human ability—every act of God's immediate power would, to human capacity, be a miracle. But if God were to constrain all his acts within the limits of human means and agencies, it would be impossible for man to discriminate between the acts of the Godhead and the acts of the manhood. And man, if he considered acts of a divine origin, which were plainly within the compass of human ability, would violate his own reason.

"This demand of the mind for miracles, as testimony of the divine presence and power, is intuitive with all men; and those very individuals who have doubted the existence or necessity of miracles, should they examine their own convictions on this subject, would see that by an absolute necessity, if they desired to give the world a system of religion, whether truth or imposture, in order to make men receive it as of divine authority, they must work miracles to test its truth, or make men believe that they do so."

"Such, then, is the constitution which the Maker has given to the mind. Whether the conviction be an intuition, or an induction of reason, God is the primary cause of its existence; and its existence puts it out of the power of man to receive a revelation from God himself, unless accompanied by miraculous manifestations. If, therefore, God ever gave a revelation to man, it was necessarily accompanied with miracles; and with miracles of such a nature, as would clearly distinguish the divine character and the divine authority of the dispensation."—Pp. 39–43.

Fully and effectually, therefore, to reveal himself to the Israelites, it was necessary for the divine Being not only to work miracles, but such ones as were obviously superior to the jugglery of the magicians of Egypt, and such as would manifest the utter imbecility of their gods. Nothing short of this would answer the purpose, and nothing more could reasonably be required. Our author clearly shows that the miracles of Moses were of this character—that they not only demonstrated the power of Israel's God, but the utter helplessness of the idols of Egypt, upon which they were a direct attack. The following may serve as an illustration of this remark:—

"The first miracle, while it authenticated the mission of Moses, destroyed the *serpents*, which among the Egyptians were objects of worship; thus evincing in the outset, that their gods could neither help the people nor save themselves."

"The sixth miracle, which destroyed the cattle, excepting those of the Israelites, was aimed at the destruction of the entire system of

brute-worship. This system, degrading and bestial as it was, had become a monster of many heads in Egypt. They had their sacred bull, and ram, and heifer, and goat, and many others,—all of which were destroyed by the agency of the God of Moses.”—P. 46.

The Israelites, having been thus assured of the being and power of God, and of his goodness in delivering them from their enemies, were prepared to receive his will as their proper rule of action, which was communicated in the Ten Commandments. To obey these they were now urged by powerful influences, viz., fear on the one hand, arising from the terrible exhibitions of power they had witnessed, and gratitude on the other, for their deliverance from a painful bondage. These, if anything extraneous to themselves could do it, accompanied as they were by the most alarming denunciations against the transgressor, were sufficient to command their faith and obedience.

But as yet the ideas of this people concerning the holiness of God, and the moral nature of his law and of human actions, were gross and indefinite. They had been occupied chiefly with his power and goodness, and saw not the impropriety of offering him the worship which was paid to idols. To correct their notions, recourse must be had to external objects, as the only means of communicating spiritual ideas. Hence the classification of animals into clean and unclean, and the selection of one from the clean without spot or blemish for sacrifice; and also the purification of the camp, the people, and everything which pertained to divine worship, by a specified process. These Levitical ceremonies, so nicely adjusted to the condition of their minds, convinced the worshippers that God was too pure to look upon iniquity.

Deeply impressed with the adaptation of the Mosaic arrangements to the ends contemplated in their adoption, the reader is led along in the series of divine manifestations, till he sees these arrangements superseded by the introduction of the living “Teacher sent from God,” who consummates the plan, and suits it to the necessities of all nations; and after illustrating its meaning and designs by exemplifying its principles, dies on the cross in attestation of the love of God, and the justness of his claim to the confidence and esteem of men. The necessity of Christ’s being what he was, appearing when, where, and as he did, and the difficulties which must have attended any different manifestation of himself, and the philosophical appropriateness of his whole course to illustrate and extend the knowledge of the plan of salvation, and make it efficient, are all ably discussed and verified. Also, the necessity of faith as the intermediate link between truth and duty. It is

obvious that truth can affect our action, only as it commands our faith. Religious truth, believed as divinely obligatory, is the standard of conscience and of duty. What faith says we ought to do, conscience prompts us to perform, and condemns us in the neglect of doing. Where faith embraces the whole truth, the decisions of conscience will harmonize with the will of God, and if scrupulously followed, will lead to holiness, happiness, and heaven. But if on the other hand faith embraces idols, and attributes to them the corruptions of the human heart, or embraces false notions of the true God and his government, the effect, of necessity, will be to pervert the conscience, and so far as it is heeded, to corrupt the heart and life. The demonstration of this is found in the history of idolatry as compared with that of Christianity. The *sincerity* of idolaters has never saved them from a single sin, but has plunged them deeper and deeper in corruption and wretchedness; while the conscientious belief and practice of revealed *truth* never failed of producing both purity and peace.

We have referred to these particulars, partly to give a view of the character of the work before us, preparatory to our remarks, and partly because we could not pass some of them without recording a note of commendation.

There are other topics relevant to the subject, upon which the author has said many excellent things, but our limits do not allow us to give them particular attention.

We hasten now to glance at some defects in the work, which we have dared to pronounce radical. We do this reluctantly, as we believe the author is a great and good man, and as his work has the sanction of distinguished names of different denominations. But if we mistake not, he has left out of the "Plan" certain features of the divine economy, without which it must for ever prove a failure. The power he has attempted to provide for philosophically, is utterly inadequate to the result contemplated. And if it were not so in the case of the better class of people, he has left an infinite difficulty in the sinner's way, for which no definite provision is made. A brief review of the "Plan" will set this matter in its true light.

1. It is assumed that "man is a *religious being*—that he will worship."

2. That by worshiping, he philosophically "becomes assimilated to the moral character of the object he worships."

3. That falling into the worship of idols, to which he attributed the greatest impurity of character, he became corrupt, and had no power to extricate himself.

4. To effect his deliverance, it was necessary that "a pure object of worship should be placed before the eye of the soul."

5. When this is done, it "should be accompanied with sufficient power to influence men to forsake their former worship, and to worship the holy object made known to them."

6. But man cannot believe a revelation to be from God, unless it be verified by the "power" of miracles; and no worship or obedience can be happy, or acceptable, which does not spring from "affection."

7. But "the affections never move,—in familiar words, the heart never loves, unless love be produced by *seeing*, or by believing that we see, some lovely and excellent qualities in the object."

8. "When the circumstances of an individual are such, that he is exposed to constant suffering and great danger; the more afflictive his situation, the more grateful love will he feel for affection and benevolence received under such circumstances;" and the degree of kindness and self-denial in his benefactor graduates the degree of affection awakened for him.

9. "Under the Old Testament the *affections* of the Israelites were educed and fixed upon God, in accordance with this law of the soul. They were placed in circumstances of abject need, and from this condition of suffering and sorrow God delivered them, [by miraculous interposition,] and thus [not only convinced them of his power,] but drew their hearts to himself."

10. Hence, to teach man his lost condition as a sinner, the benevolence of Christ in denying himself and sacrificing so much for man's happiness, so that man will believe these truths, will, according to the foregoing principles, *draw out his affections toward God, and make obedience his highest happiness.*

That we have not mistaken the positions attempted to be maintained, is evident from these statements:—

"The love and truth being so exhibited by Christ, that they would necessarily produce the condition of soul prerequisite to the exercise of affection for spiritual deliverance—now as God was the author of the law, and as he is the only proper object both of supreme love and obedience, and as man could not be happy in obeying the law without loving its author, it follows, that the *thing now necessary*, in order that man's affections might be fixed upon the proper object of love and obedience, was, that the supreme God should by self-denying kindness manifest spiritual mercy to those who felt their spiritual wants, and *thus draw to himself the love and worship of mankind.*"

"How then could God manifest that mercy to sinners, by which love to himself and his law would be [philosophically, or as a neces-

nary and unavoidable effect] produced, while his infinite holiness and justice should be maintained? We answer, in no way possible, but by some expedient by which his justice and mercy should both be exalted."

It is true it could be done in no other way, because God can no more become unjust or unholy than he can cease to exist; but the question is not, whether he could devise a plan which should compromise his justice or holiness, but whether the plan he did devise, when revealed to "the eye of the soul," *necessarily produces* this result. A word more upon this point:—

"If, in the wisdom of the Godhead, such a way could be devised, by which God himself could save the soul from the consequences of guilt—by which he himself could in some way suffer and make *self-denials* for its good, and, by his own interposition, open a way for the soul to recover from its lost and condemned condition, then the result would follow inevitably, that every one of the human family who had been led to see and feel his guilty condition before God, and who believes in God thus manifesting himself to rescue his soul from spiritual death—*every one thus believing, would, from the necessities of his nature, be led to love God his Saviour*; and—mark—the greater the self-denial and the suffering on the part of the Saviour in ransoming the soul, the stronger would be the affection felt for him. This is the central and vital doctrine of the Plan of Salvation."—Pp. 151, 152.

All, then, that is necessary to be done to produce the love of God in the hearts of men, and induce them to a cheerful and happy obedience, is to convince them of sin and of its consequences, and of the love of God as manifested in Christ toward them. This done, the affections as naturally ascend to God, as elevated material bodies, when unobstructed, following the influence of gravitation, descend to the earth, or as a magnetized needle adheres to its pole.

This view of the subject is illustrated by a figure taken from the solar system, thus:—

"Now, if a planet had broken away from its orbit, it would have a tendency to fly off for ever; and it never could be restored unless the sun, the great centre of attraction, could in some way follow it in its wanderings, and thus, by the increased power of his attraction, as he approached nearer to the fallen planet, attach it to himself, and then draw it back again to its original orbit. So with the human spirit; its affections were alienated from God, the centre of spiritual attraction, and they could never have been restored unless God had approached, and by the increased power of his mercy, as manifested in the self-denial, sufferings, and death of Christ, united man again to himself by the power of affection, that he might thus draw him up from his misery and sin to revolve around him in harmony and love for ever."

"Now, *affection* is the attraction of the moral universe. And in accordance with the foregoing deduction, to reclaim alienated man to God

would be impossible, unless there should be a manifestation of the God-head in the world, to attract to himself man's estranged affections, and then, after the affinity was fastened by faith, by his ascending to the bosom of the Deity, mankind would thus be gradually drawn back to allegiance to Jehovah."—Pp. 162, 165.

This, then, is the "plan of salvation" presented in the work under review. Who will deny that it is very beautiful and attractive, and peculiarly calculated to please the alienated mind of fallen man? Is it remarkable, that the infidel should embrace it and abandon his atheism, or deism, or other crude and disjointed notions of religion, which libel his sensibilities, his conscience, and his common sense? It is certainly not much calculated to awaken conscience and create a sensibility of guilt, or in any way to operate very favorably upon the *spiritually dead*, if indeed it is upon others. Not that it does not bring to view many interesting truths. This cannot be denied. Nor that its philosophy is sound in application to some subjects, and in application to religious experience under some conceivable circumstances. But that it presents the true "philosophy of the plan of salvation" is denied. The *philosophy* of a matter is an "explanation of the reasons of the facts or phenomena" relating to it. It is expected, therefore, in every system of philosophy, that the principal facts connected with its subject will be brought out, and assigned to their appropriate law or cause. If such facts are not noticed, or only noticed by implication, or if fundamental phenomena, which are referred to, are assigned to *improper* and insufficient causes, there is a marked defect in the system, which renders it unsafe. This we believe to be the case with the system before us. We will consider a few particulars.

1. *The necessity of a plan of salvation.* This is here represented to be, that man had fallen into *idolatry*, and was unable to extricate himself, because unable to transfer a better character to the gods he worshiped than he possessed himself. Here is no intimation that there was any corruption of human nature lying back of this, coexisting with, and giving mighty growth to, its abominations. None at all. Yet this has been regarded by evangelical writers as a foundation principle; one which is so intimately connected with the plan of salvation, that it must be recognized in order to an understanding of the atonement, or the provisions of mercy growing out of it. It is true the author says, that "human nature in the maturity of its faculties is imperfect and selfish," but this is no more than Pelagians allow. It is simply saying that man has gone astray from duty, and corrupted himself by sin.

In accordance with this view of the subject, we are told that when a pure object of worship is presented to idolatrous man, and proved to be supreme and *benevolent* by certain demonstrations, his mind naturally takes hold upon that object by faith and "*affection*," and thus becomes "*assimilated*" to it. He is represented as being unfortunately, owing to ignorance, *against* God; but yet so *neutral* in his tendencies, that when the argument comes to preponderate in favor of his power and mercy, he will at once be *with* him, and will render him affectionate homage. But is this the real state of man's heart by nature? Nearly all believers in the Deity and atonement of Christ hold that "original sin standeth *not* in the following of Adam, (as the Pelagians do vainly talk,) but it is the *corruption* of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his *own nature inclined to evil, and that continually*." Dr. Doddridge says, that "there is not in the mind, *by nature*, or in an unregenerate state, any real moral excellence,—that the heart of man, after all abatements are made which can be made, is set to *do evil* in a most affecting and dreadful manner." And the wise man declares, on divine authority, that the "heart of the sons of men is *fully set in them to do evil*." And not because they have no knowledge of, or faith in, the *goodness* and *power* of God, but because, through the *mercy* of God, "*sentence against an evil work is not speedily executed*." And does not observation and experience confirm this? The history of our race demonstrates that men are "conceived in sin," that "they are *estranged* from the womb,—that they go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies." It is, therefore, philosophically *impossible* for man, with such tendencies and affections, by the apprehension and belief of any truth, to love and affectionately obey a pure and holy God, on the principles laid down in this system.

2. The views taken of the *atonement* appear to us not less defective. What are they? That the atonement was a satisfaction made to divine justice for the sins of man, so that "God might be just and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus?" Or, was it a mere display of "*self-denial*" and "*sacrifice*" on the part of Christ, to lay man under obligation to God, and thus, by the laws of reciprocity, draw out his affections toward his benefactor? There are, indeed, incidental allusions to the former; but the latter is the prominent view taken of the subject.

Now, the Scriptures represent the death of Christ as vicarious. Says the apostle, "Christ died for us," or in our stead. "Christ

hath once suffered for sins—Christ offered one sacrifice for sins.” Not for his own sins, for he was without sin; but for “our sins.” The penalty of sin is death, of which man was deserving; but God “laid on him the iniquity of us all.” His death was *penal*, therefore, as also appears from Gal. iii, 13, “Christ hath redeemed us from the *curse* of the law, being made a curse for us.” His death was designed to satisfy the demands of the law, which required the sinner’s life, so that he might have a day of probation, obtain pardon, and the renovation of his lapsed nature, and thus become meet for an inheritance in heaven. And without this intervention of Christ, he must have perished without hope. Here is the foundation of the whole Christian system; and no philosophy of that system which overlooks, or but glances at it, can be worthy of the name it assumes. Without this, had the “*affections*” of man been drawn to God, (which we allow was impossible,) he must have perished, or the *law* had been dishonored.

3. And what becomes of the doctrine of justification, or pardon, by faith in Christ? This is one of the main pillars in the temple of salvation; without which, indeed, the whole must fall to the ground. Affection for God, and happy obedience to his law, are utterly impracticable till there is a consciousness of pardon sealed to the heart by the Holy Spirit. Where there is sensibility of guilt, there must of necessity be misery; and though there may be the fullest belief in the holiness and even the goodness of God, there can be *no* love to him, or delight in his service, till the mind receives some evidence that this guilt is canceled by a full and free *pardon* of sin. When this is the case, there will be “*love, joy, peace,*” and other graces manifest to the consciousness of the believer, not as the result of natural principles, operating philosophically; but as the direct “fruits of the Spirit,” produced according to the gracious promise of Almighty God. Hence, says the Psalmist, “Blessed [or happy] is he whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity.” And St. Paul says, “Therefore, being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ; by whom, also, we have access by faith into this grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God.” It is manifest, then, that this doctrine is a fundamental feature in the grand scheme of mercy. The Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge speaks of it thus:—“It is a capital article of that faith which was once delivered to the saints. Far from being a merely speculative point, it spreads its vital influence through the whole body of theology, runs through all Christian experience, and operates in

every part of practical godliness. Such is its grand importance, that a mistake about it has a malignant efficacy, and is attended with a long train of dangerous consequences. Nor can this appear strange, when it is considered that the doctrine of justification is no other than the way of a sinner's acceptance with God. Being of such peculiar moment, it is inseparably connected with many other evangelical truths, the harmony and beauty of which we cannot behold while this is misunderstood. It is, if anything may be so called, an essential and fundamental truth of Christianity; and as our very salvation depends on it through eternity, it deserves and demands our most serious consideration."

Now, with these views of the importance of the doctrine of justification, we naturally expected to find it occupying a very prominent place in the "Philosophy" under consideration. But the reader will be surprised to learn that it is scarcely alluded to through the whole volume, so that a stranger to the Scriptures, in reading the work, would hardly suspect that pardon of sin is a blessing of any great importance,—especially that it forms an essential part in the plan of salvation, without which we cannot be saved. Man's difficulty being, that his "*affections*" had fallen down from God, and taken hold on other objects of impure tendency, our author is so much occupied in getting them back again by a philosophical process to which the arrogance of infidelity shall not demur, that the penal nature of the atonement, justification by faith, and other great interests, are nearly overlooked.

4. The agency of the Holy Spirit is not recognized in this "Plan" as it is in the Scriptures. Our author's mode of purification is given thus:—

"A communication of knowledge, or law, does not manifest feeling so that it produces feeling in others. The moral feelings of God were manifested by the sacrifice of Christ; and that manifestation, through the flesh, affects the moral feelings of man, assimilates them to God, and produces an aversion to sin, the abominable thing which God *hates*."—P. 182.

He repeats the sentiment:—

"The truth which has been demonstrated in previous chapters is again assumed, that the manifestation of God, in Christ Jesus, would, when brought into efficient contact with the soul, produce that active holiness in the heart, which is man's greatest good."—P. 208.

And what he means by "*efficient contact*" is no more nor less than that it be clearly and forcibly set before the mind, as appears from the connection. So, that, when the manifestation of God is clearly made to the "eye of the soul," whether by reading, preach-

ing, singing, or praying, it necessarily produces regeneration, or "active holiness in the heart," as any cause produces its legitimate effect. Now, we ask, where is the Holy Ghost in all this? Is this what is meant by being "born of the Spirit?" Or what the apostle meant when he wrote to the Corinthians, "But ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God?" Did this philosophy occupy his thoughts when he wrote, "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance?" Or, "God, according to his mercy, saved us by the washing of regeneration and the renewing of the Holy Ghost?" We do not deny that the *truth* has an important agency in man's salvation, or that embracing it by faith is necessary to its efficiency; but we do deny that its philosophical effect upon any susceptibilities there may be in unrenewed man to gratitude and love, is "active holiness in the heart." This is the direct work of the Holy Spirit proffered to us in the Scriptures on *condition* of faith in Christ. Till this change is wrought, the manifestation of God to man creates no love, but rather *fear* and *dread*; since, the greater the love he has received, the greater is his guilt in abusing it. Mr. Watson, before-mentioned, speaks of the atonement and the Spirit thus:—

"As the atonement of Christ stoops to the *judicial destitution* of man, the promise of the Holy Spirit meets the case of his *moral destitution*. One finds him without any means of satisfying the claims of justice, so as to exempt him from punishment; the other, without the inclination or strength to avail himself even of proclaimed clemency, and offered pardon, and he becomes the means of awakening his judgment, and exciting, and assisting, and crowning his efforts to obtain that boon, and its consequent blessings. The one relieves him from the penalty, the other from the disease of sin; the former restores to man the favor of God, the other renews him in his image."—*Institutes*, vol. i, p. 222.

Where, we ask again, is the Holy Ghost in all this "Plan?" We are not unaware that his agency is recognized. It is so, particularly in a separate chapter, near the close of the work; but, then, it is said that it operates in accordance with the principles before developed. And, lest it should be thought to have too direct an agency in the work of grace, we are referred to the vegetable and animal creation, especially to the human body, and are reminded that, as God pervades these and superintends their operations, "in like manner the Spirit of God operates through, and guides the processes of, the plan of salvation." This is, indeed, to be preferred to an absolute denial of divine agency; but it seems to us to fall very far short of

the whole truth. According to this, *man* may produce heavenly affections in his own and in the hearts of others, as well as he can produce vegetation in his garden; and there is as little of God in the one operation as in the other.

5. Another objection to this "Plan" is, that it makes religious affection to consist, or at least to originate, in selfishness. The author admits that obedience which does not spring from love is not acceptable; and, when it arises from no other than interested motives, it is sin. Is affection from the same motives any better? The motive involved in religious affections, according to this philosophy, is, that God has not punished us as we deserved, but has made sacrifices to save us. Now, our obligation to gratitude, or reciprocal love, is not denied; but we do deny that the love of God shed abroad in the hearts of believers is principally of this character. It is, no doubt, strengthened by considerations of the goodness of God to them personally; but this is not its essential principle. Its principle is holiness, wrought in the heart by the Holy Spirit, according to the ancient promise, "The Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul." It is one of the fruits of the Spirit, rather than of constitutional philosophy. It loves our divine Benefactor, not only because he *is* our benefactor, but because he is *holy*; and all other good beings for the same reason, though they are not our benefactors. It also loves our enemies and the enemies of God, and would do them good; and hence it is so far from being selfish, it is highly benevolent. Now, this is the affection which every believer in Christ enjoys, and its phenomena cannot be accounted for on the principles of the work before us.

6. We will notice but one point more, viz., *prayer*. How this is answered, is stated as follows:—

"Prayer brings the mind to the immediate contemplation of God's character, and holds it there, till by comparison and aspiration the believer's soul is properly impressed, and his wants properly felt. The more subtil physical processes and affinities become, the better are the analogies which they furnish of processes in the spiritual world. The influence of believing prayer has a good analogy in the recently discovered daguerreotype. By means of this process, the features of natural objects are thrown upon a sensitive sheet through a lens, and leave their impression upon that sheet. So when the character of God is, by means of prayer, brought to bear upon the mind of the believer—that mind being rendered sensitive by the Holy Spirit, it [the character of God] impresses there the divine image. In this manner the image of Christ is formed in the soul."

"It follows, therefore, that a fervent, importunate state of mind is, from the nature of the case, necessary, in order that God may be glo-

rified, and man blessed, by *the duty of prayer*. It was in view of these constitutional principles that Jesus constantly taught the necessity of desire and importunity, in order that mercies might be received in answer to the supplication of saints."—Pp. 202, 205.

According to this, it matters little whether our prayers are addressed to the proper object of worship, or a block of marble, provided we imagine that the object we address possesses divine attributes, because there is no hearing or answering of prayer in the case; but merely the philosophical effect of our own exertions, in speaking to a being to whom we attribute perfection of character. Nor, indeed, is it necessary to pray at all, only so far as the exercise aids in concentrating the thoughts, and getting a clearer view of the being worshiped. As to the mind "being rendered sensitive by the Holy Spirit," it amounts to nothing; for we have already shown that the Spirit's operations are explained away, so that they have little more to do in the salvation of souls than in the preservation of the physical system. How little does all this sound like the philosophy of Heaven, as indicated in the following scriptures!—"He that cometh unto God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him. This is the confidence that we have in him, that if we ask anything according to his will, he heareth us, and God shall deliver the needy when he crieth, the poor also, and him that hath no helper. I called upon the Lord in distress, and the *Lord answered me*." Was this done on the philosophical principle involved in the daguerreotype? Was it on this newly discovered principle that the Lord heard David's "*cry*," and brought him up out of the horrible pit, and put a *new song* into his mouth? Revelation spurns the idea. Answer to prayer is something more than the mere philosophical operation of mental exertion. It is God responding directly. So we have believed and taught; and the phenomena connected with the subject can be accounted for on no other hypothesis.

We will close this sketch by remarking, that the theory we oppose is not sustained by *facts*. The history of religion is entirely against it. Universal consciousness repudiates it. And however it may moderate the extravagance of infidelity, it promises little for vital Christianity. The religion with which its discussion is so deeply impregnated, and the "practical effects" recorded in the last chapter in its support, are admirable, but they owe their existence and loveliness to a higher principle. In a word, they are "*the fruit of the Spirit*," in accordance with the gospel system, and are nowhere found except in connection with justification by faith, and the "renewing of the Holy Ghost." Whatever propen-

sity there may be in man to worship idols, to which he transfers his own corruptions, he has no such propensity to worship God. His moral feelings are all directly opposed to it. Hence, though the character of God might be set before him in the pure light of heaven, and the infinite condescension of Christ might be portrayed in the seraphic eloquence of the skies, it could no more create "*affection*" in his heart than it could raise the dead. It might, by the blessing of God, *terrify* him, and induce him to fly to mercy's altar; but it could not produce *love*. This is the peculiar office of the Spirit, and not of the "*philosophy*," to which we object. Yet, as before remarked, the work contains many interesting truths, and, if read with due precaution, may prove beneficial.

Worcester, Mass.

ART. III.—*America, and the American People.* By FREDERICK VON RAUMER, Professor of History in the University of Berlin, &c., &c. Translated from the German, by WILLIAM W. TURNER. Pp. 501. New-York: J. & H. Langley. 1846.

To those who cherish a regard for the repute in which America is held in Europe, it must be pleasing to note the character of the books put forth by the later tourists in the United States. A change is evidently coming over the spirit of their dream. Men of a high grade of intellect do not now, as many once did, consider it beneath their dignity to inquire seriously into the nature of our institutions, and discuss gravely the feasibility of the project which we have formed in civil affairs. At first our government was looked upon, almost universally, as a wild experiment. When our republic commenced its existence, England was further advanced toward free institutions than any other European state, and yet, among her men of thought, those who had no doubt of our success were few and far between. Since the days of Cromwell, and his stout-hearted iconoclasts, the divine right of kings had indeed possessed very few advocates, except among those who were conscious that certain privileges and immunities of their own were involved in the *divinity* of the royal title to sovereignty.

But that form of government which was given up as a divine institution, was, and is now, when considerably modified, defended as the best. The principle upon which despotism is founded is

this, that by virtue of birth or station some few are so exalted above the mass of the nation, that the welfare and interests of this minority who rule are of more value than those of the multitude who obey. According to this theory, all power centres in the king or the aristocracy; the people have no rights: and if the powers that be, ever, in the plenitude of their condescension, deign to bestow favors upon their subjects, these gracious gifts are to be received as we receive the bounties of Heaven, with an humble conviction that the recipients have no claims to them. These opinions have passed away, except among those that dwell in darkness and in the shadow of political death. But among multitudes of professed statesmen, that form, which was no longer advocated upon the right divine, was, and is yet, advocated upon the principles of expediency. They admit that the welfare of the people is the object of all government. They do not deny the abstract truth of the principle set forth in the great Declaration, that men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; and that, for the preservation of these rights, governments are instituted among men. But the grand problem is, How should a government be constituted so as to secure these rights with the greatest degree of certainty? Any form of government may fail of its true end, and be made the instrument of tyranny; but what particular system is least liable to these evils?

Let us endeavor to look at the subject from the European point of view.

The moderate royalist argues that he has no more veneration for the divine right than the most enthusiastic republican; but he does not believe that the masses can govern themselves. He reasons thus: 'The science of government, and of political economy in general, is not easily comprehended. A safe participation in the formation of the laws implies a deep knowledge of the general theory of civil government, and a thorough acquaintance with the practical effects of existing systems of policy. If the people themselves, by their own direct agency, secure good laws, it must be accomplished in one of two modes—either they must know what particular enactments will conduce to the general prosperity, and instruct their representatives accordingly; or the electors, by their personal knowledge of men, must select those of the strongest intellects, and the firmest principles of patriotism, and empower them to enact those laws which they, with their superior knowledge of civil affairs, may deem beneficial.

Now the first of these modes, he argues, clearly involves an impossibility; and the other is so extremely uncertain that no

reliance can be placed upon it. In all governments, the great mass of the people must continually toil for subsistence; and their want of leisure, of mental training, and of the means of acquiring sound political knowledge, necessarily precludes their knowing what laws will promote their own welfare, and they may drive their representatives into measures absolutely suicidal. If they choose the other alternative, and place implicit faith in the wisdom and virtue of their public men, they are exposed to all the evils of demagoguism and political charlatanry. A clique of designing men may combine for the prosecution of their own base purposes; and by incessantly flattering the "dear people, the intelligent people, the sovereign people," may persuade their many-headed dupe to elevate them to the summit of power. And when once duly installed in high places, they may utterly disregard the good of their constituents, and plunge the nation into endless disasters. And even then they may so keep up appearances that their deluded supporters are led to assign false reasons for existing evils, and rally devotedly around their destroyers, as the future saviours of their country.

Therefore, concludes the royalist, even admitting that all the citizens of a state mean well, and are lovers of law and order, which is no small assumption, real regard for their best interests dictates that they should not be burdened with power which they cannot employ with safety to themselves. We do not despise the masses; but we believe that circumstances, which none can control, unfit them for the great task of fashioning their own laws. Let us, then, give them that portion of influence in the state which will guard their rights, and be the palladium of their liberties; let them have their House of Commons; their Chamber of Deputies: but let there be another element, not under the direct influence of the popular will, which may check the convulsive movements of blind impulse and control its waywardness. Let there be a fly-wheel added to the engine, which will give smoothness and equability to its motion, and prevent its tearing itself to pieces by its own irregularity and violence.

These fears of popular ignorance, and consequent instability and caprice, led John Locke to recommend an aristocracy to the Georgian colonists. They led Alexander Hamilton to propose, in the great convention of 1787, that the president and senate should be elected to serve during good behavior, that is, in other words, for life; and that the former should appoint the governors of the states. They led Roger Sherman to say, in the same convention, that the people could not, with safety to their own interests, exer-

cise much direct power in the government. And so reason, to this day, many honest minds on the other side of the Atlantic; and yet, as earnest a republican as we are, we do not feel at liberty to charge this opinion to a lack of ordinary mental power, or a want of ordinary intelligence. The great Washington himself evidently considered our institutions a somewhat bold experiment; and, at times, feared the failure of all his dearest hopes.

We, on this western side of the ocean, now look no longer upon the American government as an experiment; unless, indeed, as *experimentum crucis*, which has already decided the principle for ever. In fact, we cannot contemplate the political structure which we have erected without a degree of honest exultation. We do not rejoice in the work of our hands as the Assyrian monarch gloried over Babylon. We would acknowledge that "unless the Lord build the city, they labor in vain that build it;" but "He hath not dealt so with any other nation." No nation, of modern times, has prospered as this republic has prospered. Perhaps we may say, without boasting, that we are becoming, in civil liberty, the light of the nations. When freedom first kindled her beacon light upon our shores, the tyrants of Europe, with all their mercenary train, derided the feeble beams. Even the friends of liberty, as they cast their eyes over the ocean, rejoiced with trembling, and feared every moment to see the glimmering light go out. But, as they looked, it became brighter. The flame shot up higher and higher. Soon the whole western sky glowed with the ruddy blaze. Now it tinges the mountain tops of Europe; and throughout the world the dawn of liberty is begun. It has not yet expelled all the darkness, but it will. Tyranny, like a dense thunder storm, still hangs over millions. But even where the cloud is blackest, the light of freedom falls, and spans the darkness with a bright bow of promise, which speaks of the joyous hour when clouds shall scatter, and darkness flee away. Republicanism must triumph, for it is based upon eternal truth. The idea, which denies that men can comprehend their real interest in temporals, is but a modification of that which denies the same in spirituals. Verily, they are as nearly allied as are the brothers of Siam. When a system of government is forced upon the people for their good, a system of religion is almost invariably added to it. And when one of these false notions is effectually destroyed, the other is nigh unto death. In our age, the tendency of free institutions is onward. Even where the form of royalty is retained, the spirit is fast departing. America is too small to shut in the truth; and the mighty waves of the ocean are too feeble to stop its march; it

will leap from continent to continent, from island to island, till its approach startles the nations from their long slumbers, to burst their chains and be free. The despots of Europe feel their thrones tottering beneath them. Already they see, though dimly, the shadowy hand, writing the words of doom upon the walls of their power, and hear the clangor which speaks the destroyer near. The spirit of liberty must prevail if time continue, and the world suffer no relapse. And when the day of universal triumph shall have come, then this praise shall be awarded to America, that she opened the way of liberty, and became the vanguard of the nations, the pioneer of the world.

In our age, the old doctrine touching the divine right is pretty generally abandoned. Even despots and their defenders are fonder of persuading their subjects that they are more happy than republicans, than they are of appealing to this superannuated dogma. None deny the general prosperity of our country; but different reasons are assigned for that prosperity. Perhaps we ourselves, in tracing out the cause of our happy condition, rush to the other extreme, and attribute wholly to republicanism that which is, in a great measure, the result of other circumstances. But some go so far in their opposition to our polity as to affirm that all the good that we enjoy has owed its origin to incidental causes, and that we would have been more prosperous had we remained under the maternal care of England. All the tory tourists of England, all the strong royalists of France, attempt to prove this; and they add, moreover, that our system already shows infallible symptoms of decay. The liberals, on the other hand, affirm that the question is decided in favor of republicanism, and that men need doubt no more.

Thus the strife goes on; and we poor democrats are the bone of contention between these conflicting factions. The advocates of prerogative and divine right belabor us without measure or end. The more intellectual think themselves able to demolish our theory of government by solid reasonings and incontestible facts. Mons. de Tocqueville, who heads the opponents of democracy in France, having laid down his theory in his own mind, proceeds to demonstrate its truth from the result of American republicanism. He concludes that our institutions are radically defective, and that it would be extremely hazardous for any European nation to venture into the same path. Others, without this parade of research and ratiocination, condemn us at once, supplying the want of facts by a bolder logic, and making up for the knowledge of other nations by a most liberal abuse of this. Those of a smaller

mental calibre content themselves with magnifying petty annoyances, and tracing the connection between every trifling inconvenience of their journey and the principles of the great Declaration and the federal compact.

But in the work before us American democracy has at length found an advocate, though not, in all things, the champion we would desire. This friend of republicanism is Baron Frederick Von Raumer, Professor of History in the University of Berlin, in Prussia. It certainly argues well for the government and the people of our land when one of the veteran historians of Europe, coming to America for the express purpose of learning the real workings of our institutions, returns home with the strong conviction that our political experiment has been completely successful. Indeed, M. Von Raumer is rather enthusiastic in his laudations. He justifies all the principles upon which our government is based; he praises democracy above measure; and had not the thing gone out of fashion with the French republic, we presume he would vote for the apotheosis of Thomas Jefferson, and gladly assist in the ceremony.

It must be confessed that our historian and tourist, like all his predecessors, had his prepossessions. He came with an impression that free institutions were no idle dream of visionary enthusiasts, but a palpable matter of fact, not only correct in abstract theory, but capable of realization, and already in actual existence. This conviction was not an effect of blind prejudice, but the result of a careful examination of different theories of government. His duties as professor of history led him to study with deep interest the institutions of former ages. As he came down to modern times, he saw the change which was gradually coming over the political world. Kings were no longer the deified beings that they once were; and the influence of the people was gathering strength. He was convinced that this movement had not yet reached its meridian; and, therefore, he studied the present tendency as a means of conjecturing the final result. He saw that the United States of America were leading this new movement, and consequently began to feel an interest in American institutions. Thus, while engaged in the duties of his station, and before he contemplated an actual tour in this country, he was led to investigate its past history and present condition. Being well imbued with German rationalism, which has no veneration for anything, he was not blinded by regard for antiquated forms and systems. Seeing the intolerable evils with which the sovereigns of Europe oftentimes overwhelmed their subjects, he began to inquire with

earnestness whether there was no form of government which would protect the many against the folly and madness of the few. To give the people a voice in the state would place a check upon the privileged orders; but is not popular influence a dangerous element to introduce into civil affairs? And if it be not essentially dangerous, how powerful might it be made without danger? These are questions upon which even those deeply versed in the science of government have given different decisions. Some point to the republics which have fallen from their height of grandeur into the deep degradation of anarchy and despotism, as a proof that democracy is the wildest of all political vagaries. Others contend for the dignity of man, and alledge that the race are as capable of discerning their true interest in public as in private affairs; and that they no more need the appointment of a guardian in their corporate than in their individual capacity.

Our tourist inclined to the latter opinion. He is a philosopher, but not a philosopher of the order of Heraclitus. He is one of those theorizers in whom hope predominates, and who expect much from man. He believed that there was a point of excellence in government which Europe, with all its revolutions and counter revolutions, had not attained. He regarded America as the exponent of popular institutions, and therefore became desirous of acquiring a real knowledge of its state, convinced that "amid the splendors and horrors of the French revolution, the Germano-American one had been too much overlooked."

"Eager for information, I took up in succession a great number of books of travels. But what, for the most part, were the representations I encountered? A country of late origin, and in every respect more imperfect than the other parts of the world; an unhealthy climate; infectious diseases; a dead level of democracy originating in a lawless rebellion; a presumptuous rejection of all the natural distinctions of society, together with shameful ill-treatment of the negroes and Indians. Politics everywhere a prey to party spirit; religion split up into a multitude of sects; indifference to science and art; an immoderate worship of mammon; an eager striving after material advancement, with a neglect of the spiritual and the amiable; nowhere truth and faith; nowhere the amenities of refined social existence; a total want of history, and of great poetical recollections, &c., &c."—*Pref.*, p. 5.

After plodding, with true German patience, through an intellectual quagmire, equal, at least, to the Slough of Despond, he, unlike Pilgrim, found himself as far as ever from the celestial gate which he sought. He was conscious that he possessed but little true knowledge of the Americans. No reliance could be placed upon the representations of the great mass of foreign tourists in

this country. Some were men of cultivated minds; but they were bigoted in their admiration of royalty, and brought over with them a theory for which they must find support. Others wrote as if they had been dispatched by the privileged orders of their own land to find something in American affairs which might be held up, *in terrorem*, before the eyes of the restiff multitudes of Europe. Some came for the set purpose of bookish speculation, and, of course, accommodated themselves to the taste prevalent at home among those classes to which they looked for patronage. Others came for amusement; and after wandering around among the republicans, as children would through a menagerie, published a volume or two of wonderments and puerilities as an after consideration. Still, after employing all available modes of acquiring information at home, his impressions were by no means unfavorable. But he decided to see America with his own eyes, and investigate its affairs with that attention to which, as the exemplification of popular liberty, it was entitled.

M. Von Raumer, in the prosecution of this design, sailed for America, and arrived in Boston on the 21st of April, 1844. He passed, in rapid succession, through the principal cities on the seaboard, making Charleston, S. C., the returning point of his tour. He was in Baltimore during the session of the great convention which nominated Henry Clay for the presidency, and consequently had an opportunity of witnessing a scene which, probably as much as any other, laid bare the mode of conducting popular movements in America. He pronounces the highest encomiums upon this array of the people, so entirely new to him, so totally unlike anything to be seen at home, and declares that "it was, in truth, notwithstanding some things which smacked of the ridiculous, the grandest, noblest, and most impressive national festival, not only that he had ever seen, but that can now be witnessed upon earth." His commendations, however, are not elicited by any particular affinity with the distinctive doctrines of the party whose representatives he saw in convention. He evinces, afterward, his almost entire adoption of the political faith of their opponents. But his pleasure was derived from the spectacle of an assemblage of citizens, thousands in number, from every state in the Union, gathered together to transact party business, at a time when the heat of party spirit was at its greatest intensity, and all was quiet and good order. No *gens d'armes* were seen, no armed police to repress violence, as there would have been in most European countries; and yet there was no riot, no tumult of any kind. On his arrival at Washington he found congress in

session; and consequently an opportunity was afforded him of seeing the noted men of the country. In this hasty visit, no one of our statesmen appears to have called forth his special admiration except Mr. Calhoun, for whom he had cherished a high esteem previously, and whom he lauds in the most exalted terms. In his return from South Carolina, through Virginia, he went on a pilgrimage to Monticello, and visited the tomb of Thomas Jefferson, the great idol of his political faith. At the last resting place of the departed statesman occurred about the only instance, during his whole tour, of his experiencing the emotion of veneration. There he said to himself, "Put off thy shoes, for this is holy ground;" and then he comes down, with a torrent of anathemas, upon those who undervalue Jefferson on account of his religious opinions; or, to speak with more accuracy, his opinions of religion.

Our tourist thence turned his course toward the valley of the Ohio and Mississippi; and after traveling for some little time in the regions between St. Louis and the lakes, passed into British America. After visiting Niagara, Quebec, and Montreal, he returned through Vermont and the northern part of the state of New-York, to the great commercial emporium, where he remained a few days, and then again visited Philadelphia, whence he journeyed to Boston. Here he wrote his last and longest letter on *Sunday*, September 29, 1844, five months having elapsed since his arrival.

We have been somewhat precise in tracing out the course of M. Von Raumer, for the reason that the value of his opinions touching the various matters that came under his observation must, in a great degree, be estimated from the opportunity that he had to gather data upon which to found them. His time was rather limited; but he made a serious business of his travels. He appears to have been very industrious in his researches; and he paid much attention to the collection of books and documents of various descriptions, calculated to aid him in his labors; and his work is as much a compilation from different sources as the result of his own personal observations.

He commences his volume by giving a sketch of the settlement of the American colonies, and traces the leading events of our history up to the present time. He takes it for granted that his readers know nothing of America, which is, doubtless, a very safe assumption. The historical sketch is, in the main, tolerably correct. There is an occasional mistake; generally, however, of minor importance. Some few chronological errors exist in the copy before us, which are so palpable that they may be detected

from the work itself. It is asserted, for instance, that a "union of all the colonies was talked of in 1791,"* which was four years subsequent to the formation of the constitution, and seventeen after the assembling of the first rebel congress. The conflict in Boston between the citizens and the royal troops is stated to have occurred in 1777, which date is too late by seven years. These errors, however, may exist only in the English translation of the work, and for them M. Von Raumer is probably not responsible.

There are occasional errors, too, for which M. Von Raumer is himself accountable. It is stated, for instance, that "congress rejected the proposal to forbid traveling on Sunday." Congress cannot forbid anything of the kind without transcending its powers, and encroaching upon the province of state legislation. He probably refers to the proposition once brought forward in congress to prohibit the transportation of the United States mail upon the sabbath. The committee to which it was referred, and of which R. M. Johnson was chairman, reported against the project, and it was rejected. Our tourist also states that "the clergy are excluded from both houses of congress," and then proceeds to defend the principle of exclusion. If he intends to state that in our national legislature we have no element similar to the bench of bishops in the English house of lords, he is correct; but if he imagines that the clergy are excluded, *ex officio*, from a place in congress, he is in error. The plan of exclusion has not been without its advocates, and it has been adopted in three or four of

* It is somewhat difficult to conjecture the real date to which allusion is here made. A union of the colonies was a subject of discussion for twenty years previous to its consummation. In the year 1751, when war between France and England was anticipated, the British government called a congress of commissioners to confer on the best means of defending the colonies against the French and their Indian allies. Seven states were represented. The commissioners, however, did not confine themselves to the matter which his majesty had submitted to their attention; but discussed the propriety of making an effort to form a confederation of all the colonies, and finally passed a resolution recommending union as essential to their safety. Dr. Franklin, who was one of the commissioners, drew up a plan, which proposed the formation of a colonial government, very similar to that now existing in British America. This plan was adopted by the commissioners; but when it was submitted to the parties interested, it was rejected by both. The king saw in it a concentration which might become dangerous; and the colonies, which were already mutually exasperated from their endless controversies concerning boundary lines, were jealous of each other, and afraid of the king. Dr. Franklin stated, in 1761, that a union was utterly impossible, except upon absolute compulsion. (*Statesman's Manual*.)

the state constitutions; but it is evidently founded in intolerance. Far distant be the time when ministers of the everlasting gospel shall deem it more honorable to fashion human laws than to proclaim the laws of God! But however inexpedient it may be for the clergy to leave their high vocation, and engage in political affairs, it is perfectly evident that it is contrary to all the principles of republicanism to deprive them, on account of their office, of the rights and privileges usually enjoyed by citizens.

The main body of M. Von Raumer's work treats of American affairs in essay style, instead of recounting the heterogeneous impressions made during a rapid tour. The subjects thus individually discussed are of great variety of character, comprising slavery, the Indian tribes, agriculture, manufactures, commerce, banks, the tariff, the laws, prisons, poor laws, charitable institutions, education, literature and art, religion, foreign relations, &c., &c., together with an extended sketch of the state of Ohio. To give the result of his investigations into all these things would be impracticable. We must, therefore, select two or three which are of general interest, and, at the same time, of such a nature as to involve principles, to discuss which comes somewhat within the province of our review.

American slavery is treated of at considerable length; and our author, singularly enough, opens his discussion with a grave refutation of slavery in the abstract, not forgetting to castigate Aristotle for his dogmas upon that subject. He here probably gives us an example of what he denominates, in another place, "scientific cognition, or the philosophico-systematic mode of thinking," and hints at an investigation of the origin of the difference between the Circassian and the African. He asks the question, Have all mankind descended from a single pair? And then he very coolly remarks,—

"The affirmative, which accords with the Biblical narration, is usually held to be the most pious and religious. Naturalists, however, have very properly not allowed themselves to be deterred by this supposition from independent investigations. But while Rudolphi opposes the idea of a single Adam, and denies the degeneration of one race into others, Prichard, and Johannes Müller, assert that all men are only varieties of one and the same stock."—P. 113.

However, although he thus unequivocally asserts the right of pursuing his investigations, independently of Scripture declaration, he declines, with praiseworthy prudence, to plunge into the mazes of intangible hypothesis, and descending at once to substantial, asserts that the African is greatly inferior to the white. The Cir-

cassian races alone "possess a history, in the higher sense of the term. Neither negroes nor Indians have ever formed a leading dominant state that filled and enlarged the history of the world." In referring to the origin of slavery in this country, he lays the iniquity at the door of the real transgressor.

"Negro slavery in North America by no means proceeded from republican forms, neither does it stand in any connection therewith, as is seen from the fact that one half of the twenty-six states are free; on the contrary, it was brought thither by Europeans, and England thought that she had achieved something allowable, and even great and praiseworthy, when she obtained from the king of Spain, by the Assiento treaty of 1713, the exclusive right of supplying his colonies with slaves, and obliged him to be content with taking some shares in this detestable trade. Even while the number of negro slaves in the North American settlements was still small, many perceived the lasting wrong and increasing danger of this traffic in human flesh; but no proposition, no bill of the individual colonies for taxing, impeding, diminishing, or abolishing it, received the sanction of the mother country."—P. 116.

And we may add, in continuation of our author's remarks, that a member of the English parliament declared, about five years since, in his place, that "British capital still supports the slave-trade;" and thus both England and America may find it most consistent to restrain the superabundance of their righteous indignation for the sins of others, till they are in a condition that will admit of their casting the first stone. According to M. Von Raumer's opinion, the race, notwithstanding the unfavorableness of slavery to progress, have improved, and are in a far better condition, both mental and physical, than they were at their arrival in this country. He asserts, that even where the descent is purely African, it is found that the contour of the head, and the whole carriage of the body, are improved; and that their juxtaposition with a race superior to themselves has had an elevating and salutary influence. It seems plausible, since incidental circumstances have caused this diversity of the races, that the process, which has made the African what he is, may be reversed, and the original equality be restored. And it is said by some writer that the American negro colonists on the coast of Africa look upon the natives as greatly inferior, and would, if left to impulse, maintain as dignified an aristocracy as any nation can boast. But if this reverse process has really commenced, ages must elapse before they, as a body, can approximate the level which the Circassian now occupies; and even then the progress of the whites, in the mean time, may render the disparity as great as ever. The result

of M. Von Raumer's investigations of the general subject of slavery is comprised in the following extract:—

"As in the abolition of the internal slave-trade, I behold the first great means toward an essential improvement of the existing state of things; so, too, I regard as the second, not by any means a sudden, forcible, and, in fact, impossible equalization of blacks and whites—but, what is already in many places begun, a gradual and voluntary grant of property in the soil. Offensive as it may sound, the introduction of a sort of serfdom, or *glebe adscriptio*, appears to me a measure which, while it avoids sudden social, and political leaps, includes, in itself, a better condition, and prepares for one better yet. The former slave is, then, no longer a mere chattel, without any recognition of, or regard for, his personal rights, but stands on solid ground; he is no longer a piece of moveable property, to be sold at pleasure like a brute, but there is opened to him the possibility of acquiring something for himself; ~~in~~ fact, a man *bound to the soil* is, in many respects, better off than he who is *bound to a machine*."—P. 135.

It is evident that he is in nowise disposed to join the ultraists of either party; he does not consider the case of the slave beyond hope, nor does he think that the good must all be done at once. But in sober verity, the final result of the introduction of slavery into this country is absolutely inscrutable. Darkness, which no human eye can pierce, rests upon it. To dogmatize, on either side of the question, is the easiest thing imaginable; but to demonstrate the future consequences, or even to establish a probability, the most difficult. The rigid opinionists of both parties may hurl their philippics at each other in furious attack and obstinate defense; enthusiastic men may see visions, and hopeful men dream dreams; but, in very deed, the prospects of the negro are most pitiable. Colonization has its warm advocates, as is meet and right. It has founded a flourishing colony; and it may in time utterly destroy the infernal slave-trade, and irradiate a whole continent with the glorious light of the gospel. But what can the plan do with a nation of three millions? At the time when the Colonization Society was established, in 1816, the colored population of the country was about a million and a half; since that time, if the statistics of Matthew Carey are correct, it has doubled, and is now increasing at the rate of sixty thousand annually. The society, during the thirty years of its existence, has colonized about twenty-five hundred, and has expended probably a million of dollars. If all the slave owners of the south were willing to let the children of Africa go, and doubtless multitudes would be willing, should the opportunity to let them return to Africa occur, it seems impossible that the liberated slaves should ever be conveyed

there, and sustained until able to support themselves, without as many and as great miracles as marked the deliverance of the Israelites from Egyptian bondage. The pecuniary expenses of all the wars in which we have ever been engaged would be small in comparison with those of such an enterprise. Nor is it the want of funds alone that impedes the usefulness of the society. This is as truly the home of the so-called Africans of our land as it is our home; and many of the blacks, even where the foes of this society have not raised their absurd and unjust outcry against it, evince an utter repugnance to emigration. In 1824, President Boyer, of St. Domingo, offered to colonize six thousand American blacks in that island, at his own expense; a few hundred accepted his offer, but, for some reason, most of them soon returned. The society has been a blessing to Africa; but as a scheme for removing the entire colored population, it seems wholly visionary. Whether they are in future time bond or free, that unfortunate race must find their abiding place in America.

- But are they to remain slaves? The tendency of the age, the tide of popular conviction, is setting in the opposite direction. Henry Clay has expressed an opinion that slavery will be abolished by the operation of the laws of population. We never saw a full exposition of these views, but the substance of them appears to be this:—As the population of the country becomes more dense, the price of labor will fall with the increase of the supply; this will eventually bring free into competition with slave labor; the labor of white men being most productive, slave labor will become less desirable, both on account of the smaller profits and the many annoyances and responsibilities which it involves; and thus slavery, its grand prop being removed, will fall. But if this hypothesis is correct, centuries must elapse, in all probability, before this result comes to pass, especially while the slave-owners have the privilege of avoiding the press of competition by receding into the south-west. And, incidental fluctuations apart, it is not probable that the price of labor will fall very materially, even east of the Alleghanies, so long as vast tracts of good land lie unoccupied at the west. But suppose the period already arrived, and the slaves freed, because they are no longer profitable, what will then be their condition? The future is made up of so many elements, that to foretell coming events, or even to conjecture probabilities, is often a useless pastime. That which seems demonstrable, frequently proves visionary. But the natural result of emancipation, effected thus, is the creation of a caste in the lowest depths of degradation. If the labor of hired white men is more profitable

than that of slaves, where must the labor of hired negroes rank? Certainly much lower than that of their white competitors. The consequence must be that the mass of the Africans will be scattered through the country, to be the Pariahs of our land, to perform the lowest menial offices, to be hewers of wood and drawers of water. But it is useless to multiply conjectures. Both the slaveholders and the slaves of the present generation find themselves involved in a most unhappy state of things, in the origination of which neither had any agency. Let us, then, until calm but earnest discussion shall have pointed out a safe mode of emancipation, look upon the position of our southern brethren, so far as facts charitably interpreted will justify such a conclusion, not as their fault, but as their misfortune. Slavery is the incubus of the south; and many, who are bitterly denounced by the inconsiderate, acknowledge the fact. Whatever can be done to ameliorate the slave's condition, let it be done. The only course appears to be, not to sit down supine and hopeless, but to do all that can be done safely; to endeavor to elevate the slave to the dignity of man; to go as far as light rests upon the path, and leave the future to the unerring guardianship of Him whose tender mercies are over all his works.

In the chapter succeeding that in which he treats of slavery, M. Von Raumer discusses the present condition of the remains of the aboriginal tribes. His disquisitions contain little which is new to the American reader, and we would not have alluded to them had it not been for a very sage remark which he drops, *en passant*:—

“Whether the Indians are *autocthones*, sprung from the soil, or are immigrants from Asia, whether a more civilized people preceded them, and whether the latter retired voluntarily, or through compulsion, toward the south—on these topics much may be conjectured, very little proved.”—P. 137.

If anything, in addition to the internal and historical evidence, and the blessed effects of the word of God, were needed to give the believer in revelation confidence in his system, it might be found in the intolerable absurdities of infidelity. The observation which we have quoted is such unmitigated folly, that in charity to our author we would fain have construed it into irony—a side blow at some atheistic philosopher—a clumsy German witticism—anything in the world but what the whole context proves it to be, an idea expressed with all gravity, and intended to be particularly learned and sagacious. Our tourist professes a huge admiration for the Bible; but as he explains it all away except the binding,

we may set him down as a German rationalist, otherwise an infidel. Professed skeptics are the most credulous class of men in existence. When the Christian owns his firm faith in that volume which he believes to be the word of Jehovah, the infidel looks upon him with a smile of pity or contempt, as one who is led by a cunningly devised fable, who is filled with absurd hopes and groundless fears, and who is looking onward to future existence in a land which has no being save in his own crazed imagination. The infidel feels infinite compassion for such intellectual imbecility. He can point out the apparent discrepancies in the inspired volume, and appeal for support to all the base passions of the fallen man. But drive him into the defensive ; carry the war into Africa. Since the Mosaic account of the creation is too vast for his limited powers of faith, put him upon the construction of a better one. Of the ordinary results, in such a case, we have a specimen before us. The learned M. Von Raumer, who, in many matters, seems a man of sound sense, gives us the theory, which, in the plenitude of his skeptical wisdom, he condescends to honor with his gracious assent. The sage who is too wise to admit the fable that man was created an intelligent being, by an omnipotent eternal Spirit, here teaches, with much more gravity than men of only ordinary composure of face can listen to him, that man *grew* out of the earth, "sprung from the soil," in the same way that, under the fostering hand of the baron's gardener, cabbages flourish in Berlin. Verily, *tell* it in Gath, publish it in the streets of Askelon, and let all the sons of infidelity rejoice ; let the disciples of rationalism triumph. By the way, how absurd the outcry touching the "pride of philosophy !" With humility never excelled, not even by honest Dogberry, the sage of Berlin virtually confesses, inasmuch as men sprung up like mushrooms, and, after passing through various gradations, became what they are, that he, the erudite Baron Von Raumer, "Professor of History in the University of Berlin, &c., &c.," who was toasted so profusely at the dinner on Staten Island, may, with all his honors, be nothing but a lineal descendant of one of Lord Monboddos's monkeys ; or, adopting the botanic theory, only a slight improvement on one of his gardener's vegetables. *Sed, de gustibus, &c.*

But as great as are these absurdities, there is commendable candor in the style in which the professor carries his bundle of folly. He never disowns it, or attempts to hide it from the eyes of men. If all those who deny the authenticity of the Bible were as honest as he, their delusion would have still less influence than it now wields. So long as they merely tear down ; so long as they

build nothing upon their own foundation, they possess an advantage which they are none the less inclined to employ from its being an unfair one. But they find it expedient to involve themselves in thick darkness lest their opponents should discover the deformity of their system, and defeat them at once and for ever. The same fondness for obscurity, the same love of darkness rather than light, runs through all the minor forms of infidelity now extant. Give any false system a thorough investigation, and some part will be found upon which the dreaded light must not shine. Whole classes of errorists, whom we might name, who profess to teach the very pith and marrow of the gospel, show great reluctance to giving a full exposition of their doctrinal views. They may assign, as a reason for this repugnance, their unutterable horror of *creeds*; but doubtless they have other reasons quite as good as this ostensible one. Christianity is not composed of disjointed fragments of truth; but its teachings form one harmonious whole. Consequently, they who deny any of its grand cardinal doctrines, may well feel some hesitation in showing how far their theory involves the whole system in ruin. They prefer leaving the matter where they can admit and reject, affirm and deny, advance and recede, as circumstances render it expedient; and, in the mean time, seek to cover their retreat by leaving behind them professions of immeasurable liberality of sentiment. Would that they copied M. Von Raumer!

Our author gives us a long chapter entitled "Religion and the Church," in which he professes to set forth the religious condition of America. This chapter is a very curious affair. He gives a brief account of the leading denominations; of the workings of the voluntary system, which he approves; and, of course, bewails the existence of bigotry, intolerance, and fanaticism. One sect, however, are so happy as to escape his censures, inasmuch as their views "exhibit an affinity to certain philosophical schools" of German notionalists. The professor feels much sympathy for them in their good work; but expresses doubts of their ever being able to accomplish much.

"The Unitarians will never be able to root out everywhere the longing for the marvelous, for a vicarious redemption and atonement, &c.; very many will cling to the old orthodox doctrines."—P. 337.

He gives an epitome of the religious opinions of this favored sect, which epitome comprises seven negatives, and one &c.; and then observes, with an air of despondency, that in the religious views of the Americans he perceives "no essentially new and

peculiar element ; they confine themselves mostly to the old paths, and not always without disputes and ancient bitterness."

"Of all the cantings of this canting world," says a satirical writer of the last century, "though the cant of hypocrisy may be the worst, the cant of criticism is the most provoking." But the writer, when he penned the testy remark, had probably never heard the cant of liberalism. The baron, as may be seen from the quotations already given, feels an utter repugnance to all spiritual religion, and is as bigoted in his opposition as those upon whom he expends his wrath can be in its favor. The first table of the law is of little account in his eyes. He alludes to the Deity occasionally ; but his God is a philosophical abstraction ; and in his religion the sentiment of devotion has no place. He inculcates the ordinary duties of man to man, and lauds an enlarged republicanism as the sum total of all religion ; but many of those things which we believe to be clearly enjoined in holy writ, he derides as the legitimate offspring of Pharisaism and puritanical bigotry. One of these is the Christian sabbath as observed among the "orthodox :"—

"I can more readily enter into this than into their dull, dry, severe Sundays, on which the negroes alone display any cheerfulness or enjoyment of life."—P. 426.

"In the zealous Protestant states a very strict observance of the sabbath is even required by law ; though by this the principle, that the civil authorities have nothing to do with ecclesiastical and religious matters, is certainly violated, and personal liberty restricted."—P. 342.

In another place he expresses an opinion that music will never be very extensively cultivated in America till we lay aside our present mode of keeping the sabbath, and become more liberal. This remark will have its weight with those, the magnitude of whose auricular adornment exceeds that of their souls, and who estimate their relative value accordingly. But the objection which the professor makes against our laws for preserving the sanctity of the sabbath, on the ground of their alledged anti-republicanism, might be of more force were the sabbath, like prayer, and pious meditation, of a wholly religious nature. Were the laws to compel each citizen to read a page daily in a state prayer-book, then there would be interference with the religious opinions of the subject. But a correct view of the case causes the difficulty to vanish. A civil sabbath may be necessary for the preservation of personal rights. All experience proves that the periodical observance of a day of rest is far more conducive to physical well-being than

incessant labor, even if the aggregate accomplished be the same. The mind, also, is invigorated by laying aside the cares and perplexities of secular affairs. The heart is kept from growing callous, and the home affections are cultivated, by spending the hours of sabbath quiet in the family circle; and those allied by nature are bound together with stronger and more enduring ties. Man also needs time for the consideration of subjects of a higher grade, and greater moment. The all-wise Creator, who knew what was in man, who was perfectly acquainted with his physical, intellectual, and moral nature, has ordained this periodical cessation from secular pursuits, in order that all may have time to worship him, to learn the way of life, to meditate upon divine truth, and examine the foundation upon which they base their hopes of happiness when time shall be no more. The observance of this day, in all practicable modes, is essential to our moral progress. To observe this day is not only the duty, but the privilege of all; a right which man cannot take away, because God has given. But even in our own land, and north of Mason and Dixon's line, the majority are in the employ, or in some way under the control, of the minority; and to abolish the legal sanctions of the sabbath would, in innumerable cases, place this unalienable right of the many at the mercy of the few. Some, indeed, would not abuse their power. Others, like M. Von Raumer, would recommend gayety as the proper mode of observing the holy sabbath, and exhort all to give themselves unto fiddling and puppet shows. But some would take advantage of the absence of legal enactment to oppress those dependent upon them. If the law should be so modified that no one, whether bond or free, could be compelled to labor, but the whole matter be left optional, still the evil would exist. The avarice of multitudes might soon find some cunning device to elude the charge of direct compulsion, and they would thus escape the penalty, while they broke the spirit of the law. Therefore the present laws are not founded in bigotry, nor upon the principle that religion is to be thrust upon men's consciences by the civil power; but upon this, that the rights of the dependent are to be protected against the caprice or the inhumanity of those who may, for the time, possess control over them. These laws, then, so far from being anti-republican, have for their direct object the protection of the dearest and most valuable rights of the weak against the encroachments of the powerful; and the objections urged against them are those only to which most laws, which man frames and executes, are liable.

The baron does the Methodist Episcopal Church the honor of

an extended notice ; and undertakes to give a brief sketch of its origin and progress :—

“The Methodists formed their first society in the United States in the year 1766 ; but since then they have been increased to such an extent by untiring activity and restless zeal, that they now constitute several bishoprics, and number seven thousand seven hundred and thirty stationary and four thousand eight hundred itinerant preachers. The latter constitute the yearly district conferences, which are represented by delegates in the General Conference, held every four years. The Methodists, however, allow the laity no share in the choice of preachers or in ecclesiastical legislation ; all of which is placed in the hands of the clergy. This arrangement produces, on the one hand, energy and decision ; but, on the other, gives rise to narrowness and intolerance. And yet, in the year 1838, there sprang up, even among the clergy, so great a division, that about one half separated from the other, and took to itself the designation of the Old School, in contradistinction to the New.”—P. 330.

If the work which we are examining was no more correct, in general, than is this particular paragraph, to rectify its errors would be to rewrite the volume. The Methodist Episcopal Church, as every one who has the least acquaintance with its polity knows, has no diocesan bishops, and, consequently, no bishoprics, in the technical sense of the term. Nor is it true that the laity are allowed no share in the choice of preachers, or in ecclesiastical legislation. We acknowledge, indeed, that we are strongly prepossessed in favor of itinerancy, and are aware that it can be sustained only by mutual concession, the laity giving up the power of choosing their pastors, and the clergy the power of choosing their particular congregations ; and, therefore, pastors and people agree to place the appointing power in the hands of a third party, the bishops, who, even if they should not prove to be the men we believe them to be, can have little or no motive to abuse their office. But it is false that the people have no share in the choice of pastors. They cannot, by law, designate the minister who shall officiate in any given pulpit ; but the people, as a body, have the power of nominating those from whom the choice is to be made. In some other churches, the clergy control the whole matter of educating and licensing ministers ; or, in other words, of pointing out those from whom the congregations shall select pastors. We have, in our system, the converse of this plan. The laity are not without power ; but that power is applied at the other end of the train. No one can be authorized to hold meetings for prayer and exhortation till his brethren of the laity vote to permit it. No one can receive authority to minister

in holy things till they authorize his licensure. No one can receive orders in the local ranks till his brethren advise it. No one can become a candidate for admission into the conference till they recommend his admission.

But all this is well understood among our own people; and we would not have alluded to it did we not occasionally meet with well-meaning men of other churches, who demur at laws of which Methodists never heard, and recommend the removal of evils that have no existence. Neither clergy nor laity count our system a burden; in eighty years our church has grown up from non-existence to a membership of more than a million; and therefore we may well disregard, as we have done hitherto, those predictions of future ill which are based upon a one-idea theory.

With regard to the separation into the Old and New Schools, it is evident that our tourist, through inadvertence or misinformation, has confounded the Methodist with the Presbyterian Church. He also mentions the division in the Presbyterian Church, but dates it in 1837, instead of 1838, as in the passage which we have quoted. This discrepancy arises from his referring in the one instance to the ecclesiastical action which led to the division, and which took place in 1837; and in the other, to the actual separation of the General Assembly into two bodies, which occurred the succeeding year. The remainder of the article on Methodism is taken up with an account of the separation of the north and south, which is treated with tolerable accuracy. He closes with the following remark:—

“Perhaps it is a real benefit that the growing power of this sect, and the danger of constantly increasing violence and intolerance, are, for the present, circumscribed and broken by this schism.”—P. 332.

Here the baron is guilty of a dual blunder; he errs with respect to both premises and conclusion. He sets out with the idea that the Methodist Episcopal Church is both violent and intolerant. As he does not appeal to any facts to sustain his position, we hope that none will deem us reprobates should we take the liberty of deferring our repentance and confession till this deficiency shall have been supplied. Had he spoken of constantly increasing *danger* of violence, we would not have wondered at his observation, though even then we might not have been constrained to own the soft impeachment. In years gone by, indeed, all dominant sects were more or less imbued with the spirit of persecution. In England, those who were, for the time being, at the head of the government, no matter of what faction, considered it their bounden

duty to construct a vast national conscience, according to whose dictates all must order their walk and conversation, or be converted from the error of their ways, by the clear and satisfactory arguments of the prison, the gallows, or the stake. Thus the Episcopalians hunted down the Puritans; the Puritans, in turn, hunted down the Episcopalians; and the Catholics, when they were in power, persecuted them both. In this country, the same bitter spirit ruled, and the same conflict was kept up, though on a more limited scale. In Virginia, the Episcopalians drove the Presbyterians from their borders; in New-England, the Presbyterians, filled with mighty zeal for God, persecuted all heretics with the most exemplary diligence and fervency. Had the Methodist Church existed in those days of darkness, and been in power, possibly some fiery spirit might have devised an infernal logic which would have plunged it into that which we now abhor and detest. But as it was, we know not that Methodists have ever been in any way concerned in persecution for opinion's sake, except as victims of the pious fury of others. What, then, does the baron mean by his allusions to "increasing violence and intolerance?" But if his premises were correct, his conclusion would be a *non sequitur*. If the Methodist Episcopal Church ever obtains any legal advantages over other churches, those privileges and immunities must be obtained at the bar of the state legislatures; and the influence of the denomination in the several states has not been impaired, in any degree, by the division of the north and south. Thus it appears that the "liberal" M. Von Raumer becomes alarmed at a shadow, and comforts himself with a sophism.

Our author has considerable fault to find with the American churches in general; or, at least, with all afflicted with "those fanatical movements called revivals." But we must keep in mind the peculiar views which he entertains of these subjects. His own language speaks him as perfectly destitute of all conception of enjoyment in religion, as the *meerschau* which he puffed while concocting his infidel paragraphs. To object to dancing and revelry upon the sabbath is Pharisaic bigotry. To adopt a system of theology under the impression that it is true, and that its rejection would consequently involve error, is intolerance; while to believe that both sides of an unmitigated contradiction can be substantiated from the word of inspiration, is magnanimity and liberality. To manifest as much reverential emotion in religious worship, as he himself would in soliloquizing over a pair of Jefferson's old boots, or a hair from his wig, is arrant fanaticism;

while to adopt all the irrationalities of rationalism is the highest wisdom, and ultra-democracy the only real religion.

On the subject of education in general we have a very interesting chapter. Much industry is manifested in the collection of facts and statistics, and much knowledge in the discussion of the principles involved. The professor's researches led him to the following conclusions:—

“On taking a resurvey of all that we have stated, some general remarks are suggested,—

“First. The American universities, libraries, and scientific collections, (which it is impossible to create at once,) are behind those of Europe, and especially of Germany; but, on the other hand, as regards the education of the people, many of the states are on a level with the most cultivated European countries, and far before several, including even England.

“Secondly. No nation has done so much for schools in so short a time as the Americans.

“Thirdly. There is in the United States no danger of an education too elevated for the condition and relations of the educated. Such are their political privileges, that nothing is placed wholly out of the reach of any one; wherefore the outlay goes to the education not of subjects merely, but of rulers also.”—P. 297.

Our common school system is indeed, as Governor Clinton, of New-York, remarked in his message on the subject in 1795, “the palladium of our freedom.” All who have considered the dangers to which republics are exposed, must confess that there needs be a powerful influence, not to counteract the spirit of democracy, but to guide into that path in which peace and safety dwell. Every system of polity has its peculiar dangers, its weak point, its vulnerable Achillean heel, which the arrow of the destroyer may pierce. A strong executive government may imperceptibly glide into despotism, and thus the end of government be lost. A republic, on the other hand, finds its greatest danger in that lawless spirit which spurns even salutary restraint, and tramples upon all authority. When did an enlightened republic glide insensibly into a despotism? Never. Between the free and the tyrannical stage there comes an interregnum, when the fountains of the great deep of anarchy are broken up, and the floods of corruption rush forth, and sweep all things back into chaos; when demagogues are revered as patriots, and patriots denounced as traitors; when calm counsel is derided, justice overthrown, and mob law and violence reign in their stead. When this comes to pass, some more daring spirit, who, perhaps, brandished his dagger most fiercely, and denounced tyrants most loudly, in the popular tu-

mults, seizes the supreme power, and is suffered to reign by a community weary of lawless commotion, and willing to submit to any government which will free the land from riot and bloodshed. The intellectual and moral culture of the people forms, therefore, the natural defense against this, the attendant danger of republican institutions. "Knowledge," said the great Washington, in his first message to congress, "is in every country the surest basis of public happiness." "Educate and inform," said Thomas Jefferson, "the whole mass of the people; enable them to see that it is their interest to preserve peace and order, and they will preserve them." "Knowledge," declared De Witt Clinton, "is as well the cause as the consequence of good government."

In literature and the arts, the Americans, in the estimation of our author, have made attainments which are valuable, both from intrinsic worth, and from their promising great advancement in the fullness of time. M. Von Raumer also defends us against the charges which certain very considerate Europeans have made, that we possess "no monuments, no antiquity;" for which deed of abounding charity we could have excused him, as it is certainly a work of supererogation.

With respect to the periodical press, the baron discourses more favorably than some other travelers:—

"The greater American periodicals, or critical reviews, distinguish themselves by propriety, moderation, and dignity; they display an accurate knowledge of all sciences, and often contain criticisms which are masterly both in form and substance."

Of the newspaper press, touching which Mr. Dickens penned so furious a tirade, he remarks, that the ill effects resulting from its possessing no censorship to control its licentiousness, have been no greater than they would be in Europe. With regard to the subject in general, he observes:—

"Bishop White, of Philadelphia, has justly remarked: 'No one who lives uprightly can ever be entirely put down in America by slander. Whatever the momentary effects may be, he will live down the falsehood.' But even the passing momentary effect is an injurious one; and the proverb is but too often confirmed, that something always sticks, *semper aliquid hæret*! As it is seldom possible to bring newspaper writers to justice, and only in case of gross slanders and falsehoods, they constitute, in effect, a completely independent, unassailable power."—P. 302.

No one who has acquainted himself with the character of the newspaper press, especially of the party journals, will consider this wholly imaginary. It is an unquestionable fact, that the

press, at times, does immense evil, as well as immense good. In a popular government, it must necessarily wield great influence. The principle upon which public affairs are conducted is, that the people themselves are fully capable of deciding between conflicting systems of policy, and of pointing out, not only by whom they will be governed, but how that government shall be administered. All things pertaining to the state must therefore be discussed before the electors. Here is the arena where principles and personal character are involved in the conflict, and all the art and finesse of the combatants put forth to achieve a victory, the spoils of which are office, honors, and emoluments. In this contest, every mode of attack and defense, which promises to be of advantage, is too frequently employed without scruple. And the tribunal is composed of such a variety of character and cultivation, that everything becomes available, from solid, rational argument, declamation, and wit, down to the uttermost depths of reckless abuse and frenzied rhodomontade. Writers are easily found who will hesitate at nothing which promises to be of service, whether it be insane panegyric of their own party, or vile attack upon their opponents. He that reads one side only, and believes it all, deliberately writes himself a monomaniac.

How, then, can this gigantic evil be remedied, or, at least, confined to a smaller sphere of iniquity? To adopt the European plan, and institute a censorship, would not only be contrary to the spirit of our government, but would be, in itself, perfectly nugatory. All offices are either the gift of the majority or of the chosen men of the majority; consequently, the censor would be a mere party officer, and the hopeful plan would only result in adding a new wheel to party machinery, and a new manœuvre to party tactics. The only resort is to the good sense, the virtue, and the true patriotism of the community. The evil is not in those alone who conduct journals of this description. To charge the guilt to these exclusively, would be almost as great a blunder as to criminate the types and printing press. There are many partners in the base transaction. Those who conduct a reckless paper are but the guilty instruments of evil. They deal unfairly, because they find deception a marketable commodity. They prophesy falsely, because the people love to have it so. The deluge of lies poured out is a part of the stock in trade, virtually bought and paid for by those who patronize publications of this class. Let no infernal casuistry be employed in this matter. Let no one tolerate these mighty fountains of detraction; and at the same time lay the flattering unction to his soul that he does it innocently,

inasmuch as a whole party is benefited, while the sin rests only upon him who holds the pen.

As the matter now is, multitudes are frequently deluded, where they honestly look for information. A clique of office seekers, perhaps, concert measures to promote "the cause." If popular enthusiasm can be roused in their favor, the object is certainly attained. Therefore the people must be coaxed, and blarneyed, and deluded into the belief that some great principle is involved in the election of these demagogues, when, perhaps, the whole matter discussed is of no more real consequence than a suit between John Doe and Richard Roe in a moot court. A man is hired upon the express condition that he will advocate "the cause" strongly, that is, recklessly; and the party instrument goes into operation. The streams of falsehood and sophistry rush forth, and the multitudes crowd around as eagerly as did the perishing children of Israel around the rock in the wilderness. They are told that their own party leaders are immeasurably endowed with every virtue known to humanity, and they shout with ecstasy at the discovery. They are informed that their opponents are just the reverse of all this, and they wax indignant at the sight of such hypocritical knaves. Sometimes the demagogues are fearful that they will be discovered by their own party, and they therefore draw the attention of the people away from their own operations to a very important something in another direction; like the juggler who flourishes his dagger high in air before the eyes of astonished bumpkins, while he performs his trick with the other hand. But we need not further enlarge upon these things; every one knows that these schemes are not unpracticed by the party opposite to him.

With reference to books, M. Von Raumer remarks that the liberty of the press is more rarely abused; and he also remarks that works of real merit are liberally rewarded in this country. He pays some very high compliments to those Americans who have labored in his favorite department—declaring that "men like Bancroft, Prescott, and Sparks, have effected so much in this respect, that no living European historian can take precedence of them, but might rather feel proud and grateful to be admitted by them as a companion."

But it will be impossible for us to pursue further an analysis of the work before us, or discuss all our tourist's many conclusions touching our present condition, and his many speculations concerning the future. Suffice it to say, that the conclusions to which his researches and observations led him are eminently favorable to our government and our people. He has the utmost

confidence in our system of polity ; and he believes that under the auspices of republicanism in America will be achieved those mighty advances which he thinks our race still destined to make. The essayic part of the work is concluded with the following fine remarks :—

“ From that quarter in which the greatest power of a state resides, the greatest danger is also threatened ; and this in America, without doubt, is democracy. This can lead from a noble self-respect to vain presumption, and from presumption to an insolent disregard of all law. The greater the privileges, and the greater the advancement of a people, the more they have at stake, and the more important do their duties become.

“ The most healthy government can suddenly perish, the most rational may fall into madness, and the most sickly (like that of the Byzantines) may drag on for centuries a miserable existence. May judgment, moderation, self-control, and patriotism, exercise in time to come, as in times past, a powerful influence on the political course of America ! May every one extend his views beyond the indispensable requirements of private morality, to discern what public morality and public wisdom are, and what they demand ! May no rabble, seduced by flatterers into pernicious ways, ever lift up its head ! And may zeal for dogmatic opinions never banish Christian toleration and love ! Then the work which has now prospered for sixty years—and whose cause is the cause of honor, virtue, and humanity—will not degenerate or be brought to an untimely end ; but the United States of America will press forward unceasingly, with redoubled spirit and exalted vigor, in the same glorious path which they have hitherto trod.”—P. 409.

The last ninety pages of the five hundred that compose the work are “ extracts from letters written during his tour.” These convey the thoughts and impressions of the moment, and portray the lively emotions which the sight of new objects ever produces. There is more vivacity in these letters than we had anticipated from reading the preceding parts of the work. He changes from grave to gay with great facility, and occasionally gives a touch of genuine humor. By the way, when he recommends a more “ liberal ” mode of keeping the sabbath, it cannot be said that he preaches what he does not practice. To note his proceedings in his own style of laborious minuteness, we may remark, that about one-fourth of his letters were written upon the sabbath. He travels upon the sabbath as upon any other day. He goes to see sights, visits public places, dines out on the sabbath, discusses politics, manufactures, and trade, and entertains himself and the company with Shakspeare, and—not the musical glasses—but the Greek tragedians.

His most laborious sabbath appears to have been the ninth of June, which was spent by him in Baltimore. In the morning he went with an acquaintance to the Catholic Church for the express purpose of hearing the music; at least, this was the "chief object of his visit." The music proved tolerably good, although it would "hardly bear comparison with any European church music." His friend then accompanied him, at his own request, to an African church, where both slaves and free negroes congregated. M. Von Raumer saw, of course, a display of what he denominates fanaticism. The black preacher "spoke just as well (or ill) as the generality of white preachers." The voice of the speaker rose, and he "applied to his auditors descriptions of sin, death, the wrath of God, hell, the devil, and such like spiritual Spanish flies." Then an effect was produced upon the congregation which astonished our tourist beyond measure. The tumult rose to "shrieks and yells, as if every one of them was being murdered." One cried, "Holy, holy;" another shouted, "Bless me;" and one or two others indulged in certain extraordinary gymnastics, whereat the sage professor marveled greatly. The afternoon he spent at a German public house and bowling alley, a little way out of the city, where he and his companions talked politics, and adjusted the affairs of Europe and America. In the evening he again went to the negro church; but the performances, doubtless to his great chagrin, were not so tumultuous as they had been in the morning. The scene he saw "was such as he had never before witnessed in his life." But he opened his eyes, as well he might, when he was assured by the veracious "H." that this was a "slight beginning compared with the preachings and doings of the *white* Methodists!" Had this colored congregation been treated to a neat little moral essay, or a small section of German fog, and then had adjourned to the bowling alley with the professor, to spend the remainder of the day in revelry, it would have been, in his estimation, very liberal, very rational, very free from bigotry and fanaticism.

These letters, were it not for the infidelity everywhere expressed or implied, would be quite interesting and instructive. But this is the dead insect, the effluvium of which mingles in every breath. M. Von Raumer indeed talks of God; but his God is not the God of the Bible. He alludes to Christianity; but he means by that term a very different system from that which the apostles preached, and the martyrs of old believed. He does not object to religious services; but there must be no warning sinners with tears, as Paul warned them; no allusions to judgment to

come; and, above all things, no hints about the damnation of hell.

In fine, M. Von Raumer hopes everything from the American system of government, and from the freedom of inquiry and discussion enjoyed in this country. The nations are moving on in the grand march of progress; he looks upon America as the van of the mighty procession, and bids us not lose the post of honor. The following concluding remarks of the volume express the general impression made by his tour in this country:—

“Although much still remains to be related, I must break off, and conclude this last American letter for want of time. I have here seen, heard, and learned more than in any equal portion of time in my life, so that I regard my journey as fully justified and abundantly rewarded. I shall always remember the United States, in spite of some little drawbacks, with feelings of interest, gratitude, and admiration.”—P. 501.

A modification of this language will also express our conclusion with regard to the merits of the volume before us. It is in many respects an excellent one. With reference to political affairs, M. Von Raumer has enlightened and liberal views. He was desirous of seeing America as it is, and not as aristocratic minds would prove that it must be. He delights in all that is praiseworthy; and our civil defects minister no joy to him. He is mild in his animadversions on the evils which he is too candid to hide; and the book is temperate in its general tone. It embodies a considerable amount of solid facts, and is well calculated for the purpose which the author had in view, the diffusion of information concerning America among those who were almost wholly unacquainted with our history, institutions, and present condition.

But while we would give our author all due credit for these excellences, we cannot give his work our unqualified approbation. There is an occasional want of accuracy in his statements; but that we had expected: he is strongly disposed to adopt a party badge; but that is not unpardonable. But there is one fault which we cannot so readily pass over, and which, in a Christian community, ought to place the ban of condemnation upon the work. This is his infidelity. All his ideas centre in the present. He is a perfect bigot to his own notions of liberality; his self-complacent lamentations over our fanaticism and bigotry are beyond endurance; and his attacks upon the religion of the Bible are the more dangerous from the cool, quiet self-sufficiency with which he makes them. To those who would acquaint themselves with America, there are opened other sources, at least as rich in

information, and which are, at the same time, untainted with the deadly poison which mingles in every stream that issues from this.

As far as we are able to judge, the translator, Mr. William W. Turner, has done his part well. The language is well chosen; and the general style is characterized by clearness and purity. Occasionally, the words which form the logical connectives of sentences are such as a close thinker would hardly employ; but this may have originated in the difficulties attendant on a translation from another language.

Hope, N. J., 1846.

ART. IV.—1. *A Greek-English Lexicon, based on the German Work of Francis Passow.* By HENRY GEORGE LIDDELL, M. A., and ROBERT SCOTT, M. A. *With Corrections and Additions, and the Insertion, in Alphabetical Order, of the Proper Names occurring in the Principal Greek Authors,* by H. DRISLER, M. A., *Adjunct Professor of the Greek and Latin Languages in Columbia College, New-York.* Pp. 1705. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1846.

2. *A Comprehensive Lexicon of the Greek Language, adapted to the Use of Colleges and Schools in the United States.* Third edition, greatly enlarged and improved, by JOHN PICKERING. Pp. 1456. Boston. 1846.

3. *A New Greek Lexicon, principally on the Plan of the Greek and German Lexicon of Schneider.* By JAMES DONNEGAN, M. D. Revised and enlarged by R. B. PATON. Pp. 1413. Boston and New-York.

It is now exactly forty years since the first publication in Germany of Schneider's "*Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch*," the earliest Lexicon which boldly ventured to throw aside the Latin as the medium of teaching Greek, and to adopt instead the student's mother tongue. It has proved a fruitful parent—its issue, "*magna diversaque Proles*." Since that time, vernacular Greek Lexicons have swarmed upon scholars. Years have done the work of ages. *Before*, generations—*now*, but months pass between successive editions; and, to bring the matter to a climax, in the month of August last, within two days of each other, came forth from the rival presses of New-York and Boston the two greatest works of this kind that American scholarship has as yet produced—Professor Drisler's bearing date the 18th, Mr. Pickering's the 20th of August, 1846.

Now this fact is one of deeper import than at first sight appears. It is not merely the enlarged current of a more studious age—students the cause, and books the result. On the contrary, the books were the cause, and the students the consequence. What we mean to say is this, The substitution of the vernacular for the Latin is the secret of the change. It was like striking a new vein, or opening a fresh fountain. It was a change that at once popularized Greek studies, by enabling the student to look at them directly through the medium of his own tongue, instead of giving him a feeble and distorted reflection from what may well be called a dull mirror—the student's imperfect knowledge of the Latin. Latin spectacles once taken off, youthful eyes saw clearer, the mist was removed, and the young scholar soon learned both to understand and admire what before he only admired how any one could understand. Such we hold to be the giant step taken in the "Wörterbuch" of Schneider. Nor are we left to *argue* its advantages. Experience has *demonstrated* them. Latin has been driven from the field—the vernacular has gained an overwhelming victory—not, as usual in great changes, young reformers slowly winning their way against sturdy old conservations, as Hume tells us of Harvey's great discovery of the circulation of the blood, which no physician in Europe, over the age of fifty, ever acknowledged. *Here*, on the contrary, old experience first followed—even the octogenarian pedagogue was seen to drop his Hedericus, or Schrevelius, and take up his Schneider as if by natural instinct. Such is the alacrity with which man obeys where nature and good sense lead the way. Since that time, both instructors and learners, German and English at least, have luxuriated, we may say, in the comfort of Greek Lexicons in their own mother tongue. Nor (to return to the question again) was the boy's ignorance of Latin the only objection to its use. With all its stately beauties, Latin is still a "cast-iron tongue," inflexible and unaccommodating; pre-eminently unfit, therefore, to represent the infinite graces of the language of the muses. Grecian thoughts in Latin words have always seemed to us like precious gems taken in plaster—you have the form, but not the power. All which gave it grace, delicacy, and expression, are gone. Nor let the admirers of Cicero or Lucretius quarrel with us for this judgment. We learned it from those very authors whom they admire. Lucretius himself bemoans "*egestatem linguæ*," the poverty of the language to which he was condemned, while Cicero's pages actually "bristle" with Greek words, simply because his own tongue furnished him with no equivalents. Even the very banner word

of his favorite philosophy (*ἐποχή*) he was forced to borrow from its native fountain—being unable, as he himself acknowledges, to translate it. Such was the Latin as a medium of Greek thought, even in master hands, and in its palmiest days; what, then, must it now be in the hands of modern lexicographers? But still the benefit of this exchange is very far from equal to all modern tongues. Germany, unquestionably, has the best bargain, because its “vernacular” approaches the nearest to that of Greece in all its high and varied excellences. If not (as the Greeks boasted) *αὐτογενής*, “self-born”—it is at least *ὁμογενής*, “self-compounded.” Its radicals are within itself, and therefore capable, like the Greek, of unlimited composition. This vast advantage, which it enjoys far beyond any modern tongue, fits it peculiarly to take the stamp of Grecian thought and art, while, with its infinitely diversified metres of both quantity and accent, it is obviously the only modern language which can even pretend to enter into rivalry with poets, “quibus,” as the Roman Martial enviously complains,—

“Nil erat negatum
Et quos Ἀρεῖς—Ἀρεῖς decet sonare.”

But we of Saxon race have at least the comfort of thinking that next to the German in this list stands the English, a language, which—with its double tongue, (*Britannia bilinguis*;) its Doric and its Attic dialects, affording synonyms of nicest distinction; its Saxon words of fresh vigor, and its Latin words of polished refinement—forms no contemptible rival even to its cousin German. Lowest in this scale comes the French tongue, which has been also latest to profit by the improvement, the antipodes of the Greek, both in freedom and harmony, in loftiness, as well as variety of expression: we have yet to learn what influence will be produced on its scholarship by the change. We cannot, we confess, augur well of a language which, in the hands of its master genius, brought forth a *Henriade*, as the nearest approach it could make to an *Homeric Iliad*.

But turning to our own western land, we too have taken hold of this new instrument; we too have laid our hand on the Grecian plough, and that not only with our characteristic zeal, but also with more than our characteristic success. The rapid advancement of not only American scholarship, but of high American contributions to Greek scholarship; and, above all, in the department of philology; is a fact as honorable to our scholars as it is unquestioned. In our wide, bustling, utilitarian land, it is a fact

perhaps as little known as cared for, but still it is one that begins to *tell* at home, and has already *told* sensibly abroad, in awakening respectful attention toward our country and its scholars. It is, in truth, a forward national impulse, just beginning to be generally felt; and one which, we doubt not, will, in the space of no very long time, (notwithstanding all our present deficiencies in libraries and learned endowments,) enable us to rival our German teachers, and perhaps outstrip our English ones.

Now this may sound very boastful—Anglice, American-like—but we speak it in no such spirit, but simply in a reasonable estimate of the future by the past, and of admitted causes, now actually in operation. In the first place, the American market for such works is growing, and must continue to grow, with a rapidity that distances all European competition. The recompense to scholarship will consequently advance in the same proportion, and thus call forth, as well as reward, the talent and industry needful for it. If learning be a marketable and profitable commodity, we may rest assured our country will not be backward in furnishing it. Under such patronage, too, libraries will spring up, giving to the scholar the needful books and endowments, affording to him the needful leisure. These both are the legitimate offspring of that love which comes from knowledge, when married to that wealth which comes from industry. Now of such fair progeny, in future time, we want no better proof than that afforded by the learned works whose titles we have given, in one of which, at least, all their elements prominently appear, namely, a generous love for that noble language in which Homer sung and Plato reasoned, turning into a laborious lexicographer one whom leisure, fortune, and taste seemed to have marked out as the patron of others' labors, rather than himself the drudge. But with the late Mr. Pickering, (alas that we must thus write him!) as with all true lovers, entire affection scorned meaner hands, and he himself became an humble laborer; for more than thirty years (the work having been begun in 1814, and but completed in 1846) an humble and patient, yet skillful, laborer in building for others' use the fair temple of American scholarship. Now this we say is a spirit of love and zeal, growing and spreading in our land. It is sowing the good seed broadcast over it, and out of it will come forth, at no distant day, a golden harvest—libraries for the scholars, and scholars for the libraries—learned endowments to give leisure, and worthy men to employ it aright. One further national characteristic, of which American scholarship already reaps the advantage, is the intermixture in it of German with

Saxon blood, adding, in our judgment, a new element of power to the classical scholar, and a new guaranty of success to his labors, and that more especially in the department now before us, of philological learning. How far this element has already contributed to the rank and reputation of American scholarship it is not for us to say; suffice it, it is well known as no foreign element in our highest names, nor a small ingredient in the merits of the first-named and greatest of the three Lexicons before us.

But to turn to that volume, the first-named in our list, our first thought of wonder on opening such a work is, how any human patience could stand the drudgery of its preparation, its seventeen hundred close-printed pages, and seventeen thousand articles, and perhaps one hundred thousand cited authorities. But the true solution quickly suggests itself—that no one man's industry or scholarship has effected it—that it has been, in truth, the product of a thousand minds and a thousand years—and that no one editor, however learned or laborious, can claim more than a very small fractional part of the whole merit. It has been a cumulative work, growing by slow accretion, even from the days of the Alexandrian critics; and he who has done most toward its completion has still but added his *one stone*, or cleared up the rubbish in *one little corner*. Such is the history of the Greek Lexicon of the present day, by whomsoever edited—its age runs back to the age of the Ptolemies. Still, however, there are special merits among lexicographers, and some of a higher order—such as from time to time break forth, throwing light on the true plan and principle of such a work, and adding, at once, largely and definitely to its practical value.

Before entering pointedly on the comparative merits of the works before us, it may be interesting to trace, succinctly, the rise and general progress of that on which they all rest.

When we look for the roots, and the beginning of the Greek Lexicons, we are carried back, as already observed, to the Alexandrian age, some two hundred and fifty years before Christ; the earliest grammatical, the latest literary age of Greece. We there find, not Lexicons, indeed, but the seed of Lexicons—*λέξεις*, collections of special words; and *γλῶσσαι*, glossaries of obsolete ones—sometimes confined to the examination of single authors, as *Ὅμηρικάί*, *Πλατωνικάί*, &c. Again, extending to classes, or styles of writing, as *νομικάί*, *ῥητορικάί*, &c.; but as yet nothing that can be regarded as a dictionary of the tongue. They who spoke the language needed no such work; and for barbarians the

Greeks labored not. The first step of enlargement beyond this narrow plan appears to have been taken somewhere in the third century of the Christian era, and first by one Diogenianus, an obscure grammarian, who combined several of the above into one: consolidated again by Pollux in his *Ῥομοαστικόν*, and still further enlarged in the celebrated compilations of Hesychius, and subsequently in those of the learned and virtuous Photius. The collections, again, of an unknown author, bearing the title of *τὸ μέγα ἐτυμολογικόν*, in the tenth century, and the so-called Dictionary of Suidas in the eleventh, with his critical and biographical notices, added fresh materials to the stock: until, at length, somewhere about the beginning of the fifteenth century, the more modern form was given to the work by arranging it in a *Greek and Latin Dictionary*. This was first done by one Joannes Crastonus, a Carmelite friar of Piacenza—and his lead was soon followed by several others. But we should much deceive ourselves if we were to identify this, or any other of the middle age Lexicons, with those of modern times; more especially with those of our own century. So long as these works were prepared by Greeks for Greeks, they comprehended only words of the less familiar anomalous parts of the language. The difficulties experienced by a foreigner in learning Greek, were no difficulties to them, and, therefore, were not explained nor included. With the fall of the Greek empire, (1453,) in fact, came the rise of critical learning; with the extinction of the language as a living tongue came the birth of that new science which was to teach it. Greek was first to be viewed and handled as something dead, before anatomy and analysis could do their office. Nor was it to be expected that such analytic science should be at once either complete or exact. It was, in truth, a matter of degrees, and a question of progress. Its early results were, therefore, rather “vocabularies” than “dictionaries,” being without plan, without method, without order, and without authorities—“rudis, indigestaque moles.” These grievous defects were first partially remedied in the Commentaries of Budaeus, the great restorer of classical learning in France; but soon fallen back into again in those put forth by Camerarius. The Lexicon of Constantine, also a Frenchman, (1564,) took a new step of advance by introducing the alphabetic arrangement of words; and eight years afterward, namely, 1572, that most learned of printers, and prince of Gallic scholars, Henricus Stephanus, (*Anglice*, Henry Stephens—*French*, Henri Etienne,) brought to completion his great Greek Thesaurus, the glory or the envy of his own age, and the admiration and storehouse of

each succeeding one. Looked at, however, as a *Lexicon*, and under the lights of a deeper philosophy than in his day was applied to language—the *Thesaurus* of Stephens must be held to be a mistake—a splendid one, we admit; but still a mistake in lexicography, of which assertion no further proof can well be needed than that afforded by the equally splendid failure of its recent English republication. It was not a true foundation to build upon. As its name imports, it was a *Thesaurus*, and not a *Lexicon*; and nothing short of a radical change could make it one. But still, even as it was, it had not in its republication a fair chance. Neither Valpy nor Barker had talents, or, it may be, learning for the task. The one certainly wanted skill; the other, perhaps, honesty in its fair execution; and their work fell still-born from the press—a monster, wanting reason: the age spurned it, and has already passed it by, so that it now stands like some huge boulder rolled out of place—useless where it lies, and only serving to mark the features of bygone days. The scholar often praises it, but seldom consults it; the student may have it on his shelves, but rarely, or never, opens it; nor, if he did, would he readily find what he looked for; nor if by chance found, could he depend with certainty upon its information. What will be the fate of the Paris edition of this great work, its republication in its native land, is yet to be seen. Under its higher auspices, it may not be a failure; but yet it is risking little to say, it will be, if Stephens's plan be adhered to, of no great benefit. As a *Lexicon*, it will be antiquated before it is completed; and German lexicography will prove, in the end, too strong even for French nationality.

But this brings us to the fountain head of our modern *Lexicons*, at least up to the present century, a new start made on a new track. The well-known Schrevelius, in 1654, first gave to the *Greek Dictionary* its modern form and arrangement—the alphabetical order of words—their etymology, various meanings, and dialectic variety, together with the leading inflexions of verbs and cases of nouns. On this model, most that follow have been based. It was enlarged in England by Hill; in France, by Vauvilliers and Lecluse; and in Germany, by Kritsch: and upon this special basis has come out, in our own country, repeated editions, in a greatly improved form, of the second-named *Lexicon* in our initial list, namely, that of Pickering.

But meanwhile, in Germany, a new and higher school of Greek learning was arising, bringing philosophy to bear on the analysis

of the language, and common sense on the best method of teaching it. Casting off ancient shackles, the question of a Greek Lexicon was taken up as a new question,—First, for what ends it was wanted; and, second, by what means these ends were to be attained. It was the opening up of this “ideal” of a Greek Lexicon that constituted, amid many defects of execution, the chief merit of the “Woerterbuch” of Schneider, whose second and improved edition came out in 1805, and third and last in 1819; and it has been by keeping strictly in view the same “Ideal” that all subsequent advances in it have taken place. In the same year with Schneider’s last edition, came out Passow’s first—taking a large step in advance—a second and third followed rapidly in 1825 and 1827; and a fourth and last in 1831, in which, dropping the name of Schneider, Passow carried out so fully these philosophic principles, as to leave little to those who have come after him—save to give greater accuracy and fullness to the executive part of his work. This has been done, with scholarlike ability in England, by Liddell and Scott, both of the university of Oxford, and in our own country, in the present year, by Professor Drisler, of Columbia College, New-York. We mention these two Lexicons, specifically, not as denying merit to others, but as being based, professedly and carefully, on the above work of Francis Passow, recognizing all his principles, and carrying out all his plan. Now, in this we think these editors have shown their wisdom; and we cannot, even apart from examination, but anticipate a vast difference in the value of modern Lexicons, according to the differing works they have chosen for their foundation; for in this, as in most other things, ἀρχὴ τὸ ἥμισυ.

But it may be asked, What are these boasted principles of ideal perfection thus authoritatively demanded in a Lexicon? We answer, They are such as spring from its uses, and are the demands of reason sitting in judgment on them. It asks but little philosophy to see and acknowledge what they are. They may be stated as follows, and we do state them the more formally as affording convenient tests by which to try the comparative merits of the rival Lexicons now before us. What reason demands, then, is this:—

1. That a Lexicon be a full, exact, and complete vocabulary of the language, containing, as far as may be, all that a student wants to know touching the word sought.

2. That it be, withal, compendious—giving the results of learning, not its processes—conclusions, not dissertations; in order

that the student's time be not wasted on that which he does not want.

3. That it be alphabetical in order, and single in its arrangement, that the student may turn to the word at once and with certainty, not hunting for it under its radical, nor doubtful in which of two alphabetical lists he is to find it.

4. That the explanation of words be in the student's vernacular tongue—with us, a "Greek and English," not "Greek and Latin Dictionary." In this, at least, all now agree.

5. That no generic meaning of a word be given without its distinct authority annexed—that the student may verify it if he will, and also such authorities classified, in order that the student may rightly estimate their relative value.

6. That the various generic meanings of a word be *numerically* arranged under it—made clear both to the eye and understanding, and following in a natural order, so that each word may be said to give (in the words of Passow) "its own history."

What constitutes *natural* order may, indeed, be made a question. Two choices are open, though differing more in terms than reality. 1. *The historical*, which begins with the Homeric and Hesiodic use—thence passes on to lyric or Ionic prose—thence to dramatic and Attic meaning, and concludes with the *κοινή διάλεκτος* of the Alexandrian and later age. This is one principle; or, 2. *The philosophic order*—beginning with the *literal* meaning of the word as its primitive, and proceeding, step by step, through all its transitive and metaphoric mutations. In either case, we would have, what most Lexicons want, "*lucidus ordo*." In the one case, a philosophic analysis of the word; in the other, its veritable history. As between these two, the latter is undoubtedly the true choice; the analytic is to be resorted to only when historic authorities fail.

Now if the above be conditions which reason demands to constitute a perfect Lexicon, they constitute, also, as evidently the true tests by which the comparative merits of any Lexicon may be tried. Let us so apply them to the three chief Lexicons now in the American market, between which scholars and teachers are called on to choose; and which choice it is well they should learn to make on reasonable grounds.

1. As to the question of fullness and completeness as a Greek vocabulary, so far as the "*prima facie*" evidence goes, of the number of articles, it is a comparison easily settled; and is, by all odds, in favor of Professor Drisler's. As to their comparative

accuracy, that is also an all-important element; but one not to be dogmatically settled by the casual examination of a reviewer. All we would say is, that no one can read Professor Drisler's modest account of his own devoted personal labor, (*vide* Preface,) without having awakened both respect for the untiring scholar and confidence in his faithful work.

2. Touching "compendiousness," that is, exclusion of all needless parade of learning, whether critical or speculative, no fault is to be found with any: the age has gone by that would bear it in such a practical work as a *Lexicon*. It was the millstone that sunk Valpy's *Thesaurus*, and will again swamp any work that falls into similar pedantry.

3. Alphabetic arrangement. This is also a common feature, now definitely settled in all *Lexicons* by manifest economy of time, labor, and thought; an arrangement necessary for the young student, and convenient for all, and therefore not likely to be again given up for any theoretic argument, however imposing, of radicals with their derivatives. The simplicity of use overrides all argument.

4. The same may also be said of vernacular interpretation—nature has settled this. English, married to Greek, is a union henceforth not to be broken.

5. Authorities given for each distinct meaning, and such authorities classified. To effect this was one of the special improvements, planned by Passow, and, to a fair degree, reached by him, namely, to give for every meaning the appropriate authority of some classic author, instead of that of the lexicographer, and, in so doing, carefully to discriminate (what his predecessors had huddled together) Ionic from Attic, and both from Alexandrian sanction—epic from lyric, and lyric from dramatic usage. Now it is easy to see, independent of actual comparison, the advantage, in this particular, that must be possessed by a *Lexicon* directly grafted on Passow—who made this a leading principle, over others based upon works that neither valued nor sought it—such as Hedericus, Schrevelius, and others. Nor, as before observed, can any subsequent care of editors altogether supply a radical want in the original stock on which they engraft their labors. Under this test the *Lexicon* of Professor Drisler ranks, unquestionably, first; that of Pickering follows, Patton's *Donnegan's*, though, in parts, very studiously modeled after Passow, yet unquestionably lowest. We give a case, taken at random, for illustration, therefore, rather than proof:—

DONNEGAN.	PICKERING.	DRISLER.
Ἀπεύχομαι, fut., ξομαι 1. αορ. ἀπηνξάμην, to pray or wish that something may not happen, to deprecate; to pray against, to execrate; to abhor, to detest, to ac- curse. Th., ἀπὸ, εὐχομαι.	Ἀπεύχομαι, fut., ξομαι, to deprecate, abhor, detest. Eurip. Hipp., 895; Aris- toph. Thes., 721.	Ἀπεύχομαι, fut., ξομαι, (ἀπὸ, εὐχομαι,) dep. mid., to wish away, to deprecate a thing, wish that it may not happen, τι. Eur. Hipp., 801, ubi v. Monk; ἀπ. τι τοῖς θεοῖς, to pray the gods it may not be, Plat. Legg., 687, D.; ἀπ τι μὴ γενέσθαι, Dem., also without μὴ, Id., 480, 15.—II. to reject, de- spise, τι, Aesch. Eum., 608.

Taking the above word as a sample, we see in Donnegan a crowd of meanings, but no one authority. In Pickering, one of its true meanings omitted, "*to reject*," and his two authorities, *undiscriminated*. In Drisler, we have four authorities cited in connection with their respective meanings; and one (from Aeschylus) exhibiting a meaning of the word not given by either of the other two.

6. We now come to our last and highest test, namely, the arrangement of the various meanings, together with their authorities, according to some clear natural law—one that shall throw light on the history and uses of the word—showing its origin, tracing its growth and changes, and thus giving sequence and order, and, consequently, clearness and force, besides furnishing the strongest links to memory, to what, without it, would be, more especially to the young, inextricable confusion. 'This we hold to be the true "ideal" of what a Lexicon should be, and the greatest merit of modern German lexicography. It has turned etymology into a science, elevated philology into philosophy, and associated it with all the higher studies of the intellect. In this improvement, all acknowledge Passow's work to have taken the lead, and given the model. His Lexicon was, in truth, an *era*—it brought order out of confusion, and by making each word its own history, made the sum total of the words the true history of the language. Under this light, the expanding stream of Grecian terminology assumes a new character, opens to our view like the course of some mighty river; first, we have it in its pure Homeric fountains, pouring forth fresh waters from their full urn—then in its sparkling lyric streams—then in its deeper philosophic flow—then in its Eolic and Doric branches, with their *colored* waters—then in its tragic tears and stateliness—until, at length, all unite and merge in the broad and equal current of an undistinguished

stream—κοινὴ διάλεκτος—the common mind of Greece. In such aspect does this improvement present itself—as the *crowning* excellence of a Greek Lexicon—THE test by which every new effort of scholarship is to be tried. How far it has been attained by any, may be a question; there can be none that, in proportion to its attainment, truth, beauty, and clearness, must be its results. It is, in truth, the very κόσμος of its own high philosophy—it is “order,” “beauty,” “design,” given to the unformed χάος—the ἐλὴ πρώτη of the mere plodding lexicographer; and as it is a high element, so to give it requires a mind of no ordinary powers, at once philosophic and learned. Now such mind Schrevelius had not, with his “unweeded garden;” nor Schneider, with his one-sided learning; nor Donnegan, with his unfaithfulness; nor Dunbar, with his Scottish, unmethodical scholarship. Oxford scholars were the first to appreciate and nationalize this idea in England; and in following them, Professor Drisler has consequently the merit of first engrafting it fully on American scholarship. In this, as well as most other points, he enjoys the advantage of having taken a superior basis for his own editorial labors. As before, so here, we take a word, “ad aperturam libri.”

DONNEGAN.

Διαφορά ὡς ἡ, difference, dissension, debate, controversy, profit; advantage, subst. of διαφέρω.

PICKERING.

Διαφορά, ὡς ἡ, a difference, diversity; contention, enmity, dissension, discord, a quarrel; εἰ καὶ μητρὶ διαφορὰν ἔχει, though he has a quarrel with their mother. Eurip. Med., 74, in logic, the specific difference. Fr. διαφέρω.

DRISLER.

Διαφορά, ὡς ἡ, (διαοίρω.) difference, distinction. Thuc. 3, 10, etc. 2. difference, variance, disagreement. Hdt. i, 1; also in plur., τὰς διαφορὰς διαρῥεῖν, καταλαμβάνειν, to settle differences, Hdt. 4, 23, 7, 9, 2; and so Thuc.—II. distinction, superiority, excellence, Plat. Tim. 23, A. Hence—III., advantage, interest, profit, and so,—2, money. v. διαφέρω II. διάφορος III.

Here, again, in Donnegan, we have a jumble of meanings without order, and without one authority cited. In Pickering, but one reference to many meanings, and one of those meanings needless, the “specific difference” being, in truth, the *real* difference, that is, “quo ad rem,” and, therefore, included under the first meaning given; two distinct meanings of the word are again omitted, namely, “superiority” and “profit,” with its secondary transitive, “money.” Now all these Professor Drisler gives both distinctly, and in their natural sequence.

We take another chance opening :—

DONNEGAN.	PICKERING.	DRISLER.
Μνηστεύω, fut., σω and ηστέω, to seek in marriage for another; to woo, to court, Theoc. xviii, 16, to bring about a marriage, Plat. leg. vi, Callim. iii, 265, to betroth Apollod.— <i>met.</i> , to sue for, to prosecute a suit, to bring about, or procure. Μνηστεύομαι, mid., to solicit in marriage for oneself, to woo, to court; <i>met.</i> , to prosecute a suit, to solicit, to bring about, conciliate, or procure. Plut. in Caes. Th. <i>μνύομαι</i> .	Μνηστεύω, fut. εὔσω, 1. a. ἐμνήστευσα, to sue for in marriage, to be a suitor. Eurip. Alc., 736; to be a match maker, or go between, to aspire to, to desire or seek for; to betroth one to another. Id. Elec., 313, acc. and dat.; mid. to woo for oneself, to court; to prosecute a suit, pass., <i>μνηστεύομαι</i> , to be asked in marriage; <i>μνηστεύειν γάμον</i> , to contract a marriage, Platt. Legg., vi, 773, B; pf. pass., <i>μεμνήσμεναι</i> , 1 a. pass., <i>ἐμνηστεύθην</i> , part. <i>μνηστευθείς</i> . Fr. <i>μνηστής</i> .	Μνηστεύω=μνύομαι, to woo, court, seek in marriage, c. acc., <i>γυναικα, θύγατρα</i> , Od. 18, 276; Hes. Fr. 73; <i>ἐμνήστευσε τὴν γυναῖκα ἀναλαβεῖν</i> , Xen. Hell., 6, 4, 37. <i>μν. γάμον</i> , Eur. I. A. 847; Plat. Legg. 773, B.; to woo and win, espouse, Theog., 1103; Theoc., 18, 6.—2, later in Act., to ask in marriage for another; and in mid., to woo for oneself—both in Apollod.—II., to promise in marriage, betroth, <i>τὴν θυγατέρα τινί</i> , Eur. El., 313, so <i>γάμον μνηστεύειν τινί</i> , to bring about a marriage for another, help him to a wife, Ap. Rh., 2, 511.—III. generally to sue or canvass for a thing, c. acc. <i>χειροτονίαν</i> , Isoc., 162, A.

On this word, all three Lexicons are full; but still “cum differentia.” Donnegan, with slovenly carelessness, repeats twice over the same *four* words and meanings, namely, *woo, court, bring about*, and *prosecute a suit*, besides carelessly beginning with a meaning evidently “derivative,” namely, *for another*—his authorities few, and beginning with the very latest age—*Theocritus*. Pickering is better; but still altogether wanting both in analytic and historic arrangement: but *two* authorities are given, namely, Euripides and Plato, and the later generic meaning of the word altogether omitted. In Drisler, on the contrary, we have, first, the threefold power of the word clearly discriminated to the eye—1. *To woo*; 2. *To betroth*; 3. *To canvass*. Then we have *nine* distinct authorities for its use, in place of the *two* of Pickering and *four* of Donnegan; and, lastly, we have those authorities following in historic order, beginning with Homer and Hesiod, and coming down to Isocrates and Apollonius Rhodius.

But we have done with extracts. Doubtless, *by searching*, the balance might be made to look more even. All we can say is, that the above examples have been taken at random, and present,

we think, a fair sample of the whole. If any doubt it, let them examine as fairly as we have done, and simply set down the result.

Among our own special grounds of preference, no one point weighs more with us than the peculiar prominence given by Passow, and those who have followed him, to the Homeric fountains of the Greek vocabulary. From our schoolboy days it has been our feeling, that not only were the Greeks a "Homeric people," but their language also a "Homeric tongue." Homer, "shade of a name" though he be, yet stands forth the representative of a power and a spirit to which, in the after ages of Greece, there was nothing similar and nothing second—at once the inventor and perfecter of its poetic mind, its poetic melodies, and its poetic language. To carry out this view was again our earliest experiment in education, and *that* years before Passow came out with his first essay. Our scheme was—throwing aside the Latin as a medium, in the case of a quick-minded and warm-hearted boy of some ten years of age—to cast him at once, as it were, into the ocean of Homer's greatness, to familiarize his ear to his noble rhythm, his heart to his tender thoughts, his imagination to his soul-stirring pictures, and his memory to his words; and only when thoroughly imbued with Homeric lore and love, to permit him to sail down the less pure stream; and we were satisfied with the experiment. Our present critical judgment on this point is not, therefore, one of hasty growth or partial friendship. We but hail in Professor Drisler, and in the principles he maintains, the learned and successful advocate of opinions that have "grown with our growth, and strengthened with our strength."

Before closing, we would look a little more directly into Professor Drisler's specific merits in this edition. The modesty with which he speaks of himself and his labors demands it from us. In this cumulative work he has at least added his "grain" to the "heap." His diligence has gathered somewhat that had been omitted by former editors. This is seen in the new articles added. His care has corrected somewhat that was left faulty. Hundreds of amended references attest his critical exactness, while his personal (*Preface*, p. xii) superintendence of the press has given to all a stamp of confidence which no ordinary proof-reader could give. His list of authorities consulted, has exhausted almost our patience to read—we are quite sure it would altogether do that of *our* readers—we therefore omit it. And, to crown the proof of untiring diligence, all this labor he has gone through, in addition to "his public duties in college and school, occupying six hours

of every day, apart from the necessary private preparation for those duties."—*Preface*, p. v.

But the one point on which he has ventured furthest on his own judgment, is the introduction into the *body* of the work of what is generally either omitted or given in an *Appendix*, under a separate alphabetic arrangement—we mean, the "proper names" of Greece—thus giving to his *Lexicon* somewhat of the use and value of a "classical dictionary." Now, as this is its most peculiar feature, (though not altogether without authority, Papé having somewhat carried out the same idea,) it demands from a reviewer a more special consideration. It is clearly a question that admits of two sides, as well as involves two distinct considerations: 1. How such arrangement *tells* on the practical convenience of the student; and, 2. How it accords with the appropriate and distinctive character of a dictionary of the language.

To the first question, at least, the answer is clear. It is obviously a manifest improvement, and was dictated by the editor's long practical experience. It simplifies the student's work, economizes both his time and labor, and saves him, moreover, many a disappointment (still rankling in *our* schoolboy remembrance) of hunting vainly in one list of our Hedericus, for what was to be found only in the other. Looked at in this light, (and this is its *true*, because its *practical*, light,) the editor may securely rest his justification on the united thanks of both scholar and teacher.

But as a question of high scholarship and philosophic arrangement, (the "ideal" of a *Lexicon*,) the decision is not so clear, or, rather, not so obvious; the *words of the language*, it may plausibly be urged, and the *facts of its history*, are things essentially different, each—*ἄλλο γένος*—demanding its own place and distinct alphabetic arrangement. But, in reply, we would ask: 1. As to the possibility of such separation, Can such line be strictly drawn? Can all the proper names of Greece be struck out, and yet carry nothing away with them of the language itself? Have we cut off nothing from the tongue of the people when we have cut off all those words which were at once deepest in their heart and oftenest on their tongue? their gods, their heroes, their poets, and their philosophers? let alone those names which must have been ever in their mouths—names of races, nations, places, tribes, mountains, rivers, cities? Suffice it to say, such strict rule of exclusion no lexicographer has ever ventured to carry out. The law then broken, the practice becomes a question of expediency, and, as such, is to be ruled by the convenience of the student, and settled, as here it is, by the authority of plain, practical men. But to

probe this question a little deeper,—Are such critics, we ask, sure that “proper names” are not also “common names,” and, therefore, words of meaning in the language? Has it never occurred to them that the names of gods, and heroes, and mountains, and streams, *may* be, nay, *must* be, remnants of the earliest tongue spoken by a people, and therefore not only words, but invaluable words, to the philologist and grammarian, as monuments of what the language once was, like “boulders” on some wide plain, marking the “wave course” from the mountains, or like “organic remains” to the geologist—the only veritable records that tell us of a world of words past away? We recommend these questions to such purists. To us, we confess, their answer seems a clear one. The historic names of every country are part of the primitive tongue of that country, and to the philosopher the most valuable part, because the most ancient, that part which links on to still older tongues. The heroic names of Homer are older, obviously, than the language of Homer. Whatever antiquity we assign to the poet or the poem, the heroes they celebrate are of still earlier date, and their names were familiar as household words when half of Homer’s words were as yet uncoined. Nor let any one say, “They are but names of fiction.” Not so; whatever be thought of their exploits, their names, at least, are genuine. The poet of a rude age may forge adventures, but not his hero. Him he must take, ready made, from the hearts, and tongues, and rude minstrelsy of the people whom he addresses, otherwise he would have no auditors. For ourselves, we could as soon doubt of our own personal existence as that of *Ἀγαμέμνων*, *Ἰφιδάμαντος*, *Ὀδυσσεὺς πολέμητις*—*Ἀχιλλεὺς ὠκὺς πῶδας*, or any other hero of the Iliad or Odyssey. These names are not of Homer’s creation, nor, in truth, Homer’s words. He received them, ready coined and stamped, from those of whom he so often speaks—*οἱ πρόσθεν ἀοιδοί*—“the minstrels before him,” as they had received them from their fathers—consecrated names—the sole remnant of Priam’s fated kingdom—such are *living* words. When town and tower come down, then *names* stand, the truest monument of those who bore them, “are perennius.”

But of this enough. If philosophy thus justifies what expediency had already demanded, the introduction of these names, there can be little doubt as to the verdict that will be rendered on this “quasi” original improvement in the Lexicon of Professor Drisler.

To one more point of this Lexicon, before closing, we turn attention, though to some it may appear a trifle. It bears the de-

cided stamp of a *Christian* editor. Holy names are in it, marked with appropriate reverence. Capitals attest the faith of him who uses them—witness *Χριστός, Λόγος*, &c. Touching this last word, we would add, that its spiritual or religious meaning, given but by the Oxford editors as a distinct meaning of the word, (III. 'Ο Λόγος, GOD THE WORD,) is as creditable to their scholarship as it is to their piety; for in such peculiar sense the word must be understood in Platonic, as well as Christian teaching. (Vide *Plat. Cont. Atheos*, *passim*.) Now this Christian character, however casual its exhibition can be in a Lexicon, we yet hold to be all-important even there, and will be, we think, highly operative ("ceteris paribus") in determining a choice. It is removing from classical studies one slur and one popular objection. It is laying the foundation for the Christian teaching of heathen authors. It goes to sanctify their perusal. It is, at least, keeping the banner of Christ "flying" over them; and the student walks unharmed so long as he sees that open recognition of his faith. We are much deceived if this little incidental trait in Professor Drisler's Lexicon (one wholly wanting where we should have expected to find it, in Professor Patton's *Donnegan*) do not tell powerfully with the American public in determining a preference. The time has gone by, we trust, never to return, when classical studies might stand divorced from the Christian faith.

We close with but one word of mere personal bearing. In the title-page of this work of learned and laborious diligence we hail, for the first time, the open appearance, before the public, of one long known in this his native city, as an unpretending scholar, working his way to the temple of fame, silently, patiently, yet, we think, surely, under the wise guidance of one already there established. He is now at length "déterré." His name is known by scholars, and will not soon, in his sphere, be forgotten. He is now fully entered on the "course," and in patient industry, minute accuracy, and conscientious fidelity, has at once placed himself among the favorites of the field. But among his deeper merits, is that evidently of an humble mind and a grateful heart. His debt of gratitude to Professor Anthon he acknowledges at large in his Preface, and so beautifully in his Dedication, that we are tempted to transfer it to our pages:—

"To CHARLES ANTHON, LL.D., Professor of the Greek and Latin Languages in Columbia College, this volume is most respectfully dedicated as a token of admiration for distinguished abilities zealously and successfully devoted to the elevation of classical learning in our country; a tribute of gratitude for instruction received in earlier years;

and a memorial of friendship which, commencing in the relation of professor and student, has existed unbroken during many years of almost daily intercourse, by his pupil and friend,

"THE EDITOR."

In conclusion, we have one little matter to quarrel with, though but a point of taste. We abominate in such a work all stars, *, parentheses, (), brackets, [], and obelisks, † ‡. It is, doubtless, a schoolboy prejudice, but still a well-founded one. They distract and puzzle the young student, have little or nothing to do with the scholar's needs, and lie only between the editor and his critics. In a future edition we counsel their omission. They have sprung, we know, from scholar-like modesty, not to claim another's merits, and not to mislead by unacknowledged authority. But by the time a new edition is called for, the editor's name, we doubt not, will give authority, so that the words added by him may be permitted to stand on their own merits, and when his *third* edition shall come forth, he may safely follow the example of his predecessors; and as Passow did by Schneider, and Liddell and Scott by Passow, so, too, may Professor Drisler slip his *leading strings*, and let his *own* name take its merited position on his *own* title-page.

M.

ART. V.—*A Treatise on Algebra, containing the latest Improvements. Adapted to the Use of Schools and Colleges.* By CHARLES W. HACKLEY, S. T. D., Professor of Mathematics and Astronomy in Columbia College, New-York. Harper & Brothers. 1846.

WHAT a stupendous achievement of the human intellect is the science of mathematics! From Thales, Pythagoras, and Euclid, what a magnificent advance! From small beginnings, from the most simple intuitions, have arisen the most complicated reasonings. And such is the nature of the science, that every mathematician reads the history of its growth in the history of his own intellectual development. If he ends with La Place, he must begin with Thales. The simple intuitions can never be laid aside. They are the everlasting starting-points of mathematical thought—the authority of the profoundest and most remote deductions.

The value of this science, of course, is not questioned, and yet we fear is not, generally, adequately realized. We call it a sublime study, a discipline of the mind in exact reasoning, the indispensable organon of various other and lofty sciences; and still we are

prone, mentally, to reserve that it may be dispensed with in certain forms of finished education, and that an intense devotion to it, or even very respectable attainments in it, are rather incongruous to a refined, elegant, and classical cultivation. With all its greatness it is, nevertheless, dry; and, although it leads to the comprehension of realities, it is too abstract and formal for minds that dwell amid the beautiful, or expatiate in the ideal fields of the imagination. The same, indeed, is said of philosophy in general; and many are the instances which are adduced to prove the withering influence of mathematical and philosophical abstraction over the finer powers of the mind. We have solitary and dreary chambers from whence the cheerful face of nature, the pleasant sunlight, and all sweet and familiar sounds, are shut out; we have a stern separation from social life, and everlasting absorption in diagrams and symbols, as the imagery of this self-immolation. Men of one idea are made to haunt our thoughts, whose very visages appear triangular, and whose bodies seem compressed into cubes. And then, even on the fields of severe reasoning, exceptions are taken, because, forsooth, the habit of reasoning with infallible certainty unfits the mind for reasoning where only probability is attainable.

Men of one idea are found everywhere, and wherever found are men of one idea. The everlasting politicians, political economists, poets, and fidlers, are abortions of men, no less than the everlasting mathematicians. We need a nobler standard of mental discipline. We need to remember that the same Milton who wrote *Paradise Lost*, wrote politics, divinity, and logic; that Dante was a soldier and a statesman as well as a poet; that Michael Angelo united in himself the painter, the sculptor, the poet, and the mechanician; that Schiller and Coleridge were great in philosophy as well as in verse. Where have we gained this doctrine, that the powers which God has made to coexist in the same mind, cannot be cultivated together; and that the knowledges which coexist in the universe of thought with beauty and melody, cannot be grasped by the human mind without destroying beauty and melody? The mathematics we believe to be indispensable to a thorough and right noble discipline of the mind in the intellectual functions, and not unworthy of consideration in the discipline of the æsthetical. The Greeks, in giving names, gave definitions and expounded uses. Well, therefore, did they call this science *τὰ μαθήματα*, which, adequately translated, would be something like this,—*knowledges which beget the power and habit of knowing*.

As a discipline of the attention, it is pre-eminent. The mathematics demand and hold the attention through long-continued, diffi-

cult, and most exact processes of reasoning, where the truth is presented with the sharpest and most delicate edge. Here wandering thought is impossible—here the mind must concentrate its intellectual force. If the superiority of Newton, according to the remark he is said to have made of himself, consisted in the power of long-protracted and energetic attention, we are at no loss respecting the studies by which that power was perfected.

The remark to which we have alluded, respecting the unfitness of a strictly mathematical discipline to subjects where the calculation of probabilities forms the main element of the reasoning process, while it may be justly questioned in itself, since even the calculation of probabilities often demands to be subjected to the mathematical organon, and perhaps is never wholly independent of it, is a remark which appears quite irrelevant, when we consider the nature of mathematical reasoning in general. The process here is strictly a process of deduction from first principles intuitively perceived; a deduction made by a most rigorous adhesion to the syllogism: in other words, it is the purest and most lucid deduction possible. Now we cannot conceive how the most perfect reasoning of this kind can unfit the mind for deductive processes on other subjects. On any subject, the value of our deductions must consist in their clearness and truthfulness—in their syllogistic accuracy. Mathematical discipline, therefore, by begetting this accuracy in a pre-eminent degree, is the discipline to be sought for above all others. We shall look about in vain for any substitute for geometry in enabling us both to comprehend the nature of deduction, and to perform its processes with rapidity and unerring skill.

When reasoning on subjects into which probabilities enter largely, there are other processes besides deduction. There is minute and accurate observation; there is a comparison of phenomena for the purpose of combining the like, and eliminating the unlike; there is the inductive process; and deduction may enter only occasionally into particular parts of the complex ratiocination, or may appear at the end as the winding up of the whole consecution. The truth is, that reasoning is not made up merely of deduction; but where deduction does appear, it must ever follow the laws of the syllogism. It therefore must hold good that the mathematics, and geometry in particular, as embracing the most rigid and beautiful deductions, cannot be regarded otherwise than as affording the most important discipline in this department of reasoning.

But it is not only in respect to deduction that mathematical studies serve to discipline the intellectual functions. There are often curious inductions to be performed as tentative processes upon

the general realities of quantities, preparatory to the determination of universal laws. The determination of the binomial theorem by Newton is an example of this kind. That most important function, too, the function of invention, is most conspicuously brought into action both in the solution of problems, and in those loftier processes by which the methods of the higher analyses are arrived at,—such as Newton's and La Grange's method of approximation, and the celebrated theorem of Sturm.

Indeed, whatever be the form of the process, it is this very property of exact definition, of determined thought, of unerring reasoning, of truth gained with the strongest confidence and the fullest satisfaction, which constitutes its great value in developing and sharpening the intellect. As the eye in the purest light, and amid the most transparent atmosphere, realizes most perfectly its visual capacity; so in this region of pure truth the intellect learns its strength, and the certainty of its thought. It here believes that it was constituted to know, and that knowledge is no illusion. And the confidence gained in the higher region will not forsake it when it descends to a lower: as the eye removed to a murky light will still believe itself to be the organ of vision, and will strain itself to collect the scattered rays, so the intellect, removed to more imperfect conditions, will still rest in itself as the faculty of perception, and strive, according to the laws which it has already revealed to itself, to grasp what knowledge may here lie within its reach.

The æsthetical relations of the mathematics have not been much considered in disquisitions of this character, and yet we cannot but think they are quite apparent. This infinite space around us is drawn in all directions with geometrical lines, wherein move suns and planets, as they figure to us the splendors, the beauty, and the harmony of creation. The forms of all created things are drawn by the same lines; and that relation of parts which constitutes their symmetry, and, of course, their beauty, is a relation determined by mathematical proportion. It is true, indeed, that the manifold forms of beauty in the world, rising up from the most minute and delicate textures to displays vast and magnificent, baffle our skill in determining their exact laws under appropriate formulas; but we have reason to believe that the flowers of the field, no less than the stars of light, are permeated by the same geometrical forecast. Light moves in the nicest lines and makes its angles with geometrical precision; and the sunshine, poured with such apparently wild profusion upon the careless showers, pierces the drops with unerring nicety, drawing upon the clouds the arch of the rainbow, as with compasses which cannot deviate from the

radius to which they are stretched, and painting the gradations of colors with such beautiful softness, that every tint has its measure determined by a law no more subtle than exact.

The mathematics which express the laws of light, express also the laws of sound, and the richest and most complicated music, like the illuminated showers of heaven, are governed by this mighty and harmonizing organon. Poetry flows in measured numbers; architecture is an art based upon proportion, and requires a knowledge of what the old Greeks called the *sublime geometry*, embracing conic sections; painting owes its power of representing reality to the geometry of perspective; and sculpture achieves its marvels by chiseling sharply the lines of symmetry and proportion. And when we come to examine the interior constitution of material substances, and attempt an explanation of their changes and various compositions, we are surprised again by the presence of the same mathematical thought; and the science of chemistry becomes a science of definite proportions.

Are we not then compelled to the conclusion, that the infinite mind of the Creator was pervaded by this pure science as eternal and necessary thoughts; that when he made the world he set his compasses upon the deep, and weighed the mountains in scales and the hills in a balance; and that the beauty of the world, no less than its stability, depends upon the geometry of its structure?

"It is a great error to suppose that enthusiasm is incompatible with mathematical truths; the contrary is much more true. I am persuaded that there are problems of calculation, of analysis, in Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Euler, which suppose as much intuition and inspiration as the finest ode of Pindar. Those pure and incorruptible formulas, which were before the world was, which rule all time, all space, which are, so to speak, an integral part of God,—those sacred formulas, which will survive the ruin of all universes, place the mathematician who merits the name in deep communion with the divine thought. In these immutable verities, he tastes the unmingled purity of creation, he prays in its tongue. Like him of old, he says to the world, 'Keep silence, we shall hear the murmur of the gods.'"—*Prof. E. Quinet*.

With our views of the importance and interest of mathematical science, we cannot be indifferent to scholarlike attempts to facilitate and promote its thorough cultivation by the preparation of text-books particularly designed for the youth of our country.

The work of Professor Hackley embraces that branch of mathematics which in modern times is taking precedence of every other. Algebraic analysis is now applied almost universally in determining

the relations of quantity; and, on account of its greater facility, even takes the place of the geometrical methods in departments where these had been most successfully applied. This extended application is owing in a great measure to the labors of Descartes, Euler, La Grange, La Place, Gauss, Courch, and others occupying the same elevated rank as mathematicians. It has for some time been a desideratum to have the improvements of the later mathematicians imbodyed in a work of convenient magnitude, and with such clearness as to make them available in the courses of instruction in our public institutions. For the preparation of such a work, there is required a high and peculiar order of talent—a thorough mathematical discipline; a power of grasping the whole science as a clear and distinct unity into which all the parts flow harmoniously; a happy tact in arranging and presenting the parts, so that the consecution shall strike the learner luminously; a logical readiness in explaining abstruse points, so as to awaken in the mind of the learner the process of ratiocination, as if it grew out of his own thoughts; and a certain simplicity and colloquiality of style which can be acquired only by long familiarity with teaching in the lecture-room. This desideratum Professor Hackley, in the work before us, has undertaken to supply. From an examination of his *Algebra* we are led to believe, what we indeed anticipated from the known character of his mind, the extent of his attainments, and the habits of his life, that he has been eminently successful; and has proved himself to possess that very order of talent which we have just described.

The feature of the book which first strikes us upon opening it, is its completeness. There is scarcely any subject in algebra which is not treated of with a fullness and clearness to afford satisfaction even to a ripe scholar. We anticipate that some hasty critics will be likely to make its very completeness an objection, and will adjudge that it is not sufficiently elementary and popular. Had we space we should be inclined to say much respecting the demand made for popularizing everything, as if a science can be forced out of its legitimate sphere and reduced to a standard of ignorance and imbecility. We believe that a science can be properly treated only according to its nature, and can be made no plainer than its subject matter will admit of. A popular algebra, a popular logic, a popular geometry, are words most unhappily associated, if we mean by this that these pure and sublime sciences can be squared to the measure of miscellaneous and unthinking readers, to the habits and tastes of sciolists, and can be so offered up to the public as to relieve any from the necessity of severe

study. Any attempt of this kind would be sheer intellectual empiricism, and would only flatter its subjects into a belief of attainments, the fallaciousness of which their real ignorance alone would prevent them from detecting. A science becomes transparent and satisfactory only by being mastered; and he is the true teacher who enables us to reach this.

Now, we believe that the completeness of this work will constitute one of its greatest recommendations; it will enable the learner to master the science. We grant, however, that algebra may be studied in part with a clear understanding of elementary principles, and that a brief work may be compiled for the use of such as do not wish to enter the region of the higher analyses. And Prof. Hackley has provided for this. He has discussed the first elements with an amplitude and clearness which give his work, considered as an elementary one, a superiority to every other that has fallen under our notice. Indeed, when we speak of its completeness, we refer no less to the simplest and most elementary parts, than to the remoter and higher developments of the science. In order more perfectly to adapt it to different grades of students, he has, by a felicitous arrangement of the sections, been enabled at the beginning to indicate three distinct courses of study, any one of which is as easily available as if the courses were imbodied in three separate volumes. He has indicated, first, a *minimum* course, which is strictly elementary: secondly, a *more enlarged* course, adapted to the wants of collegiate instruction: thirdly, a *full* course, embracing the whole volume, and adapted to the wants of those who wish to grasp the science throughout. The work, therefore, compared with ordinary Algebras, is just what Liddell and Scott's lexicon is to a school lexicon, compiled for reading only certain authors. The more copious lexicon, to say the least, is just as well adapted for an ordinary school lexicon, while it superadds the merits of a *Thesaurus*.

In compiling such a work, much evidently depends not only upon the arrangement, but also upon the manner in which each part is disposed of in its place. Prof. Hackley has, in this respect, shown a singularly good judgment.

Under the usual head of definitions and notations, with which, of course, the work opens, he has at once given the definition with such fullness, that the attention of the student need not afterward be distracted by returning to this subject, when he is engaged in unraveling important analyses, and in solving problems. Following this, we have a complete discussion of the forms and combinations of algebraic quantities before employing them in equations.

We are much pleased to find introduced here every variety of symbol belonging to the science. By this means the student early becomes familiar with algebraic language, and one kind of difficulty is at once disposed of. Besides the greater neatness of this method, it insures an adequate treatment of all preliminary matters, which, when postponed to the several parts where they require to be employed in analytical processes, are prone to be dismissed in a cursory manner, through the natural impatience on the part of an author of returning to elementary things, when taking in hand the loftier parts of a subject.

It belongs to the same method to give, in the earlier portions of the treatise, demonstrations of rules, and expositions of principles in marginal notes, so as to leave the rules themselves and the subjoined examples bare and distinct. Afterward this is omitted, when the student may be presumed to have become sufficiently familiar with algebraic forms and reasoning, not to be embarrassed by having the whole worked together on the body of the page.

Our author has completed each subject in its proper place, anticipated and provided for difficulties as they naturally arise, and, with unusual tact, said just enough in the way of explanation. Elementary principles are thoroughly cleared up, and the way thrown wide open for an advance into the heart of the science.

Prof. Hackley has not aimed so much to make an *original*, as a *useful* work. In his Preface he remarks :—

“No attempt has been made at originality, unless for the benefit of the student, and in the belief that the existing expositions or processes were inferior. The object has simply been, by any and all means, to make the best book, without aiming so much at individual reputation as at the author's own convenience and that of others, devoted, like himself, to the noble task of guiding the youthful votaries of science.

“The French treatises furnish excellent models of the theory of algebra; the German, of ingenuity, and brevity of notation and exposition; the English, of practical adaptation, and variety of illustration and example; and from these, after a careful comparison of many authors in each language, demonstrations have been selected and introduced verbatim, when they seemed incapable of improvement; but whenever the slightest alteration or amalgamation, or the entire remodeling of them, could give additional clearness or elegance, the *limé labor* has not been spared.”

Now we think this course deserves the highest commendation: for whatever may be the ability of an author to treat of all the subjects embraced in such a work with entire originality, the course of education certainly will be much more advanced by a digest of the treatises of various eminent mathematicians. The great im-

provements made in the science are not only thus brought from a variety of sources within the reach of every student, but are, also, by the comprehensive judgment of one mind, and the plastic labor of one hand, reduced to unity of form and method. The various subjects are arranged with particular reference to convenience and clearness, and the analyses are happily applied to practical uses. It is not the work of one mind to build up one vast science by its own original thinking; but it is the work of one mind to digest the mass of details into a convenient compendium for the purposes of education. Men of genius, in different countries and periods, slowly do the first: when that great work is completed, some patient laborer, some man of practical experience and foresight, casts up to do the last. This patient laborer is no less a benefactor than those who have prepared the way for him; and how morally great does he appear, if he voluntarily resign the charm and merit of original investigation for the work of making the labors of others available to the community! He might distinguish himself by inventing a new method, by developing a new and recondite analysis; but he prefers to apply to useful ends what has already been successfully accomplished. There are many cotemporary authors who have successfully and praiseworthily labored in this department. Among these, at least, Prof. Hackley must hold an eminent place. To verify, in some measure, our judgment of the merits of his digest, we shall make a few references.

The whole subject of division is presented with great elegance and clearness. The examples are numerous, and selected with a nice judgment in reference to exercising the skill of the pupil. Here he has introduced many examples with literal exponents and literal coefficients: the law of quotients, when they become infinite series, is given: division by detached co-efficients, and the method of synthetic division by Horner, are presented with great simplicity and beauty. We observe here in the margin, a very neat and concise demonstration of Horner's method. Let any one compare this with the demonstration given in Hutton's Mathematics, and the improvement will be obvious.

The subjects of the greatest common measure, and the least common multiple, are properly placed after division, and treated in a manner to make them easily and perfectly intelligible to the young pupil. The whole subject of radicals, the clear understanding of which is so important to the student in the higher equations, is early introduced, and cleared up most successfully by lucid explanations and appropriate examples. Fractional and negative exponents, which are so apt to embarrass the pupil, are here strip-

ped of much of their forbidding aspect, and made an intelligible language to ordinary capacity united with diligence.

On pages 64 and 242 imaginary quantities are resolved with great neatness and clearness.

On pages 100–107 the binomial theorem is determined inductively, according to Newton's method, and at once applied to series and roots. On page 108, after the way has been sufficiently prepared, the demonstration is given. This immediate application of the theorem is a happy conception: it gives interest to the theorem itself, and introduces the pupil naturally to a new and important subject. The demonstration on page 108 is given with a rigor which some mathematicians have regarded as impracticable. We cannot avoid calling attention, in connection with this, to the demonstration of the polynomial theorem on page 109—remarkable alike for its conciseness and elegance. Then follows a neat demonstration of the method of extracting the root of a polynomial.

That most important subject, ratios and proportion, a thorough comprehension of which is essential, indeed, to all mathematical reasoning, is treated of with unusual brevity and transparency, and examples subjoined which serve both to apply the doctrines and to convey useful and interesting information.

We have noticed, as improvements in treating of equations, that a variety of letters are employed to represent unknown quantities, and that elimination by common divisor is introduced in simple equations. The general discussion of equations of the first degree, page 173, is exceedingly satisfactory. In connection with this we have presented new symbols of indeterminate equations, page 177, and extended, page 178, to two or more unknown quantities.

The method of undetermined co-efficients is developed with an important improvement: the exponent is not assumed, as is ordinarily done, but is taken indeterminate, also, and then the relations are afterward proved, and the values afterward deduced.

Next in order, the subject of logarithms is taken up, and very lucidly discussed. Here, at once, a short auxiliary table is given for constructing general logarithmic tables, and its theory and use explained. Then follow a variety of analytic exercises in which logarithms are involved. After this the practical use of the tables is copiously explained, and a specimen page from *Callét* is given at the end of the volume, as an illustration. Here a variety of exercises are appended. Gauss's system of logarithms, designed exclusively for sums and differences, is then introduced; and finally the calculation of the common and Naperian logarithms by series.

Progressions are next discussed. Under this, what may, perhaps, be fitly called the historic origin of logarithms is explained.

The general theory of equations is much improved in the notation and brevity of the demonstration. Sturm's celebrated theorem, which is so blind in late treatises which have attempted to explain it, is restored to its native beauty and transparency by following strictly the author's own method. Prof. Hackley has here evidently consulted the original, instead of relying upon second-hand expositions.

Binomial equations, a subject of great importance, but usually slighted, is introduced and amply treated. It is worthy of notice, also, that cubic and biquadratic equations are treated in a very simple and analytic manner, with trigonometrical solutions of both the reducible and the unreducible case.

Thus far we have considered Prof. Hackley's work simply as a digest. In this point of view, indeed, we wish mainly to consider it; for it is in this that its great value consists, and in which the author intended it to consist. But so astute a mathematician must, in spite of his own modest intention, cause his work to be pervaded by lines of original thought, as well as give original modifications to the thoughts of others. We should do injustice to the author, therefore, did we not touch upon his performance in this point of view likewise. We would call attention, therefore, briefly to several particulars. The introduction of Horner's method of synthetic division is an important improvement in itself, but the explication of it is the author's own; we have already alluded to this, and we mention it here again for the sake of remarking its originality.

Indeterminate analysis of the first degree, page 186, and indeterminate analysis of the second degree, page 240, are very creditable examples of the author's original analytical power. The examples subjoined to the first are happily selected—they are not merely curious, but embrace solutions of practical utility. We refer also to maximum and minimum values, page 242. On pages 244–6, the method of Mourey for avoiding imaginary quantities is most ingeniously and clearly explained. In permutations and combinations new forms of notation, exceedingly convenient, are introduced, together with various modifications of the ordinary problems and formulas. The application of this subject to a variety of others, and especially to the calculation of probabilities, is also worthy of notice. The explanation of Gauss's formulas, involving sums and differences, is, we believe, new in an English dress, having been hitherto confined to German works.

After logarithms and progression there is given a very full set of formulas and rules for interest and annuities in which logarithms are applied. These tables are of great practical utility.

The important subject of interpolation is treated of in the best manner we have ever met with: also, that every equation has a root, page 203; and the subject of conjugate equations.

Another improvement is the application of Horner's method of synthetic division to the depression of roots of equations, page 316; and, in connection with Sturm's theorem, to approximations to the roots of higher equations, very rapidly, to any required number of decimal places, pages 334-338. The determination of the imaginary roots of the higher equations, page 384, and the theory of vanishing fractions, are new in an elementary treatise, and ingeniously expounded.

Our author has made improvements on the theory of elimination in higher equations, by Labatie, worthy of remark.

We call attention, also, to difference series, and a most ingenious method of applying them to determining the places of roots in the higher equations, pages 416-18; to the subject of variation, pages 425-7; to the elimination of symmetrical functions, page 436; to a new method of solving the cubic equation, by a young American; and to a simple, but very complete, exposition of the diophantine analysis, page 457.

The work concludes with an article on the theory of numbers, in which an attempt is made to give a brief explication of this extensive subject, both as treated by Legendre and others, and according to the peculiar method of presenting it adopted by Gauss. The nature of primitive roots is explained, and the Gauss method, depending on them, of solving binomial equations of all degrees. Full references are here given to larger works.

The subjects here referred to will be found generally to contain much that is new to ordinary students, extracted from eminent mathematicians of different countries, and pervaded by the author's original conceptions and modifications.

The critique we have ventured to make on Prof. Hackley's *Algebra*, we confess, aims rather to point out its excellences than to seek for its defects. This last and less gracious work we will leave to other hands. We believe that where a work has commanding merits, a greater favor is done to the public on its first introduction by leading them properly to appreciate it, than by engaging their attention to curious criticisms upon doubtful points, or by making a parade of the reviewer's skill in noticing narrowly those defects which are incidental to the best attempts. We are

decidedly of opinion, also, that a candid and thorough examination of the work will bring before the mind so much to admire and commend, that, as in our own case, there will be little disposition to mark faults which the author's own judgment and skill are adequate to correct in subsequent editions.

ART. VI.—*Twenty-seventh Annual Report of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church.*

WERE we called upon to designate that event upon which future ages are likely to look back as vastly the most important in the history of the last hundred years, we should refer to the revival and new development of missionary enterprise. This opinion we should announce without hesitation; having at the same time a lively recollection of other stupendous facts, which have made the period referred to one of the most memorable of the great historical epochs embraced in the annals of our race—of the struggle of our forefathers with the power of Britain, which gave birth to a great nation, and ushered in a new political, social, and religious economy—of the French Revolution, which swept with volcanic fury over half the civilized world, overturning and rearing thrones, subverting and re-constructing human society throughout enlightened empires—of the Reform Bill and Catholic emancipation, which have resulted in making essentially popular the essentially aristocratic government of the most wealthy and powerful nation on earth—of the abolition of slavery in the West Indies, by which eight hundred thousand bondmen were made free—of the extension of the British East Indian empire over a population of one hundred and twenty millions—of the introduction of China into the family of nations, and the free advent into the bosom of her incredible population, which may thus be given to social, moral, and economic meliorations, hitherto unknown and impossible to her narrow, bigoted civilization. We by no means affect to undervalue the importance of these great events, which have produced radical and durable, and, we verily believe, beneficial changes in the lot of the largest portion of the human family. We are quite satisfied that ours is, all things considered, the happiest of countries. We think it demonstrable that Frenchmen of the present generation, as well as the people of several other European nations, are enjoying the good fruits of their bloody revolution. We are believers in human progress, and wait hopefully to see the emancipated slaves of Ja-

maica and Barbadoes grow into virtuous, industrious communities, reflecting honor upon the liberal policy that broke their chains, and demonstrating to a more timid and wary philanthropy, that the spread of human liberty in all its forms is ever favorable to the true interests of society. It is nearly certain that the teeming populations of the East find the oppressive taxation to which civilized rule subjects every article of property, every branch of industry, and every form of life, somewhat less intolerable than the perpetual revolutions, spoliations, and massacres to which they were, from generation to generation, exposed under the subverted dynasties; and a few years of free trade and amicable relations will probably efface from the minds of the Chinese all bitter recollections of the forced importation of opium, and the bombardment of their commercial metropolis,—the rather ominous harbingers of these blessings in reserve. These statements do but partial and inadequate justice to the value of those political and social changes which, within a period not extending back beyond the memory of men now living, have produced, sometimes by violence, sometimes by peaceable means, a marked and beneficial revolution in the condition of our species. In making these concessions, however, we mean only to magnify the missionary enterprise, for which we have claimed at the outset a decided and manifest superiority over all other agencies and plans of reform. Political convulsions are wont to exact a fearful compensation for the scanty and often tardy blessings which they bring in their train. The revolution which sweeps away ancient abuses, and smooths the way for national improvement and social progress, usually sacrifices one or two generations to its wrath. Wars, which subvert cruel despotisms and disenthral enslaved nations, sow for their distant and doubtful harvests in fields enriched with precious blood, and watered by bitter tears. England came out of the French Revolution the sole unscathed victor, and her triumphs have entailed upon her oppressed population pecuniary burdens which consign millions to hopeless pauperism, while the boldest of her politicians dares not promise to remove, or sensibly to alleviate, them for this or any coming generation. After the lapse of thirty years the victory of Waterloo still enhances the price of bread to the Irish peasant, and makes heavier the burden of the Cooly on the banks of the Ganges and at the foot of the Himalaya. Unlike the convulsions and changes to which we have referred, the missionary enterprise, as “the blessing of the Lord, maketh rich and addeth no sorrow.” Without shedding one drop of blood—without a single act of oppression, or extortion, or cruelty—without carrying distress into

the bosom of a single family, the unostentatious labors of the missionary have, we are bold to affirm, achieved more and greater temporal benefits, and for greater numbers, than have resulted from all the political changes which have made up the history of the present generation and of that which preceded it. As to the emancipation of slaves both in the East and West Indies, this was confessedly a direct result of the missionary enterprise. The philanthropic efforts of self-denying men prepared the degraded bondmen for the enjoyment of freedom, while their earnest appeals aroused the public mind of Britain, and so insured the triumph of this measure in parliament; and now that this great melioration, achieved by missionary efforts, has obtained the recognition and the guaranties of law, the task of watching over the liberated serfs and conducting them onward in their transition from the weakness and degradation entailed upon them by their former condition, to the intelligence, virtue, and manliness, that befit their higher destiny, is by general consent intrusted to the same Christian agencies, as alone competent to check the vicious tendencies inherent in such a revolution, and to implant and fortify the great conservative principles, without which personal and civil liberty is incompatible with the happiness, and even the existence, of society.

Brief as is the history of missionary labors, it affords us the means of forming a just estimate of the comparative efficiency of Christian and merely political and economical agencies, in promoting the well-being of nations. During a period which extends back beyond the first inception of existing missionary efforts, the successive governments of England have been incessantly laboring to quell the discontents and remove the grievances of Ireland, and raise its degraded population from the misery and turbulence which distinguish the masses of that unhappy country. On the prosecution of this herculean work all the resources of a great empire have been lavished, and all the expedients of legislation have been tried. Millions have been expended in gratuities, and millions more in the maintenance of soldiers and policemen, for the prevention of crime, and the preservation of order. Immense public improvements have been executed. New privileges and franchises have been granted; and the emancipation and reform acts have poured their healing influences upon the irritated public mind. As the result of all these efforts, we now see a wretched population doomed, in a land proverbially fruitful, to experience the horrors of periodical and almost yearly famine. The populace are exasperated against the government that labors so assiduously for their relief—are prone to rebellion and to violence, and there is no longer

any security for property or life, while the prospect of better days recedes from the approach of every new scheme of relief and improvement. England had already been engaged for half a century in her Sisyphean labor of Irish reform, when two American missionaries planted themselves on the Sandwich Islands, then peopled by a race of savages and idolaters, tainted with the vices and debased by the thralldom that ever belongs to the condition which those words describe. In the five and twenty years that have since elapsed a change has come over the face of these realms of barbarism. The savage idolaters are transformed into Christian men, who cultivate the earth and live in commodious habitations, and enjoy the protection of good laws and a regular administration, and who worship the true God in decent temples. They have a written language in which the Bible is published, and an infant literature, while the rising generation receives the elements of common education in well-conducted schools. All this has been quietly achieved by imparting new ideas, and awakening new emotions, without blood or violence, and at a pecuniary sacrifice less than the yearly pay of the thinnest regiment whose bayonets preserve the peace in Ireland. There is no want of other examples, less striking, perhaps, but equally pertinent, to demonstrate the great superiority of the missionary over all other reformatory processes. Several tribes of American Indians have been raised by missionary efforts alone to a social and economic position, decidedly more elevated than that of the depressed classes in some of the freest countries in Europe. In France and Belgium, where so much blood has been poured out in contests for liberty, and where theoretically there is no want of liberal institutions, the great body of the laboring classes, beyond the walls of Paris and some other large towns, are practically where they were in the days of the elder Bourbons; the reform, such as it is, not having penetrated deep enough, or not having found the ideas and morals necessary for the development of rational liberty. It is, indeed, a prevailing opinion, freely expressed by mere politicians and statesmen in France itself, as well as in other parts of Europe, that the great obstacle in the way of free institutions and of valuable progress in that country is the want of Christian principles and morals. We are fully satisfied of the soundness of this opinion; and we venture to add the expression of our belief, that the few obscure missionaries, maintained in France by the Wesleyans since the beginning of the present century, have done more to prepare the mind and the heart of that interesting people for the practical realization of freedom, than did the expulsion of Napoleon

and Charles the Tenth, or the advent of Louis Philippe and the Chart of July. To an extent which will never be fully known and acknowledged till the day which reveals all secrets, have these devoted servants of Christ aroused and leavened the slumbering Protestantism of France. This has in its turn acted powerfully upon the great Catholic community with which it is everywhere in contact, till, together, the two antagonist forms of the Christian faith have put a sensible check upon the reigning infidelity, and made some progress toward a successful assertion of the claims of the Christian code of morals. This reference is made to a single class of missionaries, with no intention to disparage the efforts of others; but in a firm persuasion that their labors are not justly appreciated, at least in this country, and with some right to express the opinion that the Wesleyans in France, while they have been chiefly useful in awakening the native churches to greater zeal and effort, exhibit pre-eminently in their own scattered societies the very highest, purest examples of Protestant Christianity, especially in the virtue so rare in that country—the sanctification of the sabbath.

We cannot dismiss the train of reflections that crowd upon us in contemplating the missionary enterprise, in the performance of this, its lower and merely secular function, without expressing our entire belief in the comprehensive underlying truth, of which the facts and arguments that have been adduced are only special instances and illustrations. It is, that the gospel is the great, and, in a very important sense, the only civilizer. What nation or tribe of men has, during the last eighteen hundred years, advanced from barbarism to a state of civilization and refinement by any other agency? Will commerce enter the lists, and dispute the claims of Christianity? Africa has been its undisputed field of experiment for centuries; and what besides the diseases and vices of civilization has the trafficker left behind him on those barbarous shores, in return for gold-dust, ivory, and the “souls of men?” Portugal, Holland, and England, have grown opulent on the precious merchandise of the East; but we have not yet heard of the nation or savage tribe which the trader has been able to reclaim from the ignorance, and vices, and gross barbarism of their ancestors. Government and wise laws, embodying as they do several of the conservative maxims of religion, have proved somewhat more efficient than commerce, as instruments of human progress; but the instructive example of Ireland proclaims the impotency of the most enlightened code and the purest administration to regenerate an ignorant, degraded race. Government and law have to do with the actions of men, and these constitute the sphere of their operation

and the well-defined limits of their power. But the malignant disease of barbarous, pagan man, has its seat in his gross habits, and debasing prejudices, and low appetencies, and inherited depravity; and to it no remedies can be well adapted but such as are subtil, penetrating, spiritual. The dominion of inveterate prejudice and omnipotent custom must be subverted. There must be an infusion of new ideas, and the implantation of new motives, and the awakening of new hopes and aspirations. It has often occurred to us that if the most enlightened philosophy and the largest experience were put upon the task of finding out some sovereign remedy for such a case, they should concur in prescribing that which is so clearly described in the fourth chapter of Hebrews: "The word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discernor of the thoughts and intents of the heart." Let us imagine that the hundreds of faithful missionaries now laboring throughout British India have succeeded in commending to the undoubting faith of the multitude, not the entire system of Christianity, but some one of its great maxims—that the whole vast population of this benighted empire should be brought to believe cordially in the unity of God, and should so be led to forsake idolatry in all its hateful, degrading forms. The working of this simple idea would remove an amount of vice, and suffering, and wretchedness, which defies all computation. There would be an end of all the abominations and pollutions of pagan worship; an end of pilgrimages to holy cities, and distant temples, and sacred rivers. There would be no more self-inflicted tortures for expiation, no more immolations and human sacrifices, no more hecatombs for the insatiable Ganges, or for sanguinary Juggernaut. Or let us suppose the Scriptural teaching in regard to the rights and destiny of woman to be the solitary doctrine for which these heralds of the cross have obtained from the millions of Hindostan a practical recognition,—who does not perceive that they would have conferred upon these miserable nations a boon, in comparison with which all political and civil franchises are impotent as instruments for promoting civilization and happiness? To say nothing of the thirty thousand widows, and of the uncounted multitude of female children who would be rescued annually from a cruel death by burning and infanticide—atrocities which are only the slighter incidents of the prevailing system—this single change in Indian ideas would elevate one half of its teeming population from the condition of mere brutes to the dignity and destiny, to the enjoyments and duties, of intelligent immortal beings. Or,

finally, if missionary labors should produce no further result than the successful inculcation upon the oriental mind of the Bible theory of the unity and essential brotherhood of all the families of man, they would have removed an obstacle to Indian improvement and civilization, which, in the institutions and customs of caste, has hitherto bid defiance to every social melioration, whether its introduction has been urged by force of argument or of example—of laws or of arms. Our confident expectation is, that these and other great truths, by the development of which the gospel confers such inestimable benefits on human society, will work their way to a general recognition and practical supremacy in pagan India and the world; and it is because of this belief, and not from any strong reliance on the wisdom, or benevolence, or power of statesmen, that we rejoice in all the revolutions which throw open the barred doors of these nations. The missionaries of the awakened churches will enter side by side with the soldier, and the civilian, and the merchant, with arms more potent than theirs to win an empire, and with laws and arts more fit to rule, enrich, and adorn it. As sure as the march of time and the developments of Providence, will the gospel, while it gives eternal life to all who believe, accomplish the regeneration of human society. Its doctrines of right and of duty, no less than its doctrines of grace, are œcumenical as well as divine; and, while a heavenly sanction attends their promulgation, their manifold harmonies with the wants and sympathies of the race insure their ultimate triumph.

We shall offer no apology for having dwelt so long on what is confessedly a lower view of the missionary enterprise. It is with us a favorite aspect of the subject, and we are fain to welcome a train of reflections which may serve to magnify this highest function of the church in the eyes of those who do not contemplate it from the loftiest position, yet would gladly recognize and foster an agency that offers a sure promise “for the life which now is, as well as of that which is to come.” Even in this secular, lowest view of the subject, the establishment of missions takes the highest rank “among ancient, primitive, and heroical works.”

In passing on from these preliminary statements to the special objects of this article, we would ourselves dismiss, and, if we could, banish from the minds of our readers all thought of the material and temporal benefits which the gospel so freely diffuses, that we might contemplate the missionary enterprise solely as God’s chosen and only revealed method of making known to perishing nations the great scheme of redemption through the blood of the cross. In proceeding, as we now do, to inquire what one important branch of

the church has done, and is doing, to extend the Redeemer's kingdom over a revolted world, and to rescue from eternal perdition the myriads of blood-bought souls upon whom the Sun of righteousness has not yet risen, we would bear upon our heart a lively recollection that the church is in God's economy the great depository of saving truth and power—is intrusted with a monopoly of the only remedy for sin; and that upon its loyalty to Christ and its compassion for the heathen, it has been mysteriously permitted to depend when He shall receive his purchased inheritance, and when they shall acknowledge the Lord that bought them. We would ever bear in mind, and would entreat our readers to bear in mind, the appalling truism which we are so prone to forget or discredit, for all beyond the narrow pale of our own language and our own type of civilization, that there is salvation in no other but Christ—that faith in him is indispensable to true piety—that the heathen cannot believe in him of whom they have not heard, nor hear without a preacher; and that the preacher's indispensable function is also left dependent on other agencies—for how can he preach except he be sent? Happy shall we deem ourselves if anything contained in this discussion shall be made instrumental in exciting in that Christian community, for which it is specially intended, a more lively sense of its vast responsibility.

The Missionary Society, of which we are here presented with the Twenty-Seventh Annual Report, was organized in the year 1819. The Methodist ministry, however, was as truly, and, in proportion to their numbers, as extensively engaged in missionary labors before, as it has been since, that period. "Wesleyan Methodism," as has been justly said by the author of *The Great Commission*, "is strictly missionary in its character." This remark is pre-eminently true of American Methodism, which, in addition to the inherent adaptations of its economy to missionary operations possessed in common with the parent church, has occupied a field vast as the entire theatre of the apostolic ministry, and abounding in the strongest inducements to labor, as well as offering unusual facilities and encouragements. It will be admitted, we think, that this field has been cultivated with a good degree of zeal and perseverance, and with eminent success. Our fathers were called to enter upon their labors, after the other Christian denominations had obtained for their peculiar sentiments and politics a strong hold in the faith and hereditary attachments of the entire population; so that their work in the older settlements, and even in the large cities, was as strictly missionary as it has since been in the wild regions bordering on the great rivers and lakes of the West. Indeed, the pioneers of Me-

thodism in the new settlements have usually enjoyed facilities unknown to their early predecessors. Many of the emigrants, and especially those of the younger class, carry with them to their new homes strong predilections for Methodism. Not a few have been members of her communion, and only wait for the coming of the missionary, to rally under his banner and co-operate in his efforts to propagate the gospel among others less disposed to embrace it. In many instances local preachers, who went with the current of emigration to improve their worldly circumstances upon the virgin soil of the West, had already gathered the scattered sheep into the fold before the arrival of the accredited missionary, who was thus permitted to enter into "other men's labors," and while he confirmed and built up the infant churches, to make them the basis of more distant and extended operations. Methodism has been diffused throughout this country rather by the aggressive genius, and inherent tendencies of the system, than by any *extraordinary* arrangements and special exertions. An *itinerant* by the established economy of his church, the Methodist minister ever wears the panoply of a *missionary*, and enters upon the missionary function, at the call of duty, with less inconvenience and with habits more favorable to success than could the settled pastor, more averse as he must be to change, and with less power of adaptation to the new and trying circumstances that beset this enterprise. We speak here of the special fitness of the itinerant system to meet the religious wants of a great country like ours, under the peculiar and ever-varying conditions that result from our position, our institutions, and the character of our people—from the vast extent and fertility of the fresh regions that tempt our adventurous families to seek their fortune in the wilderness, and that give birth to new states, and territories, and populous towns, in such rapid succession—from the absence of religious establishments and endowments, and the consequent liberty conferred, and obligation imposed, upon every Christian sect to consider "the world as its parish," and to "do good to all men as it has opportunity"—from immigration and from emigration, which are constantly infusing new elements and tendencies into society, and impressing new characteristics upon our already heterogeneous population—and we are satisfied that all intelligent Christians, who recognize it as a branch of Christ's church on earth, will also recognize in American Methodism special and providential adaptations to the great field in which it has been called to fulfill its mission.

Through God's blessing upon such instrumentalities, a simple form of Christianity, everywhere of sufficient power and purity, we

verily believe, to renovate the heart and reform the manners, has been carried into every neighborhood of this great republic. We can hardly be premature in saying that Methodism has won a recognized, and, in all human probability, a permanent, position in the old and more populous states, as well as in the new and less cultivated sections of our country. Under some not unimportant modifications of its modes of operation—possibly with some loss of its aggressive power—we believe that the denomination retains everywhere a good measure of its missionary character, and we are wholly sure that it still possesses facilities and special capabilities which ought to make it the most missionary church in the land. Our pioneers still enter the forest in the vanguard of the great emigrating army. Our regular work presses incessantly against the furthest boundary of civilized society, and our outposts are counted along the entire length of the ever-lengthening line of our ever-receding frontier.

The plan of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church embraces both domestic and foreign missions; and the first article of its constitution announces that it was established for the express purpose of “enabling the several annual conferences more effectually to extend their missionary labors throughout the United States and elsewhere,” and also for the “support and promotion of missionary schools and missions in our own and in foreign countries.” Following the order here indicated, which we observe is reversed in the Report for 1846, we proceed to notice the domestic department of Methodist missions. This embraces: 1. German missions. 2. Indian missions. 3. Circuits and stations wholly or partially sustained by the society.

The German missions are justly considered in the Report before us as possessing a special and increasing importance, and as holding out peculiar encouragements. The oldest of these, so far as the annual exposé enables us to ascertain, was established in Cincinnati in the year 1837. From a beginning so recent, this good work has extended into more than a dozen states and territories. It embraces forty-eight missions and fifty-four missionaries, who have succeeded in gathering into the church three thousand three hundred and forty-nine members. There are also reported a considerable, though by no means a proportionate and satisfactory, number of children under sabbath-school instruction. Upon nothing is the valuable and permanent success of missionary labors more dependent than upon the diligent training of the rising generation; and it strikes us that this is especially true of a people so inquisitive, so educated, so prone to speculation and to skepticism, as the Germans.

It is commonly admitted that emigrants from Germany constitute the best class of our adopted citizens. Many of them are agriculturists, who, instead of congregating in the large cities to disturb their peace, and control their elections, and fill their poor-houses, find their way to the West, where there is room for them, and their labor is wanted. They are thus diffused among the native population, and placed in favorable circumstances for learning something of the new forms of life and of industry, by which they may become worthy partakers of the blessings so freely offered them, and something of the political rights and powers, to the enjoyment of which they are so frankly and courageously admitted by our wonderful system of freedom. The wide dispersion of German emigrants, which presents an apparent obstacle in the way of their evangelization, is really favorable to missionary successes among them. They are less clannish and national, while the semi-infidel Christianity which, without being well understood or much inculcated, exerts a most paralyzing influence upon the lower classes in the father-land, necessarily operates with a greatly diminished force upon isolated families, and in the absence of those associations and influences which are calculated to strengthen and perpetuate early prejudices and impressions. Their ignorance of the language of the country, though at first a serious hinderance, is, we are persuaded, a real facility to the attainment of missionary successes. We observe from the Reports that a considerable number of Roman Catholics have been converted, a species of success rarely gained among Irish and other members of that communion who speak the English language. These are now provided with churches and religious teachers in almost every part of the United States; and it can hardly be doubted that the scattered German Catholics would generally be gathered into the same folds to which they are drawn by so many sympathies, but for the barrier interposed by an unknown language which must make the sermon and the associations, as well as the liturgy, unintelligible and distasteful to them. The Methodist missionaries, who, as their Teutonic names sufficiently demonstrate, are veritable Germans, possess a talismanic passport to the affections and confidence of their compatriots, in their ability to address "every man in his own tongue wherein he was born." We will add that the disclosures made by their published reports, as well as some personal knowledge of these laborious messengers of the church, have served to impress us very favorably in regard to their character and their work. Many of them persevere under discouragements and privations which only evince more clearly that they have the zeal, and resolution, and

faith indispensable in the missionary field. One laborer in Illinois, a superintendent of a mission district, is "obliged to travel nine hundred miles every three months, in order to reach his appointments." Of his colleagues he says:—"They "have generally hard work, a slender support, and much to contend with. The Germans almost all belong to some church, and are strongly attached to what they call their faith. Hence we have to preach *their* religion out of their heads, in order to preach Bible religion into their hearts." We regard the German branch of our home missionary department as presenting a field peculiarly important, as well as encouraging. It has already produced good and abundant fruit, while the labor bestowed upon it has disclosed new and pressing wants, which appeal with peculiar propriety and emphasis to those who have been favored so highly with the divine approbation. We think that these operations ought to be extended as fast as suitable men and means can be obtained. It is gratifying to perceive that the converted Germans are disposed to help themselves as far as they can. The mission in Cincinnati is already independent of the resources of the society, and we are left to infer, from the small sums granted to other stations, that a considerable part of the support of the missionary is derived from the people among whom he labors. This is highly gratifying as an omen, as well as a fact—as a means, as well as an end; and the missionary enterprise always gives evidence of good progress toward the attainment of its objects when it raises upon the field of its operations a competent ministry, and awakens among its converts such a sense of the value of the means of grace as leads to the pecuniary sacrifices necessary to secure them.

An argument for prosecuting this particular enterprise with the utmost diligence, is the strong improbability that so free access to the German emigrants, especially to German Catholics, will much longer be enjoyed. We ought to expect that the most strenuous efforts will be made to gather these wanderers into the fold of the Papal Church, and that, as in the case of Irish emigrants, missionaries will be sent for the purpose, recommended by all the advantages now so eminently possessed by ours. In any event, however, the good already accomplished is likely to remain; and the infant churches established in so many places may be expected to become centres of attraction and light, to which the multitudes yet to be poured upon our hospitable shores, by the tide of emigration, will continue to be drawn by natural sympathies, and, as we may humbly hope, by divine influence. Some of our remarks have had special application to a rural population; but we are

happy to perceive that the wants of a vast body of Germans, resident in our large cities, have not been overlooked, and that missions for their benefit exist in New-York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, St. Louis, and several other populous towns. The obstacles to their evangelization will, we fear, be multiplied by circumstances that operate with peculiar force upon emigrants, who dwell together in sufficient numbers to form their own social and religious communities; but this only renders the more indispensable, timely and vigorous efforts to diffuse religious truth among them. What are the liabilities and tendencies of a great body of German emigrants assembled in a large city, and left pretty much to themselves, we had opportunity to learn authentically on a late visit to the British metropolis. We were invited to attend a meeting of British and foreign Christians, called for the purpose of hearing some statements in regard to the religious condition of natives of the continent resident in London, and of devising some plan for their moral improvement. The disclosures to which we there listened filled us with profound astonishment; for we could not have thought it possible for an evil so massive and tremendous to accumulate in the very centre of philanthropic operations that claim the world as their proper theatre. Of German emigrants, especially, who equal in number the population of one of our great cities of the second class, it was stated by, we believe, the only clergyman who is laboring for their evangelization, that they are nearly all freethinkers. Hardly any of them attend public worship; as, indeed, how should they, when there are no churches or chapels for them to attend? Intemperance prevails to an extent which is quite remarkable, even in the midst of the most intemperate population on earth. The sabbath is universally desecrated; and those who do not spend the day in drinking-houses, assemble in public halls, hired for the purpose, to listen to lecturers on socialism, and other kindred topics. These apostles of infidelity and vice are often men of such powers as exercise a dominant influence over the multitude; and the new-comers, who may happen to bring from the fatherland some measure of religious restraints and self-respect, easily fall a prey to an organized system which works by every known method of seduction, from a concert to a brothel. To complete the horrible picture, it was stated that marriage and its obligations are little more than a name, and that the importation from Germany of young women to supply the incredible demand for prostitution, in a community of socialists, constitutes an established branch of trade. These statements were confirmed by the Prussian ambassador, who

addressed the meeting, and who is well known in this country, and throughout the civilized world, as one of the most eminent Christian scholars and philanthropists of the age. We trust in God it may be long ere such a description is applicable to any portion of our emigrant population; but those who are intrusted with the direction of the only conservative agency on which reliance can safely be placed, will do well to recollect that nearly all of our large towns are surcharged with materials which require no process more expensive or laborious than to be let alone for a time, in order to multiply among us similar examples of loathsome, gigantic depravity.

Indian missions possess, in our estimation, a peculiar, melancholy interest. The success which has hitherto attended on all well-directed, persevering efforts for the evangelization of the aborigines of this continent, must, upon the whole, be pronounced satisfactory; yet a gloom hangs over the future destiny of even Christianized tribes, which, indeed, rather enhances than diminishes this satisfaction at their religious improvement, while it holds in abeyance, if it does not quite extinguish the hope, that these converted savages are in due time to become thoroughly civilized men, capable of self-government—of forming happy, prosperous, enduring communities among themselves, or of being usefully merged into the great political family which surrounds and overshadows them. In the “*Evidence on the Aborigines*,” taken before a parliamentary committee, as well as from other reports on the subject, it seems to be a well-established fact that missionary labors have, in several instances, arrested the tendency to depopulation and extinction, which is almost universal among savages. This is said to be the case among the Canada Indians, and it may be so with those upon our own borders, who have been most affected by Christian labors. We should indeed rejoice to believe it, but we have hitherto failed in finding sufficient ground for the indulgence of such a hope. After all that the benevolent efforts of our government, and all that Christian philanthropy have been able to achieve for this injured race, no element of character has yet been developed—no antidote for latent ills has been discovered—to justify any strong expectation that at the end of two centuries more, more than a forlorn remnant of the North American tribes will be found upon the earth. It has hitherto proved about equally fatal to them whether they adhered to the hunter life or resorted to agriculture. In the former case, the spread of white settlements consumed the game on which they must subsist; in the latter, they are soon environed by an ever-

restless, aggressive civilization, which, if it does not repel, attracts but to enfeeble and destroy.

The removal of the Indian tribes beyond the Mississippi, and far from contact with the whites, we verily believe, offers the most favorable conditions for carrying out the difficult experiment of Indian civilization. If our government continues to maintain a steady policy, and to extend to the aborigines an efficient, not officious, protection; if it shall prove itself able to do what has never yet been done, to restrain the lawless whites, who always hover, like vultures, about the Indian frontier, and always contrive from that remote position to exercise more influence at Washington than ten times their number of virtuous, peaceable citizens, then, and for the first time, will an opportunity be afforded for testing fairly what missionary labors can do to remove a barrier which has hitherto proved insurmountable. Whatever may be the result of this experiment, the duty of the churches will be plain and imperative. If crowned with success, a new impulse will be given to an enterprise which has often been left to derive its worldly encouragements rather from the present than from the distant future; if, on the contrary, it shall be demonstrated that these scattered tribes are called to fill their brief cycle under a mysterious destiny, which hastens its own accomplishment by denying to its victims the inspiring motives of patriotism and hope, all that is benevolent in the gospel loudly demands that its light and consolations be promptly extended to this long funeral procession, already saddened by the consciousness of an inevitable doom, that each individual of a race manifestly predestined to be "no people" may be furnished with the unquestionable badges of citizenship under a higher and more equal dispensation.

The most interesting portion of the Methodist Indian missions has fallen under the jurisdiction of the southern division of the denomination. Of the four thousand three hundred and three converts of 1844, only six hundred and forty are now reported as members of the Methodist Episcopal Church. These belong to the remnants of once powerful tribes now scattered along our north-western frontier; and they are represented as making some hopeful progress in the arts and habits of civilized life, in spite of their proximity to counteracting and deteriorating influences. There are eight missions and eleven missionaries, whose fields of labor are embraced by the Rock River, Michigan, and Oneida Conferences. We are sorry to say that the Report before us does not offer a very satisfactory view of this department of missionary labor. There is a lamentable deficiency of statistics and other

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precise reliable information; and how the proper authorities are able to proceed intelligently in the work of satisfying wants so inadequately set forth and so imperfectly known, we are really at a loss to conjecture. It is equally difficult to divine how, with the unsatisfied wants which are disclosed, the Christianizing process is sustained without serious and irretrievable embarrassments. There are missionaries ignorant of any language known to their flocks, who are yet wholly unprovided with interpreters, or left to struggle on with such casual helps as the Indians happen to be able and willing to supply. Schools, which must have been established at considerable expense, lack books and teachers, without which, the name of such an agency might as well be left out of the account. This is manifestly the great and crying want. Almost every missionary who gives any account of the state of his charge, complains bitterly of the utter inefficiency, or of the utter want of this right arm of an Indian mission. We know not by whose direction or oversight such a state of things is allowed to exist at a time when the missionary treasury is not absolutely exhausted, and when we venture to say an appeal to the church would afford ample means for removing an obstacle fatal to all reasonable hopes of success, and, we will add, for wiping away a reproach. The Board of Managers, with whom, in conjunction with a general committee, we believe, is lodged the power of redressing such wants, fully and explicitly recognize the crying neglect, as well as the indispensable necessity of providing ample means of education not only as a means of carrying forward the work of evangelization, but of preserving the fruits of former labors. "The board is fully persuaded that unless something further is done for the instruction of these Indians, instead of retaining and increasing the hold we now have upon their confidence and affections, the influence we have already acquired over them will be transferred to others." Again we are admonished that "the only remedy" for existing evils is "the establishment of suitable schools among them, and a more general and strict attention to their mental and moral training."—*Report*, p. 86. The entire church will subscribe to the soundness of these views, and will wait with some impatience to see them practically illustrated in this highly interesting and responsible field of missionary labor. Deeply as we should feel the mortification of seeing the influence which we now exercise over the Indian mind transferred to others, even to other evangelical Protestants; we should esteem that a slight evil in comparison with those which must follow the maintenance of that influence, notwithstanding our neglect of the sacred duties it im-

poses. True, we cannot yield the ground already won without manifest dishonor; but we cannot retain it, and yet neglect its diligent cultivation, without guilt still more manifest. It is a high duty to save the Christian name from reproach, but a higher to save souls from perdition.

In its further exposition of domestic operations, the Report brings to our notice the establishment, in the city of New-York, of a mission to Swedish seamen, for whose benefit religious services are regularly conducted in their own language, on board a bethel ship, moored in the North River. This enterprise, which was commenced in the year 1845, has been attended with a good degree of success, and offers every encouragement to perseverance.

One hundred and sixty-two missionaries are employed by the board in "deserted portions of the regular work;" and in this department, the most important fields are perhaps in the Rock River, Iowa, and Michigan Conferences, which comprehend a vast extent of territory now rapidly filling up by emigration. In our preliminary remarks upon the missionary character and capabilities of the Methodist economy, we have sufficiently indicated the process by which three-fourths of the entire field, now occupied by the Methodist Church, were brought under the influence of its doctrines and instructions. Emigration has usually scattered the good seed in the wilderness before the arrival of the missionary, who speedily extends his operations from one neighborhood to another wherever he can find a Christian family or an open door, till a circumference of one or two hundred miles is described, and forms the ample programme of his future labors. Revivals and recruits from the older churches are not long in giving resources and stability to the new circuit, which henceforward sustains its own preachers, and releases the missionary fund, to be employed in still more needy and distant regions. We do not believe that the Christian church has ever used a system of means better adapted to diffuse the gospel over a vast and growing country, such as we occupy, and we confidently expect that it will prove itself equal to the demands which the actual and prospective extension of our already immense national domain may impose upon our Christian zeal and fidelity. It has done more than any other agency to save a great country from the curse of being, at this moment, overspread with an irreligious, semi-heathen population; and the same boon, we think it likely, in its fair proportion, to extend to Oregon, and to whatever region besides, may be won and occupied by our branch of the Anglo-Saxon race.

Unquestionably, it is the high duty of the Methodist Episcopal Church, enjoined by its past history, and by all providential indications, to sustain and to multiply these very efficient and strictly indispensable missions to any extent which the expansion and movement of our population may demand. They have ever proved the most productive and the least expensive of its missionary operations, and it might easily be demonstrated, we think, that their efficiency would be impaired rather than promoted by a larger outlay of means, or any attempt to retard the earliest practicable transition of the dependent, pensioned mission, into a regular self-supporting circuit. Under these circumstances, no probable enlargement of this department of the work is likely to impose any considerable burden upon our missionary funds, or to exceed the ordinary contributions of the new conferences, within which, or adjacent to which, the most considerable expenditure will be wanted.

We are struck with the important fact disclosed in this Report, that a very large majority of the agents and pensioners of the society are employed, not on the western frontier, but within the limits of the oldest conferences and the most populous states; seventy-one are in New-England and New-York, and twenty in the comparatively small territory embraced by the Philadelphia Conference. The numbers of members given in the Report as belonging to these fields of labor are not, we presume, generally the fruits of missionary effort, but rather indicate the feebleness of the societies, many of them old, which require aid from missionary funds. A considerable number of these societies, however, are of recent origin, and the great development of manufacturing industry, in the populous regions under consideration, has given rise to many new communities, which require, and are likely to reward, missionary labors. Not a few now flourishing stations were a few years ago feeble missions; and such instances of success are already so numerous as to repay, many fold, the outlay which has been made in their behalf, and strongly to recommend the continuance of the enlightened liberal policy which has proved so beneficial to the general interests of the church.

If, however, we are not at fault in our recollections, by far the larger number of these missionary stations owe their existence to other and very different causes; and the little societies of twenty, thirty, forty, and fifty members, who enjoy the means of grace at the expense of missionary funds, have been made small by emigration, by schisms, and decay, or by the division of old circuits or stations. And here, again, we are quite aware that cases have

men, and may still rise on either of the grounds just enumerated, which fully justify, and, on all considerations of Christian benevolence and sound policy, require the application of missionary funds for their relief; but we are also persuaded that the multiplication of petty stations, which the existing system encourages, is a practical evil of no ordinary magnitude. It would not be easy to fix a standard either of numbers or circumstances by which to determine the propriety of extending aid to feeble societies; but it seems to us a sound rule not to attempt, in this way, to establish new stations, or to sustain old ones, when there is not a reasonable prospect of such an expansion as will enable them, in due time, to support themselves. In a new country, but partially supplied with religious instruction, and constantly replenished by emigration, there is always such a reasonable prospect; but in the very different circumstances of the region now under consideration, an enlightened discretion had need to be exercised over any new proposal to build up a church on missionary resources. When a village or neighborhood is already preoccupied by active, spiritual denominations, and the people are well supplied with the means of grace, it is plainly a waste of means to attempt, in this way, to raise a new congregation for the gratification of half a dozen families who may prefer our creed or polity. Whatever else may be said in favor of such an aggressive movement, it is no proper missionary work; and resources obtained for the evangelization of the heathen, or to help the destitute, cannot, without a manifest perversion, be expended on such enterprises. Our cause is essentially weakened by the multiplication of such dependent churches; and we could easily enumerate scores of stations struggling on from year to year, and doomed to struggle on, without room for expansion or the prospect of better days. A handful of people, not often wealthy, make extraordinary and painful sacrifices to sustain the preacher, who is, nevertheless, but half supported, and escapes, at the end of his brief term, as from exile, embarrassed with debt, or impoverished by the excess of his unavoidable expenses over his scanty income. All this may be cheerfully, and even joyfully, borne amid the stirring scenes of a really missionary field, and under the inspiring hope of founding churches for future generations, while a present salvation is carried to the destitute and the perishing; but in the absence of these sustaining considerations, the prosecution of the Christian ministry under such discouragements becomes, to the last degree, burdensome and irksome to the preacher, while to the people it is seldom profitable and effective. Our remarks are intended to demonstrate the utter

inexpediency of expending missionary funds in providing, for the trial and deterioration of our preachers, a larger number of these unfruitful, unimprovable fields of labor. We know it is the settled opinion of a large proportion of our most enlightened and experienced ministers, that the actual number of these petty stations ought to be greatly, though gradually, diminished; not by their abandonment, but by a return, wherever it is practicable, to the circuit system. Two or three of these small societies, united in a circuit, would afford an inspiring and remunerating field of ministerial labor, where the preacher would get a better support, and the people, we verily believe, would get better preaching. The system here recommended is universally adopted by our elder brethren in England, and with good effect, under circumstances not greatly differing from ours. It is eminently the system of Methodism, and of the very genius of itinerancy, of which it has ever been the glory, that it is adapted to find, and provide for, the scattered members and families of Christ's flock.

In passing to notice, briefly, the foreign missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, we begin with the South American mission, which stands third in the Report. The name would suggest, to one not conversant with the earlier operations of the society, something very different from what he finds on further examination. At present, the society has but one missionary stationed on the South American continent, who preaches to a small Protestant congregation, composed of English and American residents in Buenos Ayres, by whom, with the aid of some friends, his salary is paid. The Rev. William H. Norris remains at his post with the consent of the missionary board, the only ground, we suppose, for still retaining, in the Annual Report, the name of the South American mission, which was formally given up in 1841-2, after an unsuccessful attempt to make some impression on the native Catholic population of that country. This early abandonment of an enterprise which had been entered upon with flattering hopes of success, and prosecuted at great pecuniary expense by some of the most intelligent missionaries ever employed by the society, was regarded, by many friends of the cause, a hasty and ill-advised measure. Six years was, unquestionably, a short time to allow for such an experiment, and few similar attempts have ever been crowned with any very eminent success, except as the reward of more patient and protracted labors. We are among those, however, who believed that the discontinuance of this effort, which had already demonstrated itself to be nearly hopeless, was, upon the whole, expedient, and that it was better to incur the charge of

instability and irresolution—no slight faults in those who guide the missionary enterprise—than to persevere in the face of difficulties, of which it was nearly certain that they would continue to increase rather than diminish. No Protestant missions have hitherto yielded so little fruit as those set on foot for the conversion of Catholics. It was hoped that the free institutions just introduced into South America might facilitate the diffusion of religious opinions more in harmony with the new political ideas; but the visions of freedom which rose in that direction have long since given way to a painful conviction, that as no people in the world are less fitted for self-government, so none are more completely the bondmen of priestcraft and superstition.

The acknowledged failure of this mission is no unusual event in the history of such enterprises, and it is fraught with lessons of instruction, which may be highly useful in forming and executing future plans. We trust that it will inspire the board with great caution in entertaining new projects for missions among Catholics. Ten years since the feeling was strong in favor of establishing a mission in France, and we can hardly mistake in believing that, with many, this is still a favorite object. After enjoying very favorable opportunities for the formation of our opinions, we then arrived at the conclusion, which subsequent information and developments have only served to confirm, that such a mission would be injudicious, and probably useless. There are, at this moment, nearly three hundred evangelical Protestant ministers in France, who are laboring for the spiritual good of its population with all the advantages which, as natives of the country, familiar with its institutions, its literature, its sympathies and prejudices, they are likely to possess. They are the true missionaries to whom France, Catholic and Protestant, is to look for evangelizing labors. Foreign interposition has, unquestionably, been highly useful in the revival of the ancient spirit of Protestantism; and the liberality of British and American Christians may be very beneficially directed to the support of native agencies, whose efficiency depends on considerable outlays of money. Beyond this species of help, it is the well-known opinion of the best-informed men in Europe, Frenchmen as well as English and Americans, that little valuable assistance can be rendered from abroad. Providential indications manifestly point to the evangelization of the heathen as the proper sphere for our missionary operations; and till the three hundred millions of China shall enjoy the labors of as many faithful preachers of the gospel as now toil among the thirty millions of France, we can conceive of no reason likely to satisfy the head or heart of

an enlightened Christian that it is right to overlook the vaster and the more pressing want, and, we will add, to pass by the more open and inviting door, in order to attempt the evangelization of a people already Christian.

The Oregon mission, which has attracted so large a share of attention during the last ten years, can no longer be regarded a foreign mission, now that the title of the United States to that country has been acknowledged by Great Britain, and measures have been adopted for extending the benefits of a regular administration to that distant portion of the republic. No missionary undertaking has been prosecuted by the Methodist Episcopal Church with higher hopes and a more ardent zeal. That the results have fallen greatly below the usual average of missionary successes, and inflicted painful disappointment upon the society and its supporters, none, we presume, can any longer hesitate to confess. It is, no doubt, for wise purposes that God permits his people to struggle with difficulties in their well-intended efforts for the promotion of his cause. Combinations of Christians, no less than individuals, require the discipline of adversity in order to qualify them for the better performance of great duties. The purity and the power of faith are made manifest by trials, and discomfort itself, by reminding the church of its dependence on divine assistance in all its enterprises for the promotion of religion, is often, perhaps usually, the harbinger of coming triumphs. Trusting, as we do, yea, confidently and assuredly believing, that God yet designs to confide to our denomination some share in the work of evangelizing the heathen, we are disposed to look upon the history of this mission, so full of disaster and mortification, for instructive lessons to warn and guide us in our future operations. It would be wholly superfluous to declare that we mean no reflection upon the wisdom and faithfulness of those who have had the chief direction of this and other missions. We concede to them the praise of an entire devotion to the best interests of religion, and of having labored in the cause of Methodism and missions with a zeal and success which, we doubt not, will be rewarded with higher honors than our testimony could presume to confer. There is, perhaps, no reason to believe that others would have been able, under the circumstances, to judge more wisely or act more discreetly. It is, nevertheless, true, that from the more favorable position which we now occupy, we can easily detect the causes, which, whether regarded in the light of mistakes or misfortunes, led by inevitable tendencies to the failure of this mis-

sion, and the church cannot afford to lose the benefit of lessons for which it has paid so dearly.

The founder of the Oregon mission, the Rev. Jason Lee, now no more, was a man of unquestionable piety; and he gave many proofs, during his connection with the board, of possessing several high and indispensable qualifications for a pioneer in such an enterprise. Had the mission never been extended beyond three or four families, and had it been confined to its appropriate work of evangelization, we see no reason to doubt that his zeal, force of character, and perseverance, would have fully justified the confidence reposed in him by the board; but when he became the head of a religious colony, and sole director of a complicated system of operations, evangelizing, mercantile, agricultural, mechanical, and semi-political, which involved an expenditure of forty-two thousand dollars in a single year, he was thrown into an untried position, from which the wisest men in our ministry might well have shrunk, and for which, we incline to think, no man likely to be called to such duties was more eminently unfit than Mr. Lee. That he should have obtained over minds of the highest order among us such an ascendancy as is implied in their approval of his impracticable schemes, is more surprising than that, under such circumstances, he should himself indulge in visionary hopes. The mission was commenced in 1834 by two clergymen and two lay assistants. At the end of six years there were "*sixty-eight persons* connected with this mission, men, women, and children, all supported by this society." This unexampled increase had been added to the original company at the urgent representations of Mr. Lee, after having been several years in Oregon, enjoying better opportunities than any other man for becoming acquainted with the actual wants of that region. The Indian population, for whose benefit this mission was established, does not, in the estimation of the Rev. Daniel Lee, colleague and nephew of the superintendent, exceed sixteen thousand. How such a number of missionaries found employment in such a field it is not easy to conjecture, especially as the great body of the Indians never came under the influence of their labors. They were, in fact, mostly engaged in secular affairs,—“concerned in claims to large tracts of lands, amounting in all to thirty-six sections, claims to city lots, farming, merchandising, blacksmithing, carpentering, cabinet-making, grazing, horse-keeping, lumbering, and flouring, with the constant trading, hiring, and paying attendant upon all these branches.”—*Report*, p. 42. We do not believe that the history

of Christian missions ever exhibited another such spectacle. That the effect of this signal perversion of an evangelizing enterprise was no better than ought to have been expected, the Report before us, as well as some that preceded it, clearly intimates.

The mission became odious to the growing population, with whose interests and designs, good or bad, it came into perpetual conflict as an unwieldy, overshadowing, intermeddling, many-handed business establishment. As zeal grew lukewarm, and piety deteriorated under this secularizing process, the infirmities of human nature were occasionally manifested, and at length irreconcilable differences arose among the missionaries, which led to the return of several individuals to the United States, and to a disclosure of the real state of the mission. This has, of course, been followed by retrenchment and reorganization. The seculars have been discharged, and the trading establishments, mills, and workshops, have been broken up and sold by an agent, most judiciously selected, and sent out for the purpose. Two new missionaries have been sent out, who, with one or two of the old ones still in the service of the society, are henceforward to devote themselves to preaching the gospel and other strictly evangelizing efforts. Some time will probably be requisite to live down prejudices, and regain lost confidence ; but we trust that success will yet smile upon this ill-conducted enterprise. We are sure it will hereafter be managed on sounder principles than before, and we trust that nobody will think of its abandonment. Oregon is rising into importance, and some such provision, as we have just indicated, the church must make for the white population ; and with the continuance of such help as has uniformly been extended to frontier settlements, we may expect that in a few years this opening territory will be embraced in our regular work.

In regard to the spiritual results of this mission we refrain from saying much, for to us the subject is involved in painful mystery. In the earlier days of the enterprise, we believe the year before the arrival of the great reinforcement, an extensive revival was reported, and five hundred Indians became members of the mission church. None of these now remain, nor have we been able to learn the causes of declension or defection, which have so suddenly and so completely dissipated the fruits of so much labor. Did the converted Indians fly from contact with the mission when its distinctive character was lost in the industrial colony ? Were they overlooked in the multitude of new pursuits ? We are sure there were always faithful men who continued to care for these precious souls : but the entire series of Annual Reports has failed

to satisfy our reasonable and intense curiosity. On other points, no less than on this, we have been surprised at the scanty and infrequent intelligence received from this mission. Much of this is, doubtless, to be ascribed to distance and imperfect communications; but we cannot avoid the conclusion that there has been great negligence on the part of those from whom the board and the church were entitled to expect and demand regular and unre-served accounts of their operations. Such information is indispensable for the satisfaction of the public mind, as well as to guide the board in its measures; and it occurs to us, that any agent of the society, at home or abroad, who neglects so plain a duty, comprehends very inadequately the importance of one branch of his responsibilities. We shall leave this train of remark with an expression of our lively regret that so many missionaries, after having been sent to their field of labor at a heavy expense to the church, should feel at liberty to increase the burden, and set a dangerous example, by returning home without obtaining the consent of the board, a course of conduct which could not fail to impair the confidence of the church in its missionary agencies.

The length to which these strictures have already extended, leaves but little space for the most important of the society's foreign stations. Liberia has, from its first establishment, been a favorite mission with our Christian community; and many, who feel no sympathy with schemes of African colonization, have gladly co-operated in the missionary enterprise to which these attempts have given providential facilities. This must be pronounced a prosperous and highly useful mission, a reputation which we believe it has maintained under various fluctuations, from its first establishment. Its importance is heightened when we consider that this colony introduces religion and civilization to the most benighted portion of a benighted continent—that it inter-poses an effectual and constantly extending barrier to the slave-trade, and that it is, in all probability, the beginning of an empire destined to spread the gospel and its attendant social benefits, with every accession to its own territory and power. Fifteen preachers constitute the Liberia Mission Conference, who, with twenty-five individuals not named in the Report, are in the employment of the board, and dependent on its funds. There are at this time about eight hundred church members under their care. We are sorry to notice this diminution of numbers, but trust that it has been produced by transient causes, and that, with the growing population of the colony, this interesting branch of the church may enjoy increasing prosperity.

Before dismissing this mission, we wish to offer two or three distinct observations. It is not a mission to the heathen. The colonists are mostly natives of the United States, who were brought up in the belief of Christianity, and many of whom were members of the church before their emigration to Africa. It has often been stated, and we suppose truly, that the number of communicants in Liberia is greater in comparison with the whole population than it is in this country. This fact does not detract from the importance of this mission, but it determines its real character. It has little besides its greater remoteness to distinguish it from some of our domestic missions. It ought, also, to be remarked, that the laborers in this field are mostly inhabitants of the colony, employed and sustained by the Missionary Society, but not sent out as missionaries. If we rightly understand the subject, all but two or three are of the African race, and the climate has proved so fatal to white men, that we presume their proportion to their colored coadjutors is not likely to become greater. Indeed, it seems to us a duty, clearly and providentially enjoined upon those who have the oversight of these operations, to devise some plan to increase the number and efficiency of colored missionaries and teachers. It will probably be necessary, so long as Liberia shall demand a large outlay of missionary funds, to employ one or two American ministers in this perilous field. It may be doubted whether public confidence can be fully secured on easier terms; but the whole history of the enterprise demonstrates that white men cannot labor in that climate. The question is not whether self-sacrificing ministers can be found willing to encounter the perils of this service. We have had a dear-bought experience, which assures us that they can be found; but it has further taught us the inutility of multiplying such costly victims beyond the demands of an absolute necessity. We must express our full conviction that the missionary spirit has been not a little shocked and retarded in the denomination by the great sacrifice of valuable lives in this malignant climate. In this view, it must be deemed unfortunate that our only foreign mission, now justly entitled to the name, has been prosecuted under circumstances, and in the midst of developments, that have not unnaturally led many to doubt our providential call to this work; and we have long desired, not to see this field abandoned, but others sought out and entered upon, where there might be some reasonable hope that our zealous young men may live and labor, as well as die, in the cause of the crucified Redeemer.

So far as our sources of information enable us to form a correct

judgment in the premises, the Liberia mission has satisfied all the reasonable expectations of its friends with a single exception—perhaps even without that. It was confidently hoped that its establishment would give entrance to the gospel among the pagan population of Africa. We are not prepared to express a confident opinion that more could have been accomplished in this work under all the disadvantages of the climate, of the want of fit agents, and of the constant distractions of petty wars among the savage tribes adjacent to the colony. Numbers of native children have been taught in the schools, and considerable successes in evangelization have, from time to time, been reported; but we must say, that the speedy defections which have so generally followed these encouraging announcements, as well as the frequent suspension or abandonment of native stations, have led us to fear that these conversions were mostly spurious, and that there may have been some want of system, diligence, and perseverance in following up these various attempts. It seems to us perfectly obvious, that the conversion of the natives to Christianity will only be rendered more difficult, and less probable, by all fitful, ill-directed efforts. The mission to Africa, however, does not profess to be chiefly and directly a mission to the heathen; and we are persuaded that in the prosecution of its more immediate objects, it has done good service to the cause of religion and humanity, and that it deserves, as it must for some time need, the fostering care of the church.

We have thus taken a cursory survey of the entire field of our missionary operations. We have already expressed our grateful admiration at the incalculable good which, under the divine blessing, the society whose labors we now consider has been enabled to accomplish in the United States, as well as of the inherent, undiminished efficiency of this branch of the evangelizing movement.

In regard to the foreign missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, we confess that the more distinct and lively perception of their actual condition, to which this examination has conducted us, has only served to deepen the emotions of sorrow with which we have long been wont to contemplate this painful subject. What is the actual amount of our efforts and sacrifices for the conversion of the world to God? The mission to South America has been abandoned, though one of the missionaries is still usefully engaged in preaching to a congregation of his countrymen. The Oregon mission, now embraced in our own territory, has been reduced to three or four missionaries, whose work is not likely to differ greatly from that on our frontier settlements, though it is hoped

that a few Indians may yet be gathered by their labors. Liberia employs fifteen missionaries, nearly all inhabitants of the country, and engaged within the colony. Two or three of the latter class are making some attempts to reach the native population; but so far as we can learn from the Report before us, not a single missionary sent out by the Methodist Episcopal Church is laboring in the foreign field for the conversion of the heathen. *We are not aware of it, if one of our foreign missionaries preaches the gospel in any other than the English language, or if one of them has translated, or is translating, the Bible, or any part of it, or any other book or tract, to aid in the diffusion of gospel light.* We make these statements with feelings of bitter regret, to which no words can give utterance. We remember that we are in the midst of the nineteenth century, surrounded by a cloud of witnesses, and a host of inspiring, reproachful examples. Every evangelical church in the land has gratefully recognized its obligations to co-operate with its Saviour in asserting his empire over the heathen still perishing, though purchased with his blood. They offer freely of their silver and gold, and of the choicest of their sons and daughters. The missionaries of the cross are already numbered by thousands; and, with the single exception of Japan, we believe there is no considerable nation on earth where they have not obtained a footing. They have been eminently successful in Persia and Turkey; they are found in force on the plains of Bengal, and among the interior mountains, where the great rivers of India have their sources. The shores of China, so recently made accessible, are already dotted with their stations. They travel unmolested among pirates and robbers; they are domesticated with cannibals, and many populous islands have been redeemed from pagan idolatry and converted to God with a celerity which has outstripped faith itself, and satisfied Isaiah's glowing prediction of nations born in a day. We are already near the close of the first fifty years of this missionary century—of this age of missionary sacrifices and successes; and the Methodist Episcopal Church, second to none in numbers and resources, has yet to send its first missionary to the heathen world across the sea—has still to form its plans and settle preliminaries—has even to determine the doubtful question whether it will take any decided part in the conversion of the world from paganism. Multitudes of her members burn with a desire to have some part in overturning the idol temples of India and China; but not one of the six hundred and fifty thousand can consecrate himself or his property to the enter-

prise through any channel provided by his own denomination. Thousands, we believe, there are among us fully alive to the reproach and the guilt of this interminable delay. We know there are many with whom this flagrant dereliction, on the part of the church, of its highest duty, is habitually felt as a burden on the conscience, that disquiets their night watches, saddens their sacraments, and even dims their visions of heaven. They cannot divest themselves of anxiety at the thought of being *participes criminis*, in a grievous offense against Christ and the human race; and they would not meet their last account without an endeavor to make some atonement for delinquencies of such fearful magnitude. We protest earnestly, and in the sadness of our hearts, that this is no picture from the imagination, and we express our deliberate conviction that the time has come when the church *must act*. It is bound to provide some medium through which its members can give expression to their irrepressible convictions of duty toward the perishing heathen, or else frankly to announce to them that it does not propose to deviate from its present policy, and so leave their consciences free to contribute their personal and pecuniary aid through other denominations more alive to this class of Christian obligations. A few, at least, have already resorted to this method of satisfying their sense of duty to the heathen, after waiting in vain from year to year to see some movement in that direction by their own Missionary Society.

Assuming that the Methodist Episcopal Church is about to enter the field of missions for the evangelization of the heathen, we devote the few pages that remain to us to a hasty glance at the chief obstacles to be met with, and some of the conditions to be observed in the successful prosecution of such an enterprise. It has for some time been our settled opinion that a great, perhaps the greatest, hinderance that exists among us to the commencement of missionary operations, for the conversion of distant and pagan nations, is found in one of the best features of our economy, in its admirable adaptation and urgent tendency to home evangelization. It hence occurs that all the missionary zeal and resources of the church spontaneously flow, as they are powerfully drawn, into the one channel through which the itinerant system delights to expend its energies. Itinerancy is the controlling element of our economy, and it easily assimilates every enterprise to its own nature. Frontier missions and Indian missions insensibly and irresistibly grow into circuits, and even the mission to Africa becomes an itinerant conference, under the potent influence of a principle of which they are but the natural expression. It is

worthy of observation, that the Constitution of our Missionary Society fully recognizes, as all its operations have illustrated, this inherent partiality for home missions. It "is established for the express purpose of enabling the several annual conferences more effectually to extend their missionary labors throughout the United States and *elsewhere*." True to its fundamental principle, this institution has made "the United States" the almost exclusive theatre of its benevolent action, while the "*elsewhere*" has been so strictly construed as to exclude the vast heathen world from the sphere of its charities; and whenever the church has become restive under a consciousness of disobedience to the great commandment, "Go into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature," an apology and an anodyne were at hand, in the fact that we have been eminently successful in our devotion to home missions—that Michigan, Illinois, and even Ohio, are only the matured fruits of our unparalleled missionary efforts and triumphs. It is important, as it is discouraging, to observe that this favoritism toward home missions, to the neglect of the heathen, was never more predominant than at the present time. Of this, the Report of 1846 exhibits but too ample proof. Let it be remembered, that at the time of writing this annual exposé, there was in the missionary treasury an unexpended surplus of some twenty thousand dollars, and that the society was free from debt. What new enterprise awakens the zeal of the grateful board with whom God and the church have dealt so liberally? Hear the Report:—"It is hoped, therefore, that instead of deviating from our former policy, even a larger appropriation will be made for this work (domestic missions) the ensuing year."—P. 96. Again,—"*It is confidently hoped that the present state of our funds, and the increasing demand for help in our domestic department, will induce the missionary committee to make a larger appropriation for the ensuing year than they felt themselves warranted to do for the past. Such a course, we have good reason to believe, will receive the sanction of the board.*"—P. 97.

We may confidently trust in the society for the fulfillment of these reasonable hopes; but what hope for the heathen in this full treasury? None at all. The Report admits, as all its predecessors have, that it is the sacred duty of the church to send them the gospel—admits her "criminality" if she remain inactive—that she will be "recreant" to "sacred trusts," "unworthy of her parentage," "false to her own pretensions"—admits that China and the world are now accessible, and informs us that a good supply of well-qualified young ministers "are anxiously waiting"

to be sent out on a mission to the heathen. But after all these admissions, and at the conclusion of several pages of argument and remonstrance, it announces, that "until some satisfactory assurances are given that the church will sustain such an enterprise, they [the board] must hesitate in giving it encouragement."—P. 13. It, however, "affords us [the board] great pleasure to state, that a plan has already been projected, which, if sustained, and efficiently carried out, will probably meet the case in hand."—P. 15. The plan is this:—Some persons have promised to pay one hundred dollars each for ten years for the support of a mission to China. It is hoped that thirty subscribers may be found who will pay three thousand dollars per annum for that period, and it is added:—"If this amount were found to be *not quite* sufficient, it might, nevertheless, warrant the undertaking."—P. 15. The whole may be summed up in a single sentence. The twenty thousand dollars surplus, together with all the money that can be raised in the usual way, will be devoted to the enlargement of the work at home, and for the support of existing missions; and if Methodists will enjoy the luxury of attempting to evangelize the heathen, they must enter into good recognizances to indemnify the board against losses in this deviation from its appropriate work. Profound as is our mortification at this virtual denial of its obligations to extend its labors to the heathen, it is deepened by the recollection that the appeals of this society for pecuniary aid are always based on a recognition of these claims; and we do not hesitate to declare our conviction that missionary money is usually contributed with a vague expectation that it is somehow to contribute to the evangelization of pagans. Every one who hears or reads missionary appeals, knows that the wants of these outcasts, and the sacred duty of the church to enlighten them, constitute the burden of their argument. Under the head of "modes of raising supplies," the Report before us advises to "place before our people, generally, the deeply affecting state of the heathen—their intense and bewildering darkness—their cruel and ferocious habits—their revolting idolatries—their gross and disgusting superstitions—and their fearfully imminent perils. This picture of heathen degradation must be made to stand out in bold relief—its deep, dark shades must be made to appear in all the radiance of well-authenticated facts."—P. 106. We may ask, Is a Missionary Society, which gets its income on the strength of such affecting statements, at liberty to overlook them in its appropriation? Will they refuse to devote three thousand dollars a year to the relief of wants, on account of which the larger por-

tion of their funds are contributed? For ourselves, we must declare that we do not see how money can be properly solicited on such grounds, unless some respect is to be paid to the obligation thus incurred.

These strictures are made with no intention to cast censure upon the society or any of its agents, who, we are perfectly confident, have conscientiously discharged what has seemed to be their duty; but for the sole purpose of exposing the inherent and hitherto insuperable repugnance of our existing missionary arrangements to the uncongenial work of evangelization in distant pagan lands. The system rejoices and triumphs in the home field, which, for twenty-seven years, has presented an antagonism to the foreign interest strong enough to overcome the anxious wishes of the church, and the honest purposes of the society; and so adapted is the machinery, by which it connects itself with every part of the land, to perpetuate this narrow favoritism, that an application for aid from the missionary funds, by any rising or waning society of five and twenty members, is likely to be urged upon the board with an advocacy earnest enough to drown the Macedonian cry of the five hundred millions of heathen who perish in their sins between the Indus and the Sea of Japan. Is it premature to conclude that we shall never do anything valuable in the evangelization of these nations without some new arrangements better suited to the purpose? With us, opinion has ripened into a settled conviction that we must have a distinct board of foreign missions, responsible to God and the church for the zealous, faithful prosecution of that one work, leaving to the present society the field which it has cultivated so long and so well. This division of labor could hardly fail of being highly beneficial to the home interest, while it would open to the church a new and effectual door for the development of its energies in doing good. A more important subject than this will not occupy the deliberations of the General Conference at its session in 1848; and we devoutly hope that no other questions or interests will be allowed to postpone or supplant it. Under a better system, the church would soon roll away her greatest reproach, and regain confidence in her own resources and counsels. We should no longer hear of doubtful, mortifying discussions about extra efforts to send out one or two young men, commissioned to represent the entire zeal of six hundred thousand Methodists for the salvation of five hundred millions of pagans. We doubt not that ten or twenty messengers of mercy might be dispatched in a single year, and that we should eventually, and very soon, assume our just proportion of the great

work which Christ has assigned to his church. When we consent to doubt this, we shall doubt the substantial piety of the denomination; for we heartily concur in the statement of Dr. Harris, that "to decline the missionary cause, or look coldly upon its progress, is to merit the execration of the world we are neglecting, and of the church we are refusing to assist."

The Report before us questions the steadiness of the church in the prosecution of missions to the heathen, and complains that it acts from impulse—and is too impatient of delays to be trusted in such enterprises. We submit, that the zeal and perseverance of the church have not been tested; and till the experiment shall have been fairly made, we will hope and believe better things of our Zion. Present some worthy opportunity for the manifestation of the missionary spirit in its highest function—trust God and the power of his grace in the hearts of his people—send forth twenty young men into the bosom of the pagan world, and lay upon the church's conscience the responsibility of sustaining, or of recalling them, or of leaving them to starve, and there will, there must be a response as deep and as incessant as her devotion to Christ. We repeat it, we have confidence in the sons of Wesley, who are of one spirit on either side of the Atlantic; but we earnestly deprecate the tantalizing, hardening processes by which our sympathies for the heathen have been evoked so often, while no way has been devised to give to this holy sentiment any appropriate sphere of manifestation. Propose to the church some intelligible enterprise, some worthy, well-defined field for the display of its activities—*give the church something to do*, and then if her Christianity proves mere impulse and vapor, let Ichabod be written on all her tabernacles. It will be worth more than all such an experiment will cost to know in season that ours is but a spurious form of Christianity, which has no part in the mission of Christ's church.

In favor of our proposal for the establishment of a separate board for conducting foreign missions, we may add, that such a change is recommended by the practice of every Christian denomination in this country. Ours, we believe, is the only attempt to concentrate under one administration the management of interests at once so distinct and so important. The example of the British societies is inapplicable to our circumstances, as they have comparatively little concern in domestic missionary operations.

If, in addition to this indispensable change, to which we are unable to perceive any reasonable ground of objection, we might borrow from our Canadian brethren an improvement that has

vastly increased their missionary resources, we should confidently expect to see the church of our choice enter upon this long-neglected field of Christian duty with brightening prospects and fresh impulses, and under a system well adapted to foreign, no less than to home, evangelization. Every presiding elder in the Canada Conference is charged with the care of the missionary interest in his district; and it is made his duty, in concert with the churches, to organize missionary societies, and provide for the collection of funds, and to hold annually, and in all suitable places, missionary meetings, for which he has authority to detail the preachers at his discretion, providing, mean time, for their pulpits by the aid of local preachers, or otherwise. The introduction of such a feature into our missionary system—of such an element of power, of efficiency, and *order*—could not fail of producing the most important results. It would diffuse missionary spirit and activity throughout the entire connection, and, at the same time, strongly tend to combine more closely the different sections of the church under a common system, and for the prosecution of common enterprises—objects of the highest value, which are often counteracted, especially so, we think, in the missionary work, by the subdivision of the church into so many conferences, each the centre of a distinct sphere of operation, and liable, therefore, to fall under the influence of sectional interests and views. The change proposed would unquestionably impose new and onerous duties on the presiding elder, who would need to be a man of bodily and mental vigor, as well as of great industry and zeal; but the office would, we think, find its compensation for the additional burden in its vastly increased usefulness and respectability. Of this modification, as of the first proposed, we are ready to say that we can perceive no good reason against its adoption. It would harmonize perfectly with our itinerant economy. It would be a glorious recognition of the importance of the missionary work, of its identity with Christianity itself. It would make of our denomination, in fact, what it has ever claimed to be, and what it confessedly is for all the purposes of domestic evangelization, an essentially missionary church.

To the changes here proposed, and to all attempts to adapt our arrangements more fully to meet the exigences of missionary efforts among distant pagan nations, we are sorry to know that there exists, with a few excellent men, an objection which is not met by any of the arguments and explanations here adduced. They see in the admirable adaptations of our itinerant system to home evangelization, and not less in the unskillful movements of the church

in foreign enterprises, a providential intimation that we are not called to engage in the distant field of labor. We are not about to enter upon a formal refutation of this opinion, which is confessedly in conflict with the nearly universal sentiment of the denomination, as well as with that of the entire Christian church. We have referred to this objection for the purpose of throwing out an idea which we conscientiously entertain. We believe that in the present state of piety among us, and in any state of piety that can co-exist with a neglect of evangelizing efforts for the conversion of the heathen, little or no advantage can accrue from any great increase of our expenditure of money and labor on home operations. Let us suppose each annual conference to be able to send out and support a hundred additional preachers;—what reason should we have to expect any appreciable increase of numbers or piety from their labors, without some new endowment of heavenly power and grace? We might expect just the reverse of this by the subdivision of responsibilities already but too feebly felt, and the more leisurely performance of a work which is effectual only where it is done with “all the might.” In truth, the offers of salvation have already been borne around and around throughout the great mass of our home population, and pressed upon the individual conscience with whatever force our love to Christ, and the souls purchased with his blood, is able to exert, aided by all the divine assistance which is wont to be conceded to such a standard of piety as now prevails among us. There is work to be done, we admit, everywhere, and especially in new and distant settlements; but it is vain to hope that a more thorough and comprehensive evangelization can be generally attained without influences from on high, not to be expected by any church that in this day of light and urgent convictions shall continue to treat with neglect the Saviour’s last great commandment. History and observation are at hand to confirm these conclusions. What a revolution has taken place in several of our American churches since they engaged earnestly in the evangelization of the heathen! What new efficiency! What unwonted activity! What pecuniary sacrifices! What new life and energy in the laity! Tahiti and Ceylon are evidently reacting upon Boston and New-York. It was probably necessary that Christian benevolence should contemplate the worth and the degradation of blood-bought souls in the presence of false gods and abominable rites, ere it could acquire momentum sufficient to force its purifying tide along neglected lanes and wretched habitations at its own doors, so long forgotten or spurned by its sympathies. All the eminently missionary churches are now receiving into their own bosoms an

ample recompense for their outlays. Every agent in the foreign field is represented at home by half a dozen colporteurs, tract distributors, and domiciliary visitors, while an unexampled baptism of zeal and power has transformed all of God's people into prophets. And this is just such a result as we might expect from missionary efforts under our Christian economy, for they eminently fulfill the two great commandments on which hang all the law and the prophets—love to God and to man, loyalty to Christ and sympathy for souls.

While the genius of the gospel concurs with experience in thus pointing to the missionary field as that on which are to be won the spiritual discipline and gracious resources indispensable as instruments for a more general and searching evangelization at home, the example of the apostles throws contempt on that theory of Christian benevolence which refuses to put forth an effort to save remote nations, so long as there is so much sin and impenitence in our own. Had this been the gauge of their zeal and charity, the first disciples would never have crossed the boundaries of Judea, not one in a hundred of whose inhabitants were converted when the gospel was carried into remote idolatrous lands. The Holy Spirit dictated a very different policy to those who implicitly followed its guidance, and we find them passing rapidly from country to country, erecting the standard of the gospel in all the high places of the earth—in the great centres of intelligence and power, of wealth and trade,—in Rome, in Athens, in Corinth, in Philippi, in Antioch, in Damascus.

In emulation of such authoritative examples, and with some measure of the impartiality of Him who is no respecter of persons, ought the Christian church in all its branches to hasten the movements of its benevolence, till every nation under heaven shall have its day of merciful visitation. Though thousands and millions at home shall continue to "judge themselves unworthy of everlasting life," let them still turn to the heathen, for so hath the Lord commanded us, saying, "I have set thee to be a light to the Gentiles, that thou shouldest be for salvation unto the ends of the earth."

Our task will be completed when we have added a brief paragraph upon the means, pecuniary and personal, likely to be at the disposal of the church for the performance of its high duty to the pagan world. In regard to the former, the income of the Missionary Society for the last year exceeded the expenditure necessary under the existing scale of its operations by twenty thousand dollars; and yet the whole amount divided by the number of our church members gives a quotient of less than fourteen cents. To doubt the

willingness of the denomination to quadruple that insignificant average, under any system of finance and administration that shall commend itself to the intelligence and the conscience of the great body of our people, would be a grievous reflection upon their piety, in which it is at least premature to indulge. It is a fact well known that the vast majority of Methodists contribute nothing to missions, and that no earnest, systematic endeavor is made to interest them in the enterprise; while those who actually give, do it in amounts which, if equaled by the mass of their brethren, would swell the society's revenue to hundreds of thousands. Now, in forming our estimate of what may be accomplished in the department of funds, we are entitled to reckon on American Methodists as a Christian people, and on the great body of the preachers as men of God, and *we know* that under a system of applications at once energetic and comprehensive—under any system not greatly defective—carried to the doors and consciences of a pious people by a zealous, laborious, evangelical ministry, results may be reached far more satisfactory than any which we have hitherto ventured to propose. What has been done by others *can* be done by us; and it is an historical fact that much more than we have suggested as attainable by the Methodist Church, is from year to year accomplished by the Wesleyans in England, and in Canada; and by Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Episcopalians, in this country. What we have said of money may, with some change of terms, be said of men—the actual supply does, to an extent at once painful and embarrassing, exceed the demand. While the board speaks doubtfully of sending two or three missionaries to the heathen, five times that number of unexceptionable, well-qualified young men are competitors for the post of honor. Well does the Report warn the church of its “fearful responsibility,” in restraining the grace of God, which urges so many of her devoted sons into the missionary field. We trust that this gratifying fact will remove an apprehension which we believe has hitherto silently operated to deter many excellent men from lending a cordial support to foreign missions. It has been apparent to them that a good degree of literary preparation would be indispensable in preachers set apart to a work for which new languages must be acquired, and where strange forms of blended religions and philosophical error must be combated by a higher science, as well as a purer theology; and they have not seen how this manifest urgent want could be satisfied without some infringement on what they deem the true Scriptural method of ministerial training. As if to remove this practical objection from all sincere minds, God has been

pleased to awaken these convictions of duty in regard to going to the heathen, especially, if not exclusively, in young men already possessed of competent intellectual advantages; and His faithfulness is pledged, in answer to the prayers of his people, to pour out his Spirit more and more upon this large and growing class of young preachers. Should the church, however, in the prosecution of this great work, be ultimately called upon to make special provision for the training of its missionaries, this can never be deemed a good reason for withholding obedience to the great commandment, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." In the primitive church the missionary was miraculously endowed with a knowledge of the language in which he was called to preach the unsearchable riches of Christ. Now the indispensable qualification must be reached by providential, not by miraculous, means; and the toilsome season of preparation, whether spent on the shores of China, or at home, has become one of the conditions under which the missionary and the church, whose messenger and agent he is, must be content to offer an acceptable sacrifice to the Saviour of the world.

While, then, we gratefully accept the facilities so opportunely presented for an immediate entrance upon this long-deferred enterprise, we ought ever to hold ourselves ready to follow the leadings of Providence in all arrangements for the maintenance and future enlargement of the work. That the instruments hereafter to be provided, like those who now voluntarily offer themselves to the board, must be *young* men, we may thus early conclude without trespassing upon the prophetic function, or giving a too hasty interpretation to the intimations already vouchsafed to us. Young men alone can learn and *speak* a foreign language with facility. This consideration of itself conclusively determines the question. In all ordinary cases it will require twice or thrice the time for a man of forty years of age to learn a difficult language, which, after all, he will never use effectively, that will suffice for one of twenty-two or twenty-five, to obtain good facility both in writing and speaking it. In addition to this, young men alone adapt themselves to new climates, and habits, and new states of society, with little risk and inconvenience, and with the utmost readiness and tact. We have felt some surprise at hearing the question raised, whether the church can trust young men in a work so responsible as the establishment and superintendence of a foreign mission. The history of, we believe, every successful enterprise of this sort answers in the affirmative; for no church, that we are aware of, has thought it wise to deprive the home work of the

influence and counsels of middle-aged and aged ministers, in order to employ them in distant fields of labor, for which they are not qualified, and can by no effort become so. It occurs to us that the Methodist Church ought to be the last to withhold confidence from her young men, whether for this or any other department of usefulness. From the day when Methodism was first planted on our shores, young men have been its pioneers in every enterprise involving toil or sacrifice. The same thing has been exemplified both in the west and the east; and the venerable fathers who still remain to counsel and bless us, gained their greenest laurels in their youth. Providential circumstances thrust them into the most trying and responsible positions, at an age when the fullest development of bodily, as well as mental power was favored and hastened by the magnitude of the trusts confided to them. Francis Asbury was only twenty-seven years of age when Mr. Wesley appointed him "general assistant," and "constituted him the head of all the preachers and societies in America, with power to station the preachers," &c., under his own direction. Mr. Asbury, it is readily conceded, was an extraordinary man, but his example, nevertheless, illustrates a general principle; and if he, at so early an age, proved himself eminently qualified for duties and trusts so difficult and responsible, may not young ministers of the present day, selected for their piety and discretion, and always acting under the instructions of the board, be safely trusted to take care of themselves during the incipient stages of a mission, while they must be chiefly employed in learning a new language, and afterward, and with the lights of growing experience and years, to take care of the work in which they are expected to be, under divine guidance, the sole efficient instruments? We should not dwell upon a question which appears to us so very free from difficulty, but for the fact that the want of suitable men of mature experience and established ministerial reputation, to go out as superintendents of the enterprise, is believed to constitute no slight obstacle to the early establishment of missions to the heathen. We verily believe that this maturity of years and ministerial experience will be found to constitute a precise *unsuitableness* for the strange field of labor. Shall the middle-aged or veteran preacher be sent forth with his youthful coadjutors, attended probably by a numerous family, to swell the expense of the enterprise? He cannot learn the language, or not till the advance of years shall have robbed him of opportunities to use his new acquisition with the greatest benefit to the cause. Shall he follow at the close of the period which must be devoted to preliminary measures, that he may superintend

the active evangelizing operations? He can only act upon the knowledge gained by his predecessors in the field. He must inevitably be superintended by them, or only embarrass and mar plans which they alone are competent to form.

Long as this article is, its limits have compelled us to exclude several topics, and many reflections and suggestions, which it was our anxious wish to present. To the large class of our readers, who think silence should be observed in regard to deficiencies and errors such as we have dwelt upon, we submit in all humility that, in our opinion, great harm has already been done by the want of the disclosures which the Report under review contains; and that it is a first principle with us to trust unreservedly the candor and discretion of the church, in all that concerns the church's interests and responsibilities. To this and all other objections we offer as our final reply, that we have been led into the train of remark which terminates with the present sentence, by a sense of duty as clear and constraining as any to which we ever yielded a reluctant obedience.

ART. VII.—*The Life and Correspondence of John Foster: edited by J. E. Ryland. With Notices of Mr. Foster as a Preacher and a Companion.* By JOHN SHEPPARD, Author of "Thoughts on Devotion," &c. In two vols., 8vo., pp. 306, 385. New-York: Wiley & Putnam. 1846.

JOHN FOSTER was a man of great and extraordinary qualities. His "Essays" are among the most masterly productions in the English language. They have made a deep and indelible impression upon the age, and given immortality to the author's name. That a man who lived so long, and was so extensively known and admired, should have left behind him a multitude of letters and private documents which would illustrate his character, is what might be expected, and their publication would naturally excite deep interest.

The present work is almost wholly composed of Foster's productions. The editor gives us a rapid sketch of the life and labors of his subject; but even in this he weaves in passages from his letters and other documents in great abundance: so that there is scarcely a page that is not adorned by the scintillations of his genius. It is rare, indeed, that the letters of a shining character, written to his intimate friends, serve to elevate their author

in public estimation. There are many sad evidences of the truth of this remark in the numerous biographies which are extant. By this means a multitude of things freely and carelessly written, which their authors never intended for the public eye, are handed over to posterity as part and parcel of the evidence upon which a correct judgment is to be formed of their spirit, talents, and character. All this would be right, if the world is entitled to an acquaintance with the secret workings of men's minds, and to gaze upon the sanctuary of their private communings with their intimate friends. This is a question upon which we have strong doubts: for it is rarely the case that the world, for generations after a man has been dead, is competent to judge correctly of his private and confidential communications. They are generally made upon the assumption of a state of mind, and a knowledge of facts, upon the part of those to whom they are addressed, which are peculiar to them as individuals, and consequently cannot, with perhaps a few rare exceptions, be transmitted to others, even those who live in their own times; and much less to such as shall live generations afterward.

There are several of Foster's letters to his confidential friends which we regret to see. We should infinitely prefer to have known him only through his published works, illustrated by such private letters and papers as breathe the same spirit and speak the same language, to the vexation of a labored effort to reconcile *John Foster the essayist* with *John Foster the correspondent*.

We are aware it may be urged that impartial history requires that everything which is tangible, that goes to illustrate a man's character, should be brought out. And we confess there is force in the plea, and it would be perfectly conclusive, provided we could have his own explanations and qualifications, just as he would have made them if he had been writing for the gaze of the world. In his private communications he supposes these explanations and qualifications to be unnecessary; but if he had imagined himself in communication with millions of minds, extending down through countless ages, he would have judged them indispensable; or, possibly, would have withheld altogether the matter, which, if published to the world, would require them.

We have been led into this train of reflections by the perusal of the work now before us; though the matter which we deem exceptionable occupies comparatively but a small space. The letters, as a whole, rank among the most spirited and instructive compositions of the class. The exceptions are like spots upon the sun; and we confess we are grieved to see them. Indeed, we most

heartily wish, as we have no doubt the author *now* does, that they were annihilated. But before we proceed to particulars, we must give our readers a brief sketch of Mr. Foster.

John Foster was born Sept. 17, 1770, of poor, industrious, honest, and pious parents, in the parish of Halifax, between Wainsgate and Hebden-bridge, England. He says of himself, that "when not twelve years old he had a painful sense of an awkward but entire individuality." In his youth his manners and his observations upon men and things were such that he was characterized by his neighbors as "old-fashioned." His early years were spent in weaving coarse fabrics,—a business for which he had no relish, and in which he manifested little skill. He was retiring and studious. His biographer says: "While residing with his parents he studied closely, but irregularly; he would often shut himself up in the barn for a considerable time, and then come out and weave for two or three hours, 'working,' as an eye-witness expressed it, 'like a horse.'" In his eighteenth year he became a member of the Baptist Church. He commenced his studies under Dr. Fawcett at Brearley Hall, and after about three years was admitted into the Baptist college, Bristol, where, it seems, he remained only about one year. In 1792 he entered upon his first engagement as a preacher in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Here his success was small, and he only remained about three months. Next he engaged "to a Baptist society, meeting in Swift's Alley, Dublin." Here he remained but about a year. He next undertook school-keeping, taking charge of a classical school in Dublin. But he says: "The success did not encourage me to prosecute it more than eight or nine months." In 1797 he "was invited to become the minister of a General Baptist Church at Chichester. He remained there about two years and a half, and applied himself with greater earnestness than at any former period to his ministerial duties;—usually preaching three times on the Sunday, and in various ways striving to promote the piety and general improvement of the congregation." After this he spent one year "with Mr. Hughes at Battersea;" and "in 1800 he removed to the village of Downend, five miles from Bristol, where he preached regularly at a small chapel erected by Dr. Caleb Evans." After he "had resided about four years at Downend, in consequence chiefly of the high testimony borne to his character and abilities by Mr. Hall, he was invited to become the minister of a congregation, meeting in Sheppard's Barton, Frome." "It was during his residence at Frome that the 'Essays,' by which Foster attained his great celebrity, were published." Mr. Foster held the office of pastor at Frome a little

more than two years, when he became a regular contributor to the *Eclectic Review*; and henceforward gave himself almost entirely to literary pursuits. The occasion of Foster's giving up his pastoral charge at Frome was a disease in the throat, which was much aggravated by public speaking. In 1808 Mr. Foster married. In relation to this event he remarks:—

"We are thoroughly well acquainted with each other's character, tastes, and habits; and both of us believe there is a singular, even an extraordinary, degree of mutual adaptation, in all our views, feelings, and wishes. Perhaps I might have mentioned that my dear friend is about six years younger than myself. Two months hence I shall be thirty-seven years of age. . . . Our acquaintance has now been as much as seven years, and our avowed connection about five. I regret that the union has been, though unavoidably, deferred to so advanced a period of life, but I never wish I had been married very young. My general health is very good. The state of my eyes is not worse, nor the complaint which has compelled me to desist from preaching."—Vol. i, p. 192.

After his marriage he settled at Bourton; and though when he relinquished his pastoral duties at Frome, he supposed his labors as a Christian minister had closed, yet, "within little more than a year after his marriage, the morbid affection in his throat had so far diminished as to allow of his once more speaking in public." He seems for about nine years to have preached whenever an opening occurred, in all sorts of places: for he says in relation to this period, "I am become accustomed to pulpits, desks, stools, blocks, and all sorts of pedestal elevations." "Toward the close of 1817 Mr. Foster left Bourton, and became once more a resident and a stated preacher at Downend;" but "scarcely six months had elapsed when the failure of his efforts was so evident, that he could not hesitate on the propriety of relinquishing the situation." His "mode of exhibiting religious subjects" did not meet the taste of the people, and he was not much disposed to change it: for he says,—"I cannot feel the duty of making a laborious effort to change my manner for the sake of attracting persons, to whom, after all, it would be less attractive than the crudest exhibitions at the Methodist meeting." Dry, hard, intellectual essays, in the shape of sermons, without evangelical life or fire, never were and never will be "attractive" to people who feel that they have souls to be saved.

In 1821 Foster removed from Downend to Stapleton, within three miles of Bristol. In the following year he complied with the solicitations of his friends in Bristol to deliver a lecture once a fortnight at Broadmead chapel. These lectures he continued until

Robert Hall's settlement in Bristol, in 1825; when, out of deference to this prince of Christian orators, he discontinued them. He continued his residence at Stapleton until his death, which occurred Oct. 15, 1843.

Foster, as a *thinker*, was slow but profound and majestic in his evolutions. His mind was of a peculiar mold. No theme was too deep and mysterious for his adventurous and powerful genius. He seems even to prefer dwelling upon inscrutable mysteries. His disappointments in endeavoring to perforate the veil which separates between the present and the future world did not discourage his repeated efforts; and he often seems uneasy under the restraints which the wisdom of God has laid upon the mind of man in his best estate.

He was a careful and critical observer of nature. In his rambles in the field he was constantly storing his mind with minute facts, which served him as illustrations in the consideration of the laws of the universe. The following passage from his Journal shows how minutely and accurately he analyzed the most trivial matters :—

“ Observed a long time, through a small opening in a completely built and closed shed, a cow and calf. The cow advanced her head to the opening to observe *me* too. We looked at each other's face, at a very short distance, a long time, and I indulged in a kind of wondering about the nature of our mutual consciousness and thought of each other. (By the way, the mutual recognition of beings of any order is a very strange and mysterious thing.) I observed the great difference between the degree of intelligence expressed in the eyes and looks of the cow, and in those of the calf. Yet vastly less difference than between the looks of a *human* infant and a mature person.

“ Observed the beautiful appearance of the numerous shining flexures or wrinkles on the neck and shoulders of the cow. Noticed, also, an exquisite beautiful cerulean appearance within the eyes of the calf, in the half-darkness (more than half) of the shed.

“ Observed that the cow's *attention* was much more *excited*, (even when the calf did look at me,) and much longer fixed and continued, than that of the calf.”—Vol. i, p. 235.

In the same manner he remarked upon rocks and hills, plants and flowers. The “butter-cup” was with him an object of as absorbing interest as a kingdom was to Napoleon. He had a strange sympathy for flowers—seldom plucking them, not being willing to hasten the period of their glory.

As a *writer*, Foster was copious, nervous, and majestic, though not remarkable for beauty or correctness. The following critique upon the style of his “Essays,” by Robert Hall, is measurably

applicable to all his writings ; but the faults noted are less frequent in his correspondence than in his other compositions.

"We are far, however, from recommending these volumes as faultless. Mr. Foster's work is rather an example of the power of genius than a specimen of finished composition : it lies open in many points to the censure of those minor critics who, by the observation of a few technical rules, may easily avoid its faults without reaching one of its beauties. The author has paid too little attention to the construction of his sentences. They are for the most part too long, sometimes involved in perplexity, and often loaded with redundances. They have too much of the looseness of a harangue and too little of the compact elegance of regular composition. An occasional obscurity pervades some parts of the work. The mind of the writer seems at times to struggle with conceptions too mighty for his grasp, and to present confused masses, rather than distinct delineations of thought. This, however, is to be imputed to the originality, not the weakness of his powers. The scale on which he thinks is so vast, and the excursions of his imagination are so extended, that they frequently carry him into the most unbeaten track, and among objects where a ray of light glances in an angle only, without diffusing itself over the whole. On ordinary topics his conceptions are luminous in the highest degree. He places the idea which he wishes to present in such a flood of light, that it is not merely visible itself, but it seems to illumine all around it. He paints metaphysics, and has the happy art of arraying what in other hands would appear cold and comfortless abstractions, in the warmest colors of fancy. Without the least affectation of frivolous ornaments, without quitting his argument in pursuit of imagery, his imagination becomes the perfect handmaid of his reason, ready at every moment to spread her canvass and present her pencil."—*Hall's Works*, pp. 247-8.

As a *politician*—for he, from principle, meddled with the affairs of the state—he was a rigid dissenter and a democrat. Early in life he imbibed a profound horror of "religious establishments," which with advancing years grew into a passion as obstinate and relentless as death. The state of Ireland, the condition of the poor in the manufacturing districts, the extravagance of the nobility, and their cold indifference to the sufferings of the operatives, raised his ire to a fearful pitch. His scorching sarcasms upon the English clergy and gentry are now made public, and will haunt those classes like ghosts of darkness. Even "the evangelicals" do not escape his terrible inflictions. He gloried much in the act of "Catholic Emancipation," but lived long enough to see

that it strengthened Romanism in England without diminishing the power of the privileged orders, or affording a morsel of bread to the poor. His three numbers on "The Ballot," addressed "to the editor of the Morning Chronicle," are powerful, and, doubtless, truthful, exhibitions of the corruptions of the elections. They show most conclusively the impossibility of maintaining popular rights against a moneyed aristocracy. He declares it a notorious fact that "it was absolutely impossible to obtain an honest election," and quotes with approbation the language of one who said, "The Reform Bill is not worth five farthings here, so inveterate, so despotic an ascendancy has the tory corporation, combined with the high-church, acquired over the interests and fears of the inhabitants."—See *Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 178-190.

As a *Christian*, Foster does not appear to have been deeply experienced. The subject of religion pervades his correspondence: but his explanations, his reasonings, his doubtings, his gloomy retrospects and anticipations, indicate a want of deep communion with God, and assurance of his own acceptance. He seems to have reached little beyond the experience described in the seventh of Romans—the mere legal state of an awakened conscience. The triumphant language with which the next chapter opens reflected no light upon his vision. He never seems to have been rid of a *sore conscience*—never to have escaped a sense of condemnation.

His life was serious, and his deportment always consistent with the proprieties of the Christian character. But his *faith* was *weak*. He resolved to keep God's holy law—he failed—he condemned himself in unmeasured terms, and resolved again—again he failed. He talked and reasoned like a philosopher of *faith*—of the atonement—and declared that here was his only hope, and yet how to *believe* so as to make the atonement available for present deliverance from spiritual bondage he never fully learned. He was like a giant in prison, looking up and around for some way of escape,—believing that there is some way, and often hoping to find it—ever and anon dashing against the terrible barriers by which he is encircled, but making no sensible impression upon them, and hearing no voice but the echo of his own sighs and groans. "At some moments of life," says he, "the world, mankind, religion, and eternity, appear to me like one vast scene of tremendous confusion, stretching before me far away, and closed in shades of the most awful darkness;—a darkness which only the most powerful splendors of Deity can illumine, and which appears as if they never had yet *illumined* it." A confiding and commanding *faith* would have "illumined" and gilded with glory this "vast scene

of tremendous confusion." The faith of Fletcher or Mrs. Rogers would have totally changed the aspect of Foster's whole field of vision. But we must pass.

As a *preacher*, Mr. Foster fell far below the grade which the world had reason to expect and demand of one of his talents. We should judge, from all we can gather, that his thoughts were too profound, his style too massive, and his discourses, in general, not sufficiently hortatory and evangelical for the wants of the age. "Methodism"—a thing which he castigates and caricatures so dreadfully in his letters to his friend, Mr. Hill—had made too deep and wide an impression about Bristol for the popularity of such dry, hard essays as Foster dealt out to his congregations.

It will have been noticed in the sketch which we have given of his life, that he never remained long in connection with any one congregation. And in some instances he was so conscious of a total failure, that he resigned his place after an experiment of a few months only. The whole history of his ministry seems to exhibit the absence of a conviction of being "moved by the Holy Ghost" to take upon him the sacred office. In one of his letters he says, "While in Dublin I preached not once during the whole year." He discarded the Scriptural authority of "ordination," and held that ministers ought to have "some other sources of emolument than the precarious one of their ministerial employment." This was the result of *his* experience. And, doubtless, if he had not had "some other sources of emolument than the precarious one of his ministerial employment," with all his transcendent endowments, he must have starved. But Foster might have been asked what other "source of emolument" Robert Hall wanted besides that which arose from his "ministerial employment." It will not always do for a man to measure others by himself. Foster's sermons, doubtless, had extraordinary merit, but they were over the heads of the great mass of the people. A man might as well talk Greek to the people, as to talk English that they do not understand, or that they cannot feel.

As a *pastor*, we scarcely know what Mr. Foster did. But we have too much evidence as to what he did *not* do. Though he was a Baptist he *never administered the ordinances*. His views of "church institutions" were exceedingly radical and most dangerous, as will be seen from the following:—

"The wish he avowed 'to have a chapel of his own, without even the existence of what is called a church,' was not a transitory ebullition of juvenile sentiment. At a much later period, on the occasion of a violent dissension between two religious societies, which came under

his immediate notice, he speaks of 'obtaining plenty of confirmation, if he had needed it, of his old opinion, that churches are useless and mischievous institutions, and the sooner they are dissolved the better.'—Vol. i, p. 41.

To this, his friend Mr. Hughes very pertinently replied:—

"I think your conclusion strange. To be sure, if there were no churches, there would be no ecclesiastical squabbles; and, it may be added, if there were no states, there would be no civil broils; and if there were no vegetable productions, there would be no deadly nightshade; and if there were no water, no one would be drowned; and if there were no fire, no one would be consumed; and if there were no victuals, no one would be choked. Church-framers may egregiously err; but when you scout the whole tribe, and all their works, tell us how we ought to proceed; make out a strong case, and say at least that the way you would substitute would be free from the objections that cling to the old ways, and would secure greater advantages."—Ib. i, pp. 41, 42.

As a *theologian*, Mr. Foster was still more faulty than in any other respect. He early expressed a desire to become "a preacher in an Arian congregation;" but subsequently declared, that, "as to the doctrine of the divinity of Christ, I do not deny that I had once some degree of doubt, but not such a degree even as to carry me anything near the adoption of an opposite or different opinion." In the year 1800 he says:—

"My opinions are in substance decisively Calvinistic. I am firmly convinced, for instance, of the doctrines of original sin, predestination, imputed righteousness, the necessity of the Holy Spirit's operation to convert the mind, final perseverance, &c."—Vol. i, p. 84.

How far he carried his notions of "predestination" will be seen in the following statement of them:—

"My melancholy musings on the state of the world have been much consoled by the famous maxim, 'Whatever is, is right.' Yes, I believe that the whole system taken together is the best possible—is absolutely good: and that all the evil that ever has taken place, or that now prevails, was strictly necessary to that ultimate good which the Father of all intends. Believing that he has in view an *end* infinitely and perfectly good, I must believe that all things which take place among his creatures are means, proceeding in an undeviating line toward that end, and that, in decreeing the end, he decreed also the means. As nothing can take place beyond the sphere of his power, nothing can take place against his will: therefore the evils, the wickedness of mankind, are not against his sovereign will."—Vol. i, p. 62.

It is no wonder that with such views of *predestination*, Foster embraced the fatal error of *Universalism*. Early in life he de-

clared that he had "discarded the doctrine of eternal punishments," asserting at the same time that he could "avow no opinion on the peculiar points of Calvinism." We have long believed that the strong views of predestination maintained by Calvin and Edwards naturally run into Universalism. But it would seem from all we can find, that Foster became settled in the doctrine of universal salvation before he had become fully established in the doctrines of Calvinism. His course of progression is the reverse of that which is the ordinary one. Instead of first making his stand-point the position that God has foreordained, and brings to pass, all events, and the legitimate result that "whatever is, is right;"—and from this position inferring that God cannot, consistently with his attributes, eternally punish any of his rational creatures for doing "his sovereign will;"—he first "discarded the doctrine of eternal punishments," and then proceeded to settle the basis of his skepticism. It matters not whether the mind begin with the premises and go on to the conclusion, or, *vice versa*, commence with the conclusion and work back to the premises; since it is the relation of the two which constitutes the important point. It was by the latter process that the two dogmas, of universal divine decrees and efficiency, and of universal salvation, met in the irregular but powerful mind of Foster. In his "Letter to a Young Minister," dated "Sept. 24, 1841," he urges his views on this point, for this reason among others, that "no man can become good in the Christian sense, can become fit for a holy and happy place hereafter, but by this operation [special operation of grace] *ab extra*"—and that "this is arbitrary and discriminative on the part of the sovereign Agent, and independent of the will of man." Again, in his letter to Dr. Harris, he says,—

"How self-evident the proposition, that if the sovereign Arbiter had intended the salvation of the race, it must have been accomplished!" —Vol. ii, p. 291.

Mr. Foster fell into these vagaries by reversing the natural order of things. Instead of going to the Bible for his theology, and then making his philosophy bow to divine authority, his philosophy takes the lead. He makes out by "moral reasoning" what is truth, and then concludes that it must be in some way consistent with what God has revealed, but leaves that matter to those who are willing to endure the toil of a philological investigation of the language of the Bible. He says,—

"I acknowledge myself *not* convinced of the orthodox doctrine. If asked *why* not? I should have little to say in the way of criticism,

of implications found or sought in what may be called incidental expressions of Scripture, or of the passages dubiously cited in favor of final, universal restitution. It is the moral argument, as it may be named, that presses irresistibly on my mind—that which comes in the stupendous idea of eternity.”—Vol. ii, p. 263.

Was ever a great mind so palpably at fault in its processes? He does not ask “what saith the Scriptures,” but what is the result of “the moral argument.”

We should exceedingly like to examine at length this “moral argument,” but our space will not allow. We also intended to present many fine specimens of elevated thought and sentiment, which we had marked for the purpose; but for the same reason we must omit them. In conclusion, we must say we have seldom read a book with such mingled emotions of pleasure and pain. Of course the reader will by this time conclude that we are prepared to recommend the work with reserve. This is true. It is a pot of most excellent “ointment,” but the “dead flies” in it well nigh give the whole an offensive odor.

ART. VIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Witness of the Spirit: a Treatise on the Evidence of the Believer's Adoption.* By DANIEL WALTON. 18mo., pp. 228. New-York: Lane & Tippet.

THE author of this work is a distinguished minister of the Wesleyan connection. The subject is one of great importance, and yet one upon which evangelical Christians still differ in opinion. The author brings to his aid, in its discussion, candor, ingenuousness, acuteness, and learning. He rests his argument upon the word of God; but in its illustration he draws upon the experience and observations of wise and pious men. We see in a contemporary Review, a work upon this subject noticed, which professes to show that the doctrine, “as taught by the Rev. John Wesley,” is “unscriptural, false, fanatical, and of mischievous tendency.” And the reviewer thinks this work is wanted to correct “a very mischievous error, and to open the eyes of the Christian public to the leaven of fanaticism which entered into the original composition of Methodism, and which,” he seriously thinks, “it is to be feared is by no means purged out.”

We will send a copy of Mr. Walton's work to our brother; and we hope he will look a little further into the subject before he gives up the Methodists as incurable fanatics. The doctrine has been maintained by many learned and pious Calvinists, as all who are read in the theology of the Puritans, of Old and New England, very well know. Every Methodist family especially should have this little book.

2. *Resurrection of the Dead: a Vindication of the literal Resurrection of the human Body; in Opposition to the Work of Professor Bush.* By CALVIN KINGSLEY. 18mo., pp. 159. New-York: Lane & Tippet.

THE doctrine of the resurrection from the dead has ever been regarded, by orthodox Christians, as a doctrine of the Bible, and as vital to Christianity. Infidels and semi-infidels have always denied it as wholly “incredible.” Some, who repudiate both the above characters, have fallen into their modes of reasoning upon the subject with much apparent honesty. Among these Professor Bush has lately become enrolled. His book upon the subject has done much harm, and is likely to

do much more. The answer by Professor Kingsley, of Allegany College, is an admirable specimen of fair, manly argument; and, we hesitate not to say, a complete refutation of the learned effort which Professor Bush has put forth to bring into doubt and discredit a plain doctrine of God's holy and blessed word. We need not attempt to analyze this work, as its size, and the intrinsic importance of the subject of which it treats, will suggest to all who see this notice the importance of procuring and reading it for themselves. We have seldom read an argument upon any theological subject with which we have been so entirely pleased. Let every family wishing to preserve the purity and simplicity of the Christian faith free from the admixture of a vain philosophy, immediately procure this little volume, and keep it constantly at hand.

3. *A General History of the World, briefly sketched, upon Scriptural Principles.* By the Rev. C. Barth, D. D. 12mo., pp. 374. New-York: Lane & Tippet.

THE following, from the editor's preface, will give the reader a correct view of the character and importance of this work:—"This work is a brief universal history, sketched upon Scriptural principles. It was written by the Rev. Dr. Barth, of Wirtenburg, in the German language, and translated into English by Rev. R. F. Walker, A. M., for the use of the Religious Tract Society of London. By that institution the work has been extensively circulated in Great Britain, and even published in other languages.

"The want of such a book has been felt in this country, and we take pleasure in offering to the public a carefully revised edition.

"It is designed to serve two important purposes connected with the reading and study of history. 1. It will answer for beginners, as a useful introduction to more detailed and voluminous works. 2. It will scarcely be found less valuable as a summary of historical events, to which the extensive reader of history may resort for a review of his studies, and for a well-digested analysis of the leading events which have transpired in our world.

"The importance of historical knowledge is universally admitted, and the time has come when we may reasonably expect it to be more extensively cultivated among sabbath-school scholars and teachers. To contribute to this end is the special object of the present issue, while it will be found equally valuable for every other appropriate use."

4. *Incidental Benefits of Denominational Divisions; an Argument for Christian Union.* By B. P. AYDELOTT, D. D. 18mo., pp. 135. Cincinnati: 1846.

THIS is a work for the times. A portion of its title would seem to promise "an argument" against "Christian union;" but the scope of the author, as the whole title-page taken together intimates, is directly the reverse. The author admits the differences of the church to be in themselves evils, but maintains that there are great incidental and providential advantages resulting from them. In this we fully agree with him. And we also agree with him in maintaining, that, under existing circumstances, the *amalgamation of the evangelical churches would not be safe or desirable*. This object is wholly disclaimed by the *Evangelical Alliance*, and constitutes no part of the object of the great movement in favor of union now in progress. The distinction made by our author between "*denominational division* and *denominational difference*" is an important one.

He says,—"By the former is intended not merely a separation in the church, but such a separation as leads multitudes to seek their own peculiar denominational interests mainly, if not entirely, instead of keeping an eye single to the glory of God in the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom.

"By denominational difference we understand all that distinguishes from each other the various denominations professing the same essential truths of the gospel. While the spirit of division is always wrong, attachment to denominational differences is not necessarily so, because it may be entertained consistently with the exercise of the most enlarged charity."

In view of this distinction and definition, would not the title of the book be more in harmony with the scope of the author's argument if it were, instead of "*incidental benefits of denominational division*," &c., "*incidental benefits of denominational differ-*

ence? He tells us that "wherever this spirit of *division* exists, it necessarily dwarfs the soul of man. His piety is but of a weak, sickly growth at best." Surely, it is difficult to see how *division*, if such be its effects, can be *beneficial* to the church. We merely suggest this diffidently as, at least in appearance, somewhat marring the harmony of the book, while we award to the spirit and general scope of it the highest praise. We hail *Dr. Aydelott* as an able collaborer in the great and blessed cause of real Christian union, and most cordially recommend his work to our readers.

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5. *Cyclopædia of English Literature: a Selection of the choicest Productions of English Authors, from the earliest to the present Time; connected by a critical and biographical History.* Elegantly illustrated. Edited by ROBERT CHAMBERS, editor of the "Edinburgh Journal," "Information for the People," &c. In two vols., royal octavo, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln. New-York: Burgess, Stringer, & Co.

This work is described as "a concentration of the best productions of English intellect, from the earliest Anglo-Saxon to the present times, in the various departments headed by Chaucer, Shakspeare, Milton; by More, Bacon, Locke; by Hooker, Taylor, Barrow; by Addison, Johnson, Goldsmith; by Thorne, Robertson, Gibbon,—set in a biographical and critical history of the literature itself." The work is issued semi-monthly in numbers, and will form two volumes of 700 pages each. The plan is admirably calculated to provide those who have not access to large libraries with an introduction to the great masters of English literature. The work is got up in a style creditable to the enterprising house from which it emanates, and is entitled to a large public patronage.

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6. *A Universal Pronouncing Gazetteer; containing topographical, statistical, and other Information of all the more important Places in the known World, from the most recent and authentic Sources. With a Map.* By THOMAS BALDWIN, assisted by several other gentlemen. 8vo., pp. 544. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blackstone.

We are highly gratified with this work. Its principal peculiarity is the pronunciation of the names of all the places. To teachers, and public speakers, and indeed, any class of scholars, this feature of the work is highly important. There are many names of places which few know how to pronounce correctly, who have not had access to the sources of information which Mr. Baldwin has, with great industry, sought out. We most heartily recommend the work to our literary friends.

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7. *Hooper's Physician's Vade-Mecum; or, a Manual of the Principles and Practice of Physic: considerably enlarged and improved, with an Outline of General Pathology and Therapeutics.* By Wm. A. GUY, M. B., &c., with Additions by JAMES STEWART, M. D. Harper & Brothers.

This work addresses itself primarily to our medical friends; and as an acknowledged authority in professional matters, will commend itself at once as invaluable to practitioners and chemists, as well as to students. The American editor says of it: "No better evidence can exist of the great practical utility of Hooper's Vade-Mecum, than the many editions of it which have been published in Great Britain. The distinguished Dr. Guy has greatly enlarged and improved the original treatise by adding an outline of the advances made in medical science, at the present day, and but little more is left for the American editor than the additions of such facts as appeared to him most interesting to the American practitioner."

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8. *The Use of the Body in Relation to the Mind.* By GEORGE MOORE, M. D. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

This work has received, as it undoubtedly deserves, the universal commendation of the press. The author exhibits an excellent spirit in the management of his subject, and we predict that no work on this important topic will confer so much

practical good on the community as this. The treatise is prepared for the popular reader, and on every page we find some useful hint or valuable fact, which, if it is not new, is presented to us in so striking an aspect, as cannot fail to enlist our interest, and enrich our stores of knowledge. In some of his views, the author is as original as the most curious reader could desire; yet his aim is evidently to benefit his readers, both as regards their bodies and their spirit—their temporal as well as their eternal interests. The work is well worthy a place in every library.

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9. *The Treatment of Insanity.* By JOHN M. GALT, M. D., Superintendent and Physician of the Eastern Lunatic Asylum, Virginia, &c. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

DR. GALT has achieved a valuable service to physicians, and especially those who devote themselves primarily to the study and cure of that most dire of human woes—insanity. He has brought together at one view the best opinions and experience of the writers and practitioners of about a century on this important subject, adduced under every variety of circumstance, and therefore exhibiting every condition and modification of mental disease. To the popular reader there will be found a vast amount of very affecting and interesting matter: to the student the work must become exceedingly valuable as a guide in all contingencies that may arise. In a country like our own where insanity is so sadly prevalent, the utility of a work like the above cannot fail of being apparent to every one; and as prevention is better than cure, especially in a matter so momentous, we hope the fullest advantages will accrue from the circulation of this work.

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10. *The Philosophy of Magic, Prodigies, and Apparent Miracles. From the French of Eusèbe Salverte: with Notes illustrative, explanatory, and critical.* By ANTHONY THOMPSON, M. D. In two vols. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS work has long been regarded in the original as a production of high merit. The theory which the author aims to establish is, that the improbability of the prodigies and assumed miracles related by the ancients is not sufficient to authorize their being regarded as fabulous, “if that improbability be proved to be only apparent.” The reasons by which this hypothesis is sustained are ably managed; and are founded in the fact that the degree of scientific knowledge was greater than is usually supposed in early times, although confined to the cells, and cloisters, and temples of the “initiated few.” The translator has added many valuable notes and expositions, which render the author more *safe* as well as more lucid upon the subject of miracles. The two volumes combine a rare collection of curious facts and phenomena, which cannot but be read with deep interest, and not without advantage also.

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11. *The Farmer's Library.* Vol. I. *Petzholdt's Chemistry. Thüir's Agriculture.* 8vo., pp. 551. New-York: Greely & M'Elrath. 1846.
Monthly Journal of Agriculture. Vol. I. JOHN S. SKINNER, Editor. 8vo., pp. 612. New-York: Greely & M'Elrath. 1846.

THE two important volumes above were issued in monthly numbers, in connection, and are now bound in separate volumes, and constitute a noble beginning of a complete library for farmers. We have also received several numbers of the work for the present year. Each number contains a portion of Stephens' “Book of the Farm, with explanatory Notes, by J. S. Skinner,” which is designed to be bound by itself at the close of the year. The publishers are really laying the agriculturists of our great and rising country under great obligations—obligations which, we trust, will be duly appreciated and discharged by a liberal patronage. The agricultural interests of our country are constantly and rapidly rising in importance. Our farmers need more scientific knowledge—they want the best books upon the various branches of agriculture, and, so far as we are able to judge, they cannot do better than to furnish themselves with Greely & M'Elrath's series. The work is well got up, and illustrated with numerous plates, in the best taste and style.

12. *Sermons of Christmas Evans. A new Translation from the Welsh. With a Memoir and Portraiture of the Author.* By Rev. Joseph Cross. 8vo., pp. 302. Philadelphia: J. Harnstead. 1846.

THE fervid eloquence of the native Welsh preachers has often called forth the highest commendations. This, however, is comparatively a small matter. The moral effects of this eloquence, inspired and sanctioned by the divine Spirit, upon the hardy inhabitants of their native mountains and valleys is what stamps it with its highest importance. Evans is the author of the famous "Specimen of Welsh Preaching" which has been so often quoted and admired. The volume before us is well executed, and will constitute a valuable accession to any man's library. In the "Advertisement" Mr. Cross says:—"The writer does not wish to be held responsible for the theological views put forth, either in the extracts alluded to, or in the sermons. Christmas Evans was a Calvinistic Baptist, and several of his sermons inculcate, to some extent, the peculiar doctrines of that denomination; though they are generally free from sectarian bias, and may be read with advantage by spiritual Christians of all evangelical creeds."

13. *The Pictorial History of England: being a History of the People, as well as a History of the Kingdom.* Illustrated with several hundred wood cuts. By G. L. CRAIK and CHARLES MACFARLANE, assisted by several other Contributors. Vol. I: pp. 357. Royal 8vo. Harper & Brothers.

THIS History of Great Britain is one of the most important and valuable issues of the American press. It presents numerous features of attraction and novelty, besides being the most accurate and complete portraiture of the people, as well as the progressive civilization and governmental acts and records of the kingdom. Emanating under the auspices of the "*Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge*," of which Lord Brougham was the head, it comes before the world as an accredited and authentic work; its several departments being deputed to persons eminently qualified for their discussion. It is, in fact, the first instance of the kind, with which we are acquainted, in which the history of the *people*, and their daily life, combined with their civil and military operations, are made to form the staple of the history of a nation. This is the true idea of a history, and no other model can be adopted to give a correct notion of the rise, progress, and power of an empire. In the work in review, each book, or period, is, accordingly, divided into seven chapters, embracing a detailed account of: 1st. Civil and military transactions. 2d. History of religion. 3d. Government, constitution, and laws. 4th. History of national industry—a very valuable and interesting chapter. 5th. Literature, science, and the fine arts—full of valuable and curious matter, and a treasure to the scholar, antiquarian, and historical student. 6th. The manners and customs, costume, furniture, and domestic life of the people. 7th. The condition of the people; embracing what could not well be inserted under the other heads; as the national civilization of the period; statistics of vice and crime; punishments; health of the people, &c.

The illustrations are of singular value, being fac-similes of curious relics and monumental remains, coins, costumes, portraits of princes and distinguished personages, remarkable events, and historic scenes, etc., in many instances copied from ancient MSS. in the British Museum, &c.

As a work for private and family use, it is truly a desirable book, and unlike the numerous issues of the modern press, there is an intrinsic and permanent value as well as interest in its contents.

14. *History of the Thirty Years' War.* Translated from the German of Frederick Schiller. By Rev. J. A. MORRISON. Harper & Brothers.

THIS celebrated work—a classic in historic literature—forms No. 19 of *Harper's New Miscellany*. The fame of this great writer is so well known that little need be said respecting this, his favorite production. It treats of a most interesting era, made renowned by the splendid deeds of Gustavus Adolphus, Wallenstein, Turenne, and the great Condé. The work must possess peculiar interest for those who desire information in regard to the contests in which the religious sentiment had so powerful an influence.

15. *Eclectic Moral Philosophy: prepared for Literary Institutions and General Use.* By Rev. J. R. BOYD, author of *Elements of Rhetoric*. Harper & Brothers.

THIS work is a convenient compend of the best thoughts and illustrations of the best writers on moral science. Since the work of Dr. Paley we have had a host of authors on ethical philosophy, each offering some new hypothesis or modification of doctrine. The discrepancies of the various theories our author has reconciled or collated, and in so doing he has accomplished an arduous and valuable service for the student, saving him a prodigious amount of research and of money. We commend this comprehensive volume, as one of great utility, to all teachers and students especially, and also to the private reader, as an admirable epitomized system of moral philosophy.

16. *The Statesmen of the Commonwealth of England: with a Treatise on the Popular Progress in English History.* By JOHN FOSTER, of the Inner Temple. Edited by J. O. CHOULES. Harper & Brothers.

THIS elegant volume is embellished by a series of portraits, which impart additional interest as well as beauty to its contents. Mr. Foster is an impartial and able writer; his delineations of character are characterized by great fidelity and research, and in his biography of Cromwell, especially, he exhibits his full power. His view of the Protector is undoubtedly just, although it is less flattering to that great man than the sketch by Carlyle and several other biographers. The lives of Sir John Elliot, John Pym, Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, John Hampden, and Sir Henry Vane—those prominent actors in that struggle for civil freedom which agitated England during the seventeenth century—form a theme of profound interest, and one that cannot fail to affect the warmest sympathies of every true lover of his country and the onward cause of civil and religious liberty. This work ought assuredly to find a lodgment in every public and private library.

17. *The Christian's Daily Treasury: a religious Exercise for every Day in the Year.* By EBENEZER TEMPLE, Rochford, Essex. From the second revised London edition. 12mo., pp. 412. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1847.

THE "Exercises" are based upon passages of Scripture. The passage selected for the day is analyzed, expounded, and applied to practical purposes. The exercises are short, containing the elements of a sermon which will be found useful in suggesting topics for meditation, and in applying the Holy Scriptures to the purposes of experimental and practical godliness. So far as we have examined this work, it is constructed upon truly catholic principles, and may be safely recommended.

18. *The Scripture School Reader, consisting of Selections of Sacred Scriptures, for the use of Schools.* Compiled and arranged by W. W. EVERTS, A. M., author of *Bible Manual* and *Pastor's Handbook*, and W. H. WYCOFF, A. M., late Principal of the Collegiate School. 12mo. Pp. 348. New-York: Nais & Cornish. 1847.

THIS work is composed of selections from the Scriptures, arranged under appropriate heads, to be read in schools. The Bible is now quite generally out of use as a reading book in our schools. It is designed by the compilers of the present work to obviate the objections to an indiscriminate reading of the Scriptures in schools, by presenting, in a harmonious arrangement, in paragraphs, uninterrupted by the divisions into verses, appropriate passages upon the same theme. The work is divided into three parts. The first contains didactic Scriptures; the second, historical and biographical; and the third, poetical. We like the plan of this work much, and most ardently hope it may find a place in all our primary and public schools, especially in such as do not use the Bible as a reading book, under the directions of discreet teachers.

19. *The True Believer: his Character, Duty, and Privileges, elucidated in a Series of Discourses.* By Rev. ASA MAHAN, President of the Oberlin Collegiate Institute, Oberlin, Ohio. 18mo., pp. 280. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1847.

THIS work is evidently designed, and, so far as we can judge from a cursory examination, calculated, to do good. The author delivers his sentiments in a fervid, evangelical spirit, and with great force and felicity of diction. The discourses, with one exception, have appeared before in the Oberlin Evangelist, and are now revised and put into a small convenient volume. We earnestly hope they may be the means of promoting vital godliness. The author's aim is high. He pleads for full redemption, with the zeal and earnestness of conviction and experience. We wish him many stars to deck his crown in the day of his rejoicing.

20. *Classical Antiquities; or, a Compendium of Roman and Grecian Antiquities; with a Sketch of Ancient Mythology.* By J. SALKELD. Harper & Brothers.

THIS convenient little manual is designed for such as are uninitiated in the Latin and Greek, it being divested of all classical quotations, and so arranged as to be intelligible to youth. It seems to us admirably adapted for use in academies, common schools, and for the private instructions of the domestic circle.

21. *A Scriptural Defense of the Doctrine of the Trinity, or a Check to Modern Arianism, as taught by Campbellites, Hicksites, New Lights, Universalists, and Mormons; and especially by a Sect calling themselves "Christians."* By Rev. H. MATTISON. 18mo., pp. 162. New-York: Lewis Colby & Co. 1846.

THIS is a thorough refutation of a plausible but most dangerous form of error. The author thinks with great precision, and writes with perspicuity and force. This work will furnish the reader, who has not the time or means for consulting more elaborate ones, with very satisfactory replies to the principal objections against the orthodox doctrine, employed by modern Arians, and an unanswerable refutation of their theory.

22. *The Pre-Adamite Earth: Contributions to Theological Science.* By JONAS HARRIS, D. D., President of Cheshunt College, Author of the "Great Teacher," "Great Commission," "Mammon," &c. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln. 1847.

WE can at present say little in relation to this work, except that it seems fully to sustain the author's high character as a scholar and a divine. In his Preface he tells us that, "the present volume is intended to be the first of a short series of treatises—each complete in itself—in which the principles or laws hereafter deduced, and applied to the successive stages of the pre-Adamite earth, will be seen in their historical development as applied to individual man; to the family; to the nation; to the Son of God as 'the second Adam, the Lord from heaven;' to the church which he has founded; to the revelation which he has completed; and to the future prospects of humanity."

23. *A Hebrew Reader; or, a New and Practical System for the Acquisition of the Hebrew Language.* By ELI NOYSE, A. M., Author of the "Introduction to the Hebrew Language." 12mo., pp. 204. Boston: Waite, Peirce, & Co. 1846.

THE elements of the Hebrew language are, in this small book, clearly presented, and, in the hands of a competent teacher, the work will answer all the purposes of a Grammar and Reader. But we would warn all against the experiment of an attempt to learn Hebrew from this, or any other book, without the aid of a living teacher. Those who do this will find themselves woefully disappointed, or will be led into the notion that they have made themselves Hebrew scholars, when, before they can ever be such, they will be obliged to unlearn nearly all they have learned. The work before us is a beautiful specimen of Hebrew typography.

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